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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three independent chapters, each of which use microeconomic
data and methods to inform an analysis of macroeconomic models and questions. The ￿rst two
chapters study the short-run dynamics of housing markets, while the last chapter studies
￿ uctuations in labor markets.
The ￿rst chapter examines house price momentum, the positive autocorrelation of price
changes which in housing markets lasts for two to three years. The chapter introduces, empirically
grounds, and quantitatively analyzes an ampli￿cation mechanism that can generate substantial
momentum from small frictions: sellers with an incentive not to set a unilaterally high or low list
price for their house gradually adjust their price so it remains close to the market average. In
doing so, the chapter provides new evidence for explanations for price stickiness for which there is
little direct evidence. Furthermore, the chapter demonstrates that the resulting momentum helps
explain the short-run dynamics of price, volume, and inventory in housing markets.
The second chapter demonstrates how foreclosures can exacerbate a housing bust and delay
the housing market￿ s recovery and shows that such e⁄ects played a signi￿cant role in the recent
housing downturn. Foreclosures drive down prices and freeze up the retail (non-foreclosure)
market by raising the ratio of sellers to buyers and making buyers more selective. This can push
more homeowners underwater and cause more defaults, amplifying an initial shock. When
calibrated to the recent housing cycle, the model implies that foreclosures have much larger e⁄ects
than previously estimated due to general equilibrium spillovers.
The third chapter analyzes why macroeconomic calibrations imply much larger labor supply
elasticities than microeconometric studies, paying particular attention to the extensive
(participation) margin which is frequently used to explain the divergence. The chapter uses a
calibrated macro model to simulate the impacts of tax policy changes on labor supply. It also
presents a meta-analysis of quasi-experimental estimates of extensive margin elasticities. Both
iiiapproaches show that micro and macro are consistent for steady-state Hicksian elasticities, but
micro estimates of extensive-margin Frisch elasticities are an order of magnitude smaller than the
values needed to explain business cycle ￿ uctuations in aggregate hours.
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viiiIntroduction
This dissertation consists of three independent chapters, each of which use microeconomic data
and methods to inform an analysis of macroeconomic models and questions. The ￿rst two chapters
study the short-run dynamics of housing markets, while the last chapter studies ￿ uctuations in
labor markets.
The ￿rst chapter studies house price momentum, the positive autocorrelation of price changes
which in the housing market lasts for two to three years. The chapter introduces, empirically
grounds, and quantitatively analyzes an ampli￿cation mechanism that can generate substantial
momentum from small frictions and demonstrates that the resulting momentum helps explain the
short-run dynamics of housing markets. The ampli￿cation is due to a concave demand curve in
relative price, which implies that increasing the quality-adjusted list price of a house priced above
the market average rapidly reduces its probability of sale, but cutting the price of a below-average
priced home only slightly improves its chance of selling. This creates a strategic complementarity
that incentivizes sellers to set their list price close to others￿ . Consequently, frictions that cause
slight insensitivities to changes in fundamentals lead to prolonged adjustments because sellers grad-
ually adjust their price to stay near the average. I provide new micro empirical evidence for the
concavity of demand￿ which is often used in macro models with strategic complementarities￿ by
instrumenting a house￿ s relative list price with a proxy for the seller￿ s equity. I ￿nd signi￿cant
concavity, which I embed in an equilibrium housing search model in which buyers avoid visiting
houses that appear overpriced. I demonstrate and quantitatively evaluate the model￿ s ability to
amplify two frictions: staggered pricing and a fraction of backwards-looking rule-of-thumb sellers.
Both frictions are ampli￿ed substantially, and the model explains the momentum observed empiri-
cally with a small fraction of rule-of-thumb sellers. Strong house price momentum leads households
to re-time their purchase or sale, thereby explaining several features of the dynamic relationships
between price, volume, inventory, and buyer and seller entry.
The second chapter, which is joint work with Tim McQuade analyzes the role foreclosures play
in housing downturns. The recent housing bust precipitated a wave of mortgage defaults, with over
seven percent of the owner-occupied housing stock experiencing a foreclosure. This chapter presents
a model that shows how foreclosures can exacerbate a housing bust and delay the housing market￿ s
1recovery. By raising the ratio of sellers to buyers, by making buyers more selective, and by changing
the composition of houses that sell, foreclosures freeze up the market for retail (non-foreclosure)
sales and reduce both price and volume. Because negative equity is necessary for default, these
general equilibrium e⁄ects on prices can create price-default spirals that amplify an initial shock.
To assess the magnitude of these channels, the model is calibrated to simulate the downturn. The
ampli￿cation channel is signi￿cant. The model successfully explains aggregate and retail price
declines, the foreclosure share of volume, and the number of foreclosures both nationwide and
across MSAs. While the model can explain variation in sales across MSAs, it cannot account for
the aggregate level of the volume decline, suggesting that other forces have reduced sales nationwide.
The quantitative analysis implies that from 2007 to 2011 foreclosures exacerbated aggregate price
declines by approximately 50 percent and declines in the prices of retail homes by approximately
30 percent.
The third chapter, which is joint work with Raj Chetty, Day Manoli, and Andrea Weber, assesses
why macroeconomic calibrations imply much larger labor supply elasticities than microeconometric
studies. One prominent explanation for this divergence is that indivisible labor generates extensive
margin responses that are not captured in micro studies of hours choices. We evaluate whether ex-
isting calibrations of macro models are consistent with micro evidence on extensive margin responses
using two approaches. First, we use a standard calibrated macro model to simulate the impacts
of tax policy changes on labor supply. Second, we present a meta-analysis of quasi-experimental
estimates of extensive margin elasticities. We ￿nd that micro estimates are consistent with macro
evidence on the steady-state (Hicksian) elasticities relevant for cross-country comparisons. How-
ever, micro estimates of extensive-margin elasticities are an order of magnitude smaller than the
values needed to explain business cycle ￿ uctuations in aggregate hours. Hence, indivisible labor
supply does not explain the large gap between micro and macro estimates of intertemporal sub-
stitution (Frisch) elasticities. Our synthesis of the micro evidence points to Hicksian elasticities of
0.3 on the intensive and 0.25 on the extensive margin and Frisch elasticities of 0.5 on the intensive
and 0.25 on the extensive margin.
2Chapter 1:
The Causes and Consequences of House Price Momentum
1.1 Introduction
A puzzling and prominent feature of housing markets is that aggregate price changes are highly
positively autocorrelated, with a one percent annual price change correlated with a 0.30 to 0.75
percent change in the subsequent year (Case and Shiller, 1989).1 This price momentum lasts for two
to three years before prices mean revert, a time horizon far greater than most other asset markets.
Substantial momentum is surprising because predictable price changes should be arbitraged away by
investors and households that can re-time their purchase or sale and because most pricing frictions
dissipate quickly.
This chapter introduces, empirically grounds, and quantitatively analyzes an ampli￿cation
mechanism that can generate substantial momentum from small frictions. The mechanism re-
lies on a strategic complementarity among list-price-setting sellers that makes the optimal list price
for a house depend positively on the prices set by others (Cooper and John, 1988). Strategic com-
plementarities of this sort are frequently used in macroeconomic models (e.g., Ball and Romer,
1990; Woodford, 2003; Angeletos and La￿ O, 2013) but there is limited empirical evidence of their
importance and strength. In analyzing momentum in the housing market, I provide micro empirical
evidence for a prevalent strategic complementarity in the macroeconomics literature and, using a
calibrated equilibrium search model, demonstrate that its ability to amplify underlying frictions is
quantitatively signi￿cant.
I also show that momentum has important consequences that help explain several perplex-
ing features of the dynamics of housing markets relating to sales and inventory in addition to
price. These dynamics, which are analogous to several features of business cycles, matter for the
macroeconomy because housing markets a⁄ect household balance sheets, the ￿nancial system, and
business cycles and are a potential channel for monetary policy. House price momentum may also
explain why recoveries from housing-triggered cycles are slow.
The propagation mechanism I introduce relies on two components: costly search and a demand
1See also Cutler et al. (1991), Abraham and Hendershott (1996), Cho (1996), Malpezzi (1999), Meen (2002),
Capozza et al. (2004), Head et al. (2014), and Glaeser et al. (2013).
1curve that is concave in relative price. Search is inherent to housing because no two houses are
alike and idiosyncratic taste can only be learned through costly inspection. Search and idiosyncratic
taste also limit arbitrage by creating endogenous transaction costs and by making the market price
for a house di¢ cult to ascertain. Concave demand in relative price implies that the probability a
house sells is more sensitive to list price for houses priced above the market average than below
the market average. While concave demand may arise in housing markets for several reasons, I
focus on the manner in which asking prices direct buyer search. The intuition is summarized by
an advice column for sellers: ￿Put yourself in the shoes of buyers who are scanning the real estate
ads...trying to decide which houses to visit in person. If your house is overpriced, that will be an
immediate turno⁄. The buyer will probably clue in pretty quickly to the fact that other houses
look like better bargains and move on.￿ 2 In other words, the probability that a house is visited by
buyers decreases rapidly as a home￿ s list price rises relative to the market average. This generates
a concave demand curve in relative price because at high relative prices buyers are on the margin
of looking and purchasing, while at low relative prices they are only on the margin of purchasing.
Concave demand incentivizes list-price-setting sellers￿ who have market power due to search
frictions￿ to set their list prices close to the mean. Intuitively, raising a house￿ s relative list price
reduces the probability of sale and pro￿t dramatically, while lowering its relative price increases
the probability of sale slightly and leaves money on the table. Modest frictions that generate initial
insensitivities of prices to changes in fundamentals cause protracted price adjustments because
sellers ￿nd it optimal to gradually adjust their price so that they do not stray too far from the
market average.
To evaluate the concavity of the e⁄ect of unilaterally changing a house￿ s relative quality-adjusted
price on its sales probability, I turn to micro data on listings for the San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles,
and San Diego metropolitan areas from 2008 to 2013. I address bias caused by unobserved quality
by instrumenting relative list price with the amount of aggregate price appreciation since the seller
purchased. The identi￿cation strategy takes advantage of the fact that sellers with low appreciation
since purchase set higher list prices because the equity they extract from the sale of their current
home constrains their ability to make a down payment on their next home (Stein, 1995; Genesove
2￿Settling On The Right List Price for Your House,￿Ilona Bray, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/listing-
house-what-price-should-set-32336-2.html.
2and Mayer, 1997). Because I compare listings within a ZIP code and quarter, this supply-side
variation identi￿es the curvature of demand if unobserved quality is independent of when a seller
purchased their home. The instrumental variable estimates reveal a concave relationship that is
statistically and economically signi￿cant.3 My ￿ndings about the concavity of demand are robust
to other sources of relative price variation that are independent of appreciation since purchase.
To assess the strength of this propagation mechanism, I embed concave demand in a Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides equilibrium search model. I explore the e⁄ects of two separate sources of price
insensitivity. First, I consider staggered pricing whereby overlapping groups of sellers set prices
that are ￿xed for multiple periods (Taylor, 1980). Concave demand induces sellers to only partially
adjust their prices when they have the opportunity to do so, and repeated partial adjustment
manifests itself as additional momentum. Second, I introduce a small fraction of backward-looking
rule-of-thumb sellers as in Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and Gali and Gertler (1999). Backward-
looking expectations are frequently discussed as a potential cause of momentum (e.g., Case and
Shiller, 1987; Case et al. 2012), but some observers have voiced skepticism about widespread
non-rationality in housing markets given the ￿nancial importance of housing transactions for most
households. With a strategic complementarity, far fewer backward-looking sellers are needed to
explain momentum because the majority of forward-looking sellers adjust their prices gradually so
they do not deviate too much from the backward-looking sellers (Haltiwanger and Waldman, 1989;
Fehr and Tyran, 2005). This, in turn, causes the backward-looking sellers to observe more gradual
price growth and change their price by less, creating a two-way feedback that ampli￿es momentum.
I calibrate the parameters of the model that control the shape of the demand curve to match the
micro empirical estimates and the remainder of the model to match steady state and time series
moments. The calibrated model generates substantial ampli￿cation of the underlying frictions.
With staggered pricing, the model can explain a ten month price adjustment￿ or about one quarter
of the momentum in the data￿ in response to a shock to fundamentals even though all sellers have
reset their price within two months of the shock. With rule-of-thumb sellers, the model generates
three years of positively autocorrelated price changes as observed empirically if 26.5 percent of
sellers are backward-looking. By contrast, without concave demand, 78 to 93 percent of sellers
3Although endogeneity is a worry, the ordinary least squares relationship is also concave. However, as one would
expect if unobservable quality is an issue, it has a smaller slope.
3would have to be backward-looking to generate a three-year response.
The ampli￿cation mechanism adapts two ideas from the macro literature on goods price sticki-
ness to frictional asset search. First, the concave demand curve is similar to ￿kinked￿demand curves
(Stiglitz, 1979; Woglom, 1982) which, since the pioneering work of Ball and Romer (1990) has been
frequently cited as a potential source of real rigidities. In particular, a ￿smoothed-out kink￿ex-
tension of Dixit-Stiglitz preferences proposed by Kimball (1995) is frequently used to tractably
introduce real rigidities through strategic complementarity in price setting. Second, the repeated
partial price adjustment caused by the strategic complementarity is akin to Taylor￿ s (1980) ￿con-
tract multiplier.￿A lively literature has debated the importance of strategic complementarities and
kinked demand in particular for propagating goods price stickiness by analyzing calibrated models
(e.g., Chari et al., 2000), by assessing whether the rami￿cations of strategic complementarities are
borne out in micro data (Klenow and Willis, 2006; Bils et al., 2012), and by examining exchange-
rate pass through for imported goods (e.g., Gopinath and Itshoki, 2010; Nakamura and Zerom,
2010). My analysis of housing markets adds to this literature by directly estimating a concave
demand curve and assessing its ability to amplify frictions in a calibrated model.
Having established a propagation mechanism for house price momentum empirically and theo-
retically, I show that momentum a⁄ects the dynamics of sales volume and the inventory of houses
for sale. Forward-looking buyers and sellers re-time their purchase decisions due to expectations
of predictable future price changes. Such re-timing causes sudden swings in inventory that drive
the reversal between a hot market, with a substantial excess of buyers, and a cold market, with
a relative dearth of buyers. For instance, at a trough, marginal buyers rush to purchase before
prices rise, while marginal sellers wait to obtain a better price for their home, leading inventory
to plummet.4 To formalize this story, I build on Novy-Marx (2009) by including buyer and seller
entry decisions in the model.
Forward-looking entry responses in the calibrated model help explain three puzzling features of
housing cycles. First, seller entry remains high as volume plummets at peaks and remains low as
4Buyer and seller quotes in newspapers provide suggestive evidence of such re-timing. In 2013, when prices were
rising, a buyer explained to the Wall Street Journal ￿if you don￿ t get in now, things are going to skyrocket over the
next year,￿while a seller who delayed putting their house on the market told the Journal that ￿the extra money ￿
that was worth [waiting] for the year.￿This e⁄ect is part of the folk wisdom of housing markets, yet has not appeared
in the academic literature. For instance, Calculated Risk Blog describes a conversation with a real estate agent who
argues that ￿In a market with falling prices, sellers rush to list their homes, and inventory increases. But if sellers
think prices have bottomed, then they believe they can be patient, and inventory declines.￿
4volume picks up at troughs, which is the exact pattern created by the re-timing of entry in light
of momentum. Second, volume and inventory are more volatile than price. This is di¢ cult to
reconcile with most calibrations of housing search models in a direct analogue to Shimer￿ s (2005)
unemployment volatility puzzle for labor search models. With momentum, volume and inventory
are more volatile not only because price responds gradually but also because the adjustment of
inventory is accelerated by the re-timing of entry. Third, in the data, price changes are strongly
negatively correlated with inventory levels (Peach, 1983). This ￿housing Phillips curve￿is surprising
because in most asset pricing models, price changes are correlated with changes in fundamentals
such as inventory (Caplin and Leahy, 2011). In my model, the quick response of inventory and
gradual response of price create a strong correlation between price changes and inventory levels.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 introduces facts about housing
dynamics. Section 1.3 analyzes micro data to assess whether housing demand curves are concave.
Section 1.4 presents the model. Section 1.5 calibrates the model to the micro estimates and assesses
the degree to which strategic complementarities amplify momentum. Section 1.6 discusses the
consequences of this momentum for housing cycles. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Four Facts About Housing Dynamics
1.2.1 Momentum
Since the pioneering work of Case and Shiller (1989), price momentum has been considered one of
the most puzzling features of housing markets. While other ￿nancial markets exhibit momentum,
the housing market is unusual for the strength of the e⁄ect and the horizon over which it persists.5
Fact 1: Price changes are serially correlated for 8 to 14 quarterly lags.
House price momentum has consistently been found across cities and countries, time periods, and
price index measurement methodologies (Cho, 1996). Figure 1 shows three measures of momentum
5Note that the ￿momentum￿I analyze refers to autocorrelation in aggregate price time series, which is distinct
from the short-term over-performance of stocks that recently performed best that is also called ￿momentum.￿Time-
series momentum holds for a number of other asset classes over shorter horizons. Cutler et al. (1991) look across a
large number of asset classes and ￿nd that for the vast majority of assets, positive autocorrelation in returns lasts
for less than a year. Moskowitz et al. (2012) ￿nd that time series momentum lasts for approximately 12 months for
58 di⁄erent equity index, currency, commodity, and bond futures. This 12 month horizon is an upper bound for the
type of momentum studied here, which includes only capital gains, because the measured returns in Moskowitz et al.
include both dividends (which are known to be autocorrelated) and capital gains.
5Figure 1: Momentum in Housing Prices
Notes: Panel A and B show the autocorrelation function for quarterly real price changes and an impulse response of log real
price levels estimated from an AR(5) model, respectively. The IRF has 95% con￿dence intervals shown in grey. An AR(5) was
chosen using a number of lag selection criteria, and the results are robust to altering the number of lags. Both are estimated
using the CoreLogic national repeat-sales house price index from 1976-2013 collapsed to a quarterly level, adjusted for in￿ation
using the CPI, and seasonally adjusted. Panel C shows a histogram of annual AR(1) coe¢ cients of annual house price changes
as in regression (1) estimated separately on 103 CBSA division repeat-sales house price indices provided by CoreLogic. The
local HPIs are adjusted for in￿ation using the CPI. The 103 CBSAs and their time coverage, which ranges from 1976-2013 to
1995-2013, are listed in Appendix A.1.
for the CoreLogic national repeat-sales house price index for 1976 to 2013.6 Panel A shows that
autocorrelations are positive for 11 quarterly lags of the quarterly change in the price index adjusted
for in￿ ation and seasonality. Panel B shows an impulse response in log levels to an initial one
percent price shock estimated from an AR(5). In response to the shock, prices gradually rise for
two to three years before mean reverting. Finally, panel C shows a histogram of AR(1) coe¢ cients
estimated separately for 103 metropolitan area repeat-sales house price indices from CoreLogic
using a regression of the annual change in log price on a one-year lag of itself as in Case and Shiller
6As discussed in Appendix A.2, price indices that measure the median price of transacted homes display momentum
over roughly two years as opposed to three years for repeat-sales indices.
6(1989):
￿t;t￿4 lnp = ￿0 + ￿1￿t￿4;t￿8 lnp + ". (1)
￿1 is positive for all 103 cities, strongest for cities with inelastic housing supply, and the median
city has an annual AR1 coe¢ cient of 0.60. Appendix A.2 replicates these facts for a number of
countries, price series, and measures of autocorrelation and consistently ￿nds two to three years of
momentum.7
The existing evidence suggests that momentum cannot be explained by serially correlated
changes in fundamentals. Case and Shiller (1989) argue that momentum cannot be explained
by autocorrelation in interest rates, rents, or taxes. Glaeser et al. (2013) estimate a dynamic
spatial equilibrium model and ￿nd that ￿there is no reasonable parameter set￿ consistent with
short-run momentum. Capozza et al. (2004) ￿nd signi￿cant momentum after accounting for six
comprehensive measures of fundamentals in a vector error correction model.
Four main explanations have been o⁄ered for momentum in asset markets and for the housing
market more speci￿cally. First, a behavioral ￿nance literature hypothesizes that investors initially
underreact to news due to behavioral biases (Barberis et al., 1998, Hong and Stein, 1999) or loss
aversion (Frazzini, 2006) and then ￿chase returns￿due to extrapolative expectations about price
appreciation.8 Both extrapolative expectations and loss aversion are considered to be important
forces in the housing market (Case and Shiller, 1987; Berkovec and Goodman, 1996; Glaeser et
al., 2013; Genesove and Mayer, 2001). Second, Anenberg (2013) shows that gradual learning
about market conditions by sellers can create momentum. Third, Head et al. (2014) demonstrate
that strong search frictions and a gradual construction response can cause the liquidity of houses
to adjust slowly in response to a shock to local incomes, which creates momentum.9 Finally,
7In the housing market, the price level appears to be sticky but the rate of change does not appear to react
sluggishly. In particular, neither the evidence presented here nor the structural panel VAR in Head et al. (2014)
shows evidence of autocorrelations of house price changes near one or delayed ￿hump shaped￿impulse responses of
house price changes. This is unlike the CPI or GDP de￿ ator, which demonstrate considerable persistence in the rate
of change (Fuhrer, 2011).
8Frazzini argues that as prices rise, potential sellers who resist selling at a loss relative to their initial purchase
begin to experience gains. This causes them to sell, putting downward pressure on prices. A similar point could be
made with respect to underwater homeowners who regain positive equity as prices rise.
9Head et al. (2014) assume that searching buyers need housing, which must be built when a metropolitan area
grows due to an income shock. In their calibrated model, market tightness takes nearly six years to adjust to adjust
to a shock due to a slow construction response, search frictions, and a shock that exhibits persistent changes. The
gradual adjustment of market tightness creates momentum. By contrast, in the calibrated search model without
additional frictions presented here, market tightness adjusts in two years and creates a tiny amount of momentum.
7momentum could result from a gradual spread of optimism if sentiment drives house prices rather
than fundamentals (Burnside et al., 2013).
Learning and search have been calibrated quantitatively and cannot explain the full extent of
momentum in housing markets. Anenberg￿ s (2013) structural model of learning can explain an
annual AR(1) coe¢ cient of 0.124 relative to between 0.3 and 0.75 in the data. Head et al.￿ s (2014)
calibrated model can explain half of the autocorrelation in prices at one year, but almost none at
two years. In Section 1.5, I show that the vast majority of sellers would have to have a simple
form of extrapolative expectations to fully explain the amount of momentum in the data. The
role of sentiment has yet to be measured. The ampli￿cation mechanism I propose complements
these existing explanations by strengthening them so they can better ￿t the momentum that is
empirically observed.
1.2.2 Housing Cycles
I relate three other facts and puzzles about the short-run dynamics of housing cycles to momentum.
Fact 2: Seller entry rises above sales volume at peaks and falls below sales volume at troughs,
corresponding to large and sudden ￿uctuations in inventory.
Although sales and seller entry track one another, Figure 2 shows that at the peak of the recent
boom and bust cycle, seller entry remained high for several quarters as volume began to plunge,
which corresponded to a sudden increase in inventory. Conversely, as volume and prices began
to rise in 2012 and 2013, seller entry remained low, coinciding with a sudden drop in inventory.
Appendix A.2 shows that this fact is not unique to 2003 to 2013. Although there is no data on
the stock of buyers, most models imply that if seller entry lags sales, buyer entry must lead sales.
Figure 2 illustrates this by using a simple matching function parameterized based on Genesove and
Han (2012) to infer the stock of buyers from sales volume and the stock of homes for sale.
Fact 3: At an annual frequency, the volatility of sales volume is twice that of real price and the
volatility of inventory as measured by months of supply is three times that of real price.
Despite the predictability of price changes, the housing market is volatile. Table 1 shows the
standard deviation of annual log changes for four series: real disposable personal income, real house
prices, sales volume, and ￿for sale￿ inventory measured as months of supply (a common metric
in the housing market). Price is four times more volatile than income, and volume and inventory
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Figure 2: Sales, Entry and Inventory, 2003-2013
Notes: Volume is raw data from the National Association of Realtors of sales of existing single-family homes at a seasonally-
adjusted annual rate. Homes listed for sale is from the Census Vacancy Survey. Seller entry is computed as Entrantst = Sellerst
- Sellerst￿1 + Salest. Buyer entry is computed similarly, but since there is not a raw data series for the stock of buyers it is
imputed using a simple Cobb-Douglas matching function Sales
S = ￿
￿B
S
￿￿:8
with the 0.8 elasticity from Genesove and Han
(2012). In this ￿gure, ￿ = 1 so that in a steady state there is 3 months of supply. All four series are smoothed using a
three-quarter moving average.
are, in turn, more volatile than price. The volatility of inventory in particular is of note because
substantial ￿ uctuations in inventory at peaks and troughs herald rapid changes between buyers￿and
sellers￿markets. Finally, price and volume are highly positively correlated and both are positively
correlated with income.10
Fact 4: (Housing Phillips Curve) Price changes are negatively correlated with inventory levels,
with a one log point increase in months of supply correlated with a 0.14 log point decrease in annual
price growth (Peach, 1983; Lazear, 2010; Caplin and Leahy, 2011).
Figure 3 shows the time series of the annual change in the log price index and of log inventory,
10There is a substantial literature on the positive correlation of price and sales volume. Stein (1995) and Ortalo-
Magne and Rady (2006) argue prices a⁄ect the ability of homeowners to extract equity and make a down payment on
their next home, leading to a feedback from prices to volume. A literature initiated by Wheaton (1990) and Krainer
(2001) uses a steady state Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search model to argue that the relative number of buyers
and sellers in the market a⁄ects the liquidity of homes, creating a feedback from volume to price. Leamer (2007)
and Case (2008), among others, suggest that volume is more volatile than price because nominal loss aversion and
backwards-looking expectations on the part of sellers make prices sticky downward.
9Table 1: Cyclical Summary Statistics for Income, House Price, Sales, and Inventory
￿logxq￿logxq￿4 ￿x, Real HPI ￿x, Sales Volume ￿x; Months of Supply
Real Disposable Pers. Income 0.016 .819 .668 .497
Real House Price Index 0.065 .726 .305
Sales Volume 0.143 -.263
Inventory: Months of Supply 0.207
Notes: All series are for 1976-2013 at a quarterly frequency. The ￿rst column shows the standard deviation of annual log
changes, while the other columns show correlation coe¢ cients of log levels at a quarterly frequency. Real disposable personal
income is BEA series DPIC96. Real price is the CoreLogic national repeat-sales house price index adjusted for in￿ation using
the CPI. Sales volume is from the National Association of Realtors single-family existing home series. Months of supply is
created by dividing homes listed for sale from the Census Vacancy Survey by the NAR sales series. The volume, income, and
months of supply series are all seasonally adjusted.
Figure 3: Price Changes Correlated With Inventory Levels
Notes: The ￿gure shows the time series of the annual change in the log CoreLogic national repeat-sales house price index
plotted against log months of supply. The latter is calculated by dividing homes vacant for sale from the Census Vacancy
Survey by sales of existing single-family homes from the National Association of Realtors (NAR), measured at the midpoint of
the yearlong period over which the change in price is computed.
measured as months of supply at the midpoint of the year over which the change in price is calcu-
lated. This relationship is reminiscent of the Phillips curve as it relates inventory￿ the equivalent
of unemployment in the housing market￿ to price appreciation. The visible inverse co-movement
in the series is con￿rmed by a regression: a one percent increase in months of supply is associated
with a 0.14 percent decrease in the annual change in prices with an R-squared of 0.53.11 This
11Both the numerator of months of supply￿ homes for sale￿ and the denominator￿ volume￿ matter. Appendix
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Figure 4: Impulse Response to Inventory Shock in Panel VAR
Notes: The ￿gure shows orthogonalized impulse response functions to a months of supply shock computed from a two-lag
panel vector autoregression of log months of supply, log price, and log sales volume for a panel of 42 cities from 1990 to 2013
described in Appendix A.1. Price and sales are from CoreLogic, with price corresponding to the local CoreLogic house price
index adjusted for the CPI and sales corresponding to existing home sales. Months of supply at the MSA level comes from the
National Association of Realtors. All data is seasonally adjusted, and the panel VAR, which includes a ￿xed e⁄ect for each
city as described in Appendix A.2, is estimated using system GMM and Helmert mean di⁄erencing using a Stata package by
Inessa Love. The OIRFs are computed using a Cholesky decomposition with the variables ordered so that months of supply is
assumed not to depend contemporaneously on shocks to price or volume and price is assumed not to depend contemporaneously
on shocks to volume. The results are robust as long as months of supply is prior to volume in the Cholesky ordering. The blue
line is the OIRF, and the grey bands indicate 95 percent con￿dence intervals computed using a Monte Carlo procedure that
generates 500 impulse responses from draws from the distribution of coe¢ cients implied by the estimated coe¢ cients and their
variance-covariance matrix.
relationship is puzzling because most asset pricing models imply price changes should be correlated
with changes in variables that re￿ ect fundamentals, such as inventory, rather than with their levels.
With mean reverting shocks, such models imply a positive correlation between price changes and
inventory levels because when inventory levels are high, inventories tend to fall and prices tend to
rise. Caplin and Leahy (2011) show that this e⁄ect can be eliminated if prices are posted before
shocks are realized.
To bring together the facts, I estimate a panel vector autoregression with city ￿xed e⁄ects on
log price, log volume, and log inventory using a panel of 42 cities from 1990 to 2013 described
in Appendix A.1. The panel vector autoregression (VAR) is estimated using system GMM as
A.2 shows the time series look similar if log homes listed for sale adjusted for a linear time trend replaces months of
supply and that a regression of the annual change in log price on log homes listed for sale has an R-squared of 0.40.
By contrast, regressing changes on changes gives a weak correlation.
11in Arellano and Bover (1995). Figure 4 shows the orthogonalized impulse response functions of
months of supply, price, and sales in response to a one standard deviation positive shock to months
of supply. This can be thought of as a negative demand shock because the positive co-movement
of price and volume implies that demand-side shocks are predominant. Volume immediately falls,
and months of supply monotonically and gradually decays back to its steady state value after the
initial shock. Prices gradually decline over a 10-quarter period, with the price decline tapering o⁄
as inventory returns to steady state. Appendix A.2 shows similar results for a VAR and a vector
error correction model estimated on national data.
The model presented in this chapter implies that housing cycles with these four features arise
from the interaction of small underlying frictions, strategic complementarities, and forward-looking
decisions about when in the cycle to buy and sell. Several other papers have discussed how the
endogenous timing of purchasing decisions a⁄ects housing cycles, although not in light of momen-
tum. Novy-Marx (2009) shows that entry responses can amplify the long-run response to shocks
and increase the amplitude of cycles. Anenberg and Bayer (2013) demonstrate that the cost of
simultaneously holding two homes in an illiquid market can make the number of households who
simultaneously buy and sell pro-cyclical, which increases volatility.
More directly related to this chapter are explanations for why seller entry may fall at troughs
and rise at peaks. One reason why seller entry may remain low as volume rises after a trough is
nominal loss aversion (Genesove and Mayer, 2001) and lock in due to negative equity (Stein, 1995).
Head et al. (2014) present another mechanism: when local incomes rise, new entrants to an MSA
need a place to live, which drives up rents until new homes are built and causes potential sellers to
rent their homes temporarily before selling then. More broadly, Head et al. (2014) is most closely
related to this research. Their analysis of the joint responses of construction, house prices, house
sales, and population to city-level income shocks in a model with momentum is complementary to
my focus on the timing of purchase and sale decisions of existing homeowners and residents.
1.3 Are Housing Demand Curves Concave?
I propose an ampli￿cation channel for momentum based on search and a concave demand curve in
relative price. Search is a natural assumption for housing markets, but the relevance of concave
demand requires further explanation.
12A literature in macroeconomics shows how strategic complementarities among goods producers
can amplify small pricing frictions into substantial price sluggishness by incentivizing ￿rms to set
prices close to one another. Strategic complementarities operate either through a monopolistic
￿rm￿ s marginal cost or its markup, which pushes a ￿rm to price close to the market average if
demand is concave in relative price. ￿Kinked demand￿ was introduced by Stiglitz (1979) and
Woglom (1982), who hypothesized that ￿rms that increase their price induce consumers to search
for a new ￿rm, but ￿rms that cut their price only gain a few active searchers. Ball and Romer
(1990) show that this can create real rigidities and possibly explain why prices are so sticky despite
small menu costs. This argument has been formalized in several papers, such as Benabou (1992)
and Levin and Yun (2009). Kimball (1995) generalizes Dixit-Stiglitz-style aggregator to allow for
concave demand, which is used as an important real rigidity in several popular New Keynesian
models (e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2007). Despite the frequency with which it is used, there is little
direct evidence for concave demand.12
Because momentum is similar to price stickiness in goods markets, I hypothesize that a similar
strategic complementarity may amplify house price momentum. There are several reasons why
concave demand may arise in housing markets. First, buyers may avoid visiting homes that appear
to be overpriced. Second, buyers may infer that underpriced homes are lemons. Third, a house￿ s
relative list price may be a signal of seller type, such as an unwillingness to negotiate (Albrecht et al.,
2013). Fourth, homes with high list prices may be less likely to sell quickly and may consequently
be more exposed to the tail risk of becoming a ￿stale￿listing that sits on the market without selling
(Taylor, 1999). Fifth, buyers may infer that underpriced homes have a higher e⁄ective price than
their list price because their price is likely to be increased in a bidding war (Han and Strange,
2012b).
Nonetheless, concrete evidence is needed for the existence of concave demand in housing markets
before it is adopted as an explanation for momentum. Consequently, this section assesses whether
demand is concave by analyzing micro data on listings matched to sales outcomes for the San
12Gopinath and Itshoki (2010) review both the price microdata and exchange rate pass-through literatures and
argue there is a collage of evidence supporting a role for strategic complementarity in wholesale prices, but not resale
prices. The most direct evidence to date comes from Nakamura and Zerom (2010), who directly estimate the ￿super
elasticity￿ (rate of change of the elasticity) of demand for co⁄ee using a random coe¢ cients structural model and
￿nd evidence for concave demand.
13Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, and San Diego metropolitan areas from April 2008 to February 2013.13
The relevant demand curve for list-price-setting sellers is the e⁄ect of unilaterally changing a
house￿ s relative quality-adjusted list price relative on its probability of sale. Detecting a nonlinear
e⁄ect is challenging because quality is poorly measured, list prices are endogenous, and market
conditions vary. The principal econometric challenge is that quality di⁄erences unobserved to the
econometrician lead to an estimated demand curve that is far more inelastic than the true demand
curve. The analysis is also complicated by the high number of foreclosures and short sales during
the period that I analyze. Short sales, which occur when a home is sold for less than the outstanding
mortgage balance, are especially worrisome because they often involve lengthy negotiations between
the seller and their mortgage servicer which arti￿cially decrease the probability of sale.
To surmount these challenges, I use a non-linear instrumental variable approach that traces out
the demand curve using plausibly exogenous supply-side variation in seller pricing behavior. Before
explaining the econometric strategy and presenting my main estimates, I ￿rst discuss the data.
1.3.1 Data
I combine data on listings with data on housing characteristics and transactions. The details of
data construction can be found in Appendix A.1. The listings data come from Altos Research,
which every Friday records a snapshot of homes listed for sale on multiple listing services (MLS)
from several publicly available web sites and records the address, MLS identi￿er, and list price. The
housing characteristics and transactions data come from DataQuick, which collects and digitizes
public records from county register of deeds and assessor o¢ ces. This data provides a rich one-time
snapshot of housing characteristics from 2013 along with a detailed transaction history of each
property from 1988 to 2013 that includes transaction prices, loans, buyer and seller names and
characteristics, and seller distress. I limit my analysis to non-partial transactions of single-family
existing homes as categorized by DataQuick.
I match the listings data to a unique DataQuick property ID. To account for homes being de-
listed and re-listed, listings are counted as contiguous if the same house is re-listed within 90 days
and there is not an intervening foreclosure. If a matched home sells within 12 months of the ￿nal
13These metro areas were selected because both the listings and transactions data providers are based in California,
so the matched dataset for these areas is of high quality and spans a longer time period.
14listing date, it is counted as a sale, and otherwise it is a withdrawal. The matched data includes
83 percent of single-family transactions in the Los Angeles area and 73 percent in the San Diego
and San Francisco Bay areas. It does not account for all transactions due to three factors: a small
fraction of homes (under 10%) are not listed on the MLS, some homes that are listed in the MLS
contain typos or incomplete addresses that preclude matching to the transactions data, and Altos
Research￿ s coverage is incomplete in a few peripheral parts of each metropolitan area.
I limit the data to homes listed between April 2008 and February 2013.14 I drop cases in which
a home has been rebuilt or signi￿cantly improved since the transaction, the transaction price is
below $10,000, or a previous sale occurred within 90 days. I exclude ZIP codes with fewer than
500 repeat sales between 1988 and 2013 because my empirical approach requires that I calculate a
local house price index. These restrictions eliminate approximately ￿ve percent of listings.
The ￿nal data set consists of 665,560 listings leading to 467,456 transactions. I focus on the
431,830 listings leading to 318,842 transactions with an observed prior transaction, and my IV
procedure is limited to a more restricted sample described below. Table 2 provides summary
statistics for several di⁄erent subsamples.
1.3.2 Empirical Approach
Econometric Model Before presenting the empirical approach, I introduce an econometric
framework for how changes in list price around a quality-adjusted average price a⁄ect probabil-
ity of sale. Each possible sequence of list prices is associated with a distribution of time to sale.
To simplify the analysis, the unit of observation is a listing associated with an initial log list price,
p. I work with a summary statistic of the time to sale distribution, d, which in the main text is an
indicator for whether the house sells within 13 weeks, with a withdrawal counting as a non-sale. I
vary the horizon and use time to sale for the subset of listings that sell in robustness checks. The
data consist of homes, denoted with a subscript h, from markets de￿ned by a location ‘ (a ZIP
code in the data) and time period t (a quarter in the data).
14The Altos data begins in October 2007 and ends in May 2013. I allow a six month burn-in so I can properly
identify new listings, although the results are not substantially changed by including October 2007 to March 2008
listings. I drop listings that are still active on May 17, 2013, the last day for which I have data. I also drop listings
that begin less than 90 days before the listing data ends so I can properly identify whether a home is re-listed within
90 days and whether a home is sold within six months. The Altos data for San Diego is missing addresses until
August 2008, so listings that begin prior to that date are dropped. The match rate for the San Francisco Bay area
falls substantially beginning in June 2012, so I drop Bay area listings that begin subsequent to that point.
15Table 2: Summary Statistics For Listings Micro Data
Sample All Prior Trans IV All Prior Trans IV
All All All Transactions Transactions Transactions
Transaction 70.20% 73.80% 66.80% 100% 100% 100%
Prior Transaction 64.90% 100% 100% 68.20% 100% 100%
REO 20.50% 24.90% 0% 26.70% 31.90% 0%
Short Sales 20.60% 24.20% 0% 20.20% 23.70% 0%
Positive Appreciation 43.00% 100% 42.30% 100%
Since Purchase
Initial List Price $642,072 $586,010 $817,797 $581,059 $541,682 $789,897
Transaction Price $534,886 $ 497,901 $731,757
Weeks on Market 15.07 15.69 12.39
Sold Within 13 Wks 43.30% 44.10% 46.80% 61.70% 59.70% 70.10%
Beds 3.28 3.24 3.31 3.27 3.23 3.30
Baths 2.19 2.12 2.28 2.15 2.10 2.26
Square Feet 1,810.10 1,722.10 1,910.40 1,762.40 1,694.30 1,887.50
N 665,560 431,830 111,293 467,456 318,842 74,299
Notes: Data covers listings between April 2008 and February 2013 in the San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, and San Diego areas
as described in Appendix A.1. REOs are sales of foreclosed homes and foreclosure auctions. Short sales include cases in which
the transaction price is less than the amount outstanding on the loan and withdrawals that are subsequently foreclosed on in
the next two years. Appreciation since purchase is based on the ZIP code repeat-sales price index described in Appendix A.1.
I am interested in the impact of quality-adjusted list price relative to the average quality-
adjusted list price in the market on probability of sale.15 The quality-adjusted average list price
~ ph‘t has two additive components: the average log list price in location ‘ at time t, represented by
a ￿xed e⁄ect ￿‘t, and quality qh‘t that is only partially observable to the econometrician:
~ ph‘t = ￿‘t + qh‘t. (2)
In a Walrasian world, there would be no variation in ph‘t￿~ ph‘t because sellers would all price homes
at ~ ph‘t understanding that homes priced above ~ ph‘t would not sell and that pricing below ~ ph‘t leaves
money on the table. In the housing market, however, there are search frictions and substantial
amounts of idiosyncratic preference that cause demand to be a downward-sloping function of ph‘t￿
~ ph‘t, which can be thought of as the seller￿ s relative markup. Variation in the relative markup
15While I focus on list prices, it is important to test the robustness of the results to using transaction prices to
ensure that bargaining or price wars that occur after a list price is chosen do not undo any concavity in list price.
Appendix A.3 shows all results are robust to using transaction prices.
16represents di⁄erences in sellers￿outside options due to factors like liquidity.
Formally, I model the probability of sale dh‘t as:
dh‘t = g (ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t) +  ‘t + "h‘t. (3)
The demand curve in relative price g (￿) is assumed to be invariant across markets de￿ned by a
location and time net of an additive ￿xed e⁄ect  ‘t that represents local market conditions. "h‘t
is an error term that represents luck in ￿nding a buyer and is assumed to be independent of the
relative markup ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t.16
If ~ ph‘t were observable, one could directly estimate (3) by approximating g (￿) with a ￿ exible
function and using ordinary least squares or by using non-parametric regression. However, observ-
able measures of quality are imperfect, so quality qh‘t likely has a component that is unobserved
to the econometrician. I consequently model quality as a linear function of observed measures of
quality Xh‘t and quality unobserved by the econometrician uh‘t:
qh‘t = ￿Xh‘t + uh‘t: (4)
I include two measures of each house￿ s value at listing as quality measures in Xh‘t: a repeat-
sales predicted price equal to the price the last time the house sold converted to today￿ s prices
using a repeat-sales house price index and a predicted price from a hedonic index that values the
house based on its characteristics.17 To construct the repeat-sales predicted price, I ￿rst estimate
interval-weighted geometric repeat-sales house price index for each ZIP code as in Case and Shiller
(1989). The log index for a given time period is a time dummy in a regression of log house price
on house and time ￿xed e⁄ects. The log predicted price ^ p
repeat
h‘t at time t for a house h in location ‘
that sold for Ph‘￿ at time ￿ is equal to log
￿
Ph‘￿
￿‘t
￿‘￿
￿
, where ￿‘t is the ZIP code repeat-sales index
at time t. To construct the hedonic predicted price, I estimate a hedonic house price index for each
16Demand shocks like "h‘t traditionally cause an endogeneity problem because they are correlated with price.
However, here the variable of interest is relative price, so the e⁄ect of demand shocks on average price levels is
absorbed into ￿‘t. Similarly, the e⁄ect of prices on aggregate demand is absorbed into  ‘t. It is thus natural to
assume that "h‘t is independent of the relative markup in this framework.
17The inclusion of a predicted price to estimate the e⁄ect of a ￿markup￿on probability of sale builds on Yavas and
Yang (1995). More broadly, my empirical question and approach are similar to a real estate literature that seeks to
assess the impact of list price on time on the market (Kang and Gardner, 1989; Knight 2002; Anglin et al. 2003;
Haurin et al., 2010). This literature has not focused on nonlinearity, in part because of small sample sizes.
17ZIP code using a third order polynomial in age, log square feet, bedrooms, and bathrooms for the
hedonic factor. The predicted log price ^ phedonic
t is the sum of a house￿ s hedonic value as implied
by a regression and the ￿xed e⁄ect in the regression for a given time period. The construction of
both indices follows practices common in the literature and is detailed in Appendix A.1. I include
both predicted prices in Xh‘t because each approach has its virtues (Meese and Wallace, 1997).18
In Appendix A.3, I show the results are robust to modeling quality as a more ￿ exible function of
the predicted prices and to including other observables in Xh‘t.
Combining (2) and (4), the reference price ~ ph‘t can be written as:
~ ph‘t = ￿‘t + ￿Xh‘t + uh‘t (5)
where again ￿‘t is a ￿xed e⁄ect that represents the average price in location ‘ at time t and uh‘t is
unobserved quality.
Instrument To identify the demand curve g (￿) in the presence of unobserved quality, I use
plausibly exogenous supply-side variation in the list price due to the liquidity needs of sellers.
Sellers face a trade-o⁄ between selling at a higher price and selling faster. Sellers with less liquidity
and consequently a higher marginal utility of cash on hand choose a higher list price and longer time
on the market. A proxy for liquidity that is orthogonal to unobserved quality and seller patience
can is thus an instrument for list price.
The proxy for liquidity that I use is the equity a seller extracts from their sale. Housing is a
large component of household wealth, and many sellers use the equity they extract from sale for
the down payment on their next home (Stein, 1995). This increases the marginal utility of cash
on hand for sellers who extract very little equity from their house because each additional dollar
of equity they extract can be leveraged to buy a substantially better house. The marginal utility
of cash is lower for sellers extracting substantial equity because their purchasing power is limited
more by their creditworthiness and overall budget than the cash they have on hand. Consequently,
homeowners with lower equity positions set higher list prices and sell their houses at higher prices
18The hedonic approach uses a limited set of characteristics and assumes that their valuation over time is constant
because I have only a single snapshot of characteristics, but it uses all sales. Repeat sales controls for home ￿xed
e⁄ects but only uses a subset of the data and assumes that house quality is constant and that the set of houses
trading at any given time is representative.
18(Genesove and Mayer, 1997; Genesove and Mayer, 2001).
Because ￿nancing and re￿nancing decisions make the equity of sellers endogenous, I use as
my instrument the log of appreciation in the ZIP repeat-sales house price index since purchase
zh‘t = log
￿
￿‘t
￿‘￿
￿
, where ￿ is the repeat-sales house price index, t is the period of listing, and ￿
is the period of previous sale.19 This would be isomorphic to equity if all homeowners took out
an identical mortgage and did not re￿nance. The instrument thus compares sellers who purchase
identical homes with identical mortgages but who have di⁄erent amounts of cash on hand to make
their next down payment because one seller￿ s home appreciated more in value than the other￿ s.
If variation in seller liquidity represented by zh‘t is independent of unobserved quality and is
the only source of variation in price conditional on quality and average price, zh‘t can be used as
an instrument to trace out the demand curve g (￿). Because existing evidence shows that the e⁄ect
of equity is non-linear and strongest for sellers with low equity (Genesove and Mayer, 1997), I let
zh‘t a⁄ect price through a ￿ exible function f (￿). Formally, g (￿) is identi￿ed if:
Condition 1
zh‘t ? ? (uh‘t;"h‘t)
and
ph‘t = f (zh‘t) + ~ ph‘t
= f (zh‘t) + ￿‘t + ￿Xh‘t + uh‘t. (6)
The ￿rst half of Condition 1 is an exclusion restriction that requires that appreciation since
purchase have no direct e⁄ect on the outcome, either through fortune in ￿nding a buyer "h‘t in
equation (3) or through unobserved quality uh‘t. If this is the case, zh‘t only a⁄ects probability of
sale through the relative markup ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t. Because I use ZIP ￿ quarter of listing ￿xed e⁄ects,
the variation in zh‘t comes from sellers who sell at the same time in the same market but purchased
at di⁄erent points in the cycle. Condition 1 can thus be interpreted as requiring that unobserved
quality be independent of when the seller purchased.
This assumption is di¢ cult to test because I only have a few years of listings data, so ￿ exibly
19Here zh‘t is a measure of liquidity, whereas when multiplied by the previous price Ph‘￿ in Xh‘t it is used to
convert the previous price to present values and constrained to have the same coe¢ cient as the previous price Ph‘t.
19controlling for when a seller bought weakens the e⁄ect of the instrument on price in equation (6)
and widens the con￿dence intervals to the point that any curvature is not statistically signi￿cant.
Nonetheless, I evaluate the identi￿cation assumption in four ways as documented in Appendix A.3.
First, I vary the observable measures of quality. Second, I include including a linear time trend in
date of purchase or time since purchase. Third, I limit the sample to sellers who purchased prior to
2004 and again include a linear time trend, eliminating variation from sellers who purchased near
the peak of the bubble or during the bust. In all three cases, the results remain robust. Finally,
I show that the shape of the estimated demand curve is similar for IV and OLS, although OLS
results in a more inelastic demand curve due to the bias created by unobserved quality. While these
tests assuage some concerns, if homes with very low appreciation since purchase are of substantially
lower unobserved quality despite their higher average list price, my identi￿cation strategy would
overestimate the true amount of curvature in the data.20
I focus on sellers for whom the exogenous variation is cleanest and consequently exclude three
groups. First, many individuals who have had negative appreciation since purchase are not the
claimant on the residual equity in their homes￿ their mortgage lender is. For these individuals,
appreciation since purchase is directly related to how far underwater they are, which in turn a⁄ects
the foreclosure and short sale processes of the mortgage lender or servicer. Because I am interested
in market processes, I exclude short sales, withdrawals that are subsequently foreclosed upon,
and individuals who have had negative appreciation since purchase from the analysis. Second,
mortgage servicers and government-sponsored enterprises selling foreclosed homes have no reason
to be sensitive to the amount of appreciation since the foreclosed-upon homeowner purchased
and are dropped. Finally, investors who purchase, improve, and ￿ ip homes typically have a low
appreciation in their ZIP code since purchase but improve the quality of the house in unobservable
ways. To minimize the e⁄ect of investors, I exclude sellers who previously purchased with all cash,
a hallmark of investors.
The second part of Condition 1 requires that liquidity embodied in zh‘t is the only reason for
variation in ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t. This is a strong assumption because there may be components of liquidity
that are unobserved or other reasons that homeowners list their house at a price di⁄erent from
20One concern is that sellers with higher appreciation since purchase improve their house in unobservable ways with
their home equity. However, this would create a positive relationship between price and appreciation since purchase
while I ￿nd a strong negative relationship.
20~ ph‘t, such as heterogeneity in discount rates. If the second part of the condition did not hold, then
the estimates would be biased because the true ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t would equal f (zh‘t) + ￿h‘t, and the
unobserved error ￿h‘t enters g (￿) nonlinearly.
However, if other sources of variation in the relative markup ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t are independent of the
variation induced by the instrument, the error in ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t would not cause spurious concavity.
Intuitively, noise in ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t would cause the observed probability of sale at each observed ph‘t ￿
~ ph‘t to be an average of the probabilities of sale at true ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘ts that are on average evenly
scrambled. Consequently, although the slope may be biased, the curvature of a monotonically-
decreasing demand curve is preserved. An analytical result can be obtained if the true g (￿) is a
cubic regression function as in Hausman et al. (1991):
Lemma 2 Consider the econometric model described by (3) and (5) and suppose that:
zh‘t ? ? (uh‘t;"h‘t), (7)
ph‘t = f (zh‘t) + ￿h‘t + ~ ph‘t, (8)
￿h‘t ? ? f (zh‘t), and the true regression function g (￿) is a third-order polynomial. Then estimating
g (￿) assuming that ph‘t = f (zh‘t) + ~ ph‘t yields the true coe¢ cients of the second- and third-order
terms in g (￿).
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
While a special case, Lemma 2 makes clear that the bias in the estimated concavity is minimal
if ￿h‘t ? ? f (zh‘t). Appendix A.3.5 shows more generally using Monte Carlo simulation that if
￿h‘t ? ? f (zh‘t), the degree of concavity is if anything under-estimated.
However, spurious concavity is possible if other sources of variation in the relative markup are
correlated with the instrument. Speci￿cally, Appendix A.3.5 presents Monte Carlo simulations that
show that if the instrument captures most of the variation in the relative markup ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t at low
levels of appreciation since purchase but very little of the variation at high levels of appreciation
since purchase, spurious concavity is generated because the slope is attenuated for low relative
markups but not high relative markups. However, quantitatively an extreme amount of unobserved
variation in the relative markup ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t is necessary to spuriously generate the amount of
21concavity in the data.
Estimation Under Condition 1, ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t = f (zh‘t), and g (￿) can be estimated by a two-step
procedure that ￿rst estimates equation (6) and then uses the predicted f (zh‘t) as ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t to
estimate equation (3). Both equations are estimated by OLS, and in the main text I weight the
speci￿cations by the inverse standard deviation of the error in the repeat-sales index to account for
the reduced precision of the predicted prices in areas with fewer transactions. I use a third-order
polynomial for f (￿). Appendix A.3 shows that the results are robust to the order of the polynomial
used for f (￿).
I approximate g (￿) in three ways. First, I use a three-part spline in the relative markup ph‘t￿~ ph‘t,
with the knot points spaced so that each segment includes one-third of the data, which allows for a
statistical of nonlinearity. I calculate standard errors by block bootstrapping the entire procedure
and clustering on 35 units de￿ned by the ￿rst three digits of the ZIP code (ZIP-3).21 Second,
to visualize the data, I construct a binned scatter plot, which bins the data into 25 equally-sized
groups of the log list price relative to the reference price, ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t, and, for each bin, plots the
mean of ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t against the mean of the probability of sale net of the average probability of
sale in the market, dh‘t ￿  ‘t. This approximates g (￿) using indicator variables for the 25 bins of
ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t; as detailed in Appendix A.3. Third, I use a third-order polynomial to approximate g (￿)
and plot the estimated polynomial and 95 percent con￿dence bands with the binned scatter plot.
There may be small-sample bias introduced into the estimation if g (￿) is non-linear and the ￿xed
e⁄ects ￿‘t are imprecisely estimated with a small number of homes in a ZIP-quarter cell.22 Appendix
A.3 shows that the results are not substantially changed by limiting the sample to ￿xed e⁄ect cells
with at least 15 homes. Because the error in the estimated ￿xed e⁄ects is likely minimal for these
cells, this suggests that imprecision in the estimated ￿xed e⁄ects is not driving the results.23
22Figure 5: Instrumental Variable Estimates of the E⁄ect of List Price on Probability of Sale
Notes: Panel B shows a binned scatter plot of the probability of sale within 13 weeks net of ￿xed e⁄ects (with the average
probability of sale within 13 weeks added in) against the estimated log relative markup p ￿ ~ p. It also shows an overlaid cubic
￿t of the relationship, as in equation (3). To create the ￿gure, a ￿rst stage regression of the log list price on a third-order
polynomial in the instrument, ￿xed e⁄ects at the ZIP x ￿rst quarter of listing level, and repeat sales and hedonic log predicted
prices, as in (6), is estimated by OLS. The predicted value of the polynomial of the instrument is used as the relative markup.
The ￿gure splits the data into 25 equally-sized bins of this estimated relative markup and plots the mean of the estimated
relative markup against the mean of the probability of sale within 13 weeks net of ￿xed e⁄ects for each bin, as detailed in
Appendix A.3. Before binning, the 1st and 99th percentiles of the log sale price residual and any observations fully absorbed
by ￿xed e⁄ects are dropped. The entire procedure is weighted by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the prediction
error in the repeat-sales house price index in the observation￿ s ZIP code from 1988 to 2013. The sample is limited to the
IV subsample of homes that are not sales of foreclosures or short sales, sales of homes with negative appreciation since the
seller purchased, or sales by investors who previously purchased with all cash. The grey bands indicate a pointwise 95-percent
con￿dence interval for the cubic ￿t created by block bootstrapping the entire procedure on 35 ZIP-3 clusters. Panel A shows
the ￿rst stage relationship between the instrument and log initial list price in equation (6) by residualizing the instrument and
the log initial list price against the two predicted prices and ￿xed e⁄ects, binning the data into 25 equally-sized bins of the
instrument residual, and plotting the mean of the instrument residual against the mean of the log initial list price residual for
each bin. N = 111,293 observations prior to dropping the 1st and 99th percentiles and unique zip-quarter cells.
1.3.3 Results
Figure 5 shows the resulting ￿rst and second stage binned scatter plots. As shown in panel A, the
instrument induces a small amount of variation in the list price set by sellers.24 This is the variation
21I do not bootstrap the estimation of the house price indices and the predicted prices. This may add noise through
a generated regressor problem (Murphy and Topel, 1985).
22There are 9,200 ￿xed e⁄ects. Less than half a percent of the data is unused because there is only a single house
sold in a ZIP-quarter cell.
23An alternative approach is to use a random e⁄ects estimator, which I am implementing in ongoing work.
24Genesove and Mayer (1997) ￿nd that a house with 100 percent loan-to-value ratio is on average listed at a price
four percent higher than a home with an 80 percent loan-to-value ratio. Subsequent work (Genesove and Mayer,
2001) ￿nds slightly smaller numbers conditioning on whether a seller has experienced a nominal loss. Nonetheless,
the similarity between their four percent ￿gure and the amount of variation induced by the instrument in my ￿rst
stage is reassuring.
23Table 3: The E⁄ect of List Price on Probability of Sale: Regression Results
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent Var: Sell Within 13 Weeks
Sample: All Listings With Prior Observation
(431,830 obs, 420,820 After Dropping 1st and 99th % and Cells With One Obs)
Controls: ZIP ￿ Quarter ￿ Distress FE, Repeat and Hedonic Predicted Price
Lowest Tercile Middle Tercile Highest Tercile High - Low
Coe¢ cient on List Price 0.161*** -0.500*** -0.483*** -0.643***
Residual Spline (0.031) (0.091) (0.039) (0.056)
Bootstrapped 95% CI [-0.767,-0.555]
Panel B: Instrumental Variable
Dependent Var: Sell Within 13 Weeks
Sample: Listings With Prior Obs, excluding REO, Short Sales, Investors, Neg Appreciation
(111,293 obs,108,696 After Dropping 1st and 99th % and Cells With One Obs)
Controls: ZIP ￿ Quarter FE, Repeat and Hedonic Predicted Price
Instrument: Appreciation Since Purchase
Lowest Tercile Middle Tercile Highest Tercile High - Low
Coe¢ cient on List Price -0.320 0.261 -2.327*** -2.007***
Residual Spline (0.334) (1.651) (0.616) (0.588)
Bootstrapped 95% CI [-3.577,-1.293]
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Each row shows regression coe¢ cients when g(.) in equation (3) is approximated
using a three-segment linear spline with an equal fraction of the data in each segment. This relationship represents the e⁄ect of
the log relative markup on the probability of sale within 13 weeks. In the IV panel, a ￿rst stage regression of log list price on
a third-order polynomial in the instrument, ￿xed e⁄ects at the ZIP x ￿rst quarter of listing level, and log predicted price using
both a repeat-sales and a hedonic methodology, as in (6) is estimated by OLS. The predicted value of the polynomial of the
instrument is used as the relative markup in equation (3), which is estimated by OLS. The sample is restricted to non-REOs,
non-short sales, properties with positive appreciation since purchase, and properties not previously purchased with all cash
(investors). In the OLS panel, quality is assumed to be perfectly measured by the hedonic and repeat-sales predicted prices
and have no unobserved component. OLS thus regresses log list price on ￿xed e⁄ects and the predicted prices and uses the
residual as the estimated relative markup into equation (3), as described in Appendix A.3. OLS uses the full set of listings with
a previous observed transaction, so to prevent distressed sales from biasing the results, the ￿xed e⁄ects are at the quarter of
initial listing x ZIP x distress status level. Distress status corresponds to three groups: normal sales, REOs (sales of foreclosed
homes and foreclosure auctions), and short sales (cases where the transaction price is less than the amount outstanding on the
loan and withdrawals that are subsequently foreclosed on in the next two years). Both procedures are weighted by the reciprocal
of the standard deviation of the prediction error in the repeat-sales house price index in the observation￿ s ZIP code from 1988
to 2013. Before creating the spline, the 99th and 1st percentiles of the relative markup are dropped, as are any observations
fully absorbed by ￿xed e⁄ects. In addition to the regression coe¢ cients, the di⁄erence between the highest and lowest tercile
of the spline is reported. Standard errors and the 95 percent con￿dence interval for the di⁄erence between the ￿rst and third
terciles are computed by block bootstrapping the entire procedure on 35 ZIP-3 clusters.
I use to identify the shape of demand. The ￿rst stage is strong with a joint F statistic for the third
order polynomial of the instrument in (6) of 128. Panel B shows that a clear concave relationship
24is visible in the second stage, with very inelastic demand for relatively low priced homes and elastic
demand for relatively high priced homes. This curvature is also visible in the cubic polynomial
￿t.25 Table 3 shows regression results when g (￿) is approximated by a three-part spline. Panel B
shows the IV results. The concavity visible in Figure 5 is apparent, with the highest tercile having
a slope that is seven times the lowest tercile. The di⁄erence between the highest and lowest tercile
slopes is statistically signi￿cant.
As a point of comparison, Panel A shows OLS results for the full sample of homes with a prior
observed transaction. The ￿xed e⁄ects are at the ZIP ￿ quarter ￿ REO seller ￿ short seller level to
prevent distressed sales from biasing the results. OLS assumes away unobserved quality and should
be positively biased if ~ ph‘t is positively correlated with ph‘t due to omitted unobserved quality. This
is the case: the estimated demand curve is more elastic for IV than OLS. In fact, the OLS bias is
strong enough that the demand curve slopes signi￿cantly upward in the lowest tercile. Nonetheless,
a clear pattern of concavity is apparent in the OLS results. Appendix A.3 shows that OLS looks
similar on the limited IV sample.
The highest tercile IV estimates imply that raising one￿ s price by one percent reduces the
probability of sale within 13 weeks by approximately 2.3 percentage points on a base of 46.8
percentage points, a reduction of 5 percent. This corresponds to a one percent price hike increasing
the time to sale by six to eleven days. This ￿gure is of comparable magnitude to Carrillo (2012),
who estimates a structural search model of the steady state of the housing market with multiple
dimensions of heterogeneity using data from Charlottesville, Virginia from 2000 to 2002. Although
we use very di⁄erent empirical approaches, in a counterfactual simulation, he ￿nds that a one
percent list price increase increases time on the market by a week, while a ￿ve percent list price
increase increases time on the market by a year. Carrillo also ￿nds small reductions in time on the
market from underpricing, consistent with the nonlinear relationship found here.
Appendix A.3 shows that the results are robust across geographies, time periods, and speci￿-
cations, although in some cases restricting to a smaller sample leads to insigni￿cant results. It also
shows that concavity is clearly visible in the reduced-form relationship between the instrument and
probability of sale. Finally, the Appendix shows the results are robust to other measures of quality
25Most of the curvature comes from the top quarter of the sample because the instrument has the largest e⁄ect on
the small number of sellers with low appreciation since purchase and a smaller e⁄ect on sellers who have experience
moderate to high appreciation.
25and to using transaction prices rather than using list prices. The instrumental variable results thus
provide evidence of demand concave in relative price for these three MSAs from 2008 to 2013.26
1.4 A Model of House Price Momentum
This section introduces an equilibrium search model with concave demand. The model includes two
additional ingredients new to the housing search literature. First, because concave demand only
ampli￿es existing price insensitivity, I introduce variants of the model with two separate sources
of insensitivity: staggered pricing as in Taylor (1980) and a small number of backward-looking
rule-of-thumb sellers as in Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989) and Gali and Gertler (1999).
Second, I include an endogenous entry decision for buyers and sellers so that the same model
can be used to assess how the re-timing of purchases and sales in light of momentum a⁄ects housing
dynamics. Entry is a form of intertemporal arbitrage that reduces the amount of momentum in the
model, and with a completely elastic entry margin momentum would be eliminated (Barsky et al.,
2007). Consequently, the model features some households who have to move immediately so that
the entry margin is important but not strong enough to eliminate momentum.
The model builds on search models of the housing market, such as Wheaton (1990), Krainer
(2001), Novy-Marx (2009), Piazzesi and Schneider (2009), Caplin and Leahy (2011), Genesove and
Han (2012), Head et al. (2014), Ngai and Tenreyro (2013), Burnside et al. (2013), and Diaz and
Jerez (2013). I also incorporate ideas from models with price posting with undirected search (e.g.,
Kudoh, 2013).
I ￿rst introduce a framework that models a metropolitan area with a ￿xed population and
housing stock. I then describe the housing market component and show how sellers set list prices.
I then introduce staggered pricing and rule-of-thumb consumers. The notation used in the model
is summarized in Tables 4 and 5.
1.4.1 Setting
Time is discrete and all agents are risk neutral. Agents have a discount factor of ￿ and time t is
denoted with a subscript. There is a ￿xed housing stock of mass one, no construction, and a ￿xed
26Aside from the tail end of my sample, this period was a depressed market. The similarity between my results
and Carrillo￿ s provide some reassurance that the results I ￿nd are not speci￿c to the time period, but I cannot rule
out that the nonlinearity would look di⁄erent in a booming market.
26Table 4: Notation in the Model
Variable Description Note
Masses
Pop Total Population (Housing Stock Mass One)
B Endogenous Mass of Buyers Value Fn V b
S Endogenous Mass of Sellers Value Fn V s
R Endogenous Mass of Renters Value Fn V r
H Endogenous Mass of Homeowners Value Fn V h
Flow Utilities
b Flow Utility of Buyer (Includes search cost)
s Flow Utility of Seller (includes search cost)
u Flow Utility of Renter Shocked Variable
h Flow Utility of Homeowner
Moving Shock Probabilities
￿h Prob Homeowner Gets Shock
￿r Prob Renter Gets Shock
Costs
c Stochastic Cost for Homeowner to Stay in Home ￿ C (c);U (c;￿ c)
k Stochastic Cost for Renter to Stay Renter (Negative) ￿ K (k);U
￿
k;￿ k
￿
c￿ Threshold c Above Which Homeowners Enter Endogenous
k￿ Threshold k Above Which Renters Enter Endogenous
Other Parameters
￿ Discount Factor
L Probability Seller Leaves Metro Area
V 0 Value Realized Upon Exiting Metro Area
population of size Pop.27 Each period occurs in three stages: ￿rst search and transactions occur,
then ￿ ow utilities are realized, and ￿nally mismatch shocks occur.
There are four types of homogenous agents: a mass Bt of buyers, St of sellers, Ht of homeowners,
and Rt of renters. These agents have ￿ ow utilities (inclusive of search costs) b, s, h, and r, and
value functions V b
t , V s
t , V h
t , and V r
t , respectively. Buyers and sellers are active in the housing
market, which is described in the next section. The rental market, which serves as a reservoir of
potential buyers, is unmodeled aside from the ￿ ow utility net of rents. I assume that each agent
can own only one home, which precludes short sales and investor-owners, although I allow for the
re-timing of buyer and seller entry decisions described below.
Each period with probability ￿h and ￿r, respectively, homeowners and renters receive shocks
27Construction is omitted for parsimony. The model best applies to areas with inelastic housing supply in which
momentum is stronger, although it is also relevant to the short run in elastically supplied metro areas, in which
momentum is weaker but still important. See Head et al. (2014) for a model with a construction margin.
27that cause them to separate from their current house or apartment, as in Wheaton (1990). However,
rather than automatically entering the housing market, the shocks cause homeowners and renters
to draw a one-time cost, c ￿ C (￿) for homeowners and k ￿ K (￿) (likely negative) for renters,
that can be paid to stay in their current house or apartment and receive the same ￿ ow utility as
before instead of moving. Because the seller entry elasticity appears to be constant over the cycle
as shown in Appendix A.5, the cost distributions are parameterized as uniform: c ￿ U (c;￿ c) and
k ￿ U
￿
k;￿ k
￿
. This setup captures that potential movers have heterogeneous reasons to buy or sell
and consequently di⁄er in the ease with which they can re-time their transaction.
A renter who decides not to pay the cost k enters the market as a homogenous buyer. A
homeowner who decides not to pay the cost c learns after making their entry decision whether they
leave the MSA with probability L, in which case they become a seller and receive termination payo⁄
V 0 for leaving, or whether they remain in the city with probability 1￿L. If they remain in the city,
they simultaneously become a buyer and a homogenous seller. These two roles are assumed to be
quasi-independent so that the value functions do not interact and no structure is put on whether
agents buy or sell ￿rst, as in Ngai and Tenreyro (2013) and Guren and McQuade (2013).
A homeowner who draws a cost c enters the market if:
c ￿ V h
t ￿ V s
t ￿ LV 0 ￿ (1 ￿ L)V h
t ￿ c￿
t. (9)
Similarly a renter enters if
k ￿ V r
t ￿ V b
t ￿ k￿
t. (10)
The cuto⁄s c￿
t and k￿
t determine the marginal buyer and seller and control their ￿ ow into the
market.28
Because the population is constant, every time a seller leaves the city they are replaced by
a new entrant. Entrants draw a cost of being a renter and decide whether to rent or buy in
the same manner as a renter who just experienced a shock. The full closed system is illustrated
diagrammatically in Figure 6. The laws of motion and value functions of a homeowner and renter
are deferred to Appendix A.4.
28This setup makes two implicit assumptions for tractability. First, although individuals are heterogeneous in their
motivation to move, once they enter the market they are homogenous. Second, if an individual decides not to move
today, they do not make another decision about moving until they get another shock.
28Figure 6: Schematic Representation of Closed GE System
1.4.2 The Housing Market
The search process occurs at the beginning of each period and unfolds in three stages. First, sellers
post list prices ^ pt.29 Second, buyers search and stochastically ￿nd a single house to inspect. Third,
matched buyers inspect the house. When they do so, they observe their idiosyncratic valuation for
the house "m, which is match-speci￿c, drawn from F ("m) at inspection, and realized as utility at
purchase. They also observe the house￿ s permanent quality ￿h, which is mean-zero, gained by a
buyer at purchase, and lost by a seller at sale. The buyer then decides whether to purchase the
house or to continue searching.
I assume all sales occur at list price, or equivalently that risk neutral buyers and sellers expect
that the average sale price will be an a¢ ne function of the list price.30 This assumption is made
for tractability and is not essential to the propagation mechanism. It is also less strong than it may
29Lester et al. (2013) show that list prices are an optimal mechanism when inspection is costly. Intuitively, a list
price acts as a commitment by sellers not to waste buyers￿time.
30This assumption restricts what can occur in bargaining or a price war. Several papers have considered the role of
various types of bargaining in a framework with a list price in a steady state search model, including cases in which
the list price is a price ceiling (Chen and Rosenthal, 1996; Haurin et al., 2010), price wars are possible (Han and
Strange, 2013), and list price can signal seller type (Albrecht et al., 2013).
29Table 5: Notation in Housing Market
Variable Description Note
Utilities
"m Match-Speci￿c One-Time Utility Bene￿t ￿ F (")
￿h Permanent House Quality Mean Zero
Stochastic Draws
￿h;t Noise in Observed ￿h, IID Common in Period t ￿ G(￿)
Parameters / Values
￿ Market Tightness = B=S Endogenous
~ ￿ E⁄ective Market Tightness = B=Svisited Endogenous
q
￿
~ ￿
￿
Prob. Seller Meets Buyer (Matching Function) Endogenous
￿ Constant in Matching Function
￿ Matching Function Elasticity
￿ Distribution of Prices Endogenous
"￿ Threshold "m for Purchase Endogenous
￿ Threshold for Binary Signal
Distribution Parameters
￿ Exponential Dist Param for F (")
￿ Logistic Variance Param for G(￿)
￿rst appear: although many houses do sell above or below list price, Appendix A.1.3 shows that
in the merged Altos-DataQuick micro data, the modal transaction price is the list price, and the
average and median di⁄erences between the list and transaction price are less than 0.01 log points
and do not vary much across years.31
Buyer search for homes is partially directed in that buyers search only for homes that do not
appear overpriced for their quality, but whether a house is overpriced for its quality is noisily
observed. This directs search away from overpriced homes but preserves much of the structure of
random search in which frictions prevent buyers from seeking out the lowest price house relative to
quality or the house with which they have the best match. Formally, after prices are posted, buyers
receive a binary signal from their real estate agent or from advertisements. The signal reveals
whether a house￿ s quality-adjusted price relative to the average quality-adjusted price is above a
threshold. However, quality ￿h is subject to mean zero noise ￿h;t ￿ G(￿), where G(￿) is assumed
to be constant over time. This noise, which represents how well a house is marketed in a given
31An important feature of the housing market is that most price changes are decreases. Consequently, the di⁄erence
between the initial list price and the sale price ￿ uctuates substantially over the cycle as homes that do not sell cut
their list price. I abstract from such duration dependence to maintain a tractable state space.
30period, is common to all buyers but independent and identically distributed across periods.
Buyers can inspect at most one home per period, and although they can limit their search set, it
is assumed that once they do so they search randomly among homes in their search set and cannot
direct their search to a particular type of home. Buyers who only observe this signal before choosing
their search optimally limit their search to homes that the signal indicates are not overpriced.32
These are homes for which the quality-adjusted price pt ￿ ^ pt ￿ ￿h satis￿es,
pt ￿ ￿h;t ￿ E￿ [pt] ￿ ￿, (11)
where ￿ is the distribution of prices. Because the signal reveals nothing else about the home, buyers
cannot do better than searching randomly within homes satisfying (11). I assume that search
occurs according a constant returns to scale matching function so that the number of matches
can be written as a function of the number of buyers and visited sellers m
￿
Bt;Svisited
t
￿
. Because
m is constant returns to scale, I rewrite m as a function q
￿
~ ￿t
￿
of the ratio of buyers to visited
sellers ~ ￿t = Bt
Svisited
t
= Bt
StE￿[1￿G(pt￿E￿[pt]￿￿)]. The matching function captures frictions in the search
process that prevent all reasonably-priced homes and all buyers from having an inspection each
period. For instance, buyers randomly allocating themselves across houses may miss a few houses,
or there may not be a mutually-agreeable time for a buyer to visit a house in a given period.
After inspecting a house, buyers purchase if their surplus from doing so V h
t +"m ￿p￿b￿￿V b
t
is positive. This leads to a threshold rule to buy if "m > pt+b+￿V b
t+1￿V h
t ￿ "￿
t and a probability
of purchase given inspection of 1 ￿ F ("￿
t).33
Sellers have rational expectations but set their list price before ￿h;t is realized and without
knowing the valuation of the particular buyer who visits their house. The demand curve they
face when they set their price, d
￿
pt;￿t;~ ￿t
￿
, is the ex-ante probability of sale for a house with a
list price pt given a distribution of list prices ￿t and functional market tightness ~ ￿t. d(pt;￿t;￿t)
can be written as the product of the probability the house satis￿es (11) and is searched, 1 ￿
G(pt ￿ E￿ [pt] ￿ ￿), the probability a house that is searched matches with a buyer, q
￿
~ ￿t
￿
, and the
32This behavior is optimal if only the signal is observed. If both the signal and price are observed, one can always
￿nd a prior distribution for quality such that following the signal is optimal.
33Because the signal reveals no information about the house￿ s quality ￿h, posted price ^ pt, or match quality "m, the
search and inspection stages are independent.
31probability of purchase given inspection, 1 ￿ F ("￿
t):
d
￿
pt;￿t;~ ￿t
￿
= q
￿
~ ￿t
￿
(1 ￿ G(pt ￿ E￿ [pt] ￿ ￿))(1 ￿ F ("￿
t)). (12)
I parameterize the model by assuming distributions for F (￿) and G(￿). Speci￿cally, I assume
that F ("m) is an exponential distribution with parameter ￿ and G
￿
￿h;t
￿
is logistic with mean
zero and variance ￿2 ￿2
3 .34 I also assume that the matching function is Cobb-Douglas q (￿) = ￿￿￿￿,
as is standard in the search literature. While these assumptions matter for precise quantitative
predictions of the model, they are not necessary for the intuitions it illustrates.
This setup leads to a concave demand curve with considerable curvature in the neighborhood
of the average price. At above average prices, the demand curve is dominated by whether buyers
include the house in their search set, creating an elastic demand curve. At below average prices,
buyers include the house in their search set with high probability and the demand curve is dominated
by purchase decisions based on a trade-o⁄ between idiosyncratic match quality "m and price, so
demand is less elastic. To illustrate this, Figure 7 shows the shapes of the probability of inspection
q (￿t)(1 ￿ G(pt ￿ E￿ [pt] ￿ ￿)), the probability of purchase conditional on inspection 1 ￿ F ("￿
t),
and the overall demand curve d(pt;￿t;￿t), equal to the product of the ￿rst two panels. (Note that
the axes are swapped from the traditional Marshallian supply and demand diagram in order to be
consistent with the empirical analysis in Section 1.3.)
1.4.3 Flexible Price Setting
If sellers can update their list price each period, the buyer and seller value functions are equal
to the value of not transacting and remaining in the market next period plus the probability of
purchase or sale times the party￿ s surplus from the transaction relative to remaining in the market.
34It is useful to work with distributions for which the hazard rate
f
1￿F and mean excess function E [x ￿ x
￿jx > x
￿]
have closed-form analytic solutions. The exponential distribution is particularly convenient because it has a single
parameter, changes in the tail density do not drive the results, and the hazard and mean excess functions are constant,
although using a Weibull or Gamma yields similar results.
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Figure 7: The Concave Demand Curve in the Model
Notes: The ￿gures are generated using calibration described in Section 1.5. All probabilities and the additive markup are
calculated assuming all other sellers are setting the steady state price and considering the e⁄ect of a unilateral deviation.
Mathematically,
V b
t = b + ￿V b
t+1 +
d
￿
pt;￿t;~ ￿
￿
￿t
h
V h
t + "￿
t + E ["m ￿ "￿
tj"m > "￿
t] ￿ p ￿ b ￿ ￿V b
t+1
i
= b + ￿V b
t+1 +
d
￿
pt;￿t;~ ￿t
￿
￿￿t
(13)
V s
t = s + ￿V s
t+1 + max
pt
n
d
￿
pt;￿t;~ ￿t
￿￿
pt ￿ s ￿ ￿V s
t+1
￿o
; (14)
where (13) follows from the memoryless property of the exponential distribution for "m. Seller
optimization implies:
33Lemma 3 The seller￿ s optimal list price when prices can be set ￿exibly each period is:
p = s + ￿V s
t+1 +
1
f("￿
t)
1￿F("￿
t) +
g(pt￿E￿[pt]￿￿)
1￿G(pt￿E￿[pt]￿￿)
(15)
= s + ￿V s
t+1
1
1
￿
1
1+exp
￿
￿
pt￿E￿[pt]￿￿
￿
￿ + ￿
; (16)
where the second line imposes the distributional assumptions. In a rational expectations equilibrium
pt = E￿ [pt]. The optimal list price is unique on an interval bounded away from p = 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.2.
Sellers have monopoly power due to costly search. The optimal pricing problem they solve
is the same as that of a monopolist facing the demand curve d except that the marginal cost is
replaced by the seller￿ s outside option of searching again next period. The optimal pricing strategy
is a markup over the outside option s+￿V s
t+1. In equation (15) it is written as an additive markup
equal to the reciprocal of the semi-elasticity of demand,
￿d(pt;￿t;￿t)
@d(pt;￿t;￿t)
@pt
. The semi-elasticity, in turn,
is equal to the sum of the hazard rates of the idiosyncratic preference distribution F (￿) and the
distribution of signal noise G(￿).
This creates a strategic complementarity in price setting because the optimal price depends
on relative price pt ￿E [pt] through the hazard rate of the signal G(￿). In particular, the elasticity
of demand rises as relative price increases, causing the optimal markup to fall from 1
￿ to 1
1
￿+￿,
as illustrated in Figure 7. The markup thus pushes sellers to set prices close to those of others.
However, in a rational expectations equilibrium without additional sources of price insensitivity, all
sellers choose the same list price and pt = E [pt], so there is no relative price to a⁄ect the markup.
A shock to home values thus causes list price to jump proportionally to the seller￿ s outside option.
Consequently, I introduce variants of the model with two di⁄erent sources of insensitivity of prices
to generate some initial momentum.
341.4.4 Source of Insensitivity 1: Staggered Price Setting
The ￿rst source of price insensitivity I consider is staggered price setting as in Taylor (1980).35
Prices in housing markets are not constantly updated because it takes time to market a house and
collect o⁄ers, and lowering the price frequently can signal that a house is of poor quality (De Wit
and Van Der Klaauw, 2013).36 While likely not the most important pricing friction in housing
markets, staggered pricing has the virtue of being familiar, tractable, and quanti￿able in micro
data.
With N groups of sellers, denote the quality-adjusted prices p, value functions V s, masses S,
and purchase thresholds " of a speci￿c vintage of sellers using superscripts for the time since they
last reset their price ￿ = f0;:::;N ￿ 1g. The buyer￿ s surplus from purchasing from various sellers
is constant due to the memoryless property of the exponential, but the value function must be
adjusted to integrate over the sellers in the market:
V b
t = b + ￿EtV b
t+1 +
1
￿￿t
N￿1 X
￿=0
￿
S￿
t
St
d
￿
p￿
t;￿t;~ ￿t
￿￿
. (17)
The value function of a seller is similar to the frictionless case except sellers only optimize occa-
sionally so ￿ superscripts are necessary:
V
s;￿
t = s + ￿EtV
s;￿+1
t+1 + d
￿
p￿
t;￿t;~ ￿t
￿￿
p￿
t ￿ s ￿ ￿EtV
s;￿+1
t+1
￿
; (18)
where V N
t = V 0
t and d
￿
p￿
t;￿t;~ ￿t
￿
is as in equation (12) except "￿
t is replaced by a separate threshold
match quality "
￿;￿
t for each vintage of sellers.
Seller optimization implies the optimal list price is reminiscent of a Taylor (1980) or Calvo
(1983) model except there is only one good to sell, so demand is replaced by that the probability
the house sells in a given period:
35I adopt Taylor (1980) staggered pricing rather than Calvo (1983) pricing because the model includes an integral
that cannot be updated iteratively in the denominator of ~ ￿t: Staggered pricing allows for a closed form for the integral
because the price distribution has ￿nite support.
36Golosov and Lucas (2008), among others, argue that models with ￿xed adjustment dates generate more persistence
than menu cost models with state-dependent adjustment rules. As described in Section 1.5, I assume prices are ￿xed
for two months based on data from 2008-2013, a depressed market in which sellers would have the strongest incentives
to adjust their price quickly. My calibrated model thus serves as a lower bound of the frequency of price resetting
one would observe in a calibrated state-dependent model.
35Lemma 4 If posted prices last N periods, the seller￿ s optimal reset price p0
t, where the superscript
is for periods since price is set, is:
p0
t =
PN￿1
￿=0 ￿￿D￿
t
￿
p0
t
￿
￿￿
t’￿
t PN￿1
￿=0 ￿￿D￿
t
￿
p0
t
￿
￿￿
t
, (19)
where D
j
t (p) = Et
"j￿1 Y
￿=0
￿
1 ￿ d￿
￿
p;￿t+￿;~ ￿t+￿
￿￿
#
d
￿
p;￿t+j;~ ￿t+j
￿
is the expected probability the
house is sold ￿ periods after the price is set, ￿￿
t = Et
"
￿
@d(pt;￿t+￿;~ ￿t+￿)
@pt
d(pt;￿t+￿;~ ￿t+￿)
#
is the semi-elasticity of
demand with respect to price, ’￿
t = s + EtV
s;￿+1
t+￿+1 + 1
￿￿
t is the expected optimal ￿exible reset price ￿
periods after the price is set given the expected price distribution in that period, and V
s;N
t+N = V
s;0
t+N.
The optimal list price is unique on an interval bounded away from p = 1 given a condition in
Appendix A.4.2, which holds for all simulations considered.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.2.
As is standard in staggered price models, the optimal price is a weighted average of the optimal
￿ exible prices that are expected to prevail on the equilibrium path until the seller can reset his or
her price. The weight put on the optimal ￿ exible price in period t + ￿ is equal to the discounted
probability of sale in period i times the semi-elasticity of demand in period i. Intuitively, the seller
cares more about periods in which probability of sale is higher but also about periods in which
demand is more elastic because perturbing price has a larger e⁄ect on pro￿t.
In equilibrium, all agents behave optimally given the search technology, the noisy signal of
relative price, and buyers￿draw of their idiosyncratic taste when they visit a home. Laws of motion
apply due to the law of large numbers. I restrict attention to symmetric equilibria. A staggered
pricing equilibrium is consequently de￿ned by:
De￿nition 5 Equilibrium with N staggered groups of list-price-setting sellers is a set of prices p￿
t,
demands d(p￿
t;￿;￿), purchase cuto⁄s "
￿;￿
t , and seller value functions V
s;￿
t for each group of sellers
￿ = f0;:::;N ￿ 1g, buyer, homeowner, and renter value functions V b
t , V h
t , and V r
t , entry cuto⁄s c￿
t
and k￿
t, and stocks of each type of agent Bt, S￿
t ￿ = f0;:::;N ￿ 1g, Ht, and Rt satisfying:
1. Optimal reset pricing (19) and ￿xed pricing for non-resetters p￿
t = p￿￿1
t￿1 8 ￿ > 0
362. Optimal purchasing decisions by buyers: "
￿;￿
t = p￿
t + b + ￿V b
t+1 ￿ V h
t
3. The demand curve for each type of seller arising from optimal buyer search given the binary
signal (12)
4. Optimal entry decisions by homeowners and renters who receive shocks (9) and (10)
5. The value functions for buyers (17) and each vintage of sellers (18) as well as for renters and
homeowners de￿ned in Appendix A.4
6. The laws of motion for all agents de￿ned in Appendix A.4.
Appendix A.4 shows that the model has a unique steady state that is equivalent to the friction-
less case without staggered pricing (N = 1). A frictionless equilibrium is formally de￿ned in the
Appendix A.4.
I add a stochastic shock process to both this model and the analogous rule-of-thumb variant
de￿ned subsequently to examine their dynamic implications. The propagation mechanism for mo-
mentum does not qualitatively depend on any particular shock. However, the positive correlation
between price and volume in the data implies that demand-side shocks dominate.37 Although the
particular type of demand shock introduced to the model is not important for the results, I use a
shock to the ￿ ow utility of being a renter u that changes the relative value of homeownership for
potential entrants. This takes a cue from Wheaton and Lee (2009), who show that changes in the
frequency of transitions between renting and owning due to credit conditions are a precipitating
shock for housing cycles. An example of such a shock would be a change in credit standards for
new homeowners. I implement the shock by assuming that u = ￿ u+x, where x is an AR(1) process
understood by the forward-looking agents:
xt = ￿xt￿1 + ￿ and ￿ ￿ N
￿
0;￿2
￿
￿
. (20)
The model cannot be solved analytically, so I simulate it numerically using a log-cubic approx-
imation pruning higher order terms as in Kim et al. (2008) implemented in Dynare (Adjemian et
37A positive supply-side shock to the ￿ ow value h of being a homeowner, for instance, would increase the value of
homes but also induce homeowners to endogenously enter less, driving down sales volume.
37al., 2013). Appendix A.6 shows that the impulse responses are similar in an exactly-solved model
with a permanent and unexpected shock.
1.4.5 Source of Insensitivity 2: A Small Fraction of Rule-of-Thumb Sellers
The second source of price insensitivity I consider is a small fraction of rule-of-thumb sellers. Since
Case and Shiller (1987), sellers with backward-looking expectations have been thought to play
an important role in housing markets. Previous models assume that all agents have backward-
looking beliefs (e.g., Berkovec and Goodman, 1996), but some observers have found the notion
that the majority of sellers are non-rational unpalatable given the ￿nancial importance of housing
transactions for many households. Some fraction of sellers, however, may not ￿nd it worthwhile to
scrutinize current market conditions due to information costs, and my model only requires a handful
of backward-looking sellers because of the strategic complementarity. Consequently, I introduce a
small number of rule-of-thumb sellers, as in Campbell and Mankiw (1989), and assess quantitatively
what fraction of sellers is needed to be non-rational to explain the momentum in data, similar to
Gali and Gertler (1999).
I assume that at all times a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of sellers set their list price pR
t rationally according
to Lemma 3 and (15) but a fraction ￿ of sellers uses a backward-looking rule of thumb to set their
list price pN
t .
The backward-looking sellers are near-rational sellers whose optimizing behavior produces a
price-setting rule of thumb based on the recent price path. They are not fully rational in two ways.
First, backward-looking sellers understand that a seller solves,
max
pt
d
￿
pt;￿t;~ ￿t
￿
pt +
￿
1 ￿ d
￿
pt;￿t;~ ￿t
￿￿￿
s + ￿V s
t+1
￿
,
with ￿rst order condition,
pt = s + ￿EtV s
t+1 + Et
2
4
￿d
￿
pt;￿t;~ ￿t
￿
@d(pt;￿t;~ ￿t)
@pt
3
5. (21)
However, they do not fully understand the laws of motion and how prices and the value of being
a seller evolve. Instead, they think the world is a function of a single state variable, the average
38price E [pt], and can only make ￿simple￿univariate forecasts that take the form of a ￿rst order
approximation of (21) in average price and relative price:
pt = s + ￿
￿￿ V s
t+1 + ￿1E [pt]
￿
+ ￿ M + ￿2E [pt ￿ E [pt]], (22)
where ￿ V s, ￿ M, ￿1, and ￿2 are constants.
Second, backward-looking sellers only see the average prices ￿ p of houses that transact be-
tween two to four months ago and between ￿ve to seven months ago, corresponding to the lag
with which reliable house price indices are released.38 They assume that price follows a ran-
dom walk with drift with both the innovations ’ and the drift ￿ drawn independently from
mean zero normal distributions with variances ￿2
’ and ￿2
￿. Through a standard signal extrac-
tion problem, they expect that today￿ s price will be normally distributed with mean E [pt] =
￿ pt￿3 +E [￿], where E [￿] =
￿2
￿
￿2
￿+￿2
’ (￿ pt￿3 ￿ ￿ pt￿6). Given this normal posterior, equation (22) implies
pt = s + ￿
￿￿ V s
t+1 + ￿1E [pt]
￿
+ ￿ M = E [pt],39 so the backward-looking sellers follow an AR(1) rule:
pN
t =
pt￿2 + pt￿3 + pt￿4
3
+ ￿
￿
pt￿2 + pt￿3 + pt￿4
3
￿
pt￿5 + pt￿6 + pt￿7
3
￿
(23)
where ￿ =
￿2
￿
￿2
￿+￿2
’. Such an AR(1) rule is a common assumption in models with backward-looking
expectations and is frequently motivated by limited knowledge, information costs, and extrapolative
biases (e.g., Hong and Stein, 1999; Fuster et al. 2010).40
I assume that the backward-looking price setters think that the variance of the innovation ￿2
￿
is a substantial share of the overall variance in price changes and consequently use a ￿ that is
attenuated relative to what one would ￿nd if one ran a quarterly AR(1) in the model environment.
This is consistent with Case et al. (2012), who survey home buyers for four metropolitan areas
from 2003 to 2011 and show that the average predicted amount of price appreciation at a one-year
horizon is approximately 43 percent of the actual amount of appreciation. An attenuated AR(1)
38I use three-month averages to correspond to how price indices like the closely watched Case-Shiller index are
constructed and to smooth out saw-tooth patterns that emerge with non-averaged multi-period lags. A shorter
AR(1) lag would require more backward-looking sellers to match the data.
39Speci￿cally, E [pt] = s + ￿ ￿ Vs + ￿1E [pt] + ￿ M and so pt = E [pt] + ￿2E [pt ￿ E [pt]], which with a symmetric
posterior for pt implies pt = E [pt].
40Coibion and Gorodnichenko also (2011) show rule-of-thumb price setters perform similarly to sticky information
price setters in an estimated DSGE model.
39coe¢ cient is also consistent with psychological theories in which agents overweight and ￿anchor￿
on recent observable prices (see Barberis et al., 1998).
I make two additional assumptions for tractability and parsimony that are not crucial for the
results. First, I assume that regardless of whether rational or backward-looking sellers sell faster,
in￿ ows adjust so that ￿ of the active listings are houses owned by backward-looking sellers at all
times. Second, I assume that entry occurs according to the threshold rules (9) and (10) using
rational value functions. The value function of a rational seller, V
s;R
t , is the same as equation (14)
for the frictionless case, while the buyer value function needs to be altered to integrate over the
distribution of sellers:
V b
t = b + ￿EtV b
t+1 +
1
￿￿t
h
￿d
￿
pN
t ;￿t;~ ￿t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)d
￿
pR
t ;￿t;~ ￿t
￿i
. (24)
Given these assumptions, one can de￿ne an equilibrium with backward-looking sellers by:
De￿nition 6 Equilibrium with a fraction ￿ of backward-looking sellers is a set of prices pi
t , de-
mands d
￿
pi
t;￿;￿
￿
, and purchase cuto⁄s "
￿;i
t for each type of seller i 2 fN;Rg, rational seller, buyer,
homeowner, and renter value functions V
s;R
t , V b
t , V h
t , and V r
t , entry cuto⁄s c￿
t and k￿
t, and stocks
of each type of agent Bt, St, Ht, and Rt satisfying:
1. Optimal pricing for rational sellers (15) and the pricing rule (23) for backward-looking sellers
2. Optimal purchasing decisions by buyers: "
￿;i
t = pi
t + b + ￿V b
t+1 ￿ V h
t
3. The demand curve for each type of seller arising from optimal buyer search given the binary
signal (12)
4. Optimal entry decisions by homeowners and renters who receive shocks (9) and (10)
5. The value functions for buyers (24) and rational sellers (14) as well as for renters and home-
owners de￿ned in Appendix A.4
6. The laws of motion for all agents de￿ned in Appendix A.4.
The steady state of this model is the same as the staggered and frictionless models. Consequently,
the staggered pricing and backward-looking models can be calibrated using the same procedure.
401.5 How Much Can Concave Demand Amplify Momentum?
To quantitatively assess the degree to which concave demand curves amplify house price momentum,
this section calibrates the model to the empirical ￿ndings presented in Section 1.3 and a number
of aggregate moments. Before doing so, I brie￿ y analyze the frequency of price adjustment in the
micro data to motivate the calibration of the staggered pricing variant of the model.
1.5.1 Frequency of Price Adjustment
Figure 8 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival curve for list prices of homes with an observed prior
transaction in the San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, and San Diego areas between April 2008 and
February 2013. Each observation is a list price, with a sale counted as a censored observation and
a price change counted as a failure. The curve thus shows the fraction of list prices that have
survived a given number of weeks conditional on the house remaining on the market. The curve
crosses the 50 percent threshold corresponding to the median time until a price is changed at eight
weeks. Consequently, I calibrate the staggered variant of the model so that one period lasts one
month, and there are two groups of sellers that alternate setting list prices that last two months.
1.5.2 Calibration and Estimation
In order to simulate the model, 21 parameters listed in Table 7 must be set. For the backward-
looking variant of the model, the AR(1) coe¢ cient in the rule of thumb ￿ and the fraction of sellers
who follow it ￿ also require numerical values. This section describes the calibration procedure and
targets, with details deferred to Appendix A.5.
Three parameters control the shape of the demand curve and thus have a ￿rst-order impact
on momentum: ￿, the exponential parameter of the idiosyncratic quality distribution, controls the
elasticity of demand for low-priced homes that are certain to be visited; ￿, the logistic variance
parameter of the signal, controls the elasticity of demand for high-priced homes; and ￿, the threshold
for being overpriced, controls where on the curve the average price lies. The other parameters
a⁄ect momentum mainly through equilibrium feedbacks and largely have a second order e⁄ect on
momentum. Consequently, I ￿rst estimate these three parameters from the instrumental variable
micro estimates presented in Section 1.3 and then calibrate the rest of the model to match steady
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Figure 8: Kaplan-Meier Survival Curve for List Prices
Notes: The ￿gure shows the Kaplan-Meier survival curve for list prices, where sales are treated a censored observation and a
price change is treated as a failure. The curve thus corresponds to the probability of a list price surviving for a given number
of weeks conditional on the property not having sold. The sample is made up of 854,547 list prices for 420,351 listings of homes
with observed prior transactions in the San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, and San Diego areas listed between April 2008 to
February 2013.
state and time series aggregate moments. The calibration proceeds in two steps.
First, I estimate ￿, ￿, and ￿ to match the micro estimates. There is heterogeneity in list price
in the micro estimates not in the model, and the low average probability of sale in the 2008-13
period poses a challenge because the data are not generated in a plausible steady state. To account
for these features of the data, I express the probability of sale for an arbitrary distribution of prices
and an arbitrary average probability of sale as functions of observable variables and the three
parameters ￿, ￿, and ￿. This allows me to approximate the model with the heterogeneity in the
data out of steady state for the purposes of calibration and then conduct dynamic simulations with
the heterogeneity suppressed to maintain a tractable state space.
Speci￿cally, with my assumed functional forms, the probability of sale at the time the list price
is posted can be written as:
d
￿
pt;￿t;~ ￿t
￿
= q
￿
~ ￿t
￿
(1 ￿ G(pt ￿ E￿ [pt] ￿ ￿))(1 ￿ F ("￿
t))
= ￿t (1 ￿ G(pt ￿ E￿ [pt] ￿ ￿))exp(￿￿pt) (25)
42The aggregate state variables factor out into a multiplicative constant, ￿t, which can be given a
structural interpretation as a shift in the matching function e¢ ciency ￿. ￿t multiplies two terms:
the e⁄ect of perturbing price on the probability the house is visited 1 ￿ G(pt ￿ E￿ [pt] ￿ ￿) and
a term representing the buyer￿ s trade-o⁄ between idiosyncratic quality and price exp(￿￿pt). To
simulate the probability of sale, all that is needed are ￿, ￿, and ￿, observed prices p, the observed
average price E￿ [p], and the observed average probability of sale.
Using equation (25), I calibrate ￿, ￿, and ￿ to the IV binned scatter plot. The data is 25 ordered
pairs (pb;db) corresponding to the log relative markup plus the mean log price in the market and
probability of sale within 13 weeks for each of 25 bins b of the distribution of the relative markup.
I solve for ￿t to match the average probability of sale, and use (25) to simulate d(pb) in the model
for each pb. Because the zero point corresponding to the average price is not precisely estimated
and depends on the deadline used for a listing to count as a sale, I choose the average price so that
the elasticity of demand implies a monthly seller search cost of approximately $10,000 based on
evidence from Genesove and Mayer (1997) and Levitt and Syverson (2008) described in Appendix
A.5.41 In Appendix A.6.4, I evaluate the robustness of the results to this parameter by using a
far smaller seller search cost. Conditional on the average price, the best ￿t (￿;￿;￿) is chosen to
minimize the sum of squared errors ￿bwb
￿
db ￿ d3 month (pb)
￿2 where wb is a Normal kernel weight
to reduce the in￿ uence of outliers and d3 month (￿) is a simulated 3-month sale probability based on
(25). Figure 9 shows the IV binned scatter plot in blue Xs and the model￿ s predicted d(pb) for the
(￿;￿;￿) that minimize the distance between the model and the data in red circles. The ￿t suggests
that the demand curve in the calibrated model captures the curvature in the data well.
The second step in the calibration is to match a number of aggregate steady state and stochastic
moments given the ￿, ￿, and ￿ from the ￿rst step. I set 14 parameters to match 14 steady state
moments listed in the ￿rst three panels of Table 6. These targets are either from other papers or are
long-run averages for the U.S. housing market, such as the homeownership rate, the average amount
of time between moves for buyers and renters, and the average time on the market for buyers and
sellers. A few parameters for which data is not easily available are assumed, and the results are
not sensitive to the assumed values. I also match three time series moments as indicated by the
41The seller search cost is likely large because of the nuisances and uncertainties involved and the need to move
quickly. Another factor, highlighted by Anenberg and Bayer (2013), is the high cost of simultaneously holding two
homes, which pushes households to sell quickly before buying.
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Figure 9: Model Fit Relative to Instrumental Variable Estimates
Notes: The blue Xs are the binned scatter plot from the IV speci￿cation with 2.5% of the data from each end excluded to reduce
the e⁄ects of outliers. The red dots are the simulated probabilities of sale at each price level in the calibrated model.
bottom panel of Table 6. The monthly persistence of the shock is set to match the persistence of
local income shocks as in Glaeser et al. (2013). The ￿nal parameters are set to match the standard
deviation of annual log price changes and the elasticity of seller entry with respect to price in
stochastic simulations.42
For the backward-looking variant of the model, I set the AR(1) coe¢ cient ￿ to 0.4 following
evidence from Case et al. (2012). Using surveys of home buyers they show that regressing realized
annual house price appreciation on households￿ex-ante beliefs yields a regression coe¢ cient of 2.34.
I use this survey evidence to calibrate the beliefs of the backward-looking sellers by dividing the
approximate regression coe¢ cient one would obtain in quarterly simulated data (approximately
0.94) by their coe¢ cient. I adjust ￿ and recalibrate the model until the impulse response to the
renter ￿ ow utility shock matches the matches the 36 months of positively autocorrelated price
changes in the AR(5) impulse response estimated on the CoreLogic national house price index in
42Because the stock of buyers is not observed, I cannot similarly calibrate for the buyer entry elasticity. Conse-
quently, I assume the density of buyer entry costs is the same as the density of seller entry costs. Seller entry tends
to track volume, so buyer entry cannot have a substantially di⁄erent density.
44Table 6: Calibration Targets
Steady State Parameter or Moment Value Source / Justi￿cation
Parameters
￿ (Matching Function Elasticity) .8 Genesove and Han (2012)
L (Prob. Stay in MSA) .7 Anenberg and Bayer (2013)
Aggregate Targets
Annual Discount Rate 7% Carrillo (2012) housing market discount rate
Time on Market for Sellers 4 Months Approx average parameter value in literature
Time on Market for Buyers 4 Months ￿ Time to sell in surveys (Genesove and Han, 2012)
Homeownership Rate 65% Long run average, 1970s-1990s
Time in House For Owner Occupants 9 Years American Housing Survey, 1997-2005
Time Between Moves for Renters 29 Months American Housing Survey, 1997-2005
c￿ (Cost Marginal H Pays to Avoid Move) $37.5k Moving cost 5% of price (Haurin & Gill,2002)
k￿ (Cost Marginal R Pays to Avoid Buying) -$20k Tax bene￿ts of owning 29 months (Poterba & Sinai, 2008)
Assumed Values
Time Between Shocks for Homeowners 29 Months Same as renter
Steady State Price $750k Average log price in IV sample adjusted for down market
h (Flow Utility of Homeowner) $7.5k 2/3 of house value from expected ￿ ow util
Prob Purchase j Inspect 0.5 So q (￿)2[0;1]
Time Series Moments
SD of Annual Log Price Changes .065 CoreLogic national HPI adjusted for CPI, 1976-2013
￿ (Monthly Persistence of AR1 Shock) .990 Persistence of income shocks (Glaeser et al., 2013)
Price Elasticity of Seller Entry .878 CoreLogic, Census, and NAR, 1976-2013
Section 1.2.43
The staggered and backward-looking variants di⁄er minutely in their calibrated values so that
each matches the volatility of price and entry elasticity in stochastic simulations, as discussed
in Appendix A.5. Table 7 summarizes the calibrated parameter values for the backward-looking
variant of the model.44
43An alternative approach would be to simulate data, collapse it to the quarterly level, and then estimate the same
AR(5) as for the CoreLogic data. Doing so requires a fraction of rule-of-thumb price setters that is approximately
ten percent higher than matching the impulse response to the model shock. A comparably higher fraction is also
required to match the AR(5) without concavity. As shown in Appendix A.2, using a median price index generates an
impulse response in the data that reaches its peak in two years rather than three years. My approach of calibrating
the peak of the impulse response to the renter ￿ ow utility shock to the peak of the AR(5) IRF for a repeat-sales index
is comparable to simulating data, estimating the AR(5) IRF, and calibrating to match the average of the repeat-sales
and median price IRF peak quarters.
44One may argue that the ￿ ow cost of being a buyer is too large. This could be reduced without meaningfully
changing the main results by relaxing several assumptions made to keep the model tractable. The buyer search
cost is calibrated to a high level because the ￿ at slope for homes priced below average implies that the exponential
distribution for idiosyncratic quality has a long tail. This implies a high value of subsequent search for buyers, which
is o⁄set with a high search cost to maintain a reasonable value of being a buyer. Both using an idiosyncratic match
quality distribution that is bounded above and allowing the signal to reveal more information so that buyers search
45Table 7: Calibrated Parameter Values for Rule of Thumb Model
Parameter Interpretation Value Parameter Interpretation Value
￿ Monthly Discount Factor 0.994 V 0 Value of Leaving MSA $2,631k
￿ Matching Fn Elasticity 0.800 h Flow Util of H $7.5k
￿ Matching Fn E¢ ciency 0.506 u Flow Util of R $3.6k
￿h Monthly Prob H Moving Shock 0.035 b Flow Util of B (search cost) -$92.2k
￿r Monthly Prob R Moving Shock 0.035 s Flow Util of S (search cost) -$9.8k
￿ c Upper Bound, H Entry Cost Dist $463k ￿ Exponential Param for .0023
c Lower Bound, H Entry Cost Dist -$1,121k Idiosyncratic Quality Dist
￿ k Upper Bound, R Entry Cost Dist $412k ￿ Variance Param of Signal Noise 3.80
k Lower Bound, R Entry Cost Dist -$1,172k ￿ Threshold for Signal 10.47
Pop Population 1.484 ￿￿ SD of Innovations to AR(1) shock 0.360
L Prob Leave MSA 0.700 ￿ Persistence of AR(1) shock 0.990
￿ AR(1) Param in Rule of Thumb 0.40
Notes: The calibration is monthly. The parameters under the line are only used in the backward-looking variant of the model.
The parameters for the staggered variant of the model are only minutely di⁄erent and can be found in Appendix A.5.
1.5.3 Ampli￿cation of Momentum in the Calibrated Model
To assess the degree of ampli￿cation of momentum in the calibrated model, I compare the friction-
less, staggered price, and backward-looking variants of the model to one another and to versions
without concave demand. To do so, I examine the impulse response to the model shock to the
￿ ow utility of renters. The impulse response is computed as the average di⁄erence between two
sets of simulations that use the same sequence of random shocks except for one period in which
an additional standard deviation shock is added. I contrast the model impulse responses with the
impulse response to a one standard deviation price shock to the quarterly CoreLogic national house
price index estimated from an AR(5), as in Section 1.2.
Figure 10 shows the resulting simulations alongside the AR(5) impulse response. The ￿gure
shows that the strategic complementarity created by concave demand substantially ampli￿es both
sources of price insensitivity.
Panel A compares a frictionless model with concave demand to staggered price models with and
without concave demand, in dotted red, solid blue, and dashed green, respectively.45 Without both
houses they expect to like would reduce the calibrated buyer search cost substantially. Ongoing work to adjust for
bias in the slope of the micro estimates due to measurement error in the true relative markup, as discussed in Section
1.3, may also result in a smaller calibrated buyer search cost.
45The non-concave impulse response depends on the semi-elasticity of the non-concave demand function. For the
main text, I assume a semi-elasticity that equal to the steady-state semi-elasticity at the average price in the concave
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Figure 10: Price Impulse Response Functions: Model and Data
Notes: Panel A shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation negative shock to the ￿ow utility of renting in the
frictionless model with concave demand, the staggered model with concave demand, and the staggered model without concave
demand. For the model without concave demand, the threshold for being overpriced ￿ is raised to a level that is never reached,
the slope of the demand curve is adjusted to the steady-state slope at the average price in the concave model, the model
is recalibrated, and the standard deviation of the stochastic shock is adjusted so that the impulse response is even with the
frictionless and concave impulse response after a year. Panel B shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to
the ￿ow utility of renting in the backward-looking model with and without concavity. For the model without concave demand,
the threshold for being overpriced ￿ is raised to a level that is never reached, the slope of the demand curve is adjusted to the
steady-state slope at the average price in the concave model, and the model is recalibrated. Also shown in panel B in the dotted
black line and with grey 95% con￿dence intervals and on the right axis is the impulse response to a one standard deviation
price shock estimated from a quarterly AR(5) for the seasonally and CPI adjusted CoreLogic national house price index for
1976-2013, as in Figure 1. Simulated impulse responses are calculated by di⁄erencing two simulations of the model from periods
100 to 150, both of which use identical random shocks except in period 101 in which a one standard deviation negative draw is
added to the random sequence, and then computing the average di⁄erence over 100 simulations.
concave demand and staggering, reset prices jump on impact and reach a convergent path to the
stochastic steady state as soon as all sellers have reset their prices, as indicated by the dotted red
line and the dashed green line. In combination, however, the two-month staggered pricing friction
is ampli￿ed into 10 months of autocorrelated price changes, as shown in the solid blue line.
The gradual impulse response results from sellers only partially adjusting their list prices when
they have the opportunity to do so in order to not ruin their chances of attracting a buyer by being
substantially overpriced. Repeated partial adjustment results in serially correlated price changes
that last far beyond the point that all sellers have reset their price.46 Note that the impulse response
case and discuss alternative assumptions in Appendix A.6.
46With staggered pricing there are further dynamic incentives because price resetters leapfrog sellers with ￿xed
47includes endogenous entry, which weakens house price momentum as buyers and sellers re-time their
entry into the market to take advantage of the gradual price change. This e⁄ect, which is discussed
in Section 1.6, is not strong enough to eliminate momentum. Appendix A.6 shows that concave
demand also generates signi￿cant momentum for a downward shock. Intuitively, if other sellers do
not lower their prices immediately, cutting a house￿ s price substantially has a small e⁄ect on its
probability of sale and leaves money on the table.
Despite the ￿ve-fold ampli￿cation, the staggered-pricing variant of the model only explains
one quarter of the three-year impulse response in the data. This is unsurprising: there are many
potential frictions that cause momentum, so it would be unrealistic to expect staggered pricing
alone to be ampli￿ed by a factor of 20 in order to fully explain the data.47
To fully explain the impulse response in the data, I use the backward-looking variant of the
model and raise the fraction of backward-looking sellers ￿ until the impulse response function to
the renter ￿ ow utility shock peaks after 36 months. This occurs when 26.5 percent of sellers are
backward-looking. By contrast, without concave demand, between 78 and 93 percent of sellers
would have to be backward-looking in order to explain a 36-month impulse response to the renter
￿ ow utility shock, with the precise number depending on how the non-concave demand curve is
calibrated, as described in Appendix A.6.
Far fewer backward-looking sellers are needed to match the data with concave demand because
the strategic complementarity creates a two-way feedback. When a shock occurs, the backward-
looking sellers are not aware of it for several months, and the rational sellers only slightly increase
their prices so that they do not dramatically reduce their chances of attracting a buyer. When the
backward-looking sellers do observe increasing prices, they observe a much small increase than in
the non-concave case and gradually adjust their price according to their AR(1) rule, reinforcing the
incentives of the rational sellers not to raise their prices too quickly.
Panel B of Figure 10 compares the model with 26.5 percent backward-looking sellers in solid
orange to the AR(5) impulse response in dotted black and a model with an identical fraction of
prices and are subsequently leapfrogged themselves. The interested reader is referred to Appendix A.4.8 for a detailed
discussion of the dynamic intuition with staggered pricing.
47The momentum created by staggered pricing cannot be dramatically enhanced by increasing the length of stag-
gering without increasing the average time to sale. For instance, if prices were ￿xed for four months instead of two
months, the longer friction would be o⁄set because there would be fewer sellers who remain stuck at an old price
when a group of sellers sets their prices.
48backward-looking sellers without concave demand in dashed turquoise. The impulse response with
concave demand and the AR(5) impulse response are similar, although the model impulse response
grows less at the beginning and is slightly more S-shaped than the AR(5) impulse response. This
is the case because backward-looking sellers are insensitive to the shock for several months and so
the growth rate of prices takes a few months to accelerate. Without concave demand, there is an
immediate jump in prices as rational sellers raise their prices as soon as the shock to fundamentals
occurs. This is followed by nine months of rapid price growth as the backward-looking sellers catch
up. The strategic complementarity thus provides considerable ampli￿cation.48
With additional initial sources of price insensitivity it is likely that the 26.5 percent ￿gure
could be reduced even further.49 Intuitively, concave demand creates an incentive to price close
to others that interacts with any source of heterogenous price insensitivity to create additional
momentum.50 One particular friction that the literature has identi￿ed as causing momentum￿
incomplete information and learning by sellers and possibly buyers￿ merits additional discussion
because the ampli￿cation from concave demand is likely to be particularly potent. In a model with
dispersed information without strategic complementarities, such as Lucas￿(1972) ￿islands￿model,
Bayesian learning about a change in fundamentals occurs fairly rapidly. Indeed, Anenberg (2013)
shows that lagged market conditions do not have a signi￿cant impact on seller pricing after a four
months. However, with a strategic complementarity and dispersed information, the motive to price
close to others makes higher order beliefs￿ that is beliefs about the beliefs of others￿ matter, a
point ￿rst made by Phelps (1983) and modeled by Woodford (2003) and Lorenzoni (2009). Learning
about higher order beliefs is more gradual because agents must learn not only about fundamentals
but also about what everyone else has learned. Strategic complementarities in such a framework
can cause very gradual price adjustment even if ￿rst-order learning occurs rapidly.
48A direct empirical test of the degree to which concave demand ampli￿es momentum is beyond the scope of this
paper. I do, however, have one intriguing data point that may point the way for such a test in the future: a smaller
data set of merged Altos-DataQuick listings for Phoenix. Phoenix has a higher housing supply elasticity and by some
measures exhibits less momentum than coastal California, and a preliminary analysis of its micro data suggests that
the degree of curvature in Phoenix may be weaker. With many MSAs of data, one could evaluate whether the degree
of concavity in a cross section of cities can explain di⁄erences in momentum across cities.
49For instance, adding staggered pricing to the rule-of-thumb model reduces the fraction of rule-of-thumb sellers
needed to explain the data to 23.5 percent.
50Heterogeneity in sensitivity is key, as insensitivity that is uniform across identical sellers would imply that all
sellers price at the average price, neutralizing the strategic complementarity.
491.6 Can Momentum Help Explain Housing Cycles?
This section argues that momentum helps explain the three striking features of the dynamics of
housing cycles presented in Section 1.2: volume and inventory are more volatile than price, price
changes and inventory levels are highly correlated, and inventory swings correspond to periods
where seller entry and sales move in opposite directions. Momentum plays a role in causing these
features because some buyers and sellers re-time their sales and purchases in light of predictable
price changes. Before showing how this explains the three facts, I analyze the impulse response for
non-price variables to provide intuition. The precise cause of momentum does not matter greatly for
the re-timing of entry, so I focus on the backward-looking model with 26.5 percent backward-looking
sellers because it fully captures the momentum in the data.
1.6.1 Impulse Responses of Non-Price Variables
Figure 11 shows the impulse responses of price, sales volume, months of supply, and buyer and
seller entry in a frictionless model without backward-looking sellers (dotted red) and in a model
with 26.5 percent backward-looking sellers (solid blue). Recall that the shock reduces the value of
being a renter and increases the incentives to enter the market to buy.
Without staggered pricing, price jumps immediately and gradually returns towards the stochas-
tic steady state, so there is not a strong incentive to buy or sell today relative to tomorrow. Buyer
entry and seller entry, shown in panel D in dotted red and dash-dotted green, both jump on impact
due to the change in the relative value of homeownership and the elevated house price. Buyer entry
is slightly higher for 18 months as the ratio of buyers to sellers slowly rises until it settles on a
stable transition path to the stochastic steady state. The slow adjustment of market tightness, in
turn, causes a gradual increase in volume and decrease in months of supply.
By contrast, the momentum generated with a small fraction of backward-looking sellers makes
price changes predictable. This creates a strong incentive for potential buyers on the margin of
entering to enter today and for sellers on the margin of entering to wait to do so until prices rise.51
51In the model, this operates through the entry cuto⁄s c
￿
t and k
￿
t, which are de￿ned by di⁄erences of value functions
in equations (9) and (10). For instance, the cuto⁄ cost for a renter to enter k
￿
t = V
r
t ￿V
b
t . Because the value function
of being a renter V
r
t accounts for the likelihood of getting a shock and entering as a buyer in the future, when
prices are expected to rise V
r
t falls relative to V
b
t , k
￿
t falls, and the mass of buyer entrants, which is proportional to
1 ￿ K (k
￿
t), rises.
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Figure 11: Impulse Response Functions in the Rule-ofThumb Model
Notes: Each panel plots the indicated impulse response to a one standard deviation shock for the frictionless and backward-
looking variants of the model. The frictionless model uses the same calibration and shock as the 26.5 percent backward-looking
model with no backward-looking sellers. Simulated impulse responses are calculated by di⁄erencing two simulations of the model
from periods 100 to 150, both of which use identical random shocks except in period 101 in which a one standard deviation
negative draw is added to the random sequence, and then computing the average di⁄erence over 100 simulations.
The entry responses are visible in panel D as a gap opens up between the solid blue line,
which represents buyer entry with 26.5 percent backward-looking sellers, and the dotted red line,
which corresponds to buyer entry in a frictionless model. A similar gap opens up for sellers,
as shown by the dashed black line (26.5 percent backward-looking) and the dash-dotted green
line (frictionless). Volume picks up and the growth in sales, overshooting of buyer entry, and
undershooting of seller entry relative to the frictionless case together cause inventory to adjust
more rapidly and substantially than it does in the frictionless model, as shown in panel C. The
stock of renters becomes depleted and the stock of homeowners becomes enlarged to the extent
that 15 months after the shock, they reverse roles and overshoot the frictionless price path again.
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Figure 12: Sample Simulation of Entry, Volume, and Homes For Sale
Notes: This ￿gure shows buyer entry, seller entry, sales, and the stock of homes listed for sale from a simulation of the
backward-looking variant of the model with 26.5 percent backward-looking sellers.
This causes inventory and sales volume to mean revert more quickly. In fact, inventory and sales
overshoot the frictionless impulse response once again as prices begin to stabilize due to the glut of
sellers and lack of buyers. These responses look similar to the panel VAR presented in Section 1.2.
1.6.2 Explaining the Housing Cycle Facts
Buyer and Seller Entry Forward looking entry responses imply that seller entry and buyer entry
move in opposite directions at peaks and troughs, corresponding to periods of sudden inventory
adjustment, as shown for the recent boom and bust in Figure 2. While the impulse responses
illustrate a similar pattern in the model, Figure 1.6.2 provides further con￿rmation of the model￿ s
ability to replicate the data by showing a sample simulation that looks strikingly similar to Figure
2. Initially there is a sellers￿market in which inventory is low, and buyer and seller entry track one
another. When the market peaks, buyer entry dries up but seller entry remains high as sellers seek
to sell to buyers who need to buy now and are willing to pay high prices. As a result, inventory
quickly spikes. When buyers ￿nally re-enter the market, seller entry lags and the inventory glut
dissipates.
52Table 8: Quantitative Performance of Calibrated Models
Data Frictionless Staggered 26.5% Backward Looking
SD Annual ￿log(Real Price) 0.065 0.67 0.065} 0.065}
SD Annual ￿log(Sales) 0.143 0.060 0.057 0.090
SD Annual ￿log(Inventory) 0.207 0.040 0.055 0.306
Regression Coe¢ cient of -.140 0.124 0.010 -0.196
log(Inventory) on ￿yr log(Real Price) (.015) (.023) (0.006) (.007)
Regression R2 .543 0.034 0.000 0.797
Notes: } indicates the model is calibrated to match the data. All are statistics calculated as means of 200 random simulations
of 500 years. The standard deviations of annual log changes in the model are calculated by collapsing simulated data to the
quarterly level, taking logs, and reporting the quarterly standard deviations of annual di⁄erences. Inventory is measured as
months of supply. The regression of log price changes on log inventory levels is as in equation (26), with inventory measured as
months of supply at the midpoint of the year di⁄erenced to calculate the log change in price. The frictionless model, which is
not recalibrated to match the data, uses the staggered price calibration but would look nearly identical if the backward-looking
calibration were used.
The Relative Volatility of Price, Volume and Inventory In housing search models without
momentum, inventory and volume are too smooth relative to the data. The top half of Table 8
shows the standard deviation of annual changes of log price, log volume, and log months of supply
in the data and three versions of the model. In the frictionless price model, months of supply is
about a ￿fth as volatile and volume less than half as volatile as the data.
This is not unique to my particular frictionless model. In a broad class of housing search models,
combining the steady-state value of being a seller with the steady-state price and di⁄erentiating
yields:
dp
dPr[Sell]
=
Seller Surplus
1 ￿ ￿
.
This steady state response illustrates that if the seller surplus is not miniscule, price is very sensitive
to the probability of sale, which is mechanically related to inventory and volume.52 The relative
volatility of volume and inventory are also low due to the gradual dynamic adjustment of market
tightness as shown in the impulse responses.
The low volatility of inventory is directly analogous to labor search models. Shimer (2005)
52Diaz and Jerez (2013) explain the relative volatilities in a model without momentum by using a calibration in
which the seller surplus is 0.5% of the purchase price. Consequently, they argue that price is too insensitive and
volume and time on the market are too sensitive to shocks and introduce a model with ampli￿ed price volatility. My
calibration, which uses a seller surplus that is approximately 7.5% of the steady state price, implies that price is too
volatile in a frictionless setting. Head et al. (2014) make a similar point that momentum reduces price volatility.
53shows that unless the employer surplus is tiny, labor search models have di¢ culty accounting for
the volatility of unemployment because most of the response to a shock is absorbed by the wage.
Here, the unemployment rate is analogous to inventory and the wage rate is analogous to price.
Like sticky wages in labor search models, momentum makes house prices adjust more slowly and
slightly reduces price volatility. Quantities adjust slightly more and inventory adjusts substantially
more, as shown in the impulse responses and Table 8, which shows the standard deviation of annual
changes for log price, log sales, and log inventory averaged over 200 500-year simulations. Inventory
is somewhat too volatile in the calibrated model, although it is of the same order of magnitude as
the data in contrast to the frictionless model. Volume, on the other hand, falls slightly short of
the data, which suggests that other factors, such as lock in due to equity (Stein, 1995), may play
a role in amplifying volume volatility. Appendix A.2 shows that the model￿ s strongest prediction
about relative volatilities￿ that momentum and inventory volatility are positively correlated￿ is
borne out in the cross-section of cities used for the panel VAR in Section 1.2.
Housing Phillips Curve In the data, price changes are strongly negatively correlated with
inventory levels, creating a ￿housing Phillips curve.￿In the frictionless case depicted in Figure 11,
price changes are negatively correlated with inventory changes, albeit weakly because the inventory
response is delayed due to gradual entry and search frictions. With persistent but mean reverting
shocks, this generates a positive correlation between price changes and inventory levels because
when inventory is high, prices are low and tend to rise towards the stochastic steady state. This
can be seen in the bottom half of Table 8, which shows a regression coe¢ cient ￿1 in:
￿t;t￿4 log(p) = ￿0 + ￿1 log(MSt￿2) + ", (26)
estimated on simulated quarterly data. For a frictionless model, the regression coe¢ cient is signif-
icantly positive, although with a small R-squared.
With momentum, inventory rapidly adjusts and then mean reverts while price appreciation
grows and then gradually weakens, as shown in Figure 11. This creates a strong negative correlation
between price changes and inventory levels. Table 8 shows that with 26.5 percent backward-looking
sellers, a robust negative relationship emerges. In fact, the relationship is slightly stronger than in
54the data with an R-squared of nearly 0.8. Appendix A.2 shows that the housing Phillips curve is
stronger, both in terms of the magnitude of ￿1 and in terms of explanatory power, in cities with
more momentum. This is consistent with the model.
1.7 Conclusion
The degree and persistence of autocorrelation in house price changes is one of the housing market￿ s
most distinctive features and greatest puzzles. This chapter introduces a mechanism that ampli￿es
small frictions that have been discussed in the literature into substantial momentum. Search
frictions and concave demand in relative price together imply that increasing one￿ s list price above
the market average is costly, while lowering one￿ s list price below the market average has little
bene￿t. This strategic complementarity induces sellers to set their list prices close to the market
average. Consequently, modest initial price insensitivity to changes in fundamentals can lead to
prolonged periods of autocorrelated price changes as sellers slowly adjust their list price to remain
close to the mean.
This ampli￿cation mechanism depends critically on a concave e⁄ect of unilaterally changing a
house￿ s list price relative to the average on the probability of sale. I identify this e⁄ect in micro data
by instrumenting for list price with a proxy for the equity position of sellers and ￿nd statistically
and economically signi￿cant concavity.
To demonstrate the strategic complementarity￿ s ability to prolong an initial source of price
insensitivity, I introduce an equilibrium search model in which buyers avoid looking at homes they
perceive to be overpriced. I calibrate the model to the micro data and consider the quantitative
impact of two di⁄erent sources of insensitivity. A two-month staggered pricing friction is ampli￿ed
into ten months of autocorrelated price changes. If just 26.5 percent of sellers use a backward-
looking rule of thumb, the impulse response to a shock lasts for three years, as in the data. Without
concave demand, 78 to 93 percent of sellers would have to be backward-looking. The ampli￿cation
channel also interacts with other frictions that have been discussed by the literature. In particular,
concave demand in relative price would substantially amplify momentum created by learning in
an ￿islands￿model because learning about higher order beliefs is particularly sluggish. Assessing
whether such a model can explain the momentum in the data without a small number of non-
rational sellers is a promising path for future research.
55Momentum has a substantial impact on housing dynamics because it causes forward-looking
buyers and sellers to re-time their entry into the housing market in order to sell high and buy low.
These buyer and seller entry patterns can help explain the relative volatilities of price, volume, and
inventory, the ￿housing Phillips curve￿relationship between price changes and inventory levels, and
the sudden reversals between buyers￿and sellers￿markets that occurs at peaks and troughs.
Beyond the housing market, this chapter shows how a central idea in macroeconomics￿ that
strategic complementarities can greatly amplify modest frictions￿ can be applied in new contexts.
These contexts can, in turn, serve as empirical laboratories to study macroeconomic phenomena
for which micro evidence has proven elusive. In particular, many models with real rigidities (Ball
and Romer, 1990) use a concave demand curve. This chapter provides new evidence that a concave
demand curve in relative price is not merely a theoretical construct and can have a signi￿cant e⁄ect
on market dynamics.
56Chapter 2:
How Do Foreclosures Exacerbate Housing Downturns?
2.1 Introduction
Foreclosures have been one of the dominant features of the recent housing market downturn. From
2006 through 2011, approximately 7.4 percent of the owner-occupied housing stock experienced
a foreclosure.53 Although the wave of foreclosures has subsided, foreclosures remain at elevated
levels, and understanding the role of foreclosures in housing downturns remains an important part
of reformulating housing policy going forward.
The behavior of the housing market concurrent with the wave of foreclosures is shown in Figure
2.1. Real Estate Owned (REO) sales ￿that is sales of foreclosed homes owned by banks and
the GSEs ￿have made up between 20 and 30 percent of existing home sales nationally. Sales of
existing homes fell 54.9 percent peak-to-trough; retail (non-foreclosure) volume fell 65.7 percent.
Prices dropped considerably, with aggregate price indices plunging by a third and prices falling
by a quarter for indices that exclude distressed sales. Time to sale and vacancy rates have also
climbed, particularly in the retail market. Even with a slowdown in foreclosures due to lawsuits
over fraudulent foreclosure practices, foreclosures have continued at a ferocious pace.
This chapter presents a model in which foreclosures have important general equilibrium e⁄ects
that can explain much of the recent behavior of housing markets, particularly in the hardest-hit
areas. By raising the number of sellers and reducing the number of buyers, by making buyers
more choosey, and by changing the composition of houses that sell, foreclosures sales freeze up the
market for retail sales and reduce both price and sales. Furthermore, the e⁄ects of foreclosures can
be ampli￿ed considerably because price declines induce more default which creates further price
declines, generating a feedback loop. A quantitative calibration suggests that these e⁄ects can be
large: foreclosures exacerbate aggregate price declines by approximately 50 percent and retail price
declines by 30 percent.
Despite the importance of foreclosures in the housing downturn, economists have not closely
examined how the housing market equilibrates when there are a substantial number of distressed
sales. A supply and demand framework, as employed by much of the ￿nancial literature on ￿re sales
53Data from CoreLogic. The data is described in Section 2.5 and Appendix B.4.
57Figure 13: The Role of Foreclosures in the Housing Downturn
Notes: All data is seasonally adjusted national-level data from CoreLogic as described in the data appendix. The
grey bars in panels B and C show the periods in which the new homebuyer tax credit applied. The black line in panel
B shows when foreclosures were stalled due to the exposure of fraudulent foreclosure practices by mortgage servicers.
In panel C, all sales counts are unsmoothed and normalized by the total number of existing home sales at peak while
each price index is normalized by its separate peak value.
58and illiquidity, can potentially explain declining prices and volumes with demand falling relative
to supply but cannot speak to the freezing up of the retail market. Such models also assume that
investors can adjust their positions continuously by transacting in a liquid market, yet housing
is lumpy, illiquid, and expensive. A substantial literature has sought to adapt models to ￿t the
peculiarities of the housing market and explain the positive correlation between volume and price.
For instance, search frictions as in Wheaton (1990), Williams (1995), Krainer (2001), and Novy-
Marx (2009), borrowing constraints as in Stein (1995), and nominal loss aversion as in Genesove
and Mayer (2001) have been shown to play important roles in housing markets. Yet no paper has
explicitly examined the role of distressed sales in a model tailored to housing.
To illustrate the mechanisms through which foreclosures a⁄ect the housing market, a simple
model of the housing market with exogenous foreclosures is introduced. It adds two key ingredients
to an otherwise-standard search-and-matching framework with stochastic moving shocks, random
search, idiosyncratic house valuations, and Nash bargaining over price: REO sellers have higher
holding costs and individuals who are foreclosed upon cannot immediately buy a new house. These
two additions together dry up the market for normal sales, reduce volume and price, and imply
that the market only gradually recovers from a wave of foreclosures. This occurs through three
main e⁄ects. First, the presence of distressed sellers increases the outside option to transacting
for buyers, who have an elevated probability of being matched with a distressed seller next period
and consequently become more selective. This ￿choosey buyer e⁄ect￿endogenizes the degree of
substitutability between bank and retail sales. Second, because foreclosed individuals are locked
out of the market, foreclosures reduce the likelihood that a seller will meet a buyer in the market
through a ￿market tightness e⁄ect.￿ This e⁄ect emphasizes that foreclosures do not simply add
supply to the market: a key feature of foreclosures is that they also reduce demand. Third, there
is a mechanical ￿compositional e⁄ect￿as the average sale looks more like a distressed sale.
The choosey buyer e⁄ect in particular is novel and formalizes folk wisdom in housing markets
that foreclosures empower buyers and cause them to wait for a particularly favorable transaction.
For instance, The New York Times reported that ￿before the recession, people simply looked for a
house to buy ... now they are on a quest for perfection at the perfect price,￿with one real estate
agent adding that ￿this is the fallout from all the foreclosures: buyers think that anyone who is
selling must be desperate. They walk in with the bravado of, ￿ The world￿ s coming to an end, and I
59want a perfect place.￿ ￿ 54 The Wall Street Journal provides similar anecdotal evidence, writing that
price declines ￿have left many sellers unable or unwilling to lower their prices. Meanwhile, buyers
remain gun shy about agreeing to any purchase without getting a deep discount. That dynamic has
fueled buyers￿appetites for bank-owned foreclosures.￿ 55 Although other papers such as Albrecht
et al. (2007, 2013) and Du¢ e et al. (2007) have included seller heterogeneity in an asset market
model, no paper that does so has generated a choosey buyer e⁄ect, which turns out to be important
in explaining the disproportionate freezing up of the retail market.
To provide a more realistic treatment of the downturn, the basic model of the housing market
is embedded in a richer model of mortgage default in which borrowers with negative equity may
default on their mortgage or be locked into their current house despite a desire to move. This
generates a new ampli￿cation channel: an initial shock that reduces prices puts some homeowners
under water and triggers foreclosures, which cause more price declines and in turn further default.
While reminiscent of the literature initiated by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the price declines here
are caused by the general equilibrium e⁄ects of foreclosures. Lock-in of underwater homeowners
also impacts market equilibrium by keeping potential buyers and sellers out of the market.
The richer model is used to quantitatively evaluate the extent to which foreclosures have ex-
acerbated the ongoing housing bust. This quantitative analysis takes a two-pronged approach.
First, we assess the strength of the ampli￿cation channel and its sensitivity to various parameters
in the model. Second, we ￿t the model to data from the 100 largest MSAs to assess the empirical
size of the ampli￿cation channel and test its implications across metropolitan areas. The model
matches the data on the size of the price decline, the number of foreclosures, price declines in
the retail market, and the REO share of sales. It also matches the heterogeneity in foreclosure
discounts over the cycle found by Campbell et al. (2011). However, it falls short of explaining the
full sales decline, suggesting that other forces have depressed transaction volume in the downturn.
The quantitative analysis reveals that foreclosures exacerbate the aggregate price decline in the
downturn by approximately 50 percent in the average MSA (or in other words account for a third
of the decline) and exacerbate the price declines for retail sellers by over 30 percent.
Finally, we analyze the impact of the foreclosure crisis on welfare in our model and simulate
54￿Housing Market Slows as Buyers Get Picky￿June 16, 2010.
55￿Buyer￿ s Market? Stressed Sellers Say Not So Fast￿April 25, 2011.
60three foreclosure-mitigating policies: slowing down foreclosures, re￿nancing mortgages at lower
interest rates, and reducing principal. While we do not conduct a full normative analysis, the
simulations of these policies highlight the trade-o⁄s faced by policy makers.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Before presenting the model, section
2.2 presents facts about the bust across metropolitan areas. To explain the data, the remainder
of the chapter develops a model of how foreclosures a⁄ect the housing market, ￿rst focusing on
mechanisms and then on magnitudes. Section 2.3 introduces a model of exogenous defaults, and
section 2.4 explores the intuitions and qualitative implications of the model. In section 2.5, the
basic model is embedded in a more complete model in which negative equity is a necessary condition
for default, which creates a new ampli￿cation mechanism in the form of a price-default spiral. The
chapter then turns to the magnitudes of the e⁄ects identi￿ed in sections 2.3-2.5. Section 2.6
calibrates the model and quantitatively analyzes the model￿ s comparative statics and the strength
of the price-default ampli￿cation channel. Section 2.7 takes the model to the national and cross-
MSA data from the ongoing downturn. Section 2.8 considers welfare and foreclosure policy, and
section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Facts
The national aggregate time series of price, volume, foreclosure, and REO share presented in Figure
2.1 mask substantial heterogeneity across metropolitan areas in the severity of the housing bust
and wave of foreclosures. To illustrate this, Figure 14 shows price and volume time series for four
of the hardest-hit metropolitan areas. In Las Vegas, for instance, prices fell 61.5 percent, retail
sales fell 84.0 percent, and the REO share was as high as 76.4 percent. Figure 14 also illustrates
how foreclosure sales substitute for retail sales: retail sales rise as REO sales recede and fall as
REO sales surge.
To provide more systematic facts about the heterogeneity of the bust across MSAs, we use a
proprietary data set provided to us by CoreLogic supplemented by data from the United States
Census. CoreLogic provides monthly data for 2000-2011 for the nation as a whole and the 100
largest MSAs, from which we drop 3 MSAs because the full data are not available for these locations
at the start of the crisis. The data set includes a house price index,56 a house price index for retail
56The CoreLogic price index is a widely-used repeat sales index that has behaved similarly to other cited indices
61Figure 14: Price and Transaction Volume in Selected MSAs With High Levels of Foreclosures
Notes: All data is seasonally adjusted CBSA-level data from CoreLogic as described in the Appendix B.4. The sales
lines are smoothed using a moving average. In panel C, all sales counts are normalized by the total number of
existing home sales at peak while each price index is normalized by its separate peak value.
sales only,57 the number of completed foreclosure auctions, sales counts for REOs, new houses,
existing houses (including short sales), and the estimates of quantiles of the LTV distribution
described previously. These statistics are compiled by CoreLogic using public records. CoreLogic￿ s
data covers over 85 percent of transactions nationally. We seasonally adjust the CoreLogic data
and smooth the sales count series using a moving average. A complete description of the data is
in appendix B.4.
By far the best predictor of the size of the bust was the size of the preceding boom. Figure 15
in that it fell by a third during the downturn. The S&P Case-Shiller index shows similar declines to the CoreLogic
index. The FHFA expanded-data index, which includes FHFA data proprietary deeds data from other sources, fell
26.7 percent.
57Given the small number of distressed properties prior to the downturn, price indices for distressed properties
are typically not estimated. The CoreLogic non-distressed price index drops REO sales and short sales from the
database and re-estimates the price index using the same methodology.
62plots the change in log price from 2003 to 2006 against the change in log price from each market￿ s
peak to its trough through 2011. There is a clear downward pattern, with the notable exception of
a few outliers in the lower-left of the diagrams which correspond to metropoitan areas in southern
Michigan which experienced a substantial bust without a large boom.
Figure 15 also reveals a more subtle fact in the data: places that had a larger boom had a
more-than-proportionally larger bust. While a linear relationship between log boom size and log
bust size has an r-squared of .44, adding a quadratic term that allows for larger busts in places
with larger booms as illustrated in Figure 15 increases the r-squared to .57.
This chapter argues that by exacerbating the downturn in the hardest-hit places, foreclosures
can explain much of why the why the relationship between log boom size and log bust size is not
linear. This explanation implies an additional reduced-form cross-sectional test: because default is
closely connected to negative equity, a larger bust should occur in locations with the combination
of a large bubble and a large fraction of houses with high loan balances ￿and thus close to default
￿prior to the bust. To provide suggestive evidence that this prediction is borne out in the data,
the points in Figure 15 are color-coded by quartiles of share of houses in the MSA with over 80
percent LTV in 2006. While the highest measured LTVs came in places that did not have a bust ￿
home values were not in￿ ated in 2006, so the denominator was lowest in these locations ￿one can
see that the majority of MSAs substantially below the quadratic trend line were in the upper end
of the LTV distribution.
To investigate whether the interaction of high LTV and a big bust combined is correlated with
a deep downturn more formally, we estimate regressions of the form:
Y = ￿0 + ￿1 max￿03￿06 log(P) + ￿2 [￿03￿06 log(P)]
2 (27)
+￿3 (Z maxShare LTV > 80%) + ￿4 (￿03￿06 log(P) ￿ Z LTV > 80%)
+￿5 (Z % Second Mortgage, 2006) + ￿6 (￿03￿06 log(P) ￿ Z % Second)
+￿7 (Z Saiz Land Unavailability) + ￿8 (Z Wharton Land Use Regulation) + "
where Z represents a z-score and the outcome variable Y is either the maximum change in log
price, the maximum change in log retail prices, the maximum change in log existing home sales,
the maximum change in log retail sales, the maximum REO share, or the fraction of houses that
63Figure 15: Boom vs. Bust Across MSAs
Note: Scatter plot of seasonally adjusted data from CoreLogic along with quadratic regression line. The data is fully
described in Appendix B.4. Each data point is an MSA and is color coded to indicate in which quartile the MSA falls
when MSAs are sorted by the share of homes with over 80% LTV in 2006. There are two main take-aways. First,
there is a non-log-linear relationship between the size of the boom and the size of the bust, as the regression r-squared
is .44 for a linear model and .57 for a quadratic model. Second, the color-coding of the points provides suggestive
evidence that it is the combination of high LTV and a large bubble that is associated with a disproportionately large
bust.
experience a foreclosure. The key coe¢ cient is ￿4. This regression is similar in spirit to Lamont
and Stein (1999), who show that prices are more sensitive to income shocks in cities with a larger
share of high LTV households, except rather than using income shocks to measure volatility, we use
the size of the preceding bubble as measured by 2003-2006 price growth. We add the fraction of
individuals with a second mortgage or home equity loan to the regression because these loans have
received attention in analyses of the downturn (Mian and Su￿, 2011). Finally, to proxy for the
housing supply elasticity we use a land unavailability index and the Wharton land use regulation
index both from Saiz (2010). Table 9 shows summary statistics for our left hand side variables in
the top panel and our right hand side variables in the bottom panel
The regression results are shown in Table 10. The ￿rst two columns show the impacts on price
64Table 9: MSA Summary Statistics
Unweighted Mean SD Min Max N
Max ￿log(P) -.3398355 .2292549 -.9895244 -.0286884 97
Max ￿log(PRetail) -.2784659 .1929688 -.9229212 -.0388126 97
Max ￿log(SalesExisting) -.9354168 .2684873 -2.53161 -.4671416 97
Max ￿log(SalesRetail) -1.174493 .3181327 -2.736871 -.5613699 97
SalesREO
SalesExisting .3147958 .1648681 .0834633 .795764 97
% Foreclosed .0870826 .0719943 .0104154 .4205121 97
￿log(Price)03￿06 .2974835 .179294 .0389295 .7288995 97
Share LTV > 80% .1452959 .0756078 .025514 .3282766 97
Frac Second Mort, 06 .2026752 .0527425 .0259415 .2896224 97
Saiz Land Unav .2779021 .2112399 .009317 .7964462 97
Wharton Land Reg .2215807 .7050566 -1.239207 1.89206 97
Notes: Summary statistics for variables used in regression analysis. All data is from CoreLogic and fully described
in Appendix B.4. Data is for 100 largest MSAs excluding three for which complete data are unavailable as described
in the appendix.
and retail price. While the additional variables do not explain all of the non-log-linearity, they
have substantial predictive power. The key coe¢ cient shows that the interaction between a large
bubble and the share of homes with high LTV is correlated with large price declines, as suggested
by Figure 15. These interactions also have a large e⁄ect on the REO share of sales and fraction
foreclosed, suggesting that foreclosures have something to do with these trends. The coe¢ cient on
land regulation is also negative yet small, re￿ ecting the ampli￿cation provided by a high housing
supply elasticity. Having many houses with a second mortgage also reduces prices.
For sales, the regression has noticeably less predictive power and the dominant term is the con-
stant. As discussed in the analysis of the national calibration above, this suggests that foreclosures
combined with the size of the bubble will do a much worse job explaining the volume decline than
the price decline, something that will be borne out in our cross-MSA simulations. The interaction
between LTV and the bubble is insigni￿cant for existing sales but signi￿cant and negative for re-
tail sales. The pattern of REO volume largely replacing retail volume is consistent with the four
markets with high levels of foreclosure in Figure 14.
65T
a
b
l
e
1
0
:
C
r
o
s
s
M
S
A
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
o
n
t
h
e
I
m
p
a
c
t
o
f
t
h
e
S
i
z
e
o
f
t
h
e
B
u
b
b
l
e
a
n
d
I
t
s
I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
W
i
t
h
H
i
g
h
L
T
V
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
￿
l
o
g
(
P
)
￿
l
o
g
(
P
R
e
t
a
i
l
)
￿
l
o
g
(
S
a
l
e
s
E
x
i
s
t
i
n
g
)
￿
l
o
g
(
S
a
l
e
s
R
e
t
a
i
l
)
S
a
l
e
s
R
E
O
S
a
l
e
s
E
x
i
s
t
i
n
g
%
F
o
r
e
c
l
o
s
e
d
￿
l
o
g
(
P
r
i
c
e
)
0
3
￿
0
6
1
.
5
0
1
0
.
8
8
4
-
1
.
9
3
2
-
0
.
4
9
3
-
1
.
6
6
2
-
0
.
6
1
5
(
0
.
6
5
6
)
*
*
(
0
.
4
4
4
)
*
*
(
0
.
4
5
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
7
9
7
)
(
0
.
4
7
7
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
1
8
9
)
*
*
*
￿
l
o
g
(
P
r
i
c
e
)
2
0
3
￿
0
6
-
3
.
3
6
9
-
2
.
4
4
0
1
.
4
3
1
-
1
.
0
4
6
3
.
0
1
6
1
.
2
6
7
(
0
.
7
8
5
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
5
2
9
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
5
7
3
)
*
*
(
0
.
9
3
6
)
(
0
.
5
6
1
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
2
2
9
)
*
*
*
Z
S
h
a
r
e
L
T
V
>
8
0
%
0
.
0
6
2
0
.
0
6
4
-
0
.
0
0
8
0
.
0
0
5
-
0
.
0
0
9
-
0
.
0
0
8
(
0
.
0
4
0
)
(
0
.
0
3
0
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
3
8
)
(
0
.
0
5
4
)
(
0
.
0
3
3
)
(
0
.
0
1
5
)
￿
l
o
g
(
P
)
￿
Z
L
T
V
>
8
0
%
-
0
.
3
1
4
-
0
.
3
1
4
-
0
.
1
4
6
-
0
.
3
7
9
0
.
2
1
8
0
.
1
9
7
(
0
.
1
5
5
)
*
*
(
0
.
1
3
5
)
*
*
(
0
.
1
3
8
)
(
0
.
1
8
2
)
*
*
(
0
.
1
0
7
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
6
7
)
*
*
*
Z
F
r
a
c
S
e
c
o
n
d
M
o
r
t
,
0
6
-
0
.
0
5
8
-
0
.
0
3
7
-
0
.
0
6
6
-
0
.
0
7
1
-
0
.
0
2
2
-
0
.
0
1
9
(
0
.
0
3
3
)
*
(
0
.
0
2
3
)
(
0
.
0
3
3
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
4
4
)
(
0
.
0
2
7
)
(
0
.
0
1
0
)
*
￿
l
o
g
(
P
)
￿
Z
S
e
c
o
n
d
0
.
0
9
9
0
.
0
3
6
0
.
1
0
2
0
.
0
4
9
0
.
2
4
5
0
.
0
8
0
(
0
.
1
1
2
)
(
0
.
0
8
7
)
(
0
.
0
9
6
)
(
0
.
1
2
1
)
(
0
.
0
8
8
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
3
6
)
*
*
Z
S
a
i
z
L
a
n
d
U
n
a
v
-
0
.
0
2
1
-
0
.
0
0
8
-
0
.
0
1
1
-
0
.
0
1
4
0
.
0
0
3
-
0
.
0
0
3
(
0
.
0
1
8
)
(
0
.
0
1
5
)
(
0
.
0
1
8
)
(
0
.
0
2
1
)
(
0
.
0
1
5
)
(
0
.
0
0
6
)
Z
W
h
a
r
t
o
n
L
a
n
d
R
e
g
-
0
.
0
3
1
-
0
.
0
2
7
0
.
0
1
7
-
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
1
9
0
.
0
0
8
(
0
.
0
1
4
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
1
1
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
1
7
)
(
0
.
0
1
9
)
(
0
.
0
1
2
)
(
0
.
0
0
5
)
*
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
-
0
.
4
1
7
-
0
.
2
8
2
-
0
.
5
5
1
-
0
.
9
4
4
0
.
4
6
1
0
.
1
3
6
(
0
.
1
0
7
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
7
3
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
6
4
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
1
3
2
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
8
1
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
3
1
)
*
*
*
r
2
0
.
6
4
4
0
.
7
0
3
0
.
2
9
8
0
.
3
5
3
0
.
5
2
1
0
.
6
0
6
N
9
7
9
7
9
7
9
7
9
7
9
7
N
o
t
e
s
:
*
=
1
0
%
S
i
g
n
i
￿
c
a
n
c
e
,
*
*
=
5
%
S
i
g
n
i
￿
c
a
n
c
e
*
*
*
=
1
%
s
i
g
n
i
￿
c
a
n
c
e
.
A
l
l
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
r
e
r
o
b
u
s
t
t
o
h
e
t
e
r
o
s
k
e
d
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
.
A
l
l
d
a
t
a
i
s
f
r
o
m
C
o
r
e
L
o
g
i
c
a
n
d
f
u
l
l
y
d
e
s
c
r
i
b
e
d
i
n
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
B
.
4
.
D
a
t
a
i
s
f
o
r
1
0
0
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
M
S
A
s
e
x
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
3
f
o
r
w
h
i
c
h
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
d
a
t
a
a
r
e
u
n
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
a
s
d
e
s
c
r
i
b
e
d
i
n
a
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
B
.
4
.
T
h
e
k
e
y
t
a
k
e
-
a
w
a
y
i
s
t
h
e
c
o
e
¢
c
i
e
n
t
o
n
t
h
e
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
b
u
b
b
l
e
s
i
z
e
a
n
d
L
T
V
,
w
h
i
c
h
s
h
o
w
s
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
s
e
t
w
o
f
a
c
t
o
r
s
t
o
g
e
t
h
e
r
w
e
r
e
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
a
l
a
r
g
e
p
r
i
c
e
d
e
c
l
i
n
e
i
n
t
h
e
b
u
s
t
.
662.3 Housing Market Model
To theoretically examine the e⁄ect of forelcosures, we develop a model of the housing market in
which foreclosures are exogenous. We subsequently embed this model in a framework in which
default is modeled more realistically. Consequently, in this section, we focus on the mechanisms
and qualitative predictions and defer a quantitative analysis of the model to section 2.7.
2.3.1 Setup
We consider a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides-style general equilibrium search model of the housing
market. Search frictions play an important role in housing markets: houses are illiquid, most
households own one house and move infrequently, buyers and sellers are largely atomistic, and search
is costly, time consuming, and random. Additionally, the outside options of market participants
are crucial in search models, so a search framework is well-suited to formalizing the choosey buyer
e⁄ect described in the introduction.
Time is discrete and the discount factor is ￿. There are a unit mass of individuals and a unit
mass of houses, both ￿xed. This is a good approximation of the the downturn, in which there has
been a very low level of new construction and decreased migration.58
The setup of the model￿ s steady state is illustrated schematically in Figure 16. Table 11
de￿nes the model￿ s key variables. To simplify the analysis, we assume no default in steady state,
which is approximately the case when prices are stable or rising.59 In steady state, mass l0 of
individuals are homeowners. Homeowners randomly experience shocks with probability ￿ that
induce them to leave their house as in Krainer (2001) and Ngai and Tenreyro (2013).60 We assume
that these shocks occur at a constant rate and that only individuals who receive a moving shock
search for houses. This assumption turns o⁄ the ampli￿cation channel identi￿ed by Novy-Marx
(2009) through which endogenous entry and exit decisions by market participants in a search model
create a feedback loop which magni￿es the e⁄ects of fundamental shocks.
An individual who receives a moving shock enters the housing market as both a buyer with
58We do not consider the impact of long-run changes in the homeownership rate and retirement rate on the long-run
equilibrium of the market, nor do we consider the long-run impact of new construction, both of which may be a⁄ected
by the downturn and are important subjects for future research.
59Allowing default in steady state complicates the analysis but does not substantially change the results.
60Moving shocks are a reduced form for a number of di⁄erent di⁄erent life events that trigger a change in housing
preference, such as the birth of children, death, job changes, and liquidity shocks.
67Figure 16: Schematic Diagram of No Foreclosure Steady State of Model
￿ ow utility ub and a normal seller with holding cost mn. Because shocks create both a buyer and
a seller, the model is a closed system with a ￿xed population.61 In Section 2.7 we compare our
model￿ s predictions to data from both national and local markets, although the model as literally
interpreted applies best to an metropolitan area.
As in Ngai and Tenreyro (2013), we assume that the buyer and seller act as independent
agents. This means that there is no interaction between the buyer￿ s problem or bargaining game
and the seller￿ s, and there is no structure placed on whether an individual buys or sells ￿rst. This
assumption is not innocuous, as whether homeowners have su¢ cient liquidity to buy ￿rst may be
important for market equilibrium and may a⁄ect bargaining as individuals who buy before selling
holding two homes (Anenberg and Bayer, 2013). However, these e⁄ects are likely to be small
relative to REOs. For instance, Springer (1996) examines several measures of seller motivation
and ￿nds that only REO sellers are distinguishable from normal sellers, and Anenberg and Bayer
￿nd that individuals who buy ￿rst sell their homes at a two percent discount, a ￿gure that is
swamped by the average REO discount.
Buyers and sellers in the housing market are matched each period. Matching is entirely random
61We use a closed system so that housing prices are not determined principally by the ￿ ow rates of buyers into
and sellers out of the market but rather by the incentives of buyers and sellers in the market. Most moves are
within-MSA (Sainai and Souleles, 2009) or to MSAs with highly correlated housing prices, so the assumption of a
closed system is reasonable.
68Table 11: Variables in Housing Market Model
Variable Description
Endogenous Variables
h Stochastic Match Quality ￿ F (h)
hn, hd Cuto⁄ h for normal, REO sellers
SB
m;h, SS
m;h Surplus of type m seller with match quality h for buyer, seller
pm;h Price for type m seller with match quality h
￿ Market tightness (buyers/sellers)
qs (￿), qb (￿) Prob seller meets buyer, buyer meets seller
rm, rd Ratio of normal, REO sellers to total sellers
l0, l1 Masses of homeowners, homeowners that could foreclose
vb, vn, vd, vr Masses of buyers, normal sellers, REO sellers, renters
Value Functions
Vh Value of owning home with match quality h
Vn;Vd Value of seller for normal, REO sellers
B Value of buyer
R Value of renter
Parameters
￿ Discount factor
￿ Probability of moving shock
￿ Probability moving shock causes foreclosure
￿ Probability of leaving renting
￿ Seller￿ s Nash bargaining weight
￿ Probability of match in period (C-D matching function)
￿ Exponent in C-D matching function
￿ Parameter of exponential distribution for F (h)
a Shifter on exponential distribution for F (h)
ub, ur Flow utility of being a buyer, renter
mn, md Flow utility of being a seller for normal, REO
and search intensity is ￿xed, allowing us to focus on the e⁄ects of distressed sales rather than the
search mechanism. When matched, the buyer draws a ￿ ow utility h from a distribution F (h).
Utility is linear and house valuations are purely idiosyncratic so that the transaction decision leads
to a cuto⁄ rule. These valuations are completely public, and prices are determined by generalized
Nash bargaining. Because buyers know whether the seller is an individual or a bank in practice,
symmetric information is reasonable. If the buyer and seller decide to transact, the seller leaves the
market and the buyer becomes a homeowner in l0 deriving ￿ ow utility h from the home until they
receive a moving shock. If not, the buyer and seller each return to the market to be matched next
period. Note that for simplicity we do not allow speculators or ￿￿ ippers,￿who would presumably
sell quickly.
69We introduce foreclosures into this basic steady state setup by adding two key ingredients. First,
REO sellers have a higher holding costs, which is the case for several reasons. Mortgage servicers,
who execute the foreclosure and REO sale, have substantial balance sheet concerns. In most cases,
they must make payments to security holders until a foreclosure liquidates, and they must also
assume the costs of pursuing the foreclosure, securing, renovating, and maintaining the house, and
selling the property (Theologides, 2010). Furthermore, even though they are paid additional fees
to compensate for the costs of foreclosure and are repaid when the foreclosed property sells, the
servicer￿ s e⁄ective return is likely far lower than its opportunity cost of capital. Additionally,
owner-occupants have much lower costs of maintenance and security. Finally, REO sellers usually
leave a property vacant and thus forgo rental income or ￿ ow utility from the property.
An implicit assumption is that no deep-pocketed and patient market maker buys from distressed
sellers and holds the property until a suitable buyer is found. While investors or ￿￿ ippers￿have
bought some foreclosures, most have been sold by realtors to homeowners. This is likely due to
agency problems and high transactions costs.
Second, individuals who experience a foreclosure are locked out of the market. This re￿ ects
the fact that a foreclosure dramatically reduces a borrower￿ s credit score. Indeed, many banks,
the GSEs, and the FHA will not lend to someone who recently defaulted. Instead, foreclosed
individuals become renters. This is supported by the data: Molloy and Shan (Forthcoming) use
credit report data to show that households that experience a foreclosure start are 55-65 percentage
points less likely to have a mortgage two years after a foreclosure start. For simplicity, we assume
that the rental market is segmented, and renters ￿ ow back into buying at an exogenous and ￿xed
rate. While segmentation is a somewhat extreme assumption in the long run, it is a more reasonable
approximation for the short-run e⁄ects in which we are primarily interested as conversions from
owner occupied to rental units are costly and slow. Introducing an endogenous rental price and
making the out￿ ow rate covary with the price would create a force that mitigates some of the e⁄ects
in the model.
Because ￿ ow utilities for foreclosures are drawn from the same distribution as for non-foreclosures,
we are implicitly assuming that foreclosures are of roughly equal quality, which is likely not the
case in practice (Gerardi et al., 2013). In our calibration, we are careful to use moments from
studies that caerfully control for quality.
70Figure 17: Schematic Diagram of Housing Market Model With Foreclosure
While these are the only two new assumptions we make, foreclosures may have other e⁄ects.
They may cause negative externalities on neighboring properties due to physical damage, the pres-
ence of a vacant home, or crime. Campbell et al. (2011) show that such e⁄ects are small and
highly localized, although contagion is certainly possible in neighborhoods with high densities of
foreclosures. There may also be buyer heterogeneity with respect to their willingness to purchase
a foreclosure, generating an additional channel through which the REO discount widens as non-
natural buyers purchase foreclosures. Finally, foreclosures may cause banks to limit credit supply,
as shown theoretically by Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011).
The two critical assumptions are introduced into the model in Figure 17. To simplify the
analysis, we assume away re-default.62 Instead, we consider a mass of potential defaulters and
analyze how these potential defaulters ￿ ow through the system. One can think of these potential
defaulters as homeowners with high mortgage balances as will be the case in section 2.5. These
individuals have mass l1, and at time t = 0, when we introduce the exogenous foreclosure shock,
62We assume away re-default to keep the model consistent with the extended model in section 2.5. While this
assumption does slightly increase the speed of convergence back to steady state over the course of the crisis, it does
not substantively alter the quantiatative or qualitative results.
71we move everyone in l0 to l1. Potential defaulters in l1 also receive moving shocks with probability
￿, but if they receive a moving shock it triggers a foreclosure with probability ￿(t) and is a normal
moving shock with probability 1￿￿(t). If it is a normal moving shock, the homeowners becomes
a buyer and a seller as in steady state. A foreclosure shock, however, causes a bank or GSE with
holding cost md to take possession of the house and enter the housing market and the homeowner
to become a renter with ￿ ow utility ur.63 Renters become buyers each period with exogenous
probability ￿. Because there is no re-default, all buyers, including those who were formerly
renters, are added to l0 when they buy a house, so the model gradually returns to steady state.
Buyers and sellers of both types are matched in the housing market. Let vb (t), vr (t), vn (t),
and vd (t) be the masses of buyers, renters, normal sellers, and REO sellers in the market at time
t. Market tightness ￿(t) is equal to the ratio of buyers to sellers:
￿(t) =
vb (t)
vn (t) + vd (t)
: (28)
Unlike general equilibrium search models of the labor market in which market tightness is deter-
mined principally by a free entry condition for ￿rms posting vacancies, here market tightness is
determined by ￿ ows into renting due to default and out of renting at rate ￿.
For the matching technology, we use a standard Cobb-Douglas matching function so that the
number of matches when there are b buyers and s sellers is ￿b￿s1￿￿. The probability a seller meets
a buyer in a period with market tightness ￿ is given by qs (￿) =
￿b￿s1￿￿
s = ￿￿￿; and the probability
a buyer meets a seller is qb (￿) =
￿b￿s1￿￿
b = ￿￿￿￿1.
Let Vh (t) be the value of being in a house with match quality h at time t, Vm (t) be the value of
being a seller of type m (either n or d) at time t, B (t) be the value of being a buyer at time t, and
R(t) be the value of being a renter at time t. Vh (t) is equal to the ￿ ow payo⁄ plus the discounted
expected continuation value:
Vh (t) = h + ￿ f￿ [Vn (t + 1) + B (t + 1)] + (1 ￿ ￿)Vh (t + 1)g. (29)
63The bank must hold a foreclosure auction, but in the vast majority of cases the auction reserve is not met and
the bank takes the house as an REO. For instance, Campbell et al. (2011) report that 82 percent of foreclosures in
Boston are sold as REOs rather than at auction. For simplicity we assume all houses become REO.
72The match surplus created when a buyer meets a seller of type m = fn, dg and draws an
idiosyncratic match quality of h at time t is a key value in the model. Denote this surplus by
Sm;h (t), the buyer￿ s portion of the surplus by SB
m;h (t), and the seller￿ s portion by SS
m;h (t). Let
the price of the house sold if a transaction occurs be pm;h (t). The buyer￿ s share of the surplus is
equal to the value of being in the house minus the price and their outside option of staying in the
market:
SB
m;h (t) = Vh (t) ￿ pm;h (t) ￿ ub ￿ ￿B (t + 1): (30)
The seller￿ s share of the surplus is equal to the price minus their outside option of staying in the
market:
SS
m;h (t) = pm;h (t) ￿ m ￿ ￿Vm (t + 1): (31)
Prices are set by generalized Nash bargaining with weight ￿ for the seller, so:
SS
m;h(t)
SB
m;h(t)
=
￿
1 ￿ ￿
8 m. (32)
Buyers and type m sellers will transact if the idiosyncratic match quality h is above a threshold
value, corresponding to zero total surplus and denoted by hm (t). Because total surplus is:
Sm;h (t) = Vh (t) ￿ (m + ub) ￿ (￿B (t + 1) + ￿Vm (t + 1)) (33)
the cuto⁄ is implicitly de￿ned by:
Vhm(t) = m + ub + ￿ (B (t + 1) + Vm (t + 1)). (34)
We can then de￿ne the remaining value functions. The value of being a type m seller is equal
to the ￿ ow payo⁄ plus the discounted continuation value plus the expected surplus of a transaction
times the probability a transaction occurs. Because sellers meet buyers with probability qs (￿(t))
and transactions occur with probability 1 ￿ F (hm(t)), Vm is de￿ned by:
Vm (t) = m + ￿Vm (t + 1) + qs (￿(t))(1 ￿ F (hm(t)))E
￿
SS
m;h (t)jh ￿ hm (t)
￿
: (35)
73The most important aspect of Vm is that in a downturn qs (￿) falls below its steady state value
because foreclosures create renters rather than buyers (￿ < 1). The chance that a seller does not
meet a buyer thus reduces the value of being a seller.
The value of being a buyer is de￿ned similarly, although we must account for the fact that the
buyer can be matched with two types of sellers. Let the probability of matching with a type m
seller conditional on a match be rm (t) =
vm(t)
vn(t)+vd(t). B is de￿ned by:
B (t) = ub + ￿B (t + 1) + qb (￿(t))
X
m
rm (t)(1 ￿ F (hm(t)))E
￿
SB
m;h (t)jh ￿ hm (t)
￿
. (36)
Because of random matching, as more REO sellers enter the market the weight on REO sellers in
the buyer￿ s value function rd rises. REO sellers are be more likely to sell, so foreclosures raise the
value of being a buyer. The decline in ￿ caused by foreclosures also raises qb (￿), further increasing
the value of being a buyer.
It is worth discussing what the implications of allowing buyers to direct their search towards
foreclosures would be. A model with completely segmented REO and retail markets produces
unreasonable parameter values. Intuitively, the REO and retail markets are linked by a buyer
indi⁄erence condition that the probability of a match times the surplus must be the same in the
REO market and the retail market. With a reasonable foreclosure discount, buyer indi⁄erence can
only hold if the opportunity cost of waiting slightly longer for a distressed sale ￿the ￿ ow utility
from being in that house ￿is implausibly high.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that any buyers look exclusively at one type of property. Instead,
partially-directed search, in which buyers are able to direct their search to particular sub-markets
in which the REO share of vacancies is higher than other sub-markets but is still not close to
one, is most plausible. Examples of sub-markets include neighborhoods within a MSA or lower
priced homes where there are likely to be more foreclosures. In this case, the e⁄ects we identify
would be most pronounced in those sub-markets which had the highest REO share of vacancies,
although there would be some spillovers because marginal individuals would switch to the REO-
laden market. This is consistent with the ￿ndings of Landvoigt et al. (2012) that price declines
in San Diego were stronger at the lower end of the market. We leave understanding the role of
foreclosures for within-housing-market dynamics to future research.
74The value of being a renter is de￿ned as:
R(t) = ur + ￿ f￿B(t + 1) + (1 ￿ ￿)R(t + 1)g: (37)
We will assume ur = ub, so that a renter is simply a buyer without the option to buy.
The conditional expectation of the surplus given that a transaction occurs appears repeatedly
in the value functions. This quantity can be simpli￿ed as in Ngai and Tenreyro (2013) by using
(29) together with (33):
Sm;h (t) = Vh (t) ￿ Vhm (t) =
h ￿ hm (t)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
:
The conditional expectation is
E [Sm;h (t)jh ￿ hm (t)] =
E [h ￿ hm (t)jh ￿ hm (t)]
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
: (38)
We parameterize F (￿) ￿ exp(￿) + a, an exponential distribution with parameter ￿ shifted
over by a constant a. The memoryless property of the exponential distribution implies that
E [Sm;h (t)jh ￿ h￿
m (t)] = 1
￿. This is a fairly strong assumption. By using the exponential dis-
tribution in our simulations, we eliminate changes in the expected surplus due to changes in tail
conditional expectations of the F distribution, which cannot be observed.
The model is completed with the laws of motion for the mass of sellers of type m, buyers,
renters, and homeowners of type li. These laws of motion, which formalize Figure 17, are in
appendix B.1.2.
Prices can be backed out by using Nash bargaining along with the de￿nitions of the surpluses
and (38) to get:
pm;h (t) =
￿(h ￿ hm (t))
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
+ m + ￿Vm (t + 1) (39)
This pricing equation is intuitive. The ￿rst term contains h ￿ hm (t), which is a su¢ cient statistic
for the surplus generated by the match as shown by Shimer and Werning (2007). As ￿ increases,
more of the total surplus is appropriated to the seller in the form of a higher price. This must
be normalized by 1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿), the e⁄ective discount rate of a homeowner. The ￿nal two terms
75represent the value of being a seller next period, which is the seller￿ s outside option. These
terms form the minimum price at which a sale can occur, so that all heterogeneity in prices comes
from the distribution of h above the cuto⁄ hm (t). Because with the exponential distribution
E [h ￿ hm (t)] = 1
￿, all movements in average prices work through Vm (t + 1).
2.3.2 Numerical Methods
For reasonable parameter values, the model has a unique steady state that can be solved block
recursively and studied analytically. The full derivation and existence and uniqueness proofs for
the steady state can be found in appendix B.1.1. Although there are no foreclosures in steady state,
the price and probability of sale for a REO seller are well de￿ned and represent what would occur if
a measure zero mass of normal sellers were instead REO sellers. For a ￿xed idiosyncratic valuation
h, REO properties sell faster and at a discount due to the higher holding costs of distressed sellers.
The dynamics of the model, however, have no analytic solution, so we turn to numerical simu-
lations. We solve the model using Newton￿ s method as described in appendix B.1.2.
Simulating the model requires choosing parameters. We defer a more rigorous quantitative
analysis to section 2.7, which features a richer model, and focus on the mechanisms at work in
this section. Consequently, for now we present simulation results using an illustrative calibration
similar to the one described in section 2.5. We simulate a wave of foreclosures by moving everyone
in l0 to l1 at time t = 0 and raising ￿ for a period of ￿ve years. After the wave of foreclosures, the
model returns to the original steady state.
2.4 Basic Model Results and Mechanisms
2.4.1 Market Tightness, Choosey Buyer, and Compositional E⁄ects
The qualitative results in our model are caused by the interaction of three di⁄erent e⁄ects: the
￿market tightness e⁄ect,￿ the ￿choosey buyer e⁄ect,￿ and the ￿compositional e⁄ect.￿ Each is
crucial to understand the e⁄ect of foreclosures on the housing market.
First, because foreclosed individuals are locked out of the housing market as renters and only
gradually ￿ ow back into being buyers, foreclosures reduce market tightness ￿(t). This mechanically
decreases the probability a seller meets a buyer in a given period and triggers endogenous responses
76as each party￿ s outside options to the transaction changes, altering the bargaining and the hs for
which a sale occurs. For sellers, the reduction in market tightness reduces the value of being a seller
for both types of seller, reducing prices and causing sellers to sell more frequently. The endogenous
response is stronger for REO sellers who have a higher opportunity cost of not meeting a buyer.
For buyers, the elevated probability of meeting a seller raises their expected value, leading to lower
prices and a shift in the cuto⁄s that makes buyers more choosey.64 The market tightness e⁄ect
elucidates that an important element of foreclosures is a reduction in demand relative to supply,
as in a typical market a move creates a buyer and a seller while foreclosures create an immeiate
bank seller but a buyer only when the foreclosed upon individual￿ s credit improve. This contrasts
with some market analysts who treat foreclosures as a shift out in supply rather than a reduction
in today￿ s demand.
Second, the value of being a buyer rises because the buyer￿ s outside option to transacting,
which is walking away and resampling from the distribution of sellers next period, is improved by
the prospect of ￿nding an REO seller who will give a particularly good deal. Mathematically, as
REOs make up a larger fraction of total vacancies, rd rises and the term in the sum in (36) relating
to REO sales gets a larger weight. This term is larger because REO sellers are more likely to
transact both in and out of steady state. The resulting increase in buyers￿outside options leads
buyers to become more aggressive and demand a lower price from sellers in order to be willing to
transact. In equilibrium, this leads to buyers walking away from more sales. Importantly, this
e⁄ect will be most prevalent in the retail market where sellers are less desperate and therefore less
willing to accommodate buyers￿demand for lower prices, resulting in a freezing up of the retail
market.
The choosey buyer e⁄ect is new to the literature. Albrecht et al. (2007, 2013) introduce
motivated sellers into a search model, but focus on steady-state matching patterns (eg whether a
high type buyer can match with a low type seller) and asymmetric information regarding seller type.
Du¢ e et al. (2007) consider a liquidity shock similar to our foreclosure shock, but a transaction
occurs whenever an illiquid owner meets a liquid buyer, and so while there are market tightness
e⁄ects their model does not have a choosey buyer e⁄ect.
64In the calibration utilized here and in later sections, we set ￿ = :84. Thus the e⁄ect on qs (￿) signi￿cantly
outweighs the e⁄ect of market tightness on qb (￿).
77The market tightness e⁄ect and choosey buyer e⁄ect are mutually reinforcing. As discussed
above, the market tightness e⁄ect is more pronounced for REO sellers. Because the value of being
an REO seller falls by more, REO sellers become even more likely to sell relative to non-REO
sellers during the downturn. This sweetens the prospect of being matched with an REO seller next
period, amplifying the choosey buyer e⁄ect.
Finally, a greater share of REO sales makes the average sale look more like REO properties,
which sell faster and at lower prices both in and out of steady state. Foreclosures thus cause
a mechanical compositional e⁄ect that a⁄ects sales-weighted averages such as total sales and the
aggregate price index.
The market tightness e⁄ect is the aspect of the model that comes closest to a standard Walrasian
analysis with a single market for housing. By reducing the number of buyers relative to sellers,
it is similar to an inward shift in the demand curve relative to the supply curve that reduces both
prices and transaction volume. The market tightness e⁄ect does, however, asymmetrically impact
REO and retail sellers due to their di⁄erential holding costs, leading to a greater freezing up of the
retail market as buyers walk away from retail sellers in hopes of contacting increasingly-desperate
REO sellers. These types of di⁄erential e⁄ects and further feedback loops ￿which stem from the
choosey buyer e⁄ect and its interaction with the market tightness e⁄ect ￿are novel to the literature
and di⁄erentiate our model from a simpler Walrasian model.
Furthermore, all three e⁄ects dissipate more slowly than in traditional asset pricing models
because they depend on ￿ ows as well as stocks and lead to a sluggish return of the housing market
to steady state. The choosey buyer and compositional e⁄ects last as long as foreclosures remain in
the market, which is only a few months after the shock ends as these houses sell quickly. However,
the market tightness e⁄ect persists for much longer as it takes several years for the renters to return
to being homeowners.
2.4.2 Qualitative Results
Figure 18 shows the e⁄ect of a the ￿ve-year wave of foreclosures. Because the model is entirely
forward looking, prices and probability of sale conditional on a match fall discretely on the impact of
the shock at t = 0. This is typical in completely forward-looking models. The sluggish adjustment
of house prices to shocks remains a puzzle for much of the literature, and a solution to this problem
78Figure 18: Housing Market Model: Qualitative Results
Notes: This ￿gure shows the results of the housing market model with exogenous foreclosures using an illustrative
calibration similar to the one developed in Section 2.5 and a ￿ve-year foreclosure shock. Panels A and B show the
average price and sales by type, with pre-downturn price and volume normalized to 1. Prices drop discretely at time
zero as is standard in forward-looking models with no uncertainty. The REO discount widens, the aggregate price
index is pulled towards the REO index as REOs make up a greater share of the market, and prices rise in anticipation
of the end of the downturn. Retail volume plunges dramatically, but the decline is partially made up for by surging
REO volume. Panel C shows the probability of sale conditional on a match and the unconditional probability of
sale for each type with the pre-downturn probability normalized to one. This panel illustrates the mechanisms at
work in the model, as described in the main text. The key take-away is that the probability of sale conditional on a
match, which is the clearest indicator of how the behavioral responses of buyers and sellers play out in equilibrium,
falls dramatically for retail and is roughly ￿ at for REO.
is outside the scope of this chapter.
As shown in panel A, at t = 0 prices fall considerably for both REO and retail and gradually
return to steady state over the next several years. The overall sales-weighted price index dips more
than retail sales as foreclosures are averaged in. The price movements lead to a substantial rise in
the average REO discount that falls o⁄ over time.
Prices fall due to all three e⁄ects. Recall that from (39), movements in the average price of
properties sold by a type m seller are controlled by movements in Vm (t + 1). The market tightness
e⁄ect has a direct e⁄ect on the value of being a seller and thus brings down prices. Because this
e⁄ect is stronger for REO sellers, this contributes to the larger REO discount. The choosey buyer
e⁄ect has an indirect e⁄ect on Vm (t + 1), as in general equilibrium increased buyer choosiness
reduces the value of being a type m seller, which causes prices to fall. The e⁄ect of market
tightness on the value of being a buyer operates in a similar manner. Finally, there is a pure
compositional e⁄ect as REO sales become a greater share of total sales, which is shown graphically
79by the departure of the aggregate price index from the price index for retail sales.
As for sales, the wave of foreclosures sales causes the retail market to freeze up, with retail
volume falling substantially as shown in panel B and REOs constituting a larger fraction of total
sales than of total vacancies. Total volume, however, does not fall as much because much of the
decline in retail sales is o⁄set by REO sales. After the foreclosures end, sales return back to normal
in a matter of months as REOs are eliminated from the market. Most of the sluggish adjustment
comes from the dissipation of the accumulated renters and retail sellers, which takes several years.
The intuition behind the e⁄ects on transaction volume is more nuanced as the market tightness,
choosey buyer, and composition e⁄ects have cross-cutting impacts. Panel C, which shows percent
changes from steady state in the probability of sale both raw and conditional on a match, elucidates
the role of each e⁄ect.65
Consider ￿rst the probability of sale conditional on a match, controlled by hm (t).66 The market
tightness e⁄ect on the probability a seller meets a buyer raises the probability of sale conditional
on a match because sellers meet buyers less frequently and thus have a greater incentive to sell
when they are matched, an e⁄ect which is stronger for REO sellers. The choosey buyer e⁄ect and
the e⁄ect of market tightness on the probability a buyer meets a seller both reduce the probability
of sale conditional on a match as buyers become more choosy. Panel C shows that the two e⁄ects
o⁄set for REO sales as the probability of sale conditional on a match ￿ uctuates around its steady
state value, while the choosey buyer e⁄ect and the market tightness e⁄ect on buyers dominate
for retail sales as the probability of sale conditional on a match falls substantially. The relative
strength of these two e⁄ects for the two types of sellers thus plays an important role in freezing up
the retail market.
The market tightness e⁄ect, however, plays an additional role: it mechanically reduces volume
because there are fewer buyers. This causes the unconditional probability of sale and thus trans-
action volume to fall for both types, although it falls more for REO sellers. Note, however, that
decline for retail sales is quicker and the trough lasts longer.
The compositional e⁄ect also plays an important role in determining transaction volume. Be-
cause REOs sell faster both in and out of steady state, as the average sale looks more like an REO,
65The probability of sale conditional on a match is exp(￿￿(hm (t) ￿ a)) and the total probability of sale is
qs (￿(t))exp(￿￿(hm (t) ￿ a))
66Time to sale is inversely related to the unconditional probability of sale.
80volume rises. This is the main reason why total volume does not fall so dramatically. It is possible
for volume to rise, although for reasonable calibrations we ￿nd that the market tightness e⁄ect is
strong enough relative to the compositional e⁄ect that REO sales do not make up the full shortfall
in retail sales and overall volume falls.
Qualitatively, the model explains many salient features of the housing downturn. The substan-
tial decline in both retail and REO prices is consistent with the data in Figure 2.1, and the widened
distressed sale discount in a downturn is corroborated by Campbell et al. (2011). The freezing up
of the retail market and the large share of REO sales in total sales relative to listings is borne out
in the data, as are a rise in times to sale and increasing vacancy rates. The fact that REO sales
replace a good deal of the lost volume in the retail market is consistent with the evidence from the
hardest hit markets as shown in Figure 14.
2.4.3 Isolating the Role of Each E⁄ect
To further illustrate how each e⁄ect contributes to our results, Figure 19 depicts simulations iden-
tical to our main results for a wave of foreclosures except with the market tightness e⁄ect, choosey
buyer e⁄ect, and both the choosey buyer and market tightness e⁄ects shut down. Although the
market tightness e⁄ect plays an outsized role, all three e⁄ects are necessary for our results.
The market tightness e⁄ect generates a signi￿cant fraction of the price and volume declines.
Row two also illustrates that the market tightness e⁄ect increases the conditional probability of sale
for REO sellers during the downturn. Market tightness e⁄ects also cause total volume to decline
because of the mechanical decrease in matching probabilities.
However, the choosey buyer e⁄ect plays an essential role in freezing up the retail market. As
can be seen from row two, with no choosey buyer e⁄ect the conditional probability of sale for retail
sellers essentially remains ￿ at. On the other hand, from row one we can see that when only the
choosey buyer e⁄ect is present there is a non-trivial decrease in this conditional probability. This
freezing up is even more pronounced when both market tightness and choosey buyer e⁄ects are
present due to their interaction.
The compositional e⁄ect mainly reduces the aggregate price index, as shown in row 3 of Figure
19. It also increases total volume slightly because REO sales sell faster.
81Figure 19: Isolating the Role of Each E⁄ect
Notes: The top row shows price, sales, and conditional and unconditional probability of sale, all normalized to 1 for
their pre-downturn values, for the case of no market tightness e⁄ect. The second row shows the same results for
no choosey buyer e⁄ect. The third row shuts down both, leaving only the compositional e⁄ect. The ￿gure shows
that both the market tightness and outside option e⁄ects are critical for the qualitative results; in particular panel
C2 shows that without the choosey buyer e⁄ect the probability of sale conditional on a match does not fall much for
retail sellers. To shut down the market tightness e⁄ect, instead of creating renters we instead assume that distressed
sale shocks create REO sellers and home-buyers. To shut down the choosey buyer e⁄ect, we modify the buyer￿ s value
function so that agents behave as if the probability they will hit a distressed seller is zero regardless of the presence
of distressed sellers in the market. Because we calibrate to a steady state with no distressed sales, the steady state
of these modi￿ed models replicates the steady state of our full model. See appendix B.2.1 for full details on these
models.
822.5 An Extended Model of Default
Foreclosures are not random events. With few exceptions, negative equity is a necessary but not
su¢ cient condition for foreclosure (Foote et al., 2008). This is because a homeowner with positive
equity can sell his or her house, pay o⁄ the mortgage balance, and have cash left over without
having to default. Homeowners with negative equity, however, are not able to pay the bank and
thus default if they experience with a liquidity shock.
The previous section showed that foreclosures have general equilibrium e⁄ects that cause prices
￿and thus homeowner equity ￿to fall. In a world in which negative equity leads to foreclosure,
this will cause more foreclosures and price declines, generating a feedback loop that ampli￿es the
e⁄ects of an initial decline in house prices.67
In this section we embed the housing market component of the exogenous default model de-
veloped in the section 2.3 into a model in which negative equity is a necessary but not su¢ cient
condition for default. Subsequent sections provide a rigorous quantitative analysis of the extended
model and analyze welfare and foreclosure policy using the model.
2.5.1 Default in the Extended Model
We model default as resulting primarily from shocks that cause homeowners with negative equity
to be unable to a⁄ord their mortgage payments, the so-called ￿double trigger￿model of mortgage
default. While ￿ruthless￿or ￿strategic default￿by borrowers has occurred, much of the literature
on default argues that strategic default has contributed surprisingly little to foreclosures, partic-
ularly at low levels of negative equity.68 Bhutta et al. (2010) use a method of controlling for
income shocks to estimate that the median non-prime borrower does not strategically default until
their equity falls to negative 67 percent. Even among non-prime borrowers in Arizona, California,
Florida, and Nevada who purchased homes with 100 percent ￿nancing at the height of the bubble
￿80 percent of whom defaulted within 3 years ￿over 80 percent of the defaults were caused by
income shocks. Similarly, Foote et al. (2008) show that in the Massachusetts housing downturn
67In all cases we have considered, each additional round of feedback is smaller than the previous one generating a
convergent series and a unique dynamic equilibrium, although in principle the feedback could be strong enough to
generate a divergent series.
68Relevant papers than analyze the default decision and conclude that a ￿ruthless exercise￿option model of default
is insu¢ cient include Deng et al. (2000), Bajari et al. (2009), Elul et al. (2010), and Campbell and Cocco (2014).
83of the early 1990s, the vast majority of individuals who default have negative equity but most
individuals with negative equity do not default. Consequently, the largest estimate of the share
of defaults that are strategic is 15 to 20 percent.69 To keep the model tractable, we thus do not
model strategic default, nor do we model the strategic decision of the bank to foreclose or short
sales.70
Modeling negative equity requires that homeowners have loan balances. We assume that
homeowners in l1 have a distribution of loan balances L de￿ned by a CDF G(L).71 So that no
foreclosures occur without an additional shock, in general we assume that G(L) has continuous
support on [0;V ￿
n], where the steady state value of being a normal seller which is equal to the
expected price net of the costs of sale. We assume away re-default so that we do not need to worry
how new home purchases a⁄ect G(L).
To incorporate liquidity shocks into our model, we assume that they occur to individuals with
negative equity at Poisson rate ￿I. All other shocks are taste shocks that occur at Poisson rate ￿,
so that liquidity shocks are in addition to normal shocks.
Liquidity and taste shocks have di⁄erent e⁄ects depending on the equity position of the home-
owner. Homeowners with any shock with L ￿ Vn (t) have positive equity enter the housing market
as a buyer and seller. To keep the model tractable, we assume that buyers and sellers are identical
once they pay o⁄their loan balance. Homeowners with L > Vn (t) have negative equity net of mov-
ing costs and default if they experience an income shock because they cannot pay their mortgage or
sell their house. Defaulters enter the foreclosure process.72 Although foreclosure is not immediate
and some loans in the foreclosure process do ￿cure￿before they are foreclosed upon, for simplicity
we assume that foreclosure occurs immediately. We alter this and introduce foreclosure backlogs
in Section 2.8. We also assume that income shocks are a surprise, so an underwater homeowner
69This estimate comes from Experian-Oliver Wyman. Guiso et al. (2013) analyze a survey that asks people
whether they strategically defaulted and ￿nd that 25 to 35 percent of defaults are strategic.
70￿Fishing￿￿that is listing a home for a high price and hoping that someone who overpays for it will come along
as in Stein (1995) ￿and short sales are unusual because they require sellers to ￿nd a buyer who will pay a minimum
price, which a⁄ects bargaining. Modeling short sales and their e⁄ect on market equilibrium is an important topic
for future research.
71We are agnostic as to the source of the loan balance distribution and leave this unmodeled. G(L) is ￿xed over
time because principal is paid down slowly, particularly by those in the upper tail of the loan balance distribution
who are relevant for the size of the feedback loop.
72It is also possible for banks to possess the house and rent it to the homeowner or to o⁄er a short sale, in which
the bank accepts a sale at a price below the oustanding loan balance. While these options have become more popular
in recent years due in large part to political pressure, for most of the crisis the banks simply foreclosed on borrowers.
84Figure 20: Extended Model Schematic Diagram
expecting an income shock cannot list their house with the hope of getting a high-enough price
that they can pay o⁄ their loan before the bank forecloses. While this may happen infrequenlty,
it is unlikely very unlikely that a desperate seller would receive such a high price.
Finally, homeowners with negative equity who receive a taste shock would like to move but
owe more than their house is worth. Consequently, they are ￿locked in￿ their current house
until prices to rise to the point that they have positive equity.73 We assume that once they do
not move when they get a taste shock, these homeowners make accommodations and thus do not
immediately move when they reach positive equity. Instead, once they have positive equity they
become indistinguishable from households in l0 who are waiting for a moving shock. In our context,
lock-in further reduces sales in markets with many foreclosures.
Figure 20 shows our formalization of default in the extended model in a schematic diagram.
The extended model only alters the mechanisms through which homeowners default and enter the
housing market, and consequently the housing market component of the model is exactly as in
73Formally, de￿ne w(t) as the mass of individuals who are locked in at time t. The distribution of loan balances
in w(t) will be the same as G(L) truncated below at Vn (t).
85Table 12: Variables Used In Extended Model
Variable Description
Endogenous Variables
L Loan Balance ￿ G(L)
w Mass of locked in homeowners
f Mass of homeowners in foreclosure process
Parameters
￿I Probability of a liquidity shock
￿ Probability above-water homeowner becomes renter
ba, bb Parameters of Beta distribution for G(L)
section 2.3 and is thus not depicted in Figure 20. This structure preserves all of the key intuitions
developed in section 2.4. Because there is still no default in steady state, the steady state remains
the same. Because the modi￿ed model has an identical housing market to the model in section
2.3, the Bellman equations and cuto⁄ conditions are unchanged. The new laws of motion are in
Appendix B.1.4, and the additional parameters introduced in the extended model are listed in
Table 12.
2.5.2 Starting the Downturn
An exogenous shock is required to generate an initial price drop. We introduce the exogenous
shock in two di⁄erent ways.
First, we assume that due to both tighter lending practices and income shocks a fraction ￿ (t) of
individuals who sell their house as a normal seller after receiving a taste shock cannot buy a house
and instead transition from owning to renting. This generates an initial market tightness e⁄ect
that reduces prices, putting some individuals underwater and triggering a price-default spiral. Such
a shock ￿ts most naturally in the model. We use a 5-year increase in ￿ (t) to perform a sensitivity
analysis in section 2.6.
However, when we take the model to the data in section 2.7, it is clear that the main shock in
the recent episode is a bursting housing bubble. Our primary interest is understanding the amount
of overshooting of prices caused by the presence of foreclosures and not realistically modeling the
bursting of the bubble absent foreclosures. Consequently, we introduce a bursting bubble into the
model with a permanent decline in a, the minimum ￿ ow utility of housing. While the ￿ ow utility
of housing clearly did not fall overnight, the source of the initial drop in prices is immaterial to
86our results and reducing a is the simplest way to generate such a price drop. The reduction in a
should thus be seen as a stand-in for a number of factors that have depressed home prices, from
changes in credit availability to belief disagreements to irrational exuberance.74
With a permanent decline in a and a constant hazard of an income shock, all individuals whose
loan balance is above the new steady-state price level will eventually default. This does not seem
realistic ￿many homeowners will eventually pay down their mortgage and avoid default. Rather
than modeling the dynamic deformation of the G(￿) distribution over time, we instead assume that
after 5 years the hazard of income shocks ￿I gradually subsides over the course of a year.75
With both exogenous shocks, defaults due to negative equity and the resulting foreclosures
amplify the e⁄ects of shocks in the housing market due to a price-foreclosure feedback loop. Due
to the forward-looking nature of agents in the model, this spiral is capitalized into the prices of
retail sales and REO sales when the shock occurs, with further gradual declines as the REO share
of volume in the market increases.
2.6 Quantitative Analysis: Calibration and Ampli￿cation
Having analyzed the mechanisms at work in our extended model, we now turn to the model￿ s
implied magnitudes by conducting a quantitative analysis. In this section, we calibrate the model
and examine the strength of the ampli￿cation channel. In section 2.7, we take the model to the
data on the ongoing downturn.
2.6.1 Calibration
In order to simulate the model numerically, we must choose parameters. As mentioned previously,
we parameterize the distribution of idiosyncratic valuations F (￿) as an exponential distribution
with parameter ￿ shifted by a. We parameterize the loan balance distribution G(L) as a beta
distribution with parameters ba and bb scaled to have support on [0;V ￿
n]. This ￿ exible distribution
allows us to approximate the loan balance distribution in various locations on the eve of the crisis
as described below. This gives 12 exogenous parameters to calibrate for the basic housing market
74While a bursting bubble is the most likely source of a large price change that would put many homeowners
underwater, the type of foreclosure crisis we describe could be created by any type of large negative price shock.
75Formally, after 5 years ￿I falls by 5% of its previous value every month, taking roughly a year to settle at zero.
87model ￿a, ￿, md, mn, ur, ub, ￿, ￿, ￿, ￿, ￿, and ￿ ￿and three parameters to calibrate unique to
the extended model ￿￿I, and ba and bb. We also must choose the initial shock.
Our calibration procedure proceeds in three steps. We take care to calibrate to pre-downturn
moments whenever possible in order to make our tests out-of sample, although in some cases we
have no choice but to choose a parameter using data from the housing bust. First, we set ￿, ur,
ub, ￿, ￿, ￿, and ￿I independently to match several moments. Second, we choose a, mn, md, ￿ and
￿ so that the steady state of the model matches additional targets. Third, we calibrate ba and bb
to the appropriate geographic unit that we are considering.
This leaves two variables that we do not choose through calibration: ￿, the probability of leaving
the rental market, and the initial shock. Although there are several guidelines regarding how long
banks deny mortgages to individuals who default,76 there is no good data on this parameter in
practice. Consequently, we pursue a two-pronged approach. First, to understand the impact
of ￿ and the exogenous shock, we examine the response of the model to di⁄erent values of each.
Second, we use data on the size of the bust across housing markets to select a preferred calibration
of these two parameters, as described in Section 2.7. In the remainder of this section, we describe
the moments to which we calibrate the model in our three steps.
Step 1: Exogenous Parameter Choices
We choose ur, ub, ￿, and ￿ so that one period is equivalent to one week, although the results are
insensitive to the time interval chosen. We set the annual discount rate equal to 5%, so that the
discount factor is ￿ = 1 ￿ :05
52 . We assume ur = ub = 0 so that buyers and renters are identical in
their ￿ ow utility. Buyers, however, have the option to buy which has considerable value so B > R.
This assumption is equivalent to assuming that buyers and renters pay their ￿ ow utility in rent in
a perfectly competitive rental market.
We set the probability of moving houses in a given week to ￿t a median tenure for owner
occupants of approximately 9 years from the American Housing Survey from 1997 to 2005, so
￿ = :08
52 .
We set ￿ = :84 using estimates from Genesove and Han (2012), who use National Association
of Realtors surveys to estimate the contact elasticity for sellers with respect to the buyer-to-seller
76Three years of good credit are needed to get a Federal Housing Administration loan, and according to Fannie
Mae guidelines issued in 2010, individuals are excluded from getting a mortgage for two to seven years if they are
foreclosed upon, depending on the circumstances. However, these guidelines are not ubiquitous.
88ratio. ￿ is then a constant chosen to make sure the probability of matching never goes above
1 for either side of the market. We choose ￿ = :5, which in our simulations leads to matching
probabilities on [0;1]. The results are robust to alternate choices of ￿.
The one parameter that we need data from the downturn to choose is ￿I. We set ￿I = 8:6%
annually using national data from CoreLogic on the incidence of foreclosure starts for houses with
negative equity as described in appendix B.4.
Step 2: Matching the Pre-Downturn Steady State
We then ￿t the following ￿ve aggregate moments from the housing market prior to the housing
bust to the model￿ s steady state to set ￿, a, ￿, mn, and md:
1. The mean house price for a retail sale, which we set equal $300,000 as an approximation to
Adelino et al.￿ s (2012) mean house price of $298,000 for 10 MSAs. In reporting results, we
normalize this initial house price to 1. Our results are approximately invariant to the mean
house price as long as the residual variance is rescaled proportionally.
2. The residual variance of house prices due to the idiosyncratic preferences of buyers. We set
this equal to $10,000.
3. The REO discount in terms of mean prices, which we set equal to a quality-adjusted 20%
based on the average discount in good times from Campbell et al. (2011), whose results are
consistent with a literature surveyed by Clauretie and Daneshvary (2009). In Section 2.6
we also consider a 10% discount, closer to the estimates of Zillow (2010) and Clauretie and
Daneshvary (2009).
4. Time on the market for retail houses, which we set to 26 weeks as in Piazzesi and Schneider
(2009). This number is a bit higher than some papers that use Multiple Listing Service
Data such as Anenberg (2013) and Springer (1996), likely because of imperfect adjustment
for withdrawn listings and re-listings. Our results are not sensitive to this number.
5. Time on market for REO houses, which we set to 15 weeks. Springer (1996) analyzes various
forms of ￿seller motivation￿such as relocation and ￿nancial distress using data form Texas
from 1991-3. He ￿nds that a foreclosure sales are the only motivated sellers that have
signi￿cantly reduced time on the market. His estimate is that time on the market is reduced
89Table 13: Calibrated Parameter Values
a ￿ md mn ur ub ￿
3:399 0:08
52 ￿0:403 ￿0:091 0 0 0:087
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿I ba bb
1 ￿ 0:05
52 3:490 0:5 0:84 :086
52 0:898 1:223
by .2135 log points or 23.7%. However, REO sales are almost never withdrawn from the
market, whereas retail sales are frequently withdrawn (Anenberg, 2013). We also attempt
to adjust so our number excludes extremely rundown properties that sit on the market for
several years.
These moments provide a unique mapping to ￿, a, ￿, mn, and md, as described in appendix
B.1.3.
The calibration procedure results in the parameter values listed in Table 13, with all prices and
dollar amounts in thousands of dollars. Two main things are of note about the calibration. First,
md < mn, so the ￿ ow cost of being a REO seller is higher than the ￿ ow cost of being a regular
seller. This is due to the fact that distressed sales take less time to sell and trade at a discount in
steady state. Second, ￿ is quite low in order to rationalize the 20 percent discount for REO sales
in steady state. This means the buyer will get a majority of the surplus and the value of being a
buyer in the buyer￿ s market of the downturn will be high.77
Step 3: Geographically-Speci￿c Parameters
To calibrate the two parameters of the loan balance distribution ba and bb at the national and
MSA level we use proprietary data from CoreLogic on seven quantiles of the combined loan-to-
value distribution for active mortgages in 2006. These LTV estimates are compiled by CoreLogic
using public records, with the LTV estimates supplemented using CoreLogic￿ s valuation models.78
77A low ￿ is consistent with the logic of directed search and Genesove and Han￿ s (2012) estimate of ￿ = :84. In
directed search models ￿ is determined endogenously through price posting behavior. The buyer￿ s bargaining power
is the elasticity of contacts with respect to market tightness ￿ and so ￿ should be below 1 ￿ ￿ = :16. Intuitively the
seller has very low bargaining power because the seller￿ s contact rate is more sensitive to a change in market tightness
than the buyer￿ s.
78Although the CoreLogic estimates of negative equity and the loan-to-value distribution are most cited, some
have argued that they do not fully capture the extent of negative eqiuity. Recent estimates by Zillow use credit
report data instead of public records and get a higher ￿gure for negative equity than CoreLogic (methodologi-
cal di⁄erences are described here http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2012/05/24/negative-equity-more-widespread-
than-previously-thought-report-says/). Beyond issues of data sourcing, Korteweg and Sorensen (2013) argue that
traditional methods of estimating house price indices under-estimate the variance of the house price distribution and
thus under-estimate the number of loans with high LTV.
90Table 14: Sensitivity Analysis: Time Out of Market For Renters
Price Index Decline Total Sales Decline
￿ = 1=52 (1 year out) 4:0% 4:4%
￿ = 1=65 (1.25 years out) 4:9% 4:8%
￿ = 1=78 (1.5 years out) 5:8% 5:2%
￿ = 1=91 (1.75 years out) 6:6% 5:5%
Because our model concerns the entire owner-occupied housing stock and not just houses with an
active mortgage, we supplement the CoreLogic data with the Census￿estimates of the fraction of
owner-occupied houses with a mortgage from the 2005-2007 American Community Surveys. We
construct the empirical CDF of the loan balance distribution and then ￿t a beta distribution with
parameters ba and bb to the empirical distribution using a minimum distance method described in
Appendix B.4. The ￿t is quite good across the 50th to 100th percentiles of the LTV distribution.]
Table 13 shows the resulting ba and bb for the nationwide loan balance distribution.
2.6.2 Strength of Ampli￿cation Channel and Comparative Statics
Having calibrated the model, we now gauge the potential magnitude of the ampli￿cation channel
and elucidate key comparative statics in the extended model. Our initial shock will be one in which
a fraction ￿ (t) of individuals who receive a taste shock transition from owning a home to renting,
as described previously. This causes an initial price decline since it reduces the number of buyers
but not the number of sellers. In particular, we use a shock of ￿ (t) = :10 for ￿ve years.79 Holding
the initial shock constant, we then vary the average weeks out of the market for a renter, the steady
state discount on REO sales, and the loan balance distribution. Speci￿cally, we consider average
times out of the market of 1, 1.25, 1.5, and 1.75 years and REO discounts of 10% and 20%. For
the loan balance distribution, we consider beta distributions ￿tted to match the national data as
well as data from New York, which had a low share of high LTV homes, and Las Vegas, which had
a high share.
Since our initial shock is a market tightness e⁄ect, the strength of this e⁄ect will be governed
by ￿. Table 14 reports the price index decline and total volume decline generated by the initial
shock in the absence of any defaults.
79Raising the size of the initial shock within reasonable parameter ranges magni￿es the strength of the ampli￿cation
channel, but the increase is mild.
91Table 15: Sensitivity Analysis: Loan Balance Distribution and REO Discount
￿ = 1=52 REO Disc. 10% REO Disc. 20% ￿ = 1=65 REO Disc. 10% REO Disc. 20%
New York (4:8%;2:8%) (6:2%;3:4%) New York (6:6%;4:0%) (8:4%;4:9%)
National (22:3%;11:9%) (29:4%;14:6%) National (30:0%;17:3%) (38:5%;20:5%)
Las Vegas (46:0%;23:7%) (60:2%;28:7%) Las Vegas (62:0%;34:6%) (79:3%;40:6%)
￿ = 1=78 REO Disc. 10% REO Disc. 20% ￿ = 1=91 REO Disc. 10% REO Disc. 20%
New York (8:6%;5:5%) (10:8%;6:5%) New York (10:9%;7:2%) (13:6%;8:4%)
National (39:3%;23:9%) (49:7%;27:8%) National (51:0%;32:2%) (63:9%;36:9%)
Las Vegas (83:6%;49:0%) (105:6%;56:4%) Las Vegas (115:4%;69:5%) (145:5%;79:1%)
Note: This table shows comparative statics with respect to three important variables: ￿, the Poisson probability of a
renter becoming a buyer, the REO discount, and the loan balance distribution. The table shows how these variables
a⁄ect the degree of ampli￿cation of the initial shock to prices created by adding foreclosures. The ￿rst entry in
each pair is the percentage increase in the price index decline generated by defaults over and above that created by
the initial shock. The second entry in each pair is the percentage increase in the total sales decline. For instance,
when ￿ = 1/52 and the REO discount is 20%, the table has an entry of (60.2%,28.7%) for the 2006 Las Vegas loan
balance distribution. Given a price index decline of 4.0% and volume decline of 4.4% from the initial shock alone,
this indicates that the full price index and volume declines are respectively 6.4% and 5.7%.
Increasing the average length of time for which individuals who transition to renting stay out of
the housing market leads to greater percentage decreases in both the price index and total volume.
The e⁄ects of such a shock as small as the one we consider are relatively modest, but our key question
remains the potential strength of the ampli￿cation channel when we allow for defaults. Table 15
reports the results from varying the REO discount and loan balance distribution in addition to
￿. Rather than reporting levels, each entry reports the percentage ampli￿cation of the aggregate
price index decline and sales decline generated by defaults over and above the decline created by
the initial shock in a price-volume pair.
Table 15 shows that foreclosure spirals can signi￿cantly amplify an initial shock. The strength
of this spiral grows as we increase the amount of time individuals who default spend out of the
housing market due to a more persistent market tightness e⁄ect. The shape of the loan balance
distribution also plays a critical role in determining the strength of the ampli￿cation. A greater
proportion of individuals with high LTV ratios implies than a given initial shock will put a greater
fraction of the market underwater. This leads to greater numbers of foreclosures, more powerful
general equilibrium e⁄ects, and in turn even more foreclosures. This illustrates the fragility created
by the combination of a housing bubble and reduced down payment requirements.
Table 15 also shows that a lower steady state REO discount dampens the spiral. This is in
92part due to a compositional e⁄ect which ameliorates the e⁄ect of a given number of REOs on the
price index. Additionally, though, the choosey buyer e⁄ect is weaker since waiting for an REO
sale is no longer as attractive, and so the retail market does not freeze up as much. Finally, the
ampli￿cation channel can generate signi￿cant total volume declines, greater than we saw in section
2.3 with exogenous defaults for a given shock size. The reason is that in the extended model,
relative to section 2.3, the number of individuals who become locked-in during the downturn can
be substantial. Note that this implies a greater REO share of vacancies which strengthens both
the compositional e⁄ect and the choosey buyer e⁄ects and thus feeds back into further declines in
both the overall and non-distressed price indexes.
2.7 Cross-MSA Quantitative Analysis
In order to assess quantitatively the role of foreclosures in the crisis and to test the model￿ s perfor-
mance, we calibrate the model to national and cross-MSA data described in section 2.2.
Because the size of the preceding bubble is the single best predictor of the size of the ensuing
bust, we use a permanent shock to prices that operates through reducing ￿ ow utilities a to start the
downturn. We assume income shocks last for 5 years, after which they gradually taper o⁄. Recall
that there are two parameters that are left to calibrate: ￿, which controls how long the average
renter takes to return to owner-occupancy, and the size of the permanent shock to prices. To
calibrate these parameters, we use the aggregate national data and the cross-MSA data together.
We ￿rst set a grid of ￿s. For each ￿, we choose the nationwide permanent shock to prices so
that with the nationwide loan balance distribution the model exactly matches the maximum log
change in the national house price index. We then simulate the model for each MSA and for
each value of ￿ by assuming that the permanent shock to prices in the MSA is equal to the
nationwide permanent shock to prices multiplied by the relative size of the bubble in the MSA
as measured by
￿log(PMSA
03￿06)
￿log(PNational
03￿06 ). In other words, we assume that the relative amount of housing
price appreciation from the bubble that is permanently lost is the same in each MSA.80 We then
calculate the unweighted sum of squared distances between the maximum change in the log price
index in the data and the model for each value of ￿ and choose the ￿ with the minimum sum of
80For instance, the maximum ￿log(P) in Las Vegas is was 1.52 times as big as the nation-wide price index. Below
we ￿nd the permanent price decline for the nation is 21.5%. Thus the permanent decline in Las Vegas is 32.8%.
93squared distances.
This methodology yields a sum of squared distances function that is a smooth and convex
function of ￿. Intuitively too high of a ￿ will cause the model to over-predict the size of price
declines in high-LTV but low-bubble MSAs, while too low of a ￿ will cause the model to under-
predict the size of price declines in high-bubble MSAs. The optimal ￿ is the one that does best
across distribution of bubble size.
The sum of squared distances has a unique minimum, which corresponds to 1
￿ = 1:05 years out
of the market for the average renter and ￿maxPNational = 21:5% (a log point decrease of :242).81
A 21.5% price drop from the peak implies that about 2/3 of the price gains between 2003 and 2006
were permanently lost when the bubble burst.
Figure 21 shows the time series price, sales, the characteristics of distressed sales, probability
of sale, foreclosures, and the mass of each type in the market for the resulting national simulation.
The qualitative patterns closely match those described in the simpler model in Section 2.4. Recall
that there is a one-to-one mapping between the unconditional probability of sale and time to sale,
which move in opposite directions.
Figure 22 shows the results of the cross-MSA simulations by plotting the simulated results
against the data in six panels that show the maximum change in log price, log retail price, log
sales, log retail sales, REO share, and fraction foreclosed. In each ￿gure, the 45-degree line is
drawn in to represent a perfect match between the model and the data. The small dots represent
MSAs while the large X represents the national calibration.
The calibration procedure does well in matching declines in the aggregate price index across
the bubble-size spectrum, as indicated by the fact that the data points are clustered around the
45-degree line. As with the regressions, the extreme outliers are in greater Detroit (the two points
in the lower right), which has had a large bust without a preceding boom, and Stockton (the point
in the lower middle), which had a much larger bust than boom. Despite these outliers, we cannot
reject a coe¢ cient of one when regressing the simulated results on the data, and relative to a case
with no default where the entire national price decline is permanent, adding default to the model
increases the r-squared of the simulation by 20 percent.82 These results suggest that default can
811.05 years out of the market for the average renter may be a bit on the short side, but because we have a constant
Poisson probability of leaving renting, the distribution of times out of the market has a very thick tail.
82This r-squared is calculated as 1 minus the the squared distance between the simulated maximum log price decline
94Figure 21: National Calibration With Permanent Price Drop
Note: This ￿gure shows the results of the extended model calibrated to match the national and MSA data as in section
2.7. It uses a permanent shock to housing values and an LTV distribution corresponding to the national housing
market. Panels A and B show the average price and sales by type, with pre-downturn price and volume normalized
to 1. Panel C shows the REO discount, share of vacancies, and share of volume. Panel D shows the probability of
sale conditional on a match and the unconditional probability of sale for each type with the pre-downturn probability
normalized to 1. Panel E shows the annualized fraction of the owner occupied housing stock that is foreclosed upon
at each point in time. Panel F shows the mass of each type of agent in the market. The overall results are similar
to the qualitative results outlined previously.
95Figure 22: Cross-MSA Simulations vs. Data
Note: Scatter plots of data vs. simulation results for 97 MSAs in regression analysis. The red X represents the
national simulation and each black dot is an MSA. The 45-degree line illustrates a perfect match between the model
and the data. The variable being plotted shown in each plot￿ s title. Data is fully described in appendix B.4. The
calibration methodology described in text and appendix B.4. The ￿gure shows the model performs well for prices
and the number of foreclosures but is o⁄ by a constant for volume.
96explain some of the nonlinearity in Figure 15.
More importantly, the model cannot be rejected for additional outcomes beyond the aggregate
price index that was used for calibration. For the change in log retail price, the national data closely
matches the model: for the most part, the points lie around the 45-degree line, with a few more
exceptions where the model under-estimates the change in log retail price such as Stockton and Las
Vegas. Nonetheless, a statistical test con￿rms that we cannot reject that the model matches the
data. The model also comes close to matching the data for total foreclosures over 5 years and the
model cannot be statistically rejected, although there are some extreme outliers where there were
many more foreclosures than the model predicted. Again, some of these are in Greater Detroit
and Stockton, but there are a few other hard-hit markets like Las Vegas and the Central Valley in
California where the model under-predicts the number of foreclosures. Finally, although it is not
in Figure 22, the national calibration predicts a maximum REO discount of 36.7%. This is slightly
above the maximum foreclosure discount for Boston of 35.4% reported by Campbell et al. (2011),
so the model can explain time variation in REO discounts.
However, as foreshadowed by the regressions, the model consistently under-predicts the decline
in sales. In Figure 22, the data cluster roughly parallel to the 45-degree line for both retail and
total sales, although this is only statistically signi￿cant for retail sales. This means that the model
does a good job of capturing di⁄erences in the size of the maximum sales decline across locations
but that volume has fallen nationwide for reasons beyond the model. Potential unmodeled forces
reducing volume include the tightening of credit markets, credit constraints and losses on levered
properties reducing the purchasing power of buyers (Stein, 1995; Ortalo-Magne and Rady, 2006),
a decline in household formation and immigration, a reluctance on the part of retirees to sell their
house in a down market, nominal loss aversion (Genesove and Mayer, 2001), increasing returns to
scale in matching (Ngai and Tenreyro, 2013), and a reduction in the number of transactions by
speculators who ￿ ip houses quickly. The cause of the massive decline in volume in the housing
downturn is an important subject for future research.
Because it under-estimates the sales decline, the model also under-estimates the REO share in
locations that had extremely high amounts of foreclosures, although when we include a constant in
and its counterpart in the data divided by the squared distance between the data and its mean. This is the r-squared
of a regression of the model on the data without a constant.
97a regression of the simulated results on the data we cannot reject a coe¢ cient of one. Because the
vast majority of sellers also become buyers, a decline in sales would strengthen the choosey buyer
e⁄ect, as REO sellers would take up a greater fraction of the market. It would, however, have a
much smaller impact on market tightness, because a reduction in the number of buyers and sellers
would reduce both the numerator and the denominator. We expect the overall magnitude of the
combined general equilibrium e⁄ect of foreclosures to be similar.
What do these ￿gures imply about the quantitative extent to which foreclosures exacerbate
housing downturns? In the national data, the permanent price decrease that would occur without
default is 21.5% (.24 log points) and with default is 33.5% (.41 log points). This implies that
the general equilibrium e⁄ects of foreclosures together with the compositional e⁄ects on the price
index induced by a high REO share made the downturn 56% worse than it would have been in the
absence of foreclosure. Equivalently, foreclosures account for 36% of the price decline. This ￿gure
is larger in MSAs with larger busts, more default, and a bigger price-default spiral.
The 56% ￿gure, however, includes compositional e⁄ects and is thus not the best measure of how
much the general equilibrium e⁄ects of foreclosure reduce the price a retail seller would get if they
wanted to sell at the bottom of the market. This is the relevant price for determining negative equity
and thus defaults. An alternate metric of the extent to which foreclosures exacerbate downturns,
then, is the decline in the retail-only price index, which is 28.7% (.34 in log points) with default
and 21.5% without default. The price decline in the retail market is thus 34% worse than it would
have been in the absence of foreclosures.
Perhaps surprisingly, these quantitative results are not dramatically changed with an REO
discount of 10% in steady state as suggested by Clauretie and Daneshvary (2009) and Zillow (2010).
In this case, the same calibration procedure implies a permanent price decline of 22.4% and an
average time out of the owner-occupied market for foreclosures of 1.3 years. Intuitively, with the
compositional e⁄ect weakened by a smaller foreclosure discount, the calibration implies a slightly
larger permanent price decline and a stronger market tightness e⁄ect. With a 10% steady state
discount, the model implies that foreclosures exacerbate the aggregate price decline by 50%. See
Appendix B.2.2 for details.
These magnitudes are larger than those implied by other papers. Mian et al.￿ s (2014) empirical
study comes closest to our results. By comparing neighborhoods in states that require judicial
98approval of foreclosure with neighborhoods just over a border in states that do not, they ￿nd that
foreclosures were responsible for 20 to 30% of the decline in prices. Our analogous ￿gure of 36% is
only slightly higher, likely because we consider market-wide e⁄ects that comparing neighborhoods
only partially picks up. Calomiris et al. (2008) use a panel VAR to analyze the e⁄ect of foreclosures
on housing market equilibrium and ￿nd that foreclosures would reduce prices by 5.5 percentage
points in a foreclosure wave, about half what we ￿nd. However, they simulate the impulse response
to a wave of foreclosures without a bursting bubble that puts a substantial fraction of homeowners
under water, which dramatically increases the size and length of the foreclosure wave. Using a
calibrated macro model that focuses on how foreclosures can constrict credit supply, Chatterjee
and Eyigungor (2011) ￿nd that foreclosures account for 16% of the overall price decline.83
2.8 Welfare and Policy Implications
2.8.1 Welfare
To evaluate welfare we adopt a utilitarian social welfare function that equally weights all agents.
We can construct social welfare as the discounted sum of individual ￿ ow utilities:
W =
1 X
t=0
￿t
￿
vn (t)mn + vd (t)md + (l1 (t) + f (t))(h￿
n + 1=￿) +
f (t)
￿f (t) + 1
c + q (t)
￿
where q (t) follows the law of motion:
q (t + 1) = (1 ￿ ￿)q (t) + vb (t)qb (￿(t))
X
m
rm (t)(1 ￿ F (hm(t)))(hm (t) + 1=￿); q (0) = 0:
were q (t) denotes the expected ￿ ow housing services generated to homeowners in l0 at time t.
We also assume that a foreclosure completion entails certain costs to the bank, such as legal fees
and lost revenue from interest payments. A 2008 report by Standard & Poors estimates these
costs of foreclosure in excess of the loss on the sale to be approximately $10,000, so that we set
83Our results also relate to an empirical literature that examines the e⁄ects of REO sales on the sale prices of
extremely nearby houses. These papers typically ￿nd that a single REO listing reduce the prices of neighboring
properties by 1%, with a nonlinear e⁄ect (Campbell et al, 2011). The literature is divided as to the mechanism.
Anenberg and Kung (Forthcoming) arguing that REOs increase supply at an extremely-local level consistent with our
market tightness e⁄ect, although at a very local level. By contrast, Gerardi et al. (2013(Gerardi, Willen, Rosenblatt,
and Yao 2013)) argue that the owners of distressed property reduce investment in their home, e⁄ects for which we
attempt to control. These papers typically include ￿ne geographic ￿xed e⁄ects and consequently do not pick up the
search-market-level e⁄ects that are substantial in our model.
99c = ￿10. Finally, we suppose that individuals who receive a taste shock but are unable to move
due to negative equity receive no ￿ ow utility from their mismatched house.
There are competing e⁄ects of foreclosures on social welfare. First, total welfare is decreased
relative to the steady state since securing a foreclosure completion is costly, foreclosed homes are
sold by REO sellers with higher holding costs, and all homes take longer to sell. More signi￿cantly,
welfare is decreased by the fact that a number of homeowners receive no ￿ ow utility from housing
because they are excluded from the housing market for a period of time due to default or locked
into a house that does not suit their needs. Second, buyers who do participate in the market are on
average purchasing homes which they value more than homes purchased in steady state. Because
these buyers stay in these houses for a median of 9 years, this generates a substantial positive e⁄ect
on welfare that is consistent with anecdotal evidence of the downturn being a ￿buyer￿ s market.￿
Note that the decline in prices which accompanies the downturn has no direct impact on welfare
since it operates simply as a transfer from sellers to buyers that has no e⁄ect on social welfare.
Ultimately, when all of the various e⁄ects net out, social welfare falls, but the decline is modest.
This likely understates policy makers￿perception of the social impact of foreclosures. The
welfare calculation uses a utilitarian framework and a high discount rate. Given that the downturn
is temporary and a number of individuals actually bene￿t from the housing downturn in the form
of increased housing services relative to steady state, it is not surprising we ￿nd a modest decline in
welfare. However, it is still the case that a substantial mass of individuals are substantially worse
o⁄ for several years. To the extent that policy makers adopt a Rawlsian short-term perspective,
the social impact of foreclosures could be large.
Most importantly, by focusing only on the housing market, the model misses a number of other
potential normative implications of foreclosures. As discussed by Iacoviello (2005), house price
declines can have pecuniary externalities because a collapse in home prices destroys wealth in the
form of home equity and can impede borrowing by households and ￿rms, creating a ￿nancial ac-
celerator e⁄ect similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Moreover, lock-in due to negative equity
can impede labor mobility (Ferriera, Gyourko and Tracy, 2010) and exacerbate structural unem-
ployment and can increase the e⁄ective risk faced by households since housing consumption is not
adjustable (Chetty and Szeidl, 2007). Additionally, banks may be forced to realize substantial
losses on foreclosed properties, which impacts their balance sheets through the well-documented
100Table 16: E⁄ects of Foreclosure Policies
Policy Baseline ￿ = 4000 ￿ = 6000 7% ! 4% L # $2K L # $5K
max￿log(P) -.414 -.400 -.387 -.382 -.407 -.396
max￿log(PRetail) -.343 -.344 -.347 -.327 -.339 -.334
max￿log(SalesExisting) -.226 -.205 -.189 -.210 -.223 -.217
max￿log(SalesRetail) -.352 -.322 -.295 -.314 -.339 -.321
max SalesREO
SalesExisting 21.44 17.49 12.61 17.47 20.63 19.41
% Ever Foreclosed 7.55 7.54 7.48 6.10 7.27 6.86
Note: This table shows the impact of various policies on market equilibrium. The ￿rst and second rows show the
maximum change in log aggregate and retail price, the third and fourth rows show the maximum change in log
existing sales and retail sales, the fourth row shows the maximum REO share, and the sixth row shows the fraction
of homes foreclosed upon. The ￿rst column shows the baseline, which is as in Section 2.7. The second and third
columns show the e⁄ects of slowing down foreclosures, as 1
￿ foreclosures can be processed each week. ￿ = 4000
and ￿ = 6000 correspond to a maximum of 1.3 and .9 percent of the housing stock being foreclosed upon per year,
respectively. The fourth column shows the e⁄ect of reducing interest rates for all homeowners from 7 to 4 percent, a
generous estimate of the potential e⁄ects of re￿nancing mortgages. The sixth and seventh columns show the e⁄ects
of reducing principal by $2,000 and $5,000 for all homeowners, corresponding to a $100 billion principal reduction
that is either untargeted or only targeted at under water homeowners.
net-worth channel in ￿nancial intermediation, potentially leading to problems in the interbank repo
market, cash hoarding by banks, and a freezing up of credit. Finally, the presence of substan-
tial numbers of foreclosed homes can have negative externalities on communities (Campbell et al.,
2011) and can reduce residential investment, construction employment, and consumption (Mian et
al, 2014).
While we leave detailed analyses of these important issues to future research, we believe the
discussion in this section illustrates there is value in understanding the e⁄ectiveness of various
policies in ameliorating the foreclosure crisis. We thus conduct a basic positive analysis of three
policies that have been proposed that ￿t into our model: delaying foreclosure, re￿nancing mortgages
at lower interest rates, and reducing principal. To assess the maximum potential impact of each
policy, we introduce the policy at time 0. The results of our policy simulations, discussed in the
following subsections, are shown in Table 16. We use the national loan balance distribution and
compare the housing market under each policy to a baseline of no policy that is shown in column
1.
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A simple and low-cost policy that has been proposed is slowing down the pace of foreclosures. To
incorporate sluggish foreclosure into our model, we assume that when a homeowner defaults the
bank begins foreclosure proceedings but that only 1
￿ foreclosures can be processed by the system
each week.84 While in the foreclosure process, it is possible for prices to rise and the house to
no longer be in negative equity. If this happens, the foreclosure ￿cures￿and the homeowner lists
their house as a normal seller but subsequently become a renter because of the liquidity shock they
experienced. In table Table 16, we compare the baseline of ￿ = 0 to cases when ￿ = 4,000 and
￿ = 6,000 so that the maximum annual pace of foreclosure is given by 1.3 percent per year and .9
percent per year, respectively. To further elucidate the e⁄ects of foreclosure backlogs, Figure 23
shows the aggregate and retail price indices and foreclosure starts and completions for the three
values of ￿.
A tighter foreclosure pipeline has di⁄erent implications for the prices of retail homes versus the
overall price index. In particular, the maximum decline in the overall price index falls because the
compositional e⁄ects of foreclosure are weakened. However, the maximum retail price decline is
greater and the price declines last for longer because the foreclosure crisis is extended: as panel B
shows, even though foreclosure starts fall o⁄ after 5 years, with ￿ = 4;000 the wave of foreclosures
lasts over 6 years and with ￿ = 6;000 it lasts nearly 9 years. This increases the duration of both
the market tightness and choosey buyer e⁄ects which gets capitalized into lower retail prices.
The e⁄ect of foreclosure backlogs in our model is consistent with the argument that delaying
foreclosures does not substantially prevent foreclosures in the long run and only draws out the pain.
However, there may be bene￿ts to delaying foreclosure that are not captured by the pure backlog
story. For instance, if one expects household formation to pick up and boost demand in the near
future, delaying foreclosures from a period of low demand to a period of higher demand could limit
price declines. Similarly, slowing down foreclosures could cause banks to o⁄er more mortgage
modi￿cations or short sales, reducing the number of delinquencies that result in a foreclosure.
In fact, the empirical evidence on states with judicial approval of foreclosure ￿in which backlogs
84Formally, we assume that if f (t) homes are in the foreclosure process pending approval only
f(t)
￿f(t)+1 can be
processed in a given period. We choose this function as a smooth approximation to min
n
f;
1
￿
o
, which processes up
to
1
￿ foreclosures each period. Such an approximation is necessary for the numerical implementation.
102Figure 23: Policy: Various Sized Backlogs
Note: The ￿gure shows the e⁄ect of prices and foreclosure start and completion rates for three di⁄erent backlogs. The
model is calibrated to the national calibration developed in section 2.7. The pre-downturn price level is normalized
to one. One in ￿ houses can be foreclosed upon each week, so ￿ = 4,000 corresponds to 1.3 percent of the housing
stock being foreclosed upon per year and ￿ = 6,000 corresponds to .9 percent. The ￿gure shows that slowing down
foreclosures extends the downturn and makes prices remain low for longer. Although the overall price index rises,
this is because of a compositional e⁄ect and the retail price index falls.
are much larger (Mian et al., 2014) ￿suggests that slowing down foreclosures might reduce the
incidence of foreclosure. Adding a judicial state dummy to regression (27) leads to a judicial
dummy coe¢ cient +.08 log points for the aggregate price index and +.05 for the non-distressed
index even with a full set of controls, as shown in appendix B.3. Our model cannot generate such
a dramatic price increase by adding a narrow foreclosure pipeline ￿the only way to get an e⁄ect
of this order of magnitude is to reduce the incidence of foreclosures. The welfare e⁄ects of policies
that limit the ability of lenders to foreclose by slowing down foreclosures are, however, unclear, as
lenders may respond to a diminished ability to foreclose by increasing interest rates on mortgages
or denying mortgages to credit-worthy borrowers.
2.8.3 Interest Rate or Payment Reductions
Another much-discussed policy that is being implemented with the Home A⁄ordable Re￿nance Pro-
gram is to re￿nance the mortgages of underwater borrowers, many of whom are stuck at extremely
high interest rates due to an inability to re￿nance, at today￿ s low interest rates. This could reduce
103defaults because some individuals who are currently unable to meet their monthly payment may
be able to pay a reduced monthly payment.
To simulate this intervention, we reduce ￿I, the hazard of default for individuals who are
underwater, from 8.6 percent to 7.1 percent. Appendix B.4 uses an estimate of the e⁄ect of
reducing monthly payments on defaults from Bajari et al. (2010) to show that this reduction in ￿I
is equivalent to reducing interest rates from 7 to 4 percent ￿a generous estimate of what is possible
purely through re￿nancing. The results are shown in column 4 of Table 16.
Although foreclosures still play an important role in exacerbating the downturn, re￿nancing has
a substantial e⁄ect both because mechanically fewer foreclosures occur at a given level of negative
equity and because the ampli￿cation mechanism is weaker. The size of these e⁄ects, however,
depends critically on the e⁄ect of reducing interest rates on default. While we calibrate to the
existing evidence from Bajari et al. (2010), their estimates are not causal. Understanding the
impact of interest rate reductions on default is an important subject for future research.
2.8.4 Principal Reduction
The ￿nal policy we simulate is a $100 billion principal reduction.85 The results are shown in
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 16. Column 5 assumes that the government cannot target underwater
homeowners gives every mortgage holder a $2,000 principal reduction. Column 6 assumes that
the government can target the approximately 20 million individuals who have had negative equity
during the crisis so that principal is reduced by $5,000 for each underwater homeowner.
Principal reduction provides a direct way to reduce negative equity and the price-default am-
pli￿cation. The targeted principal reduction has a signi￿cant ameliorating e⁄ect on the crisis,
although it is not as e⁄ective as the interest rate reduction. The smaller principal reduction,
however, has an e⁄ect that is much smaller. The government￿ s ability to target homeowners in
need is thus crucial to the e⁄ectiveness of principal reduction.
Beyond the government￿ s ability to target under water homeowners, costs that we do not model
may limit the e⁄ectiveness of principal reduction. Chief among these is moral hazard: if people
expect that underwater mortgages will be bailed out with principal reductions, they may be more
85We assume that raising the funds for the intervention does not a⁄ect housing demand, housing prices, or the rate
at which liquidity shocks occur.
104likely to become delinquent on their mortgage. Similarly, strategic default may be elevated. The
empirical relevance and size of such moral hazard e⁄ects is an important subject for future research.
2.8.5 Other Policies
Our policy simulations reveal the trade-o⁄s faced by policy makers and the parameters that future
research on anti-foreclosure policy should consider. In addition to the policies simulated here,
there are a number of other policies that require a richer model to be given full justice and that we
hope will be analyzed by future research.
First, a policy maker might try to stimulate additional buyer demand. To have a substantial
e⁄ect on market tightness, one would have to stimulate entry by new homeowners. Such a policy is
outside the scope of our model as it would require endogenous household formation or an endogenous
buy-rent decision. Nonetheless, our model does suggest that any increase in new home ownership
would have to be permanent; an intervention that boosts new home ownership for a few months
at the expense of demand in subsequent months would not have a lasting e⁄ect. The short-lived
e⁄ects of the 2009 new homeowner tax credit suggests that it is di¢ cult to generate a long-lasting
e⁄ect.
Second, our model cannot consider the conversion of owner-occupied housing to rental housing
without an endogenous rent-buy margin. In particular, the conversion of REOs to rental properties
has been discussed. While such a policy would reduce rental prices and REO inventories, with
endogenous tenure choice it is possible that renting becomes much more appealing, drawing away
buyers and further freezing up the owner-occupied market. There is also the potential for rent-
seeking behavior by investors who seek to buy REO properties in bulk and convert them to rental
homes.
2.9 Conclusion
This chapter argues that foreclosures play an important role in exacerbating housing downturns
due to their general equilibrium e⁄ects. We add foreclosure to a simple search model of the housing
market with two types of sellers by making two additional assumptions: banks selling foreclosed
homes have higher holding costs than retail sellers and homeowners who are foreclosed upon cannot
immediately purchase another home.
105With these assumptions, foreclosures alter market behavior by reducing the number of buyers
in markets, which makes sellers and particularly REO sellers desperate to sell, and by raising
the probability that a buyer meets a REO seller who sells at a discount, which makes buyers more
selective. Foreclosures also alter the composition of transactions, making the average sale look more
like a foreclosure sale. These e⁄ects all create downward pressure on price but have opposing e⁄ects
on volume as sellers want to sell faster but buyers are more choosey. Sales fall disproportionately
in the retail market, helping to explain how foreclosures freeze up the market for non-distressed
homes.
We then embed our basic model of the housing market in a richer model which allows for endoge-
nous defaults and homeowner lock-in. We elucidate the potential for spirals in which foreclosures
lower prices, putting more homeowners underwater, leading to more defaults and therefore even
more foreclosures. A sensitivity analysis demonstrates that such a spiral can operate as a power-
ful ampli￿cation channel of shocks, especially when the proportion of homeowners in the market
with high LTV ratios is high. A calibration of the full model to cross-market data is successful in
matching both the average level of the price decline of the housing bust and a signi￿cant proportion
of the cross-sectional variation in prices. The model matches the cross-sectional pattern of volume
declines but is unable to fully account for the level. A quantitative exercise shows that foreclosures
exacerbate the price declines in downturns on the order of 50 percent overall and 33 percent in the
retail market.
An alternative explanation for the freezing up of the retail market during the housing bust is
nominal loss aversion as documented by Genesove and Mayer (2001). The housing bubble may have
created a reference point for homeowners such that when the bubble burst, they were not willing
to sell for less than what they perceived the true value of their homes to be. If this were not the
case for banks, the retail market would disproportionately freeze up. However, loss aversion would
have to be extreme to explain a freezing up of the retail market for several years. Consequently,
while it may not be able to fully account for the freezing up of the retail market, loss aversion may
have played a role in the housing downturn and may be able to explain the volume declines that
our model cannot capture. Note also that in a model in which nominal loss aversion is an operative
channel, foreclosures may actually aid in price discovery.86
86Thanks to Ed Glaeser for this insight.
106Credit constraints and capital losses on levered houses could also explain some of the freezing
up of the retail market and the decline in volume that our model cannot explain. Ortalo-Magne
and Rady (2006) present a model in which homeowners use equity extracted from their previous
house to purchase their next house. With down payment requirements as in Stein (1995), moderate
swings in housing prices can generate large swings the purchasing power of potential homeowners.
This may cause some homeowners not to move at all, creating e⁄ective lock-in of non-under-
water borrowers and helping to freeze up the retail market. The substantial decline in household
formation is another factor that could explain the decline in volume that our model cannot explain.
Our analysis suggests several directions for future research. First, it would be interesting to
endogenize the decision to enter the housing market. Chetty and Szeidl (2007) present an (S,s)
model of consumption commitments based on the decision to move homes which could be embedded
into a general equilibrium model of the housing market. This would allow an analysis of how market
forces a⁄ect the decision to move and elucidate why sales remain depressed and more people are
not taking advantage of the buyer￿ s market by trading up. Second, an endogenous rent-buy margin
would allow the rental market to be less segmented and would allow for analyses of several additional
policies, as we describe in Section 2.8. Finally, the addition of supply considerations would allow
an analysis of how the dynamics of new construction and conversion of owner-occupied housing to
renter-occupied are a⁄ected by foreclosures.
107Chapter 3:
Does Indivisible Labor Explain the
Di⁄erence Between Micro and Macro Elasticities?
A Meta-Analysis of Extensive Margin Elasticities
3.1 Introduction
Macroeconomic models of ￿ uctuations in hours of work over the business cycle or across countries
imply much larger labor supply elasticities than microeconometric estimates of hours elasticities.
Understanding this divergence is critical for questions ranging from the sources of business cycles
to the impacts of tax policy on growth and inequality. Starting with the seminal work of Roger-
son (1988) and Hansen (1985), one leading explanation of the divergence is the extensive margin
response created by indivisible labor supply. If labor supply is indivisible, changes in tax or wage
rates can generate large changes in aggregate hours by inducing extensive margin (participation)
responses even if they have little e⁄ect on hours conditional on employment. In view of this ar-
gument, modern macro models are calibrated to match low micro estimates of intensive margin
elasticities. However, the extensive margin elasticity is usually treated as a free parameter that
can be calibrated purely to match macroeconomic moments.
We argue that the extensive margin elasticity should not be treated as a free parameter. Macro
models should be calibrated to match micro estimates of extensive margin elasticities in the same
way that they are calibrated to match micro estimates of intensive margin elasticities. The
size of the extensive margin responses depends on the density of the distribution of reservation
wages around the economy￿ s equilibrium. The same marginal density that determines the im-
pacts of macroeconomic variation on aggregate employment also determines the impacts of quasi-
experiments such as tax policy changes on employment rates. Micro estimates of extensive margin
elasticities can therefore be used to calibrate macro models.87
In this chapter, we assess whether existing calibrations of macro models are consistent with micro
evidence on extensive margin responses. In doing so, we ￿nd that it is crucial to distinguish between
two types of elasticities: Hicksian and Frisch. The Frisch (marginal utility constant) elasticity
87The distribution of reservation wages at the margin could vary across subgroups, potentially generating di⁄erences
between micro and macro estimates of extensive-margin responses. As we explain below, observable heterogeneity
in elasticities across subgroups reinforces our conclusions.
108controls intertemporal substitution responses to temporary wage ￿ uctuations and is therefore the
relevant parameter for understanding labor supply ￿ uctuations over the business cycle.88 The
Hicksian (wealth constant) elasticity controls steady-state responses to permanent wage changes
and is therefore the relevant parameter for understanding di⁄erences in labor supply across countries
with di⁄erent tax systems. We use two approaches to comparing macro calibrations with micro
evidence: simulations of quasi-experiments and a meta-analysis of micro elasticity estimates. Both
approaches show that micro and macro evidence agree about Hicksian (steady state) elasticities
but disagree about Frisch (intertemporal substitution) elasticities.
We begin by simulating the impacts of policy changes that generate exogenous changes in
incentives to work in a standard macro model and comparing the predicted responses with the
￿ndings of microeconometric studies. We use Rogerson and Wallenius￿(2009) [RW] calibrated
model of life cycle labor supply as a benchmark model for this exercise. The RW model matches
macro evidence by generating an intertemporal substitution elasticity of aggregate hours above 2
even when calibrated to generate a Frisch intensive-margin elasticity below 0.5. We simulate labor
supply responses to three policies using this model: (1) a tax-free year in Iceland in 1987 studied
by Bianchi et al. (2001), (2) a randomized experiment providing temporary subsidies for work to
welfare recipients in Canada (Card and Hyslop 2005), and (3) the 1994 expansion of the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) for low-income individuals in the United States (Meyer and Rosenbaum
2001). The ￿rst two examples are ideal for identifying Frisch elasticities because they induce
temporary variation in wage rates. Bianchi et al. (2001) ￿nd that employment rates in Iceland
do indeed rise in 1987, but the increase is only one ￿fth as large as that predicted by the RW
model. Similarly, the calibrated RW model predicts intertemporal substitution responses to the
work subsidies in Canada that are nearly four times larger than what Card and Hyslop observe in
their data. The third example ￿the EITC expansion ￿generates permanent variation in tax rates
and thus is well-suited for identifying steady-state elasticities. The RW model performs better in
matching the impacts of the EITC expansion on employment rates because it generates a Hicksian
aggregate hours elasticity of approximately 0.7, resulting in steady-state impacts of taxes on labor
88The extensive margin Frisch elasticity is technically ill-de￿ned because each agent is not at an interior optimum.
We therefore de￿ne the Frisch extensive elasticity empirically as the impact of an in￿nitismal, temporary wage
change on employment rates. This is the relevant elasticity for evaluating employment responses to business cycle
￿ uctuations.
109supply that are closer to micro estimates.
While our quantitative results rest on the particular assumptions of the RW model, our quali-
tative conclusions apply more generally. Any macro model that relies primarily on changes in labor
supply to generate business cycle ￿ uctuations must feature a large extensive margin Frisch elastic-
ity. As a result, any such model will over-predict the response to temporary wage changes such as
the tax holiday in Iceland and work subsidies in Canada. Intuitively, ￿ uctuations in employment
over the business cycle and the employment e⁄ects of quasi-experimental wage changes are both
fundamentally determined by the same density of the reservation wage distribution at the margin
irrespective of model speci￿cation. Thus, any labor supply model that ￿ts the quasi-experimental
evidence cannot generate large ￿ uctuations in employment over the business cycle.
To explore whether the results of the three studies we consider in the simulations are representa-
tive of the broader empirical literature, we conduct a meta-analysis of quasi-experimental estimates
of extensive margin elasticities. We summarize results from ￿fteen studies that span a broad range
of countries, demographic groups, time periods, and sources of variation. These studies generally
analyze changes in incentives for small subgroups of the population, permitting identi￿cation of
labor supply elasticities that are not confounded by changes in equilibrium wage rates. Despite
the great variation in methodologies, there is consensus about extensive margin elasticities. The
mean extensive margin elasticity among the studies we consider is 0.28 and every estimate is below
0.43. The intertemporal substitution (Frisch) elasticity estimates for temporary policy changes
turn out be quite similar to the steady-state elasticity estimates obtained from permanent policy
changes. The small elasticities imply that most individuals are at a corner in their employment
choices; that is, the density of individuals at the margin of employment is thin in practice.
We conclude our analysis by evaluating whether extensive margin elasticities of around 0.25 as
suggested by micro evidence are adequate to reconcile the gap between micro and macro estimates
of aggregate hours elasticities. To do so, we summarize micro and macro estimates of Hicksian
and Frisch elasticities on both the extensive and intensive margins. We ￿nd that micro and
macro studies agree about the steady-state impacts of taxes on labor supply. Both micro and
macro studies imply Hicksian extensive margin elasticities around 0.2. And both micro and macro
evidence are consistent with intensive margin elasticities around 0.3 once one accounts for frictions
that may attenuate observed micro estimates (Chetty et al. 2011a, Chetty 2012). Prescott￿ s (2004)
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elasticity of 0.7, only slightly larger than micro estimates.89 These ￿ndings indicate that labor
supply responses to taxation could indeed explain much of the variation in hours of work across
countries with di⁄erent tax systems.90
On the intertemporal substitution margin, the limited existing evidence on intensive margin
elasticities suggests that values around 0.5 are consistent with both micro and macro data. How-
ever, micro and macro estimates of extensive margin intertemporal substitution elasticities di⁄er by
an order of magnitude. Quasi-experimental estimates of extensive margin intertemporal substitu-
tion elasticities are around 0.25. In contrast, pure equilibrium macro models, in which employment
￿ uctuations are driven purely by preferences, imply intertemporal substitution extensive margin
elasticities in excess of 2. Hence, the puzzle to be resolved is why employment rates ￿ uctuate
so much over the business cycle relative to what one would predict based on the impacts of tax
changes on employment rates ￿that is, why micro and macro estimates of the Frisch extensive
margin elasticity are so di⁄erent.91 Even accounting for indivisible labor, micro studies do not
support representative-agent macro models that generate Frisch elasticities above 1.
There are two potential concerns that one may have with using microeconomic estimates to
calibrate macroeconomic models. The ￿rst is that heterogeneity in extensive margin responses
complicates the mapping from micro estimates to macro elasticities that re￿ ect economy-wide
behavior.92 This problem is compounded by the concern that micro studies sometimes exclude
important subgroups that could matter for economy-wide extensive margin responses (Dyrda et
al. 2012). In practice, however, heterogeneity across subgroups appears to strengthens our main
conclusion about agreement on the Hicksian elasticity but disagreement on the Frisch elasticity. The
89Prescott reports an elasticity of approximately 3 in his paper. Importantly, this is a Frisch rather than Hicksian
elasticity. Prescott implicitly maps the Hicksian elasticity of 0.7 implied by the data to a Frisch elasticity of 3 based
on speci￿c parametric assumptions. See Section 3.2 below for further details.
90Other factors, such as institutions or regulations, could also play a signi￿cant role in explaining cross-country
hours di⁄erences (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2005). Our analysis does not rule out the importance of such
factors. We simply show that micro estimates of labor supply elasticities are consistent with observed di⁄erences in
aggregate hours across countries with di⁄erent tax systems.
91Some progress has been made in recent years on this front: for instance, search and matching models with rigid
wages (e.g. Hall 2009) can potentially match business cycle ￿ uctuations with smaller extensive margin labor supply
elasticities.
92Note that the same problem could in principle arise with intensive margin elasticities as well. Although macro
models are often parametrized so that the intensive margin elasticity is constant by assumption, there is no economic
reason for intensive margin elasticities to remain constant as wage rates change. Hence, if one is willing to use micro
estimates to calibrate intensive margin elasticities, one should be equally willing to do so on the extensive margin as
well.
111heterogeneity in micro estimates of extensive-margin Hicksian elasticities mirrors the heterogeneity
observed in macro studies of steady-state responses. For instance, both micro and macro studies
indicate that extensive-margin elasticities are higher for subgroups that are less attached to the labor
force, such as single mothers and individuals near retirement. However, heterogeneity magni￿es the
discrepancy between micro and macro estimates of intertemporal substitution elasticities. Most
notably, employment rates ￿ uctuate substantially over the business cycle even for prime-age males,
which stands in sharp contrast with the near-zero micro extensive margin Frisch elasticity estimates
for this group.
A second potential concern in mapping micro estimates to macro labor supply elasticities is that
reduced-form micro studies may not directly identify the structural primitives of the reservation
wage distribution that control extensive margin labor supply choices. This is particularly a concern
if frictions prevent the labor market from clearing, as our analysis suggests. In a model with
frictions, reduced-form micro elasticity estimates represent a convolution of the density of the
reservation wage distribution at the margin and other structural parameters, such as the distribution
of adjustment costs or search frictions or the degree of liquidity constraints. Importantly, the same
reduced-form elasticities would also determine the impact of wage changes on labor supply over the
business cycle in such an environment. Hence, micro estimates should continue to provide useful
targets for calibrating macro models even though they do not identify the structure of preferences
or other primitives necessary for normative analysis.93 However, especially when reduced-form
elasticities combine several structural parameters, they may not be stable across settings. Because
of this instability, one should not seek to calibrate macro models to match any single estimate
of a micro elasticity. Nevertheless, one can gauge the range of plausible magnitudes by pooling
evidence from many di⁄erent studies and settings as we do here. The fact that every quasi-
experimental study we review ￿nds elasticities signi￿cantly less than 0.5 casts doubt upon macro
models calibrated with extensive margin elasticities above 1.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 brie￿ y reviews the existing literature on indi-
visible labor. In Section 3.3, we establish a terminology for the various elasticity concepts, as these
93Some micro studies attempt to strip out frictions by studying subgroups such as bike messengers or taxi drivers
who can choose their daily labor supply more freely. However, it is not clear that these pure labor supply elasticity
estimates are more relevant for macro calibrations. If the same frictions that constrain salaried workers from
responding to tax changes also contrain their responses to ￿ uctuations over the business cycle, then it is the observed
reduced-form elasticity for the average worker that matters.
112terms are often used in di⁄erent ways in the existing literature. Section 3.4 reports simulations of
the three quasi-experiments in the Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) model. Section 3.5 presents the
meta-analysis of micro estimates. In Section 3.6, we compare micro and macro evidence on the
intensive and extensive margins. Section 3.7 concludes. Details of the simulation methods and
meta-analysis are given in the appendix.
3.2 Indivisible Labor: Background
Equilibrium macroeconomic models ￿in which di⁄erences in hours of work are driven by prefer-
ences ￿require large labor supply elasticities to explain the variation in hours of work over the
business cycle and across countries with di⁄erent tax regimes. In contrast, quasi-experimental
microeconometric studies of the impacts of tax reforms on hours of work and earnings typically
obtain elasticities close to zero for most groups except very high income earners.94
A large literature has posited that the discrepancy between micro and macro elasticities can
be explained by indivisibilities in labor (e.g. Hansen 1985, Rogerson 1988, Cho and Rogerson
1988, Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992, Cho and Cooley 1994, King and Rebelo 1999, Chang
and Kim 2006, Ljungqvist and Sargent 2006, Prescott, Rogerson, and Wallenius 2009, Rogerson
and Wallenius 2009).95 If individuals cannot freely choose hours of work or face ￿xed costs of
entry, aggregate employment depends upon the distribution of reservation wages in the economy.
If this distribution has substantial density at the margin ￿i.e., many individuals are indi⁄erent
between working and not working at prevailing wage rates ￿then a small reduction in wage rates
could reduce aggregate hours of work signi￿cantly because many individuals will stop working.
Yet the same change in wage rates may not a⁄ect hours of work conditional on employment very
much, implying a small intensive margin labor supply elasticity. As a result, a model with large
extensive margin elasticities and small intensive margin elasticities could match both the micro
and macro evidence. Motivated by these results, modern macro models are calibrated to match
micro estimates of intensive margin elasticities but typically calibrate the extensive margin elasticity
94Early estimates of intensive-margin elasticities include MaCurdy (1981), Altonji (1986), and Angrist (1991).
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) review this literature. Chetty (2012) and Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012) summarize
more recent quasi-experimental intensive margin elasticity estimates.
95The literature has taken two approaches to aggregation with indivisible labor supply: aggregation over states
via employment lotteries (e.g. Hansen 1985, Rogerson 1988) or aggregation over time periods in a lifecycle model
(e.g. Mulligan 2001, Ljungqvist and Sargent 2006, Prescott, Rogerson, and Wallenius 2009). The micro evidence on
extensive margin responses we review here is most easily interpreted through the modern life cycle models.
113purely to match macroeconomic moments (King and Rebelo 1999, Rogerson and Wallenius 2009,
Ljungqvist and Sargent 2011).
In parallel with the development of macro models of indivisible labor supply, a large micro-
econometric literature has recognized the importance of the extensive margin in the analysis of
labor supply. Ashenfelter (1984) and Heckman (1984) discuss the importance of extensive mar-
gin labor supply choices in the analysis of aggregate ￿ uctuations. Heckman and Killingsworth
(1986) and Heckman (1993) review the literature on labor supply models that explicitly model
participation decisions. More recent research has estimated extensive margin elasticities using
quasi-experimental methods.
However, macro models have not been calibrated to match micro evidence on extensive margin
elasticities. One complication in performing such a calibration is that extensive margin elasticities
vary with the wage rate unless the density of the reservation wage distribution happens to be
uniform. Hence, any micro estimate of an extensive margin elasticity is necessarily local to the wage
variation used for identi￿cation. However, this argument does not justify treating the extensive
margin elasticity as a free parameter for two reasons. First, if the micro estimates are identi￿ed
using variation similar to that used in macroeconomic comparisons, one will obtain the appropriate
local elasticity relevant for macro calibrations. Second, the same problem arises when calibrating
macro models with micro estimates of intensive margin elasticities, insofar as elasticities will only
be constant on the intensive margin if utility happens to produce a constant-elasticity labor supply
function. We revisit this issue in Section 3.6 and show that, if anything, observable heterogeneity
in elasticities reinforces the conclusions drawn below.
3.3 Terminology
It is helpful to establish some conventions about terminology given the various elasticity concepts
discussed in this chapter. We distinguish between elasticities based on the margin of response
(extensive vs. intensive) and the timing of response (intertemporal substitution vs. steady state).
There are four elasticities of interest: steady-state extensive, steady-state intensive, intertemporal
extensive, and intertemporal intensive. Each of these four elasticities can be estimated using
both micro (quasi-experimental) and macroeconomic variation. We use the terms ￿micro￿and
￿macro￿elasticities exclusively to refer to the source of variation used to estimate the elasticity.
114The elasticity of aggregate hours ￿the relevant parameter for calibrating a representative agent
model ￿is the sum of the extensive and intensive margin elasticities, weighted by hours of work if
individuals have heterogeneous preferences (Blundell, Bozio, and Laroque 2013).
The macro literature uses the term ￿macro elasticity￿to refer to the Frisch elasticity of aggregate
hours and ￿micro elasticity￿ to refer to the intensive-margin elasticity of hours conditional on
employment (e.g. Prescott 2004, Rogerson and Wallenius 2009). We use di⁄erent terminology
here for two reasons. First, the intensive-margin is no more ￿micro￿than the extensive margin;
both are determined by household-level choices and both have been estimated using micro data.
Second, and more importantly, the Frisch elasticity is critical for understanding business cycle
￿ uctuations in models where aggregate hours ￿ uctuations are purely driven by labor supply, but it
is not the relevant parameter for evaluating the steady-state impacts of di⁄erences in taxes across
countries. The Frisch (marginal utility constant) elasticity controls intertemporal substitution
responses to temporary wage ￿ uctuations, while the Hicksian (wealth constant) elasticity controls
steady-state responses and the welfare consequences of taxation (MaCurdy 1981, Auerbach 1985).96
The distinction between Hicksian and Frisch elasticities is quite important in practice. Prescott
(2004) reports that cross-country di⁄erences in aggregate hours imply an elasticity of 3 in a
representative-agent model, whereas Davis and Henrekson (2005) estimate an elasticity of 0.33
using similar data. The di⁄erence arises primarily because Prescott reports a Frisch elasticity
whereas Davis and Henrekson report a Hicksian elasticity. Regressing log hours on log tax rates in
Prescott￿ s data yields a Hicksian elasticity of 0.7, as shown in 25a below. Prescott maps this esti-
mate of the Hicksian elasticity into a value for a Frisch elasticity based on parametric assumptions
about utility and the wealth-earnings ratio. When utility is time-separable, the Frisch ("F) and
Hicksian ("H) elasticities are related by the following identity (Ziliak and Kniesner 1999, Browning
2005):
"F = "H + ￿(
d[wl]
dA
)2 A
wl
,
where ￿ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS),
d[wl]
dA is the marginal propensity to earn
out of unearned income, and A
wl is the ratio of assets to earnings. The reason that Prescott obtains
96The Hicksian elasticity determines the impact of taxes in steady-state if government revenues are returned to the
consumer as a lump sum, as commonly assumed in representative-agent macro models. If revenues are not returned
to consumers, tax changes have income e⁄ects and the Marshallian elasticity becomes the relevant parameter.
115a much larger value of "F than "H is that the parametric utility speci￿cation he uses produces
large values of A
wl and
d[wl]
dA . However, microeconometric evidence shows that income e⁄ects on
labor supply are much smaller than those produced by the Prescott utility speci￿cation (Holtz-
Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 1993, Imbens et al. 2001). Under a utility speci￿cation that matches
empirical estimates of the mean values of
d[wl]
dA and A
wl, the Frisch elasticity is only slightly larger
than the Hicksian elasticity because the di⁄erence between the two elasticities is proportional to
the income e⁄ect squared (
d[wl]
dA )2 (Chetty 2012, Table III).97
3.4 Simulations of Quasi-Experiments in the RW Model
We evaluate whether macro models with indivisible labor are consistent with micro evidence on
extensive margin responses by focusing on the Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) model. The RW
model is a leading example of recent models of indivisible labor that aggregate over individuals by
time-averaging over the life cycle, as in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006). The model is well-suited
for our purposes because it features both an extensive and intensive margin of labor supply. RW
calibrate their model to show that small intensive-margin micro elasticities are consistent with a
large Frisch elasticity of aggregate hours. We adopt the parameters chosen by RW and simulate
the impacts of policy changes analyzed in three prominent microeconometric studies.98
Setup. RW analyze an overlapping-generations model in which a unit mass of agents is born at
each instant and lives for one unit of time. An individual who supplies h(a) 2 [0;1] hours at age
a produces e(a) ￿ max
￿
h(a) ￿ ￿ h;0
￿
e¢ ciency units of labor, where e(a) = 1 ￿ 2(1 ￿ e1)
￿ ￿1
2 ￿ a
￿ ￿
is a tent-shaped life-cycle productivity pro￿le and ￿ h > 0. Complete asset markets lead to perfect
consumption smoothing. With log utility over consumption, each generation solves
max
c;h(a)
log(c) ￿ ￿
Z 1
0
h(a)
1+￿
1 + ￿
da s.t. c = (1 ￿ ￿)
Z 1
0
e(a)max(h(a) ￿ ￿ h;0)da + T
where ￿ is the tax rate and T is a lump-sum tax rebate that balances the government￿ s budget.
97Subsequent studies calibrate models to match Prescott￿ s Frisch elasticity of 3, but choose a di⁄erent functional
form for utility and wealth-earnings ratios (e.g. Trabandt and Uhlig 2011). The conclusions drawn by these studies
￿e.g. that reductions in tax rates would increase tax revenue ￿might di⁄er had they directly matched the steady
state elasticity of 0.7 implied by Prescott￿ s data.
98On the intertemporal substitution margin, we sought to maximize the model￿ s chance of ￿tting the data by
analyzing the two studies that obtain the largest intertemporal elasticity estimates among those considered in our
meta analysis (Table 17). On the steady-state response, we chose a representative study of a well-known policy (the
Earned Income Tax Credit) to show that the model is consistent with typical micro estimates.
116The model can be solved analytically as described in RW and in Appendix C.4. Because wages
are paid per e¢ ciency unit, individuals have low hourly wage rates at the beginning and end of
their lives and ￿nd it optimal not to work at those points. This generates an extensive margin of
participation over the life cycle. The convex disutility over hours of work generates an intensive
margin hours response to changes in wage rates as well. RW normalize the price of output to 1 and
assume a constant-returns-to-scale production technology, so changes in tax rates have no impact
on pre-tax wages and prices. Accordingly, the quasi-experiments we simulate also hold pre-tax
wages and prices constant, as the studies on which they are based typically analyze the impacts of
di⁄erential changes in incentives for relatively small subgroups of the population.
RW calibrate the parameters ￿, e1, and ￿ h to match empirically observed values for the fraction
of life worked (f), the maximum hours worked per week over the life cycle (hmax), and the wage rate
at retirement relative to the maximum wage rate over the life cycle (wR=wmax). Following RW,
we set hmax = 45% (45 hours per week) and wR=wmax = 1=2. We set f to match the aggregate
employment rate in the period prior to each policy experiment we consider. The parameter ￿
controls the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, as in standard life cycle models (Card 1990). We
set ￿ = 2 to obtain an intensive margin Frisch elasticity of "INT = 1
￿ = 0:5, consistent with the
microeconometric evidence summarized below; we show in Appendix C.1 that setting "INT = 0:25
yields similar results.99 For each of the three tax policy changes simulated below, we choose
the model￿ s remaining parameters f￿;e1;￿ hg to match the moments fhmax;wR=wmax;fg under the
tax system prior to the tax change.100 In all three cases, the calibrated model generates an
intertemporal substitution elasticity for aggregate hours above 2 despite having an intensive margin
intertemporal substitution elasticity of only 0.5, consistent with RW￿ s main result.101 As in RW,
we assume that each agent lives for 60 years (corresponding to average adult working lives) and
simulate each quasi-experiment by changing the tax rate for the number of periods in the model
99RW show that the intertemporal elasticity of aggregate hours in their model is not sensitive to the intensive-
margin intertemporal elasticity. They therefore calibrate ￿, e1, and h to match the three moments conditional on
various values of ￿.
100In one of the simulations, the welfare demonstration in Canada, a small enough fraction of the population is
employed prior to the intervention that ￿tting wR=wmax = 1=2 would require negative productivity at certain points
in the life cycle. Consequently, for that simulation, we set e1 = 0, generating
wR
wmax = :615.
101We calculate this and all other Frisch elasticities by simulating the impact of a small, temporary tax change
in the RW model. This direct calculation of the Frisch elasticity di⁄ers from the values reported by RW. RW
report aggregate hours Frisch elasticities for a stand-in household whose behavior matches the aggregate steady-state
properties of their economy. However, this stand-in household￿ s behavior does not necessarily match the aggregate
intertemporal substitution properties of the RW model.
117that correspond to the duration of the tax policy change in the data.102
To simulate the impacts of unanticipated tax changes, we must specify how the lump sum rebate
T changes for each agent. To simplify aggregation, we assume that each generation receives a lump-
sum rebate equal to the taxes they pay at each instant in time.103 We ignore heterogeneity in the
tax system across individuals and set ￿ equal to the average tax rate for the subgroup analyzed
(which is relevant for extensive margin decisions).
Experiment 1: Tax Holiday in Iceland. In 1987, Iceland suspended its income tax for one year
as it transitioned from a system under which taxes were paid on the previous year￿ s income to a
system where taxes were paid on current earnings. In 1987, individuals paid tax on income earned
in 1986; in 1988, individuals were taxed on income earned in 1988, and thus income in 1987 was
untaxed. The average tax rate was 14.5% in 1986, 0 in 1987, and 8.0% in 1988 (Bianchi et al.
2001). Although this tax change could also produce a change in labor demand due to a general
equilibrium impact on wage rates, the tax holiday had no impact on labor supply for individuals
with low initial tax rates (Bianchi et al. 2001, Figure 9). This implies that the general equilibrium
feedback on wage rates was negligible, so the aggregate employment response can be interpreted
as a labor supply elasticity.104 We simulate the tax reform in Iceland in the RW model under
the assumption that the tax system remains stable prior to 1986 and after 1988. The reform was
announced in late 1986, so we model the tax change as an unanticipated change at the start of
1987. The average employment rate in the three year period prior to the reform is f = 79:2%,
which implies that individuals work for 47.5 years in the model. The single-year tax reduction
thus comes close to the ideal experiment for identifying a Frisch elasticity of reducing tax rates for
an in￿nitesimal fraction of the working life.
Figure 24a plots annual changes in employment rates (the employment rate in year t minus the
employment rate in year t ￿ 1) around the reform, demarcated by the vertical line. The Icelandic
administrative records analyzed by Bianchi et al. (blue squares) show a modest but signi￿cant
increase in employment rates in 1987 followed by a sharp dip in 1988, consistent with intertemporal
102To characterize high frequency dynamics precisely, we simulate the model with at least 100 periods per year in
all cases; see Appendix C.4 for details.
103Tax policy changes a⁄ect each generation di⁄erently because they are at di⁄erent points in the lifecycle when the
change occurs.
104Stated di⁄erently, the di⁄erential response for workers who experienced larger changes in tax rates can be inter-
preted as a pure labor supply elasticity that nets out changes in wage rates. Bianchi et al.￿ s analysis reveals that
this di⁄erential impact is similar to the aggregate impact we simulate here.
118Figure 24: Impacts of Tax Changes on Employment Rates: Simulations vs. Data
Notes: Each panel shows the impact of an unanticipated change in incentives to work on employment rates. The red dashed
series shows the impact predicted by the calibrated Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) model, while the blue solid series shows
the impact observed in the data. Panel (a): Iceland suspended its income tax for one year in 1987. Average tax rates in
Iceland changed from 14.5% in 1986 to 0% in 1987 and then 8.0% in 1988. Following Bianchi et al. (2001), we de￿ne the
employment rate as the fraction of weeks worked in a given year in the adult population. This panel plots annual changes in
employment rates. Panel (b): The Canadian SSP demonstration randomly assigned a group of welfare recipients a wage subsidy
for 36 months in the early 1990s. Individuals in the control group faced an e⁄ective average tax rate of 74.3% for working full
time at the minimum wage, while individuals in the treatment group faced an e⁄ective average tax rate of 16.7%. Following
Card and Hyslop (2005), we plot the di⁄erence in monthly employment rates between the treatment and control groups. We
add the observed control group mean at the start of the experiment (23.5%) to the di⁄erence for scaling purposes. Simulated
employment rates are the fraction of individuals aged 16 to 46 working in a given month, re￿ecting the age distribution of the
SSP treatment group (see Appendix A). Panel (c): The EITC expansion in the US in 1994-5 lowered average tax rates net of
taxes and transfers for single mothers from 50.8% in 1992 to 43.6% in 1996. Meyer (2010, Figure 2) reports annual employment
rates for single women using CPS data. We plot the employment rates of single mothers adjusted for observables and time
trends as in Meyer (2010); simulated employment rates are reported for individuals aged 16 to 46.
119substitution. The impact predicted by the RW model (red circles) is an order of magnitude larger
than the observed impact. In the data, employment is 3 percentage points higher in 1987 relative
to 1988, but the RW model predicts that it would be 13.5 percentage points higher. The model
generates a much larger spike in employment because the fraction of cohorts that are close to being
indi⁄erent between working and staying out of the labor force is large. The temporary increase
in the wage rates therefore induces a large group of agents to work. Note that it is precisely this
mechanism ￿having a large fraction of individual near the margin ￿that allows the RW model
to generate a large Frisch elasticity for aggregate hours and thus explain ￿ uctuations in aggregate
hours over the business cycle.
Experiment 2: SSP Welfare Demonstration in Canada. The Iceland analysis focuses on em-
ployment changes in the aggregate economy, which are relevant for understanding business cycle
￿ uctuations but may mask substantial heterogeneity across groups. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006),
Rogerson and Wallenius (2007), and others emphasize that certain groups of the population ￿such
an individuals near retirement or those with low wage rates ￿are likely to exhibit particularly
large extensive margin responses and drive the change in aggregate hours. To evaluate whether
the model￿ s predictions are more accurate for these more elastic subgroups, we consider a policy
experiment targeted at welfare recipients who frequently transition in and out of the labor force.
In the early 1990s, the Canadian government conducted the Self Su¢ ciency Project (SSP) to
test whether a temporary earnings subsidy could induce welfare recipients to start working. The
project was a randomized experiment involving over 5,000 single parents who had been on welfare
for at least one year. Half the individuals (the treatment group) were given a large subsidy if they
worked more than 30 hours per week. The subsidy lasted for 36 months.105 Under the prevailing
welfare system in Canada, welfare payments were reduced dollar-for-dollar with earnings above a
low baseline level. As a result, a single parent with one child in the control group faced an e⁄ective
average tax rate of 74.3% when moving from no work to full-time work (see Appendix C.1). In
contrast, an individual in the treatment group faced an e⁄ective average tax rate of 16.7% for the
same change. The employment rate during the month the experiment began was f = 23:5%.
105Individuals were given up to one year to start working and the 36 month period began after they started to work.
This feature of the program generated an incentive to establish eligibility for the subsidy by working within the ￿rst
year, accentuating the intertemporal substitution incentive. We ignore this feature of the program in our simulation
by assuming that the subsidy starts immediately after random assignment. This simpli￿cation biases the size of the
employment increase predicted by our simulation downward.
120Card and Hyslop (2005) use survey data to calculate employment rates at a monthly frequency
for 53 months starting from the month of random assignment. Figure 24b plots monthly em-
ployment rates after the experimental intervention began. The series in blue squares shows the
di⁄erence in employment rates for the treatment group relative to the control group (Card and
Hyslop, Figure 3a), with the model the SSP experiment as a tax reform that lowers the tax rate
from ￿ = 74:3% to ￿ = 16:7% for a three year period, after which the tax rate reverts to ￿ = 74:3%.
The pre-experiment employment rate of 23.5% is added to the di⁄erence to facilitate interpretation
of the scale. The data show that the subsidy had a substantial impact: employment rates rise
by approximately 14 percentage points in the treatment group relative to the control group a year
after the subsidy was introduced. These employment gains fade away after the subsidy expires,
consistent with intertemporal substitution.
The series in red circles in Figure 24b shows the corresponding impacts predicted by the RW
model. Because the sample analyzed by Card and Hyslop consists primarily of younger individuals
(less than 2.5% of the sample is over age 50), we report simulated employment rates for individuals
in the ￿rst half of the life cycle (ages 16-46). The impacts predicted by the calibrated model ￿an
employment increase of 52.8 percentage points one year after the subsidy is introduced ￿are again
substantially larger than what is observed in the data. Hence, even for subgroups that are closer
to the margin of entering or exiting the labor force and are therefore more elastic, the RW model
signi￿cantly over-predicts extensive margin responses.
One may be concerned that liquidity constraints attenuate the degree of intertemporal substi-
tution in the low-income population treated by the SSP. The estimated elasticity therefore may
not directly identify preference parameters in the RW model. However, as noted above, the same
liquidity constraints should also a⁄ect employment responses to business cycle ￿ uctuations in wage
rates. Hence, the reduced-form response estimated by Card and Hyslop is still informative about
the magnitude of labor supply ￿ uctuations over the cycle for this subgroup.
Experiment 3: Earned Income Tax Credit in the U.S. The last policy change we consider ￿the
expansion of the EITC in 1994 analyzed by Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000, 2001) and Meyer (2010)
￿is a permanent tax change whose impact is determined by the Hicksian rather than the Frisch
elasticity.106 The EITC expansion lowered average tax rates (including implicit taxes generated
106If the tax change is not rebated to the consumer as a lump sum, its impact depends on the uncompensated
121by the phase-out of transfers) from 50.8% in 1992 to 43.6% in 1996 for single mothers (Meyer and
Rosenbaum 2000, Table 2).107 Roughly half of the expansion occurred in 1994. For simplicity,
we model the tax change under the assumption that the change occurs immediately at the start of
1994, ignoring the phase-in of the reform. We also assume as above that the tax system remains
stable prior to 1994. The average employment rate for the single mothers is f = 79:1% in the
three years preceding the reform.
Figure 24c shows the employment rates of single mothers around the 1994 reform using data
from Meyer (2010, Figure 2). The series in blue circles shows employment rates for single mothers
with 1 or 2 children, adjusted for time trends and changes in observables as in Meyer (2010) (see
Appendix C.1 for details). The labor force participation rate of single mothers rose from 79.6% in
1993 to 85.8% in 1997 after the EITC expansion was fully phased in. The RW model predicts a 6.0
percentage point increase in employment rates on impact and an additional 0.3 percentage point
rise over the subsequent 5 years. The impact predicted by the model is thus very similar to the
observed impact.
The RW model performs much better in predicting the impacts of the EITC expansion than the
preceding experiments because it predicts much smaller steady-state responses than intertemporal
substitution responses. Intuitively, a permanent change generates a much lower elasticity because
all generations increase their labor supply at the point in their life cycle when they are most
productive, smoothing the aggregate response across time. With a temporary change, every
generation has an incentive to work when net-of-tax wage rates are high, resulting in a large Frisch
elasticity.108 In the RW model, a large mass of cohorts is at the margin with respect to a temporary
tax change or wage ￿ uctuation because individuals do not have strong preferences over when they
work during their lives. However, in any given period, a much smaller fraction of individuals within
each cohort are at the margin with respect to a permanent change in incentives.
Together, the simulations highlight two results that we develop further below. First, the
(Marshallian) elasticity rather than the Hicksian elasticity. In practice, microeconometric estimates of income e⁄ects
are quite small (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 1993, Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote 2001), suggesting that the
impact of the EITC change is well approximated by the Hicksian elasticity.
107The changes in average tax rates in Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) take into account conurrent changes in bene￿ts
from welfare and Medicaid. See Appendix A for details.
108Although the SSP welfare demonstration was temporary, a three-year subsidy actually covers a sizable fraction of
the working life. The responses to the experiment are therefore determined by a combination of Hicksian and Frisch
elasticities. Together, the Iceland and SSP simulations demonstrate that the RW model over-predicts responses both
at very short and medium-term frequencies.
122extensive margin elasticities required to explain the sharp ￿ uctuations in aggregate hours over the
business cycle are far larger than micro estimates. Second, micro and macro evidence are in much
closer alignment about the steady-state impacts of taxes on labor supply.
Although the quantitative results of our simulations depend to some extent upon the parametric
choices made by RW, we expect these lessons to apply more broadly. Generating a large macro
Frisch elasticity by having a large fraction of individuals who are nearly indi⁄erent between working
and not working is precisely what delivers predictions about how temporary tax changes a⁄ect
employment rates that contradict the data. A macro model calibrated to match micro estimates
of extensive margin intertemporal substitution elasticities would no longer generate large Frisch
elasticities for aggregate hours.
3.5 Meta-Analysis
In this section, we evaluate whether the three quasi-experiments considered above are representative
of the broader literature by conducting a meta-analysis of extensive margin elasticity estimates.
Although several papers have reviewed intensive margin elasticities (e.g. Pencavel 1986, Blundell
and MaCurdy 1999, Chetty 2012), we are not aware of a meta-analysis of quasi-experimental
estimates of extensive margin elasticities.
We focus on reduced-form studies that use changes in tax policies or long-term wage trends for
identi￿cation rather than structural studies that exploit variation in wage rates at the individual
level to fully identify a structural model. Keane and Rogerson (2010) argue that obtaining con-
sistent structural estimates from wage variation over the life cycle requires accounting for a broad
range of factors such as human capital accumulation (Imai and Keane 2004), credit constraints
(Domeij and Floden 2006), and uninsurable risks (Low 2005). Moreover, structural models typi-
cally rely on strong exclusion restrictions for identi￿cation.109 The quasi-experimental studies we
consider here exploit variation that is orthogonal to wage rates and thus are more robust to the
biases emphasized by Keane and Rogerson. The exclusion restriction underlying these studies is
109Common instruments for wage rates include nonlinear age and time trends (Kimmel and Kniesner 1998) or
interactions of education and experience (Gourio and Noual 2009) conditional on individual ￿xed e⁄ects. Keane
(2010) uses years of schooling as an instrument for the wage to identify an elasticity in Eckstein and Wolpin￿ s (1989)
classic structural model. The exclusion restrictions for these instruments are that employment rates do not vary with
age conditional on wage rates or that individuals with di⁄erent levels of education do not have di⁄erent employment
trajectories over their lifecycle. If factors that predict high wage rates also predict high latent tastes for work, the
elasticity estimates would be biased upward.
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124that the di⁄erential changes in tax rates across groups is not correlated with unobserved determi-
nants of employment rates, typically a weaker assumption than those required forfull identi￿cation
of a structural model.110
Table 17 summarizes extensive margin elasticity estimates from ￿fteen quasi-experimental stud-
ies. The calculations underlying the estimates and standard errors are described in Appendix C.2.
We calculate the extensive margin labor supply elasticity as the change in log employment rates
divided by the change in log net-of-tax wage rates. Employment rates are typically de￿ned as
working at any point during the year, though there are some di⁄erences across studies as described
in the appendix. We use the authors￿preferred estimate whenever possible. For studies that
do not report such an estimate, we construct elasticities from reported estimates of changes in
participation and calculations of the change in net-of-average-tax wage rates. We use the delta
method to calculate standard errors in such cases.
The studies summarized in Table 17 report labor supply elasticities for various countries and
subgroups using many di⁄erent sources of variation. Yet the elasticity estimates exhibit substantial
consensus. The elasticity estimates range from 0.13 to 0.43, with an overall unweighted mean across
the ￿fteen studies of 0.28. To obtain further insight into the key patterns, we divide the studies
into two groups ￿steady-state and intertemporal substitution ￿based on the type of variation they
use for identi￿cation.
The ￿rst panel in Table 17 shows steady-state (Hicksian) elasticities identi￿ed from perma-
nent wage changes resulting from tax reforms or long term trends in wage rates across regions or
skill-groups.111 The simplest empirical designs (e.g. Eissa and Liebman 1996) use di⁄erence-in-
di⁄erences approaches, while more recent studies (e.g. Meghir and Philips 2010) combine multiple
reforms over time that a⁄ect individuals di⁄erently. The mean elasticity across the nine studies
that estimate steady-state elasticities is 0.25.
The second panel in Table 17 summarizes results from studies that exploit temporary wage
changes to identify intertemporal substitution (Frisch) elasticities. Some of these studies exploit
110Keane (2010(Keane 2010)) and Keane and Rogerson (2010) review structural estimates and ￿nd larger values
than the quasi-experimental estimates summarized below. It would be useful to simulate the impacts of tax policy
changes in these structural models to understand why their predictions di⁄er from the reduced-form evidence.
111Some of the studies in Panel A of Table 17 do not fully account for income e⁄ects and thus obtain estimates
that are closer to Marshallian elasticities than Hicksian elasticities. However, we can still conclude from the mean
estimates in Panels A and B of Table 17 that the Hicksian elasticity is between 0.25 and 0.32 because the Hicksian
is bounded by the Marshallian and Frisch elasticities (MaCurdy 1981).
125temporary tax changes such as the Iceland tax holiday discussed above or temporary increases
in labor demand, such as Carrington￿ s (1996) analysis of the e⁄ect of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
on Alaska￿ s labor market. Other studies analyze the impact of anticipated variation in wages
generated by pension schemes on retirement behavior. For instance, Gruber and Wise (1999)
correlate employment rates of adults near retirement with the implicit tax generated by social
security systems across OECD countries. Their analysis implies an elasticity of 0.23. Brown
(2009) and Manoli and Weber (2011) estimate elasticities using the bunching of retirements around
the kinks in the budget set created by discontinuities in pension systems. The small elasticities
found by these studies implies that the fraction of individuals who are ￿at a corner with respect to
the decision to retire￿(Ljungqvist and Sargent 2011) is quite large in practice.
The mean estimate of the intertemporal substitution elasticity across the six studies in Panel
B is 0.32, only slightly larger than the estimates of steady-state elasticities in Panel A. The
similarity between Hicksian and Frisch elasticities is consistent with evidence that income e⁄ects
are not large enough to produce a substantial di⁄erence between intertemporal substitution and
steady-state responses.112
The elasticity estimates vary across subgroups in correspondence with their mean employment
rates, as is well known from prior work (Heckman 1993, Keane and Rogerson 2010). Groups
that have the weakest attachment to the labor force, such as single mothers or older workers near
retirement, are the most elastic on the extensive margin (e.g. Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001, Gruber
and Wise 1999). Among prime-age males, high rates of labor force participation and low aggregate
hours elasticities (which combine the intensive and extensive margins) have led researchers to
conclude that the extensive margin response is likely to be quite small (see e.g., Hausman 1985 and
Juhn, Murphy, and Topel 1991). This is why most of the studies in Table 17 focus on groups with
relatively low participation rates. Hence, the mean extensive margin elasticity in the population
as a whole is likely to be below the unweighted mean across the studies in Table 17 of 0.28.
The heterogeneity in elasticities across subgroups implies that there is no single value of the
extensive margin elasticity that can be used across applications. For instance, a recession or
tax policy change that a⁄ects prime-age males may generate smaller employment responses in the
112This does not imply that income e⁄ects are small in magnitude. Because the gap between the Frisch and the
Hicksian is proportional to the square of the income e⁄ect, even sizable income e⁄ects
d[wl]
dA produce a small gap
between the Frisch and Hicksian elasticities; see Chetty (2012(Chetty 2012)) for details.
126Table 18: Extensive Margin Elasticity Estimates From Quasi-Experimental Studies
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin Aggregate Hours
Steady State (Hicksian) micro 0.33 0.25 0.58
macro 0.33 0.17 0.50
Intertemporal Substitution micro 0.54 0.32 0.86
(Frisch) macro [0.54] [2.77] 3.31
Notes: Each cell shows a point estimate of the relevant elasticity based on meta analyses of existing micro and macro evidence.
Micro estimates are identi￿ed from quasi-experimental studies; macro estimates are identi￿ed from cross-country variation
in tax rates (steady state elasticities) and business cycle ￿uctuations (intertemporal substitution elasticities). The aggregate
hours elasticity is de￿ned as the sum of the extensive and intensive elasticities. Macro studies report intertemporal aggregate
hours elasticities but do not always decompose these values into extensive and intensive elasticities. Therefore, the estimates
in brackets show the values implied by the macro aggregate hours elasticity if the intensive Frisch elasticity is chosen to match
the micro estimate of 0.54. See Appendix C for sources of these estimates.
macroeconomy than a change in incentives that a⁄ects other groups. The estimates in Table 17
should therefore be interpreted as a rough guide to plausible targets for calibration: they suggest
that extensive margin elasticities around 0.25 are reasonable, while values above 1 are not.
3.6 Comparing Micro and Macro Estimates
The micro evidence points to Frisch and Hicksian extensive margin elasticities around 0.25. Does
this estimate generate aggregate hours elasticities consistent with macro evidence? The answer to
this question depends on the size of intensive margin elasticities because aggregate hours elasticities
combine extensive and intensive elasticities. We therefore begin by summarizing the micro and
macro evidence on both extensive and intensive margins in Table 18. The sources and calculations
underlying these estimates are described in Appendix C.3. The rows of Table 18 consider steady-
state (Hicksian) vs. intertemporal substitution (Frisch) elasticities, while the columns compare
intensive margin (hours conditional on employment) and extensive margin (participation) elastic-
ities. Within each of the four cells, we report micro and macro estimates of the elasticity based
on (unweighted) means of existing studies. We also calculate aggregate hours elasticities ￿the
parameter relevant for calibrating representative agent models ￿by summing the extensive and
intensive elasticities.113
113For micro studies, this calculation requires that preferences are homogenous across the population. If groups
that work few hours have higher extensive elasticities, as suggested by existing evidence, this calculation yields an
upper bound on the aggregate hours elasticity (Blundell, Bozio, and Laroque 2011).
127It is important to note that there are wide con￿dence intervals associated with each of the point
estimates in Table 18, as well as ongoing methodological disputes about the validity of some of the
underlying studies (see e.g., Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2012). Therefore, the estimates should be
treated as rough values used to gauge orders of magnitude: di⁄erences of 0.1 between elasticity
estimates could well be due to noise or choice of speci￿cation, while di⁄erences of 1 likely re￿ ect
fundamental discrepancies. We consider the evidence on steady-state and intertemporal elasticities
in turn.
Steady-State. On the extensive margin, our rough estimate of the steady state elasticity from
the micro literature is the mean of the estimates in Panel A of Table 17, which is 0.25. On the
intensive margin, Chetty (2012) presents a meta-analysis of micro estimates of Hicksian elasticities
and reports a mean value of 0.15 (Chetty 2012, Table 1). However, Chetty argues that these
elasticities are attenuated by optimization frictions: the small tax changes used to identify micro
elasticities do not generate substantial changes in hours because the adjustment costs agents have
to pay to change hours outweigh the second-order bene￿ts of reoptimization. Chetty develops
a bounding method of recovering the underlying structural elasticity relevant for evaluating the
steady-state impacts of taxes. Pooling the 15 studies he analyzes (Table 1, Panels A and B), he
obtains a preferred estimate of the structural intensive margin Hicksian elasticity of 0.33.114
Macro steady-state estimates are obtained from comparisons across countries with di⁄erent tax
regimes. Nickell (2003) and Davis and Henrekson (2005) ￿nd extensive steady-state elasticities of
0.13 and 0.14, respectively, by regressing log employment-population ratios on log mean net-of-tax
rates across countries. Prescott￿ s (2004) tax data coupled with measures of labor force participation
rates implies an extensive steady-state elasticity of 0.25 (see Appendix C.3). Our rough estimate of
the steady state extensive margin elasticity from the macro literature is the mean of the estimates
from these three studies, which is 0.17. Davis and Henrekson (2005) estimate a steady-state
intensive elasticity of 0.20 by regressing log hours conditional on employment on log net-of-tax
rates. As noted above, Prescott￿ s (2004) data produces a steady-state aggregate hours elasticity
114Our proposed elasticities of 0.33 on the intensive margin and 0.26 on the extensive margin may appear to
contradict the common view that tax changes have smaller short-run e⁄ects on the intensive margin than extensive
margin. Chetty (2012) argues that the structural intensive margin elasticity relevant for long-run comparisons is
larger than the structural extensive margin elasticity once one accounts for frictions. In particular, he shows that
frictions attenuate observed extensive margin elasticities much less than intensive margin elasticities because the
utility gains from reoptimizing are ￿rst-order on the extensive margin and second-order on the intensive margin.
128of 0.7; subtracting the extensive margin macro elasticity of 0.25 produced from Prescott￿ s data
therefore implies an intensive steady-state elasticity of 0.46. The mean intensive margin elasticity
implied by Prescott and Davis and Henrekson￿ s analysis is 0.33, which we use as our estimate of
the macro intensive margin elasticity.
We conclude that micro and macro estimates of steady state aggregate hours elasticities match
once one accounts for extensive margin responses and optimization frictions.115 Figure 25a illus-
trates the agreement by plotting log of hours per adult vs. log net-of-tax rates using the same
cross-country data as Prescott (2004). The solid green line shows the best ￿t to Prescott￿ s data,
which generates a Hicksian elasticity of 0.7 as noted in Section 3.2. The dashed red line shows the
relationship predicted by our preferred estimate of the micro aggregate hours elasticity of 0.58 from
Table 18 (with the intercept chosen to match the mean values in the data). The similarity of the
two lines illustrates the concordance between micro and macro estimates of steady-state elasticities.
Intertemporal Substitution. On the extensive margin, our preferred micro estimate of the
intertemporal elasticity is the mean of the estimates in Panel B of Table 17, which is 0.32. On the
intensive margin, there is less quasi-experimental evidence on intertemporal substitution elasticities.
Bianchi et al. (2001) ￿nd an intensive-margin elasticity from the Iceland reform of 0.37 (see Chetty
(2012) for the elasticity calculation using Bianchi et al.￿ s estimates). Pistaferri (2003) reports a
Frisch intensive elasticity of 0.7 using microdata on expectations about wages. The mean of these
two estimates is 0.54. It is not surprising that these estimates of the intensive Frisch elasticity are
only slightly larger than our preferred estimate of the intensive Hicksian elasticity of 0.33. Chetty
(2012) shows that the Frisch elasticity must be less than 0.47 given a Hicksian elasticity of 0.33 in
an intensive-margin model with balanced growth and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
consumption below 1. Utility speci￿cations that generate a Frisch elasticity that is much larger
than the Hicksian elasticity are inconsistent with micro estimates of income e⁄ects and elasticities
of intertemporal substitution of consumption.
Equilibrium macro models identify intertemporal substitution labor supply elasticities from
￿ uctuations in hours over the business cycle. Most macro studies calibrate representative agent
models and therefore report only intertemporal elasticities of aggregate hours. The intertemporal
115The similarity between micro and macro estimates may be surprising given the institutional and regulatory
di⁄erences across countries (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2005). However, institutions and regulations can partly
be interpreted as sources of optimization frictions, which we account for using Chetty￿ s (2009) bounding procedure.
129Figure 25: Micro Predictions Versus Macro Data
Notes: Panel A plots log hours worked per adult vs. log of 1 ￿average tax rate using data from Prescott (2004) across countries
and time periods described in Appendix C. The data imply an aggregate hours Hicksian elasticity of .7, as shown by the solid
green best ￿t line. The dashed red line is drawn through the mean of the x and y values with a slope of 0.58, in accordance with
the aggregate hours micro elasticity from Table 18. Panel B plots the log deviation of employment from a Hodrick-Prescott
￿ltered trend for the United States from 1948 to 2008. The data is taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and available at
http://www.bls.gov. The solid blue line is generated using seasonally adjusted quarterly data on employment tabulated from
the Current Population Survey, series LNS12000000Q. The raw data was Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered using a smoothing parameter
of 1600. The dotted black line is taken from the same source for men ages 25-54, series LNS12000061Q. The dashed red line
is a projected employment series based on ￿uctuations in real wages. Real wages are measured as real hourly compensation
for the nonfarm business sector, Bureau of Labor Statistics series PRS85006153. To generate the projection, real wages are
Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered using a smoothing parameter of 1600 and multiplied by the micro extensive margin Frisch elasticity
of 0.32 from Table 17.
130aggregate hours elasticity required to match business cycle data ranges from 2.6 to 4 in real business
cycle models (Cho and Cooley 1994, Table 1; King and Rebelo 1999, p975). Table 18 reports the
mean intertemporal aggregate hours elasticities implied by these numbers, 3.31.116 Micro estimates
imply a Frisch elasticity of aggregate hours of 0.86, well below the values implied by RBC models.
The few available decompositions of macro aggregate hours elasticities into extensive and in-
tensive margins suggest that macro estimates are roughly in alignment with micro estimates on
the intensive margin. Business cycle ￿ uctuations in hours conditional on employment account
for only 1/6 of the ￿ uctuations in aggregate hours at an annual level (Heckman 1984). Given
that elasticities of 2.6 to 4 ￿t the ￿ uctuations in aggregate hours, we infer that intensive Frisch
elasticities around 0.43 to 0.66 would match macro evidence in RBC models. These values are
modestly larger than the intensive intertemporal elasticity of 0.5 implied by micro evidence.
In contrast, macro evidence sharply contradicts micro estimates of the extensive intertemporal
elasticity. The fact that employment ￿ uctuations account for 5/6 of the ￿ uctuation in aggregate
hours suggests that extensive elasticities of 2.18 to 3.33 would be needed to match the data in
standard RBC models.117 If the RBC models considered in Table 18 were calibrated to match
an intensive intertemporal elasticity of 0.54, they would require extensive intertemporal elasticities
of 3.31-0.54 = 2.77 on average to match aggregate hours ￿ uctuations. This value is an order of
magnitude larger than all of the micro estimates in Table 17.
We conclude that extensive labor supply responses are not large enough to explain observed
￿ uctuations in employment rates at business cycle frequencies. This result is illustrated in Figure
25b. The solid blue line in the ￿gure shows ￿ uctuations in employment rates over the business
cycle in the U.S. It plots the log deviation of employment (measured using household surveys) from
a Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered trend. The dashed red line shows predicted employment ￿ uctuations
due to labor supply using our preferred micro estimate of the extensive margin Frisch elasticity of
0.32. The prediction is constructed by multiplying the Frisch elasticity of 0.32 by log deviations
116An earlier version of this table (Chetty et al. 2011b) included an estimate 1.92 from Smets and Wouters (2007)
when computing the macro estimate of the intertemporal substitution elasticity. While Smets and Wouters report
an estimate of 1.92, in personal correspondence they noted that the correct elasticity implied by their model is the
reciprocal of the reported estimate,
1
1:92 = 0:52. This elasticity is much lower than traditional models because of a
large number of frictions including wage and price rigidities, which make the Smets and Wouters paper signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from the pure equilibrium macro models discussed here. We thank Susan Yang for pointing out this
correction.
117Cho and Cooley (1994) decompose the aggregate hours elasticity in their RBC model into intensive and extensive
margins using a di⁄erent methodology. Their analysis generates an extensive Frisch elasticity of 1.61.
131in real wages from a Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered trend. The ￿ uctuations in the data are much larger
than the prediction based on micro evidence, illustrating that ￿ uctuations in labor supply account
for only a small share of observed employment ￿ uctuations over the business cycle.
The size of the ￿ uctuations in the micro prediction may be attenuated because of composition
bias in the BLS wage series. Barsky, Solon and Parker (1994) argue that actual wages are ap-
proximately twice as volatile as observed wages because of changes in the composition of employed
workers. With this adjustment, one would need an aggregate hours elasticity of 3:31=2 = 1:66
to ￿t the macro data. While accounting for composition bias helps reduce the gap substantially,
it does not fully reconcile the discrepancy between the macro business cycle data and predictions
based on micro evidence.
Heterogeneity. As emphasized by Dyrda et al. (2012), macro models may not exactly match
micro evidence on the extensive margin because of heterogeneity in elasticities across subgroups.
However, observable heterogeneity in elasticities if anything reinforces the main conclusions drawn
above. The heterogeneity in extensive margin responses across groups documented in Table 17
mirrors the heterogeneity observed in extensive margin responses when comparing steady-state
behavior across countries with di⁄erent tax regimes. In particular, individuals near retirement and
secondary earners exhibit the largest di⁄erences in employment rates across countries with di⁄erent
tax systems (Rogerson and Wallenius 2007, Blundell, Bozio, and Laroque 2013).
In contrast, heterogeneity ampli￿es the discrepancy between micro and macro estimates of
intertemporal substitution elasticities. Employment rates ￿ uctuate substantially over the business
cycle even for this subgroup (Clark and Summers 1981, Jaimovich and Siu 2009). This is illustrated
by the dashed black series in Figure 25b, which plots detrended employment for males aged 25-55.
Fluctuations in employment for prime age males are very similar to those for the population as a
whole. However, microeconomic studies clearly show that extensive margin elasticities are near
zero for prime-age males. The sharp divergence between micro and macro Frisch elasticities within
this subgroup reinforces our conclusion that indivisible labor supply cannot fully account for the
￿ uctuations in aggregate hours over the business cycle.118
118Fluctuations in wage rates for prime age males are very similar to those for the population as a whole at business
cycle frequencies. To illustrate this, we use CPS data on median usual weekly earnings for full time employed
wage and salary workers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (series LEU0252881500) and men aged 25-54 (series
LEU0252888100), available from 2000 to 2011. We adjust for in￿ ation using the CPI provided by the BLS aggregated
to a quarterly frequency and HP ￿lter the logs of the CPI-adjusted wage series with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
1323.7 Conclusion
Indivisible labor is a central feature of many modern macroeconomic models that seek to explain
aggregate ￿ uctuations in labor utilization using labor supply. From a qualitative perspective,
microeconometric evidence strongly supports the importance of indivisible labor: changes in wage
rates clearly induce extensive-margin responses. From a quantitative perspective, observed ex-
tensive margin responses are adequate to explain the gap between micro and macro estimates of
steady-state elasticities when combined with factors such as frictions. However, extensive margin
labor supply responses are not large enough to explain the gap between micro and macro estimates
of intertemporal substitution elasticities. Consequently, explanations of the business cycle based
on changes in labor supply can only partly explain ￿ uctuations in hours over the business cycle.
One interpretation of our analysis is that it points in favor of recent macro models that feature
a cyclical ￿labor wedge￿between the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure and
the marginal product of labor. The micro evidence reviewed here is consistent with macro evidence
that labor wedges are substantial (Chari et al 2007(Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2007); Shimer,
2009). Our conclusion that labor supply is important but cannot entirely account for ￿ uctuations
over the business cycle supports models that combine a labor supply margin with other sources of
￿ uctuations. For instance, Hall (2009) shows that a search-and-matching-generated unemployment
margin combined with a labor supply margin can match observed ￿ uctuations in employment rates
over the business cycle without requiring large extensive margin labor supply responses.119 Models
that generate unemployment by taking individuals o⁄their labor supply curve in the short run, e.g.
due to wage rigidities, are also consistent with our results. While our analysis does not distinguish
between alternative explanations of the labor wedge, our estimates could be used to calibrate the
labor supply component of models that seek to explain aggregate ￿ uctuations with labor wedges.
Based on our reading of the micro evidence, we recommend calibrating macro models to match
Hicksian elasticities of 0.3 on the intensive and 0.25 on the extensive margin and Frisch elasticities
The resulting standard deviation of log real wages around the HP ￿ltered trend is .0122 for the full population and
.0123 for prime aged men.
119In Hall￿ s model, workers choose both hours and employment based on both standard labor supply factors and
the time and e⁄ort needed to ￿nd a job as in a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model with rigid wages. These forces
generate an aggregate hours elasticity of 1.9 even with an intensive Frisch elasticity of 0.7.
133of 0.5 on the intensive and 0.25 on the extensive margin.120;121 These elasticities are consistent
with the observed di⁄erences in aggregate hours across countries with di⁄erent tax systems. They
also match the relatively small ￿ uctuations in hours conditional on employment over the business
cycle. The remaining challenge is to formulate models that ￿t the large ￿ uctuations in employment
rates over the business cycle when calibrated to match an extensive margin labor supply elasticity
of 0.25. Even with indivisible labor, models that require a Frisch elasticity of aggregate hours
above 1 are inconsistent with micro evidence.
120That is, one should choose a reservation wage distribution such that a 10% increase in the net-of-tax wage leads
to a 2.5% increase in employment rates. More generally, simulating quasi-experiments such as the tax policy changes
analyzed here would be a simple way to evaluate which macro models are consistent with micro data.
121We suspect that this estimate is, if anything, biased upward for two reasons: (1) the mean extensive margin
elasticity for the population as a whole is less than 0.25 as noted above and (2) publication bias drives micro studies
toward reporting higher elasticity estimates (Card and Krueger 1995).
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150A Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1 Data
A.1.1 Time Series Data
National and Regional Data In the main text, three data series are used for price, volume
and inventory:
￿ The CoreLogic national repeat-sales house price index. This is an arithmetic interval-weighted
house price index from January 1976 to August 2013. The monthly index is averaged at a
quarterly frequency and adjusted for in￿ ation using the Consumer Price Index, BLS series
CUUR0000SA0.
￿ The National Association of Realtors￿ series of sales of existing single-family homes at a
seasonally-adjusted annual rate. The data is monthly for the whole nation from January
1968 to January 2013 and available on request from the NAR. The monthly data is averaged
at a quarterly frequency.
￿ Homes listed for sale comes from vacant homes listed for sale from the Census Housing
Vacancy Survey, quarterly from Q1 1968 to Q4 2012. This is divided by the NAR sales
volume series to create months of supply.
Other price and inventory measures are used in Appendix A.2. The price measures include:
￿ A median sales price index for existing single-family homes. The data is monthly for the
whole nation from January 1968 to January 2013 and available on request from the National
Association of Realtors.
￿ The quarterly national ￿expanded purchase-only￿ HPIs that only includes purchases and
supplements the FHFA￿ s database from the GSEs with deeds data from DataQuick from Q1
1991 to Q4 2012. This is an interval-weighted geometric repeat-sales index.
￿ The monthly Case-Shiller Composite Ten from January 1987 to January 2013. This is an
interval-weighted arithmetic repeat-sales index.
151￿ A median sales price index for all sales (existing and new homes) from CoreLogic from January
1976 to August 2013.
The additional inventory measure is the National Association of Realtors￿series on inventory
and months of supply of existing single-family homes. The data is monthly for the whole nation
from June 1982 to February 2013 and is available on request.
For annual AR(1) regressions, I use non-seasonally-adjusted data. Because the volume series
comes seasonally adjusted, for any analysis that includes sales volume, I use the data provider￿ s
seasonal adjustment if available and otherwise seasonally adjust the data using the Census Bureau￿ s
X-12 ARIMA software using a multiplicative seasonal factor.
City-Level Data I create two city-level data sets. The ￿rst consists of local repeat-sales price
indices for 103 CBSA divisions from CoreLogic. These CBSAs divisions include all CBSAs divisions
that are part of the 100 largest CBSAs which have data from at least 1995 onwards. Most of these
CBSAs have data starting in 1976. See Table 19 for the full list of CBSAs and years. This data is
used for the annual AR(1) regression coe¢ cient histogram in Figure 1 and is adjusted for in￿ ation
using the CPI.
The second city-level data set is used for the panel VAR and several cross-city comparisons
in Appendix A.2. It combines the same CoreLogic city-level repeat-sales house price indices with
transaction volume data for existing home sales from CoreLogic and months of supply at the MSA
level provided by the National Association of Realtors. The CoreLogic and NAR data sets are
merged using the principal city of the MSA and CBSA division. The volume series sometimes have
discontinuities corresponding to the introduction of an additional county to a CBSA, so I examine
each time series and select a starting date for the volume series for each CBSA division equal to the
month after the last discontinuity. Similarly, the NAR months of supply measure is occasionally not
reported for a given MSA. I drop all prior quarters if there are four continuous quarters of missing
data. There are, however, a few interspersed quarters with missing data. The similarity between
the panel VAR and a VAR on national data shows that the missing quarters are not driving the
results. Each MSA￿ s start quarter and end quarter are the ￿rst and last quarters, respectively,
for which both volume and inventory data are available, with the inventory data typically being
the binding constraint. Finally, I limit the sample to 42 MSAs with at least 50 quarters of both
152Table 19: CBSAs in CoreLogic City-Level Price Data Set
CBSA Code Main City Name Start End 32820 Memphis, TN 1984 2013
10420 Akron, OH 1978 2013 33124 Miami, FL 1976 2013
10580 Albany, NY 1992 2013 33340 Milwaukee, WI 1976 2013
10740 Albuquerque, NM 1992 2013 33460 Minneapolis, MN 1976 2013
10900 Allentown, PA 1976 2013 34980 Nashville, TN 1976 2013
12060 Atlanta, GA 1976 2013 35004 Nassau, NY 1976 2013
12420 Austin, TX 1976 2013 35084 Newark, NJ-PA 1976 2013
12540 Bakers￿eld, CA 1976 2013 35300 New Haven, CT 1985 2013
12580 Baltimore, MD 1976 2013 35380 New Orleans, LA 1976 2013
12940 Baton Rouge, LA 1992 2013 35644 New York, NY 1976 2013
13140 Beaumont, TX 1993 2013 36084 Oakland, CA 1976 2013
13644 Bethesda, MD 1976 2013 36420 Oklahoma City, OK 1976 2013
13820 Birmingham, AL 1976 2013 36540 Omaha, NE 1990 2013
14484 Boston, MA 1976 2013 36740 Orlando, FL 1976 2013
14860 Bridgeport, CT 1976 2013 37100 Ventura, CA 1976 2013
15380 Bu⁄alo, NY 1991 2013 37764 Peabody, MA 1976 2013
15764 Cambridge, MA 1976 2013 37964 Philadelphia, PA 1976 2013
15804 Camden, NJ 1976 2013 38060 Phoenix, AZ 1976 2013
16700 Charleston, SC 1976 2013 38300 Pittsburgh, PA 1976 2013
16740 Charlotte, NC 1976 2013 38900 Portland, OR 1976 2013
16974 Chicago, IL 1976 2013 39100 Poughkeepsie, NY 1976 2013
17140 Cincinnati, OH 1976 2013 39300 Providence, RI 1976 2013
17460 Cleveland, OH 1976 2013 39580 Raleigh, NC 1976 2013
17820 Colorado Springs, CO 1976 2013 40060 Richmond, VA 1976 2013
17900 Columbia, SC 1977 2013 40140 Riverside, CA 1976 2013
18140 Columbus, OH 1976 2013 40380 Rochester, NY 1991 2013
19124 Dallas, TX 1977 2013 40484 Rockingham County, NH 1990 2013
19380 Dayton, OH 1976 2013 40900 Sacramento, CA 1976 2013
19740 Denver, CO 1976 2013 41180 St. Louis, MO 1978 2013
19804 Detroit, MI 1989 2013 41620 Salt Lake City, UT 1992 2013
20764 Edison, NJ 1976 2013 41700 San Antonio, TX 1991 2013
21340 El Paso, TX 1977 2013 41740 San Diego, CA 1976 2013
22744 Fort Lauderdale, FL 1976 2013 41884 San Francisco, CA 1976 2013
23104 Fort Worth, TX 1984 2013 41940 San Jose, CA 1976 2013
23420 Fresno, CA 1976 2013 42044 Santa Ana, CA 1976 2013
23844 Gary, IN 1992 2013 42644 Seattle, WA 1976 2013
24340 Grand Rapids, MI 1992 2013 44140 Spring￿eld, MA 1976 2013
24660 Greensboro, NC 1976 2013 44700 Stockton, CA 1976 2013
24860 Greenville, SC 1976 2013 45060 Syracuse, NY 1992 2013
25540 Hartford, CT 1976 2013 45104 Tacoma, WA 1977 2013
26180 Honolulu, HI 1976 2013 45300 Tampa, FL 1976 2013
26420 Houston, TX 1982 2013 45780 Toledo, OH 1976 2013
26900 Indianapolis, IN 1991 2013 45820 Topeka, KS 1985 2013
27260 Jacksonville, FL 1976 2013 46060 Tucson, AZ 1976 2013
28140 Kansas City, MO 1985 2013 46140 Tulsa, OK 1981 2013
28940 Knoxville, TN 1977 2013 47260 Virginia Beach, VA 1976 2013
29404 Lake County, IL 1982 2013 47644 Warren, MI 1976 2013
29820 Las Vegas, NV 1983 2013 47894 Washington, DC 1976 2013
30780 Little Rock, AR 1985 2013 48424 West Palm Beach, FL 1976 2013
31084 Los Angeles, CA 1976 2013 48620 Wichita, KS 1986 2013
31140 Louisville, KY 1987 2013 48864 Wilmington, DE 1976 2013
32580 McAllen, TX 1992 2013 49340 Worcester, MA 1976 2013
153Table 20: MSAs in Merged Price-Inventory-Volume Panel
Principal City First Date Last Date Obs Principal City First Date Last Date Obs
Akron, OH 1990, Q1 2013, Q1 87 Miami, FL 1993, Q1 2013, Q1 69
Allentown, PA 1999, Q1 2013, Q1 50 Milwaukee, WI 1998, Q1 2013, Q1 61
Atlanta, GA 1999, Q1 2012, Q3 55 Nashville, TN 1999, Q3 2013, Q1 55
Austin, TX 1994, Q1 2013, Q1 66 New Brunswick, NJ 1999, Q1 2013, Q1 57
Baltimore, MD 1999, Q1 2013, Q1 57 New York, NY 1999, Q1 2013, Q1 57
Charleston, SC 1997, Q1 2013, Q1 65 Newark, NJ 1998, Q1 2013, Q1 61
Chicago, IL 1999, Q1 2013, Q1 57 Oklahoma City, OK 1990, Q1 2013, Q1 79
Cincinnati, OH 1990, Q1 2006, Q4 51 Omaha, NE-IA 2000, Q3 2013, Q1 51
Columbia, SC 1995, Q1 2013, Q1 61 Phoenix, AZ 1993, Q2 2012, Q2 74
Columbus, OH 1995, Q2 2013, Q1 69 Portland, OR 1994, Q1 2011, Q3 66
Dallas, TX 2000, Q1 2013, Q1 53 Providence, RI 1994, Q1 2013, Q1 71
Denver, CO 1999, Q1 2013, Q1 57 Raleigh, NC 1991, Q2 2008, Q2 55
Greenville, SC 1994, Q1 2013, Q1 60 Richmond, VA 1990, Q1 2009, Q2 57
Honolulu, HI 1999, Q1 2013, Q1 57 San Antonio, TX 1998, Q2 2013, Q1 60
Houston, TX 1999, Q3 2013, Q1 55 San Diego CA 1997, Q1 2013, Q1 65
Kansas City, MO 1998, Q3 2012, Q3 57 San Francisco, CA 1992, Q2 2009, Q4 58
Knoxville, TN 1998, Q1 2013, Q1 57 Santa Ana, CA 1999, Q1 2013, Q1 57
Las Vegas, NV 1992, Q2 2013, Q1 63 St. Louis, MO 1996, Q2 2013, Q1 64
Little Rock, AR 1998, Q3 2013, Q1 59 Tampa, FL 1999, Q1 2013, Q1 57
Los Angeles, CA 1993, Q3 2013, Q1 79 Tulsa, OK 1999, Q1 2013, Q1 57
Memphis, TN 1994, Q2 2013, Q1 76 Washington, DC 1993, Q2 2013, Q1 72
inventory and volume data. Table 20 summarizes the full list of MSAs and years in the data set.
A.1.2 Micro Data
The matched listings-transactions micro data covers the San Francisco Bay, San Diego, and Los
Angeles metropolitan areas. The San Francisco Bay sample includes Alameda, Contra Costa,
Marin, San Benito, San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa Clara counties. The Los Angeles sample
includes Los Angeles and Orange counties. The San Diego sample only includes San Diego County.
The data from DataQuick run from January 1988 to August 2013. The Altos data run from October
2007 to May 2013. I limit my analysis to April 2008 to February 2013, as described in footnote 14.
DataQuick Characteristic and History Data Construction The DataQuick data is pro-
vided in separate assessor and history ￿les. The assessor ￿le contains house characteristics from
the property assessment and a unique property ID for every parcel in a county. The history ￿le
contains records of all deed transfers, with each transfer matched to a property ID. Several steps
are used to clean the data.
154First, both data ￿les are formatted and sorted into county level data ￿les. For a very small
number of properties, data with a typo is replaced as missing.
Second, some transactions appear to be duplicates. Duplicate values are categorized and com-
bined into one observation if possible. I drop cases where there are more than ten duplicates, as this
is usually a developer selling o⁄ many lots individually after splitting them. Otherwise, I pick the
sale with the highest price, or, if as a tiebreaker, the highest loan value at origination. In practice,
this a⁄ects very few observations.
Third, problematic observations are identi￿ed. In particular, transfers between family mem-
bers are identi￿ed and dropped based on a DataQuick transfer ￿ ag and a comparison buyer and
seller names. Sales with prices that are less than or equal to one dollar are also counted as trans-
fers. Partial consideration sales, partial sales, group sales, and splits are also dropped, as are
deed transfers that are part of the foreclosure process but not actually transactions. Transactions
that appear to be corrections or with implausible origination loan to value ratios are also ￿ agged
and dropped. Properties with implausible characteristics (<10 square feet, < 1 bedroom, < 1/2
bathroom, implausible year built) have the implausible characteristic replaced as a missing value.
From the ￿nal data set, I only use resale transactions (as opposed to new construction or
subdivisions) of single-family homes, both of which are categorized by DataQuick.
Altos Research Listings Data Construction and Match to DataQuick The Altos research
data contains address, MLS identi￿er, house characteristics, list price, and date for every week-
listing. Altos generously provided me access to an address hash that was used to parse the address
￿elds in the DataQuick assessor data and Altos data and to create a matching hash for each. Hashes
were only used that appeared in both data ￿les, and hashes that matched to multiple DataQuick
properties were dropped.
After formatting the Altos data, I match the Altos data to the DataQuick property IDs. I
￿rst use the address hash, applying the matched property ID to every listing with the same MLS
identi￿er (all listings with the same MLS ID are the same property, and if they do not all match
it is because some weeks the property has the address listed di⁄erently, for instance ￿street￿ is
included in some weeks but not others). Second, I match listings not matched by the address hash
by repeatedly matching on various combinations of address ￿elds and discarding possible matches
155when there is not a unique property in the DataQuick data for a particular combination of ￿elds,
which prevents cases where there are two properties that would match from being counted as a
match. I determined the combinations of address ￿elds on which to match based on an inspection
of the unmatched observations, most of which occur when the listing in the MLS data does not
include the exact wording of the DataQuick record (e.g., missing ￿street￿ ). The ￿elds typically
include ZIP, street name, and street number and di⁄erent combinations of unit number, street
direction, and street su¢ x. In some cases I match to the ￿rst few digits of street number or the
￿rst word of a street name. I ￿nally assign any unmatched observations with the same MLS ID as
a matched observation or the same address hash, square feet, year built, ZIP code, and city as a
matched observation the property ID of the matched observation. I subsequently work only with
matched properties so that I do not inadvertently count a bad match as a withdrawal.
The observations that are not matched to a DataQuick property ID are usually multi-family
homes (which I subsequently drop), townhouses with multiple single-family homes at the same
address, or listings with typos in the address ￿eld.
I use the subset of listings matched to a property ID and combine cases where the same property
has multiple MLS identi￿ers into a contiguous listing to account for de-listings and re-listings of
properties, which is a common tactic among real estate agents. In particular, I count a listing as
contiguous if the property is re-listed within 13 weeks and there is not a foreclosure between the
de-listing and re-listing. I assign each contiguous listing a single identi￿er, which I use to match to
transactions.
In a few cases, a listing matches to several property IDs. I choose the property ID that matches
to a transaction or that corresponds to the longest listing period. All results are robust to dropping
the small number of properties that match to multiple property IDs.
I ￿nally match all consolidated listings to a transaction. I drop transactions and corresponding
listings where there was a previous transaction in the last 90 days, as these tend to be a true
transaction followed by several subsequent transfers for legal reasons (e.g., one spouse buys the
house and then sells half of it to the other). I ￿rst match to a transaction where the date of last
listing is in the month of the deed transfer request or in the prior three months. I then match
unmatched listings to a transaction where the date of last listing is in the three months after
the deed transfer request (if the property was left on the MLS after the request, presumably by
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Figure 26: Match Rates by Month of Transaction
accident). I then repeat the process for unmatched listings for four to 12 months prior and four to
12 months subsequent. Most matches have listings within three months of the last listing.
For matched transactions, I generate two measures of whether a house sold within a given time
frame. The ￿rst, used in the main text, is the time between the date of ￿rst listing and the date of
￿ling of the deed transfer request. The second, used in robustness checks in Appendix A.3, is the
time between date of ￿rst listing and the ￿rst of the last listing date or the transfer request.
Figure 26 shows the fraction of all single-family transactions of existing homes for which my
data accounts in each of the three metropolitan areas over time. Because the match rates start low
in October 2007, I do not start my analysis until April 2008, except in San Diego where almost all
listings have no listed address until August 2008. Besides that, the match rates are fairly stable,
except for a small dip in San Diego in mid-2009 and early 2012 and a large fall o⁄ in the San
Francisco Bay area after June 2012. I consequently end the analysis for the San Francisco Bay area
at June 2012. Figures 27, 28, and 29 show match rates by ZIP code. One can see that the match
rate is consistently high in the core of each metropolitan area and falls o⁄ in the outlying areas,
such as western San Diego county and Escondido in San Diego, Santa Clarita in Los Angeles, and
Brentwood and Pleasanton in the San Francisco Bay area.
157Figure 27: Match Rates by ZIP Code: Bay Area
Figure 28: Match Rates by ZIP Code: Los Angeles
158Figure 29: Match Rates by ZIP Code: San Diego
Construction of House Price Indices I construct house price indices largely following Case
and Shiller (1989) and follow sample restrictions imposed in the construction of the Case-Shiller
and Federal Housing Finance Administration (FHFA) house price indices.
For the repeat sale indices, I drop all non-repeat sales, all sales pairs with less than six months
between sales, and all sales pairs where a ￿rst stage regression on year dummies shows a property
has appreciated by 100 percent more or 100 percent less than the average house in the MSA. I
estimate an interval-corrected geometric repeat-sales index at the ZIP code level. This involves
estimating a ￿rst stage regression:
ph‘t = ￿h‘ + ￿t + "h‘t, (40)
where p is the log price of a house h in location ‘ at time t, ￿h‘ is a sales pair ￿xed e⁄ect, ￿t is a
time ￿xed e⁄ect, and "h‘t is an error term.
I follow Case and Shiller (1989) by using a GLS interval-weighted estimator to account for the
fact that longer time intervals tend to have a larger variance in the error of (40). This is typically
implemented by regressing the square of the error term "2
h‘t on a linear (Case-Shiller index) or
quadratic (FHFA) function of the time interval between the two sales. The regression coe¢ cients
159are then used to construct weights corresponding to 1 p
^ "2
h‘t
where ^ "2
h‘t is a predicted value from the
interval regression. I ￿nd that the variance of the error of (40) is non-monotonic: it is very high for
sales that occur quickly, falls to its lowest level for sales that occur approximately three years after
the ￿rst sale, and then rises slowly over time. This is likely due to ￿ ippers who upgrade a house
and sell it without the upgrade showing up in the data. Consequently, I follow a non-parametric
approach by binning the data into deciles of the time interval between the two sales, calculate the
average "2
h‘t for the decile ￿ "2
h‘t, and weight by 1 p
￿ "2
h‘t
. The results are nearly identical using a linear
interval weighting.
exp(￿t) is then a geometric house price index. The resulting indices can be quite noisy. Conse-
quently, I smooth the index using a 3-month moving average, which produced the lowest prediction
error of several di⁄erent window widths. The resulting indices at the MSA level are very comparable
to published indices by Case-Shiller, the FHFA, and CoreLogic.
The log predicted value of a house at time t, ^ pt, that sold originally at time ￿ for P￿ is:
^ pt = log
0
@
exp
￿
^ ￿t
￿
exp
￿
^ ￿￿
￿P￿
1
A.
For the hedonic house price indices, I use all sales and estimate:
pi‘t = ￿t + ￿Xi + "i‘t; (41)
where Xi is a vector of third-order polynomials in four housing characteristics: age, bathrooms,
bedrooms, and log(square feet), all of which are winsorized at the one percent level by county
for all properties in a county, not just those that trade. Recall that these characteristics are all
recorded as a single snapshot in 2013, so Xi is not time dependent. I do not include a characteristic
if over 25 percent of the houses in a given geography are missing data for a particular characteristic.
Again exp(￿t) is a house price index, which I smooth using a 3-month moving average. The log
predicted price of a house is
^ pit = ^ ￿Xi + ^ ￿i:
For homes that are missing characteristics included in an area￿ s house price index calculation, I
160replace the characteristic with its average value in a given ZIP code.
For robustness I calculate both indices for the full sample and a non-distressed sample, where
a repeat-sales pair counts as distressed if either sale is an REO sale, a foreclosure auction sale, or a
short sale. For my analysis, I use a ZIP code level index, but all results are robust to alternatively
using a house price index for all homes within one mile of the centroid of a home￿ s seven-digit ZIP
code (roughly a few square blocks). I do not calculate a house price index if the area has fewer than
500 sales since 1988. This rules out about 5% of transactions, typically in low-density areas far
from the core of the MSA. For each ZIP code, I calculate the standard deviation of the prediction
error of the house price index from 1988 to 2013 and weight most speci￿cations by the reciprocal
of the standard deviation.
Construction of the Final Analysis Samples I drop listings that satisfy one of several criteria:
1. If the list price is less than $10,000;
2. If the assessed structure value is less than ￿ve percent of the assessed overall value;
3. If the data shows the property was built after the sale date or there has been ￿signi￿cant
improvement￿since the sale date;
4. If there is a previous sale within 90 days.
Each observation is a listing, regardless of whether it is withdrawn or ends in a transaction. The
outcome variable is sold within 13 weeks, where withdrawn listings are counted as not transacting.
The price variable is the initial list price. The predicted prices are calculated for the week of ￿rst
listing by interpolation. The sample is summarized in Table 2 in the main text, and the fraction
of the sample accounted for by each MSA and year are summarized in Table 21.
A.1.3 List Prices Relative to Transaction Prices
As mentioned in the main text, the modal house sells at its list price at the time of sale and the
average and median house sell within 0.01 log points of their list price. To illustrate this, Figure 30
shows a histogram of the di⁄erence between the log list price at sale and the log transaction price
161Table 21: Share of Sample Accounted For By Each MSA and Year
Sample All Prior Trans All Prior Trans
All All Transactions Transactions
SF Bay 26.98% 26.68% 28.03% 27.44%
Los Angeles 58.81% 59.47% 57.37% 58.22%
San Diego 14.22% 13.85% 14.59% 14.33%
2008 18.18% 19.87% 16.42% 17.91%
2009 20.70% 21.26% 21.19% 21.81%
2010 23.88% 23.59% 23.48% 23.15%
2011 21.07% 20.36% 21.64% 20.97%
2012 14.86% 13.75% 15.93% 14.93%
2013 1.30% 1.17% 1.34% 1.24%
Notes: Each cell indicates the percentage of each sample accounted for by each MSA (above the line) or by each year of ￿rst
listing (below the line).
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Figure 30: Histogram of the Di⁄erence Between Log Transaction Price and Log List Price
Notes: The ￿gure shows a histogram of the di⁄erence between log transaction price at the time of sale and log list price for
all homes in the San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, and San Diego areas that were listed between April 2008 and February 2013
that are matched to a transaction and have a previous observed listing. The 1st and 99th percentiles are dropped from the
histogram. N = 303,731.
in the Altos-DataQuick merged data. One can see that nearly 18 percent of transactions sell at list
price, and the mean of the list price distribution is 0.01 log points below the transaction price.
Table 22 reinforces these ￿ndings by showing mean log di⁄erence for each of the three MSAs in
each year. The mean does not ￿ uctuate by more than 0.03 log points across years and MSAs.
162Table 22: Mean Di⁄erence Between Log Transaction Price and Log List Price
SF Bay Los Angeles San Diego
2008 -0.007 -0.014 0.003
2009 0.000 -0.008 -0.006
2010 0.001 -0.011 -0.015
2011 -0.014 -0.022 -0.028
2012-3 0.001 -0.015 -0.019
Notes: Each cell shows the mean di⁄erence between the log transaction price and log list price in the indicated MSA-year cell.
N = 303,731
A.2 Housing Market Facts
A.2.1 Momentum
To assess the robustness of the facts about house price momentum presented in Section 1.2, Table
23 shows several measures of momentum for ￿ve di⁄erent national price indices. The indices are
the CoreLogic National repeat-sales house price index discussed in the main text, the Case-Shiller
Composite Ten, the FHFA expanded repeat-sales house price index, the National Association of
Realtors￿national median price for single-family homes, and CoreLogic￿ s national median price for
all transactions. The ￿rst column shows the coe¢ cient on an AR(1) in log annual price change
run at quarterly -frequency as in equation (1).122 The next two columns show the one- and two-
year lagged autocorrelations of the quarterly change in log price. The fourth column shows the
quarterly lag in which the autocorrelation of the quarterly change in log price is ￿rst negative.
The ￿fth column shows the quarter subsequent to a shock in which the impulse response from an
estimated AR(5) estimated in log levels, as in Section 1.2, reaches its peak value. Finally, the sixth
column shows the quarterly lag in which the Lo-MacKinlay variance ratio statistic reaches its peak
value. This statistic is equal to,
V (k) =
var
￿Pt￿k+1
t=1 rt￿k+1
￿
=k
var(rt)
=
var(log(pt) ￿ log(pt￿k))=k
var(log(pt) ￿ log(pt￿1))
, (42)
122Case and Shiller (1989) worry that the same house selling twice may induce correlated errors that generate
arti￿cial momentum in regression (1) and use ￿pt;t￿4 from one half of their sample and ￿pt￿4;t￿8 from the other. I
have found that this concern is minor with 25 years of administrative data by replicating their split sample approach
with my own house price indices estimated from the micro data.
163Table 23: The Robustness of Momentum Across Price Measures and Metrics
Price Measure Annual 1 Year 2 Year Lag in Which Quarter Quarter of
AR(1) Lagged Lagged Quarterly ￿p of Peak Peak Value of
Coe¢ cient Autocorr of Autocorr of Autocorr is of AR(5) Lo-MacKinlay
Quarterly ￿p Quarterly ￿p First < 0 IRF Variance Ratio
CoreLogic Repeat 0.665 0.516 0.199 12 12 19
Sales HPI, 1976-2013 (0.081)
Case-Shiller 0.67 0.578 0.251 14 11 20
Comp 10, 1987-2013 (0.088)
FHFA Expanded 0.699 0.585 0.344 14 11 18
HPI, 1991-2013 (0.089)
NAR Median 0.458 0.147 0.062 12 6 16
Price, 1968-2013 (0.103)
CoreLogic Median 0.473 0.215 0.046 11 7 16
Price, 1976-2013 (0.082)
Notes: Each row shows six measures of momentum for each of the ￿ve house price indices, which are detailed in Appendix A.1.
The ￿rst row shows the AR(1) coe¢ cient for a regression of the annual change in log price on a on-year lag of itself estimated
on quarterly data, as in equation (1), with robust standard errors in parenthesis. The second and third columns show the one
and two year lagged autocorrelations of the quarterly change in log price. The fourth column shows the quarterly lag in which
the autocorrelation of the quarterly change in log price is ￿rst negative. The ￿fth column indicates the quarter in which the
impulse response function estimated from an AR(5), as in Section 1.2, reaches its peak. Finally, the last column shows the
quarterly lag for which the Lo-MacKinlay variance ratio computed as in equation (42) reaches its peak.
Table 24: Testing For Asmmetry in Momentum
Dependent Variable: Annual Change in Log Price Index at CBSA Level
Speci￿cation With Interaction Without Interaction
Coe¢ cient on Year-Lagged 0.614*** 0.591***
Annual Change in Log Price (0.011) (0.020)
Coe¢ cient on Interaction With 0.045
Positive Lagged Change (0.031)
CBSA Fixed E⁄ects Yes Yes
CBSAs 103 103
N 13,188 13,188
Notes: *** p<0.001. Each column shows a regression of the annual change in log price on a one-year lag of itself and CBSA
￿xed e⁄ects. In column two, the interaction between the lag of annual change in log price with an indicator for whether the lag
of the annual change in log price is also included as in equation (43). The regressions are estimated on the panel of 103 CBSAs
repeat-sales price indices described in Appendix A.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
164where rt = log(pt) ￿ log(pt￿1) is the one-period return. If this statistic is equal to one, then there
is no momentum, and several papers have used the maximized period of the statistic as a measure
of the duration of momentum.
Table 23 shows evidence of signi￿cant momentum for all price measures and all measures of
momentum. The two median price series exhibit less momentum as the IRFs peak at just under
two years and the two-year-lagged autocorrelation is much closer to zero.
Table 24 tests for asymmetry in momentum. Many papers describe prices as being primarily
sticky on the downside (e.g., Leamer, 2007; Case, 2008). To assess whether this is the case, I turn
to the panel of 103 CBSA repeat-sales price indices described in Appendix A.1, which allows for a
more powerful test of asymmetry than using a single national data series. I estimate a quarterly
AR(1) regression of the form:
￿t;t￿4 lnpc = ￿0 + ￿1￿t￿4;t￿8 lnpc + ￿2￿t￿4;t￿8 lnpc ￿ 1[￿t￿4;t￿8 lnpc > 0] + ￿c + ", (43)
where c is a city. If momentum is stronger on the downside, the interaction coe¢ cient ￿2 should
be negative. However, Table 24 shows that the coe¢ cient is insigni￿cant and positive. Thus
momentum appears equally strong on the upside and downside when measured using a repeat-sales
index.
Across Countries Table 25 shows annual AR(1) regressions as in equation (1) run on quar-
terly non-in￿ ation-adjusted data for ten countries. The data come from the Bank for International
Settlements, which compiles house price indices from central banks and national statistical agen-
cies. The data and details can be found online at http://www.bis.org/statistics/pp.htm. I select
ten countries from the BIS database that include at least 15 years of data and have a series for
single-family detached homes or all homes. Countries with per-square-foot indices are excluded.
With the exception of Norway, which shows no momentum, and the Netherlands, which shows
anomalously high momentum, all of the AR(1) coe¢ cients are signi￿cant and between 0.2 and 0.6.
Price momentum thus appears to show up across countries as well as within the United States and
across U.S. metropolitan areas.
165Table 25: Momentum Across Countries
Country AR(1) Coe¢ cient N Country AR(1) Coe¢ cient N
Australia, 1986-2013 0.217* 100 Netherlands, 1995-2013 0.951*** 67
(0.108) (0.079)
Belgium, 1973-2013 0.231** 154 Norway, 1992-2013 -0.042 79
(0.074) (0.091)
Denmark, 1992-2013 0.412*** 78 New Zealand, 1979-2013 0.507*** 127
(0.110) (0.075)
France, 1996-2013 0.597*** 62 Sweden, 1986-2013 0.520*** 103
(0.121) (0.100)
Great Britain, 1968-2013 0.467*** 173 Switzerland, 1970-2013 0.619*** 167
(0.079) (0.082)
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Each row shows the AR(1) coe¢ cient for a regression of the annual change in log
price on an annual lag of itself, as in equation (1), estimated on quarterly, non-in￿ation-adjusted data from the indicated country
for the indicated time period. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and N indicates the number of quarters in the sample.
The BIS identi￿ers and series descriptions are listed for each country. Australia: Q:AU:4:3:0:1:0:0, residential property for all
detached houses, eight cities. Belgium Q:BE:0:3:0:0:0:0, residential property all detached houses. Denmark: Q:DK:0:2:0:1:0:0,
residential all single-family houses. France: Q:FR:0:1:1:6:0, residential property prices of existing dwellings. Great Britain:
Q:GB:0:1:0:1:0:0, residential property prices all dwellings from the O¢ ce of National Statistics. Netherlands: Q:NL:0:2:1:1:6:0,
residential existing houses. Norway: Q:NO:0:3:0:1:0:0, Residential detached houses. New Zealand: Q:NZ:0:1:0:3:0:0, residential
all dwellings. Sweden: Q:SE:0:2:0:1:0:0, owner-occupied detached houses. Switzerland: Q:CH:0:2:0:2:0:0, owner-occupied single-
family houses.
A.2.2 Housing Cycle Facts
Relative Volatilities To assess the robustness the relative volatilities of price, volume, and
inventory summarized by Fact 2, Table 26 shows the standard deviation of annual log changes for
four additional measures of price and two additional measures of inventory discussed in Appendix
A.1. The series all have di⁄erent time coverages, and the standard deviation is calculated for the
period over which data is available. The ￿rst three rows show various house price indices. With the
exception of the Case-Shiller Composite Ten, which is known to be volatile given that it follows ten
cities with relatively inelastic housing supplies, the standard deviation of annual log changes are
close to the 0.065 ￿gure for the national CoreLogic house price index presented in the main text,
although the two median price series are slightly less volatile. The last two rows show two measures
of inventory. The ￿rst is houses listed for sale rather than months of supply. This is about half as
volatile as months of supply because it is not divided by volume. The second is a separate months
of supply measure from the NAR, which is only slightly less volatile than the measure in the main
166Table 26: Robustness of Relative Volatilities
Measure ￿logxq￿logxq￿4
Case-Shiller Composite 10, 1986-2013 0.087
FHFA Expanded, 1991-2013 0.052
NAR Median Price, 1968-2013 0.046
CoreLogic Median Price, 1976-2013 0.061
Census For Sale Inventory, 1968-2013 0.106
NAR Months of Supply, 1982-2013 0.170
Notes: All series are 1976-2013 at a quarterly frequency. The ￿rst column shows the standard deviation of annual changes.
Data is described in Appendix A.1.
text that combines Census and NAR data. I was not able to ￿nd another national volume series
with long enough coverage to reliably calculate volatility. Overall, Table 26 supports the conclusion
that price is less volatile than inventory and volume, regardless of how each is measured.
Housing Phillips Curve To assess the robustness of the ￿housing Phillips curve￿relationship
between price changes and inventory levels (Fact 3), Table 27 shows regression coe¢ cients and
R-squareds for regressions of the annual change in log price on log inventory levels, as in equation
(26), for ￿ve di⁄erent house price indices and three di⁄erent measures of inventory. The strong
negative relationship is present across all 15 combinations of price and inventory measures.
Two things in particular are of note. First, the relationship is stronger for repeat-sales house
price indices, which display more momentum, than it is for median price indices. Second, the middle
row shows that the result is robust to measuring inventory as homes listed for sale (adjusted for
a linear time trend) instead of as months of supply. The importance of homes listed for sale,
the numerator of months of supply, suggests that the price-volume relationship, which a⁄ects the
denominator of months of supply, is not driving the negative relationship between price changes
and inventory levels in the data.
Price, Volume, and Inventory VAR and VEC In the main text, I estimate a panel vector
autoregression model on log price, log volume, and log inventory on a panel of 42 cities. The model
for the panel VAR is:
xct = ￿0 + ￿1xc;t￿1 + ￿2xc;t￿2 + ’c + "t
167Table 27: Robustness of Housing Phillips Curve Relationship
CoreLogic Case-Shiller FHFA NAR CoreLogic
National Composite Expanded Median Median
HPI Ten Natl HPI Price HPI Price HPI
Inventory Measure 1976-2013 1987-2013 1991-2013 1968-2013 1976-2013
Months of Supply, ￿ -0.140*** -0.232*** -0.147*** -0.089*** -0.095***
1968-2013 (0.015) (0.022) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014)
From Census & NAR R2 0.530 0.630 0.804 0.406 0.283
Homes For Sale ￿ -0.283*** -0.385*** -0.273*** -0.148*** -0.235***
1968-2013 (0.035) (0.054) (0.029) (0.021) (0.030)
From Census R2 0.404 0.407 0.619 0.310 0.319
Months of Supply ￿ -0.130*** -0.237*** -0.170*** -0.088*** -0.083***
1982-2013 (0.016) (0.023) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017)
From NAR R2 0.367 0.597 0.792 0.283 0.191
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Each cell shows a regression of the annual change in log price on log inventory
levels measured at the midpoint of the year over which changes are calculated, as in equation (26). Each column uses a di⁄erent
measure of price, and each row uses a di⁄erent measure of inventory. For prices, the measures used are the CoreLogic national
repeat-sales HPI from 1976-2013 as in the main text, the Case-Shiller Composite 10 repeat-sales HPI from 1987 to 2013, the
FHFA expanded repeat-sales HPI from 1991 to 2013, the NAR median price index for single-family existing homes from 1968
to 2013, and the CoreLogic national median price index for all sales from 1976 to 2013. For inventory, the ￿rst row uses months
of supply created by dividing homes vacant for sale from the Census Vacancy Survey by volume for single-family existing homes
from the NAR. The second row just uses only the numerator, homes listed for sale from the Census Vacancy Survey, and adjusts
the data for a linear time trend. The third row uses months of supply from 1982 to 2013 from the NAR. Robust standard errors
are in parenthesis.
where c represents an MSA, xc;t is the vector of log months of supply, log price, and log sales volume
in city c at time t, and ’c is a city ￿xed e⁄ect. I use a Cholesky decomposition with the variables
ordered so that months of supply is assumed to not depend contemporaneously on shocks to price
or volume and price is assumed not to depend contemporaneously on shocks to volume. The results
are robust as long as months of supply does not depend contemporaneously on volume.
To show the robustness of these result, Figure 31 estimates a two-lag vector autoregression
model and a two-lag vector error correction (VEC) model on the national data sets used in the
main text. The Cholesky ordering and VAR are the same as for the panel VAR except there is
a single time series. The results look similar, although months of supply does not mean revert as
quickly. Furthermore, the VEC model looks similar to the VAR model, which is reassuring if one
is worried about the variables being cointegrated.
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Figure 31: Impulse Response to Inventory Shock in VAR and VEC on National Data
Notes: The ￿gures show orthogonalized impulse response functions to a months of supply shock from a two-lag vector autore-
gression model and vector error correction model of log months of supply, log price, and log sales volume. Price is the CoreLogic
national HPI, sales is from the NAR single-family existing home sales series, and months of supply is from the Census Vacancy
Survey and NAR, all from 1976-2013. All data are seasonally adjusted. The OIRFs are computed using a Cholesky decompo-
sition with the variables ordered so that months of supply is assumed to not depend contemporaneously on shocks to price or
volume and price is assumed to not depend contemporaneously on shocks to volume. The results are robust as long as months
of supply is prior to volume in the Cholesky ordering. The blue line is the OIRF, and for the VAR the grey bands indicate 95%
con￿dence intervals.
A.2.3 Buyer and Seller Entry
To show the robustness of Fact 4, which shows that entrants and sales move in opposite directions
at peaks and troughs, Figure 32 shows the full data series calculated using the Census￿homes for
sale measure from 1968-2013 as well as the 2003 to 2013 period for months of supply from the
National Association of Realtors. Although the patterns in previous cycles are not as dramatic,
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Figure 32: Sales, Entry: Full Series and NAR Data
Notes: Volume is raw data from the National Association of Realtors of sales of existing single-family homes at a seasonally-
adjusted annual rate. The top panel shows seller entry using the stock of sellers measured by the Census Vacancy Survey, while
the bottom panel shows the stock of sellers measured by the National Association of Realtors. Seller entry is computed as
Entrantst = Sellerst - Sellerst￿1 + Salest. Buyer entry is computed similarly, but since there is not a raw data series for the
stock of buyers it is imputed using a simple Cobb-Douglas matching function Sales
S = ￿
￿B
S
￿￿:8
with the 0.8 elasticity from
Genesove and Han (2012). In this ￿gure, ￿ = 1 in the top panel so that in a steady state there is 3 months of supply. Because
the NAR series reports more homes listed for sale, ￿ = :5 in the bottom panel to ￿t the same average market tightness as the
Census series. All three series are smoothed using a three-quarter moving average in both ￿gures.
170Table 28: Cross-City Facts on Momentum, Inventory Volatility, and the Housing Phillips Curve
Dependent Var SD of Annual Log Log Price Changes on Log Price Changes on
Change in Log Inventory Levels Log Inventory Levels
Months of Supply Regression Coe¢ cient Regression R-Squared
Annual ￿log(p) 0.201* -0.159** 0.920***
AR(1) Coe¢ cient (0.099) (0.055) (0.258)
N 42 42 42
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Each column shows a regression of the indicated dependent variable calculated
at the MSA level on the AR(1) coe¢ cient from a regression of the annual change in log price on a one-year lag of itself, as in
equation (1). These regressions thus show how the dependent variable varies across cities based on the degree of momentum the
cities exhibit. The data used is the merged National Association of Realtors and CoreLogic data for 42 cities used in the panel
VAR and described in Appendix A.1. Months of supply is directly from the NAR. The regression of the annual log change in
price on log inventory levels is as in Equation (26). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
one can still see the same pattern. Furthermore, the pattern is clearly visible for the 2000s boom
and bust in the NAR data.
Cross-City Facts Table 28 tests two of the model￿ s predictions about the housing cycle facts in
the cross-section of 42 cities used in the panel VAR analysis and described in Appendix A.1. Each
column shows a regression in which the independent variable is a city-level measure of momentum:
the AR(1) coe¢ cient of the annual change in log price regressed on an annual lag of itself in quarterly
CoreLogic data, as in equation (1). The ￿rst column shows that momentum co-varies positively
with the standard deviation of the annual change in log months of supply, which comes from a
separate data set from the National Association of Realtors. In the model, more momentum causes
more re-timing of purchases and more inventory volatility. The second and third columns show the
relationship between momentum and the regression coe¢ cient and R-squared, respectively, from a
regression of the annual change in log price on log months of supply at the midpoint of the year
as in equation (26). Recall that in the data the coe¢ cient is negative. Table 28 shows that the
correlation between price changes and inventory levels is more negative and stronger the greater the
degree of momentum in the city. This is consistent with the model, in which the housing Phillips
curve arises due to the rapid adjustment of inventory and gradual adjustment of price in light of
momentum.
171A.3 Micro Evidence For Concave Demand
A.3.1 Binned Scatter Plots
Throughout the analysis I use binned scatter plots to visualize the structural relationship between
list price relative to the reference list price and probability of sale. This section brie￿ y describes
how they are produced.
Recall that my econometric model is:
dh‘t = g (ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t) +  ‘t + "h‘t (44)
where ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t is equal to f (zh‘t) in:
ph‘t = f (zh‘t) + ￿Xh‘t + ￿‘t + uh‘t. (45)
To create the IV binned scatter plots. I ￿rst estimate f (zh‘t) by (45) and let ph‘t￿~ ph‘t = f (zh‘t).
I drop the 1st and 99th percentiles of ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t and ZIP-quarter cells with a single observation
and create 25 indicator variables ￿b corresponding to 25 bins q of ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t. I project sale within
13 weeks dh‘t on ￿xed e⁄ects and the indicator variables:
dh‘t =  ‘t + ￿b + ￿h‘tq (46)
I visualize g (￿) by plotting the average ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t for each bin against the average dh‘t ￿  ‘t for
each bin, which is equivalent to ￿b.
A.3.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Recall that the Lemma assumes that:
zh‘t ? ? (uh‘t;"h‘t),
ph‘t = f (zh‘t) + ￿h‘t + ~ ph‘t,
172￿h‘t ? ? f (zh‘t), and that the true regression function g (￿) is a third-order polynomial. Because
of the ￿xed e⁄ect ￿h‘t in ~ ph‘t, ￿h‘t can be normalized to be mean zero. Using the third-order
polynomial assumption, the true regression function is:
g (ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t) = E [dh‘tqjf (zh‘t) + ￿h‘t; ‘t] = ￿1 (f (zh‘t) + ￿h‘t)
+￿2 (f (zh‘t) + ￿h‘t)
2 + ￿3 (f (zh‘t) + ￿h‘t)
3 .
However, ￿h‘t is unobserved, so I instead estimate:
E [dh‘tqjf (zh‘t); ‘t] = ￿1f (zh‘t) + ￿2f (zh‘t)
2 + ￿3f (zh‘t)
3
+￿1E [￿h‘tjf (zh‘t)] + 2￿2E [f (zh‘t)￿h‘t] + ￿2E
￿
￿2
h‘tjf
￿
+3￿3f (zh‘t)E
￿
￿2
h‘tjf
￿
+ 3￿2
3f (zh‘t)E [￿h‘tjf] + ￿3E
￿
￿3
h‘tjf
￿
.
However, because ￿h‘t ? ? f (zh‘t), E [￿h‘tjf (zh‘t)] = 0, E [f (zh‘t)￿h‘t] = 0, and E
￿
￿2
h‘tjf
￿
and
E
￿
￿3
h‘tjf
￿
are constants. The ￿2E
￿
￿2
h‘tjf
￿
and ￿3E
￿
￿3
h‘tjf
￿
terms will be absorbed by the ￿xed
e⁄ects  ‘t, leaving:
E [dh‘tqjf (zh‘t); ‘t] = ￿1f (zh‘t) + ￿2f (zh‘t)
2 + ￿3f (zh‘t)
3 + 3￿3f (zh‘t)E
￿
￿2
h‘tjf
￿
Thus when one estimates g (￿) by a cubic polynomial of f (zh‘t),
dh‘tq = ￿1f (zh‘t) + ￿2f (zh‘t)
2 + ￿3f (zh‘t)
3 +  ‘t + "h‘t,
one recovers ￿1 = ￿1 + 3￿3E
￿
￿2
h‘tjf
￿
, ￿2 = ￿2, and ￿3 = ￿3, so the true second- and third-order
terms are recovered.
A.3.3 Instrumental Variable Robustness and Speci￿cation Tests
This section provides robustness and speci￿cation tests for the IV estimates described in Section
1.3.
Figure 33 shows the reduced-form relationship between the instrument and outcome variable
173.
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Figure 33: Reduced-Form Relationship Between the Instrument and the Outcome Variable
Notes: This ￿gure shows the reduced-form relationship between the instrument on the x-axis and the probability of sale within
13 weeks on the y axis. Both are residualized against quarter x ZIP ￿xed e⁄ects and the repeat-sales and hedonic predicted
prices and the means are added back in. This is the basic concave relationship that the IV approach uses, although the
downward-sloping ￿rst stage ￿ips the x-axis.
when both are residualized against ￿xed e⁄ects and the repeat-sales and hedonic predicted price.
The estimates presented in the main text rescale the instrument axis into price (and in the process
￿ ip the x axis), but the basic concave relationship between probability of sale and appreciation
since purchase is visible in the reduced form.
Figure 34 shows IV binned scatter plots when the y-axis is rescaled to a logarithmic scale so
that the slope represents the elasticity of demand, which does not alter the ￿nding of concavity.
Figure 35 shows third-order polynomial ￿ts varying the number of weeks that a listing needs
to sell within to count as a sale from six weeks to 26 weeks. Concavity is evident regardless of the
deadline used.
Figure 36 shows the IV binned scatter plot and a third-order polynomial ￿t when the sample
is limited to transactions and the prices are measured in list prices rather than transaction prices.
Substantial concavity is still present, assuaging concerns that the concavity in list prices may not
translate into a strategic complementarity in transaction prices. The upward slope in the middle
of the ￿gure is not statistically signi￿cant.
Tables 29, 30, 31, and 32 present various robustness and speci￿cation tests of the main IV
speci￿cation in Panel B of Table 3. Each row in the tables represents a separate regression, with the
speci￿cations described in the main text. Coe¢ cients for a three-segment spline in the log relative
174Figure 34: Instrumental Variable Estimates With Probability of Sale Axis in Logs
Notes: The ￿gure shows a binned scatter plot of the log of probability of sale within 13 weeks net of ￿xed e⁄ects (with the
average probability of sale within 13 weeks added in) against the estimated log relative markup. It also shows an overlaid cubic
￿t of the relationship, as in equation (3). To create the ￿gure, a ￿rst stage regression of the log list price on a third-order
polynomial in the instrument, ￿xed e⁄ects at the ZIP x ￿rst quarter of listing level, and repeat sales and hedonic log predicted
prices, as in (6), is estimated by OLS. The predicted value of the polynomial of the instrument is used as the relative markup.
The ￿gure splits the data into 25 equally-sized bins of this estimated relative markup and plots the mean of the estimated
relative markup against the mean of the probability of sale within 13 weeks net of ￿xed e⁄ects for each bin. The y-axis is
rescaled into logs after means are calculated and the cubic ￿t is estimated because the outcome variable is binary. Before
binning, the 1st and 99th percentiles of the log sale price residual and any observations fully absorbed by ￿xed e⁄ects are
dropped. The entire procedure is weighted by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the prediction error in the repeat-sales
house price index in the observation￿ s ZIP code from 1988 to 2013. The sample is limited to the IV subsample of homes that are
not sales of foreclosures or short sales, sales of homes with negative appreciation since the seller purchased, or sales by investors
who previously purchased with all cash. N = 111,293 observations prior to dropping the 1st and 99th percentiles and unique
zip-quarter cells.
markup, the di⁄erence between the highest and lowest tercile coe¢ cients, and a bootstrapped 95
percent con￿dence interval for the di⁄erence are reported. In some speci￿cations the bootstrapped
con￿dence intervals widen when the sample size is reduced to the point that the results are no
longer signi￿cant, and the middle tercile slope can be sensitive because the middle third of the data
tends to correspond to a very small range of log relative markups and is thus noisily estimated.
Nonetheless, the robustness and speci￿cation checks show evidence of signi￿cant concavity.
Table 29 evaluates the exclusion restriction that unobserved quality is independent of when
a seller purchased. The ￿rst two speci￿cations add a linear trend in date of purchase or time
since purchase in Xh‘t along with the two predicted prices, thus accounting for any variation in
unobserved quality that varies linearly in date of purchase or time since purchase. The next three
rows limit the sample to homes purchased before the bust (before 2005), after 1994, and in a window
175.
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Figure 35: Instrumental Variable Estimates: Varying The Sell-By Date
Notes: The ￿gure shows third-order polynomial ￿ts of equation (3) for the probability of sale by eleven di⁄erent deadlines (6,
8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, and 26 weeks) net of ￿xed e⁄ects (with the average probability of sale added in) against the
estimated log relative markup. To create the ￿gure, a ￿rst stage regression of the log list price on a third-order polynomial
in the instrument, ￿xed e⁄ects at the ZIP x ￿rst quarter of listing level, and repeat sales and hedonic log predicted prices, as
in (6), is estimated by OLS. The predicted value of the polynomial of the instrument is used as the relative markup before
equation (3) is run. The entire procedure is weighted by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the prediction error in the
repeat-sales house price index in the observation￿ s ZIP code from 1988 to 2013. The sample is limited to the IV subsample
of homes that are not sales of foreclosures or short sales, sales of homes with negative appreciation since the seller purchased,
or sales by investors who previously purchased with all cash. N = 111,293 observations prior to dropping the 1st and 99th
percentiles and unique zip-quarter cells.
from 1995 to 2004. Finally, the last two rows add linear time trends to the purchased before 2005
sample. In all cases, the bootstrapped 95 percent con￿dence intervals continue to show signi￿cant
concavity.
Table 30 shows various speci￿cation checks. The ￿rst set of regressions limit the analysis to
ZIP-quarter cells with at least 15 and 20 observations to evaluate whether small sample bias in the
estimated ￿xed e⁄ect ￿h‘t could be a⁄ecting the results. In both cases, the results appear similar
to the full sample and the bootstrapped con￿dence interval shows a signi￿cant di⁄erence between
the highest and lowest terciles, which suggests that bias in the estimation of the ￿xed e⁄ects is
not driving the results. The second set introduces Xh‘t, the vector of house characteristics that
includes the repeat-sales and hedonic predicted prices, as a quadratic and cubic function instead
of linearly. It does not appear that assumed linearity of these characteristics is driving the results.
Finally, the third set considers di⁄erent speci￿cations for the ￿ exible function of the instrument
f (zh‘t) in the ￿rst stage. Again, changing the order of f (￿) does not appear to have a signi￿cant
176.
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Figure 36: Instrumental Variable Estimates: Transaction Prices
Notes: The ￿gure shows a binned scatter plot of the probability of sale within 13 weeks net of ￿xed e⁄ects (with the average
probability of sale within 13 weeks added in) against the estimated log relative markup measured using transaction prices rather
than list prices. It also shows an overlaid cubic ￿t of the relationship, as in equation (3). To create the ￿gure, a ￿rst stage
regression of the log list price on a third-order polynomial in the instrument, ￿xed e⁄ects at the ZIP x ￿rst quarter of listing
level, and repeat sales and hedonic log predicted prices, as in (6), is estimated by OLS. The predicted value of the polynomial
of the instrument is used as the relative markup. The ￿gure splits the data into 25 equally-sized bins of this estimated relative
markup and plots the mean of the estimated relative markup against the mean of the probability of sale within 13 weeks net
of ￿xed e⁄ects for each bin. Before binning, the 1st and 99th percentiles of the log sale price residual and any observations
fully absorbed by ￿xed e⁄ects are dropped. The entire procedure is weighted by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the
prediction error in the repeat-sales house price index in the observation￿ s ZIP code from 1988 to 2013. The sample is limited
to the IV subsample of homes that are not sales of foreclosures or short sales, sales of homes with negative appreciation since
the seller purchased, or sales by investors who previously purchased with all cash. To obtain transaction prices, the sample is
also limited to homes that transact. The grey bands indicate a pointwise 95-percent con￿dence interval for the cubic ￿t created
by block bootstrapping the entire procedure on 35 ZIP-3 clusters. N = 74,299 observations prior to dropping the 1st and 99th
percentiles and unique zip-quarter cells.
e⁄ect on concavity.
Table 31 shows various robustness checks. These include:
￿ House Characteristic Controls: Includes a third-order polynomial in age, log square feet,
bedrooms, and bathrooms in Xh‘t.
￿ Alternate Time To Sale De￿nition: Instead of measuring time to sale as ￿rst listing to the
￿ling of the deed transfer request, this speci￿cation measures time to sale as ￿rst listing to
the ￿rst of the deed transfer request or the last listing.
￿ 18 and 10 Weeks to Sale: Tests the robustness to the horizon for having sold.
177Table 29: IV Robustness 1: Controls for Time Since Purchase
Dependent Var: Sell Within 13 Weeks
Speci￿cation Tercile Spline Coe¢ cients Di⁄erence
(Details In Text) Lowest Middle Highest High - Low Bootstrapped 95% CI Obs
Linear Trend in -0.391 1.009 -2.826*** -2.435** [-5.014, -1.994] 111,293
Date of Purchase (0.403) (4.134) (0.810) (0.836)
Linear Trend in -0.396 1.109 -2.849*** -2.453** [-5.065, -1.999] 111,293
Time Since Purchase (0.407) (4.240) (0.824) (0.848)
Purchased Pre 2005 -0.038 -0.357 -4.11 -4.072 [-13.155, -2.282] 102,642
(0.374) (1.907) (4.115) (4.116)
Purchased Post 1994 -0.702 -0.095 -2.503*** -1.800 [-4.375, -1.790] 93,080
(0.769) (0.952) (0.676) (1.025)
Purchased 1995-2004 -0.407 -0.816 -4.252 -3.845 [-15.221, -2.432] 84,429
(0.782) (2.193) (5.149) (5.443)
Pre 2005 With Trend -0.042 -0.152 -3.183 -3.140 [-7.326, -1.871] 102,642
in Date of Purchase (0.306) (0.999) (2.157) (2.124)
Pre 2005 With Trend -0.042 -0.156 -3.21 -3.168 [-7.624, -1.893] 102,642
in Time Since Purchase (0.307) (1.016) (2.238) (2.204)
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Each row shows regression coe¢ cients when g(.) in equation (3) is approximated
using a three-segment linear spline with an equal fraction of the data in each segment. A ￿rst stage regression of log list price
on a third-order polynomial in the instrument, ￿xed e⁄ects at the ZIP x ￿rst quarter of listing level, and log predicted price
using both a repeat-sales and a hedonic methodology, as in (6), is estimated by OLS. The predicted value of the polynomial of
the instrument is computed is used as the relative markup in equation (3), which is estimated by OLS. The sample is restricted
to non-REOs, non-short sales, properties with positive appreciation since purchase, and properties not previously purchased
with all cash (investors). The entire procedure weighted by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the prediction error in
the repeat-sales house price index in the observation￿ s ZIP code from 1988 to 2013. Before creating the spline, the 99th and
1st percentiles of the relative markup are dropped, as are any observations fully absorbed by ￿xed e⁄ects. In addition to the
regression coe¢ cients, the di⁄erence between the highest and lowest tercile of the spline is reported. Standard errors and the
95 percent con￿dence interval for the di⁄erence between the ￿rst and third terciles are computed by block bootstrapping the
entire procedure on 35 ZIP-3 clusters. The number of observations listed is prior to dropping observations that are unique to a
ZIP-quarter cell and the 1st and 99th percentiles. The appendix text details each speci￿cation.
￿ Non-REO House Price Index for Predicted Price: Uses house price indices for the predicted
price that does not include REOs.
￿ Nearby REOs: Controls for third order polynomial in number of REOs within 1/4 mile from
2006 to 2013 to account for quality correlated with distressed sales at the sup ZIP code level.
The results are similar if one varies the radius considered from .1 to 1 mile or counts REOs
within a year of the listing rather than from 2006 to 2013.
￿ No Weights: Does not weight observations by the inverse standard deviation of the repeat-sales
house price index prediction error at the ZIP level.
178Table 30: IV Robustness 2: Speci￿cation Checks
Dependent Var: Sell Within 13 Weeks
Speci￿cation Tercile Spline Coe¢ cients Di⁄erence
(Details In Text) Lowest Middle Highest High - Low Bootstrapped 95% CI Obs
Only FE Cells With -0.068 -0.295 -2.575*** -2.507*** [-4.31, -1.844] 64,236
At Least 15 Obs (0.455) (2.731) (0.705) (0.667)
Only FE Cells With -0.285 -2.024 -3.163** -2.878 [-6.835, -1.265] 44,795
At Least 20 Obs (1.052) (4.378) (1.192) (1.480)
Predicted Prices -0.225 -0.425 -2.248*** -2.023*** [-3.324, -1.307] 111,293
Introduced as Quadratic (0.353) (2.154) (0.503) (0.534)
Predicted Prices -0.228 -0.361 -2.314*** -2.086*** [-3.313, -1.344] 111,293
Introduced as Cubic (0.355) (2.014) (0.500) (0.532)
Linear Fn -0.440 0.260 -4.511*** -4.071*** [-6.632, -2.926] 111,293
of Instrument (0.503) (0.603) (0.982) (0.900)
Quadratic Fn -0.466 0.262 -4.301** -3.835** [-7.602, -1.998] 111,293
of Instrument (0.594) (0.601) (1.438) (1.466)
Quartic Fn -0.279 0.069 -2.171*** -1.892*** [-3.237, -1.235] 111,293
of Instrument (0.302) (3.092) (0.533) (0.536)
Quintic Fn -0.235 -0.560 -2.120*** -1.885*** [-3.340, -1.150] 111,293
of Instrument (0.404) (2.248) (0.518) (0.573)
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Each row shows regression coe¢ cients when g(.) in equation (3) is approximated
using a three-segment linear spline with an equal fraction of the data in each segment. A ￿rst stage regression of log list price
on a third-order polynomial in the instrument, ￿xed e⁄ects at the ZIP x ￿rst quarter of listing level, and log predicted price
using both a repeat-sales and a hedonic methodology, as in (6), is estimated by OLS. The predicted value of the polynomial of
the instrument is computed is used as the relative markup in equation (3), which is estimated by OLS. The sample is restricted
to non-REOs, non-short sales, properties with positive appreciation since purchase, and properties not previously purchased
with all cash (investors). The entire procedure weighted by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the prediction error in
the repeat-sales house price index in the observation￿ s ZIP code from 1988 to 2013. Before creating the spline, the 99th and
1st percentiles of the relative markup are dropped, as are any observations fully absorbed by ￿xed e⁄ects. In addition to the
regression coe¢ cients, the di⁄erence between the highest and lowest tercile of the spline is reported. Standard errors and the
95 percent con￿dence interval for the di⁄erence between the ￿rst and third terciles are computed by block bootstrapping the
entire procedure on 35 ZIP-3 clusters. The number of observations listed is prior to dropping observations that are unique to a
ZIP-quarter cell and the 1st and 99th percentiles. The Appendix text details each speci￿cation.
￿ No Possibly Problematic Observations: A small number of listings are matched to multiple
property IDs and I use an algorithm described in Appendix A.1 to guess of which is the
relevant property ID. Additionally, there are spikes in the number of listings in the Altos
data for a few dates, which I have largely eliminated by dropping listings that do not match
to a DataQuick property ID. Despite the fact that these two issues a⁄ect a very small number
of observations, this speci￿cation drops both types of potentially problematic observations to
179Table 31: IV Robustness 3: Other Robustness Tests
Dependent Var: Sell Within 13 Weeks Unless Otherwise Indicated
Speci￿cation Tercile Spline Coe¢ cients Di⁄erence
(Details In Text) Lowest Middle Highest High - Low Bootstrapped 95% CI Obs
House Characteristic -0.366 0.350 -2.804*** -2.438*** [-3.938, -1.567] 107,176
Controls (0.359) (1.953) (0.589) (0.593)
Alternate Time -0.587 0.186 -2.104*** -1.516** [-2.772, -0.660] 111,293
to Sale Defn (0.357) (1.772) (0.506) (0.561)
Dep Var: 18 Weeks -0.240 -0.974 -2.140*** -1.900*** [-3.124, -1.159] 111,293
(0.339) (1.685) (0.524) (0.537)
Dep Var: 10 Weeks -0.049 0.611 -2.302*** -2.252*** [-3.742, -1.359] 111,293
(0.413) (1.842) (0.549) (0.588)
No REO HPI -0.139 0.391 -1.248*** -1.110* [-2.231, -0.210] 108,081
For Predicted Price (0.505) (2.549) (0.253) (0.541)
Nearby REOs -0.393 1.012 -2.827*** -2.434*** [-4.381,-1.332] 111,293
(0.402) (4.136) (0.810) (0.836)
No Weights -0.153 1.109 -2.046*** -1.892*** [-3.015, -1.062] 111,293
(0.399) (1.394) (0.511) (0.505)
No Poss Problematic Obs -0.280 0.246 -2.355*** -2.075*** [-3.526, -1.47] 107,865
(0.325) (1.768) (0.588) (0.551)
First Listed 2008-6/2010 0.273 -0.871 -2.967*** -3.240*** [-5.684, -2.174] 57,384
(0.507) (4.533) (0.766) (0.902)
First Listed 7/2010-2013 -1.034 1.265 -2.039* -1.005 [-3.030, 1.199] 53,909
(0.907) (1.429) (0.894) (1.150)
Bay Area -0.324 1.292 -4.430 -4.105 [-10.067, -1.505] 29,108
(1.348) (2.284) (2.786) (2.892)
Los Angeles 0.152 0.251 -2.172** -2.325** [-4.203, -1.144] 68,749
(0.656) (2.542) (0.688) (0.813)
San Diego -3.344 1.068 -2.683 0.661 [-54.876, 2.189] 13,436
(11.060) (2.741) (9.616) (20.092)
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Each row shows regression coe¢ cients when g(.) in equation (3) is approximated
using a three-segment linear spline with an equal fraction of the data in each segment. A ￿rst stage regression of log list price
on a third-order polynomial in the instrument, ￿xed e⁄ects at the ZIP x ￿rst quarter of listing level, and log predicted price
using both a repeat-sales and a hedonic methodology, as in (6), is estimated by OLS. The predicted value of the polynomial of
the instrument is computed is used as the relative markup in equation (3), which is estimated by OLS. The sample is restricted
to non-REOs, non-short sales, properties with positive appreciation since purchase, and properties not previously purchased
with all cash (investors). The entire procedure weighted by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the prediction error in
the repeat-sales house price index in the observation￿ s ZIP code from 1988 to 2013. Before creating the spline, the 99th and
1st percentiles of the relative markup are dropped, as are any observations fully absorbed by ￿xed e⁄ects. In addition to the
regression coe¢ cients, the di⁄erence between the highest and lowest tercile of the spline is reported. Standard errors and the
95 percent con￿dence interval for the di⁄erence between the ￿rst and third terciles are computed by block bootstrapping the
entire procedure on 35 ZIP-3 clusters. The number of observations listed is prior to dropping observations that are unique to a
ZIP-quarter cell and the 1st and 99th percentiles. The Appendix text details each speci￿cation.
180Table 32: IV Robustness 4: Transactions Only
Dependent Variable Tercile Spline Coe¢ cients Di⁄erence
(Details In Text) Lowest Middle Highest High - Low Bootstrapped 95% CI Obs
Sell Within 13 Weeks 0.254 4.376 -2.169*** -2.423** [-4.243, -0.825] 74,299
-0.778 -2.500 -0.486 -0.923
Weeks on Market (25.263) -102.910* 62.734*** 87.996*** [58.917, 143.191] 74,299
-20.157 -50.969 -11.02 -19.655
Weeks on Market (18.203) -126.848* 56.316*** 74.519*** [51.993, 110.053] 74,299
Alternate Defn -16.871 -58.846 -10.094 -15.106
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 .Each row shows regression coe¢ cients when g(.) in equation (3) is approximated
using a three-segment linear spline with an equal fraction of the data in each segment. A ￿rst stage regression of log list price
on a third-order polynomial in the instrument, ￿xed e⁄ects at the ZIP x ￿rst quarter of listing level, and log predicted price
using both a repeat-sales and a hedonic methodology, as in (6), is estimated by OLS. The predicted value of the polynomial of
the instrument is computed is used as the relative markup in equation (3), which is estimated by OLS. The sample is restricted
to non-REOs, non-short sales, properties with positive appreciation since purchase, and properties not previously purchased
with all cash (investors). The entire procedure weighted by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the prediction error in
the repeat-sales house price index in the observation￿ s ZIP code from 1988 to 2013. Before creating the spline, the 99th and
1st percentiles of the relative markup are dropped, as are any observations fully absorbed by ￿xed e⁄ects. In addition to the
regression coe¢ cients, the di⁄erence between the highest and lowest tercile of the spline is reported. Standard errors and the
95 percent con￿dence interval for the di⁄erence between the ￿rst and third terciles are computed by block bootstrapping the
entire procedure on 35 ZIP-3 clusters. The number of observations listed is prior to dropping observations that are unique to a
ZIP-quarter cell and the 1st and 99th percentiles. The Appendix text details each speci￿cation.
show that they do not a⁄ect results.
￿ By Time Period: I split the data into two time periods, February 2008 to June 2010 and July
2010 to February 2013.
￿ By MSA: Separate regressions for the San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, and San Diego areas.
The results continue to show concavity, although in some speci￿cations it is weakened by the smaller
sample size and no longer signi￿cant. In particular, in San Diego the con￿dence intervals are so
wide that nothing can be inferred. Additionally, both when predicted prices are computed using
non-REO house price indices (which are much noisier) and in the second half of the sample, the
result is slightly weakened and no longer signi￿cant.
Finally, Table 32 shows results for the subset of homes that transact for three di⁄erent outcome
variables. First, it shows the main sale within 13 weeks outcome, for which the concavity is still
signi￿cant. The second two speci￿cations show results using weeks on the market as the outcome
variable, and so concavity is indicated by a positive di⁄erence between the highest and lowest
181terciles. For both the baseline and alternate weeks on the market de￿nitions, there is signi￿cant
concavity in the IV speci￿cations that indicates that increasing the list price by one percent increases
time on the market by 1.1 to 1.5 weeks.
A.3.4 Ordinary Least Squares
An alternative to IV is to assume that there is no unobserved quality and thus no need for an
instrument. This ordinary least squares approach implies that:
~ ph‘t = ￿‘t + ￿Xh‘t
and so ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t is equal to the regression residual ￿h‘t in:
ph‘t = ￿‘t + ￿Xh‘t + ￿h‘t, (47)
which can be estimated in a ￿rst stage and plugged into the second stage equation:
dh‘t = g (￿h‘t) +  ‘t + "h‘t.
Given the importance of unobserved quality, this is likely to provide signi￿cantly biased results,
but it is worth considering as a benchmark as discussed in the main text. This section provides
additional OLS results to show that the ￿ndings in Panel A of Table 3 are robust.
Because the OLS sample may include distressed sales, I take a conservative approach and include
￿xed e⁄ects at the ZIP ￿ quarter ￿ distress status level. Distressed status is de￿ned as either non-
distressed, REO, or a short sale (or withdrawn listing subsequently foreclosed upon). The results
would look similar if ZIP ￿ quarter ￿xed e⁄ects were used and an additive categorical control for
distressed status were included in Xh‘t.
First, Figure 37 shows binned scatter plots for OLS for all listings, transactions only, and the
IV subsample. In each, a clear pattern of concavity is visible, but as discussed in the main text,
the upward slope on the left indicates the presence of substantial unobserved quality￿ particularly
among homes that do not sell￿ and thus the need for an instrument.123
123An alternative explanation is that in the later years of my sample I do not have follow-up data on foreclosures, so
182Table 33: Ordinary Least Squares Robustness
Dependent Var: Weeks on Market
Speci￿cation Tercile Spline Coe¢ cients Di⁄erence
(Details In Text) Lowest Middle Highest High - Low Bootstrapped 95% CI Obs
House Characteristic 0.155*** -0.293*** -0.553*** -0.708*** [-0.835, -0.616] 414,525
Controls (0.034) (0.047) (0.034) (0.058)
Alternate Time 0.143*** -0.529*** -0.496*** -0.639*** [-0.762, -0.533] 431,830
to Sale Defn (0.030) (0.093) (0.042) (0.060)
Dep Var: 18 Weeks 0.195*** -0.419*** -0.496*** -0.692*** [-0.802, -0.59] 431,830
(0.031) (0.090) (0.034) (0.056)
Dep Var: 10 Weeks 0.122*** -0.536*** -0.453*** -0.575*** [-0.692, -0.473] 431,830
(0.030) (0.088) (0.039) (0.056)
Hedonic Predicted 0.128*** -0.255*** -0.458*** -0.587*** [-0.724, -0.427] 665,560
Price Only (0.038) (0.049) (0.043) (0.076)
Low REO ZIPs 0.152** -0.943*** -0.465*** -0.618*** [-0.847, -0.513] 180,517
(0.052) (0.086) (0.050) (0.095)
Low Short Sale ZIPs 0.060 -1.063*** -0.405*** -0.465** [-0.773, -0.272] 113,196
(0.073) (0.124) (0.084) (0.147)
No REO or Short Sale 0.322*** -0.738*** -0.525*** -0.846*** [-1.052, -0.684] 221,013
(0.043) (0.175) (0.068) (0.096)
Transactions Only 0.012 -0.419*** -0.510*** -0.522*** [-0.607, -0.46] 318,842
(0.029) (0.045) (0.021) (0.038)
IV Subsample 0.322*** -1.110*** -0.533*** -0.854*** [-1.141, -0.65] 111,293
(0.073) (0.154) (0.073) (0.137)
Only FE Cells With 0.156*** -0.610*** -0.496*** -0.652*** [-0.819, -0.563] 273,100
At Least 20 Obs (0.034) (0.117) (0.057) (0.072)
Predicted Prices 0.144*** -0.405*** -0.534*** -0.679*** [-0.777, -0.588] 431,830
Introduced as Cubic (0.033) (0.039) (0.026) (0.050)
First Listed 2008-7/2010 0.046 -0.616*** -0.522*** -0.567*** [-0.685, -0.467] 233,115
(0.032) (0.086) (0.041) (0.057)
First Listed 7/2010-2013 0.317*** -0.375*** -0.415*** -0.731*** [-0.873, -0.642] 198,715
(0.041) (0.099) (0.034) (0.060)
Bay Area 0.170** -0.421*** -0.565*** -0.735*** [-0.879, -0.571] 115,223
(0.065) (0.097) (0.058) (0.081)
Los Angeles 0.186*** -0.555*** -0.440*** -0.626*** [-0.79, -0.479] 256,816
(0.048) (0.109) (0.044) (0.081)
San Diego 0.133*** -0.275* -0.578*** -0.710*** [-0.748, -0.65] 59,791
(0.013) (0.134) (0.039) (0.027)
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Each row shows regression coe¢ cients when g(.) in equation (3) is approximated
using a three-segment linear spline with an equal fraction of the data in each segment. OLS estimates the relative markup based
on a ￿rst stage, equation (47), and plugs in the estimate relative markup into equation (3). The ￿xed e⁄ects at the quarter of
initial listing x ZIP x distress status level. Distress status corresponds to three groups: normal sales, REOs (sales of foreclosed
homes and foreclosure auctions), and short sales (cases where the transaction was less than the amount outstanding on the loan
and withdrawals that are subsequently foreclosed on in the next two years). Both procedures are weighted by the reciprocal of
the standard deviation of the prediction error in the repeat-sales house price index in the observation￿ s ZIP code from 1988 to
2013. Before creating the spline, the 99th and 1st percentiles of the relative markup are dropped, as are any observations fully
absorbed by ￿xed e⁄ects. In addition to the regression coe¢ cients, the di⁄erence between the highest and lowest tercile of the
spline is reported. Standard errors and the 95 percent con￿dence interval for the di⁄erence between the ￿rst and third terciles
are computed by block bootstrapping the entire procedure on 35 ZIP-3 clusters. The number of observations listed is prior to
dropping observations that are unique to a ZIP-quarter cell and the 1st and 99th percentiles. The Appendix text details each
speci￿cation.
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Figure 37: The E⁄ect of List Price on Probability of Sale: Ordinary Least Squares
Notes: Each panel shows a binned scatter plot of the probability of sale within 13 weeks against the log relative markup. OLS
assumes no unobserved quality. To create the ￿gure, a ￿rst stage regression of log list price on ￿xed e⁄ects at the ZIP x ￿rst
quarter of listing level x seller distress status level and repeat sales and hedonic log predicted prices, as in (47), is estimated by
OLS. The residual is used as the relative markup in equation (3), which is estimated by OLS. The ￿gure splits the data into 25
equally-sized bins of the estimated relative markup and plots the mean of the estimated relative markup against the log of the
mean of the probability of sale within 13 weeks net of ￿xed e⁄ects for each bin. Before binning, the 1st and 99th percentiles of
the log sale price residual and any observations fully absorbed by ￿xed e⁄ects are dropped. The entire procedure is weighted
by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the prediction error in the repeat-sales house price index in the observation￿ s ZIP
code from 1988 to 2013. Observation counts prior to dropping the 1st and 99th percentiles are 431,830 for panel A (all listings
with a prior observed sale), 318,832 for panel B (listings with a prior observed sale that lead to transactions), and 111,293 for
panel C (IV sample).
Table 33 shows a number of robustness and speci￿cation checks. Those di⁄erent from the IV
speci￿cation checks described previously are:
￿ House Characteristic Controls: As with IV, this includes a third-order polynomial in age, log
square feet, bedrooms, and bathrooms, but it also includes additive ￿xed e⁄ects for quintiles
of the time since purchase distribution in Xh‘t.
￿ Hedonic predicted price only: Drops the repeat-sales house price index from Xh‘t. This
expands the sample to all listings in the data rather than only those with a prior observed
sale.
￿ Low REO ZIPs: Only includes ZIP codes with less than 20 percent REO sale shares from
2008 to 2013. (REO is a sale of a foreclosed property.)
some withdrawn short sales are counted as non-distressed. This may explain some of the upward slope, as the upward
slope is concentrated in non-withdrawn properties, high short sale ZIP codes, and the later years of my sample.
184￿ Low Short ZIPs: Only includes ZIP codes with less than 20 percent short sale shares from
2008 to 2013. (A short sale occurs when a homeowner sells their house for less than their
outstanding mortgage balance and must negotiate the sale with their lender.)
￿ No REO or Short Sale: Drops REOs, short sales, and withdrawn sales subsequently foreclosed
upon homes, thus only leaving non-distressed sales.
￿ Transactions only: Drops houses withdrawn from the market.
￿ IV Subsample: Drops homes with negative appreciation since purchase, REOs, and homes
previously purchased with all cash.
All speci￿cations show signi￿cant concavity.
A.3.5 Monte Carlo Assessment of Bias From Other Sources of Markup Variation
This appendix presents Monte Carlo simulations to assess the degree of bias from other sources of
variation in the relative markup entering g (￿) nonlinearly.
To do so, for each house in the IV sample I simulate dh‘t using an assumed g (￿) and an estimated
 h‘t:
dh‘t = g (ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t) +  ‘t + "h‘t.
However, rather than assuming ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t = f (zh‘t), I let ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t = f (zh‘t) + ￿h‘t and report
results for di⁄erent parameterizations for the other sources of relative markup variation ￿h‘t.
Speci￿cally, I follow a ￿ve step procedure 1,000 times and report the average values:
1. Based on ￿rst stage, calculate ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t = f (zh‘t).
2. Estimate  ‘t given g (￿)
3. Draw ￿h‘t. Using the known g (￿), calculate g (f (zh‘t) + ￿h‘t) +  ‘t
4. dh‘t is Bernoulli: a house sells with probability g (f (zh‘t) + ￿h‘t) +  ‘t
5. Run the estimator of interest on the simulated data.
185Table 34: Monte Carlo Simulations: Other Sources of Markup Variation Independent of Instrument
3-Part Spline SD of ￿h‘t
Coef Estimates 0.000 0.01 0.02 0.04
Lowest Tercile -0.215 -0.851 -1.110 -2.486
(0.371) (0.571) (0.422) (0.379)
Middle Tercile 0.201 -0.768 -1.145 -3.002
(1.037) (1.249) (1.090) (1.008)
Highest Terclie -2.219 -1.861 -2.077 -3.386
(0.264) (0.605) (0.816) (0.267)
High - Low -2.006 -1.010 -0.968 -0.900
(0.429) (1.068) (1.032) (0.443)
Notes: Each column shows the mean and standard deviation over 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations of the point estimates of
a three-part spline in g(.) as in the main text. The simulated data is the actual data for all parameters except for
whether the house sold within 13 months, which is created as simulated data using an assumed value for g(.), here the
baseline estimate, and then adding noise to the ￿rst stage relative markup that is independent of the instrument and
normally distributed with mean zero and the indicated standard deviation. The simulation procedure is described in
detail in the Appendix text.
Table 34 shows results with a normally distributed ￿h‘t that is independent of f (zh‘t). The
assumed g (￿) is the third-order polynomial estimate of g (￿) shown in Figure 5. Increasing the
standard deviation of ￿h‘t leads to a g (￿) that is steeper and more linear than the baseline estimates.
Other sources of variation in the relative markup that are independent of the instrument would
thus likely lead to an under-estimate of the true degree of concavity.
Spurious concavity is, however, a possibility if the variance of ￿h‘t is correlated with zh‘t. Specif-
ically, consider the case where the instrument captures most of the variation in the relative markup
for sellers with low appreciation since purchase but little of the variation with high appreciation
since purchase. Then the observed probability of sale at low ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t would be an average of
the probabilities of sale at true ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘ts that are scrambled, yielding an attenuated slope for
low ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t. However, at high ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t, the observed ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t would be close to the true
ph‘t ￿ ~ ph‘t, yielding the true slope.
Table 35 illustrates that this type of bias could cause spurious concavity, but that generating the
amount of concavity I observe in the data would require an extreme amount of unobserved variation
in the relative markup at low levels of appreciation since purchase. To show this, I assume the
true g (￿) is linear and let the standard deviation of ￿h‘t depend on f (zh‘t) as indicated in the ￿rst
two rows of the table. The ￿rst column shows estimates with no noise, which are approximately
186Table 35: Monte Carlo Simulations: Other Sources of Markup Variation Corr With Instrument
SD f (z) < :01 0 0.05 0.5 1.0 0.5
SD f (z) ￿ :01 0 0 0 0 0.2
Lowest Tercile -1.267 -1.256 -0.557 -.194 -0.566
(0.382) (0.381) (0.414) (.405) (0.404)
Middle Tercile -1.556 -1.629 -0.768 -.399 -0.786
(1.008) (1.000) (1.084) (1.070) (1.044)
Highest Terclie -1.321 -1.315 -1.454 -1.503 -1.234
(0.263) (0.257) (0.281) (0.275) (0.271)
High - Low -0.054 -0.060 -0.897 -1.310 -.668
(0.450) (0.436) (.479) (0.466) (0.454)
Notes: Each column shows the mean and standard deviation over 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations of the point estimates of a
three-part spline in g(.) as in the main text. The simulated data is the actual data for all parameters except for whether the
house sold within 13 months, which is created as simulated data using an assumed value for g(.), here the baseline estimate,
and then adding noise to the ￿rst stage relative markup. Here the variance of the noise depends on f (zh‘t) (the estimated
log relative markup) and thus the instrument. Speci￿cally, the noise is normally distributed with a standard deviation equal
to the ￿rst row if f (zh‘t) < :01 and the second row if f (zh‘t) ￿ :01. This makes the noise larger for homes with
more appreciation since purchase, creating the potential spurious concavity from heterskedasticity described in the text. The
simulation procedure is described in detail in the Appendix text.
linear. To generate substantial spurious concavity, the instrument must be near perfect for low
appreciation since sale and that the other sources of variation must have a standard deviation of
over half a log point for low appreciation since purchase. In other words, the amount of other
sources of variation in the relative markup must be near zero for low appreciation since purchase
and over 25 times as great as the variation induced by the instrument for high appreciation since
purchase.
A.4 Model
A.4.1 Laws of Motion and Value Functions
This Appendix derives the probabilities of sale and value functions for a model with a general price
distribution. It then provides the laws of motion and value functions not provided in the main text.
The ex-ante probability of sale for a seller posting price pt with a price distribution of ￿t and
a functional market tightness of ~ ￿t is:
d
￿
pt;￿t;~ ￿t
￿
= q
￿
~ ￿t
￿
(1 ￿ G(pt ￿ E￿ [pt] ￿ ￿))(1 ￿ F ("￿
t)).
187The functional market tightness is ~ ￿t ￿ Bt
Svisited
t
= ￿t
E￿[1￿G(pt￿E￿[pt]￿￿)], where ￿t = Bt
St is the buyer-
to-seller ratio. The probability of purchase for a buyer is the probability of a match times an
integral over all sellers with the integrand equal to the probability of meeting any given seller times
the probability of purchase from that seller:
Pr
h
Buyj￿t;~ ￿t
i
=
q
￿
~ ￿t
￿
~ ￿t
Z
1 ￿ G(pt ￿ E￿ [pt] ￿ ￿)
E￿ [1 ￿ G(pt ￿ E￿ [pt] ￿ ￿)]
(1 ￿ F ("￿
t (pt)))d￿(pt)
Note the probability distribution the buyer integrates over is the distribution of homes that satisfy
pt￿￿h;t￿E [pt] ￿ ￿ but ￿(pt) applies to all posted prices. Multiplying by
1￿G(pt￿E￿[pt]￿￿)
E￿[1￿G(pt￿E￿[pt]￿￿)] con-
verts the density ! (pt) from the distribution of posted prices to the distribution of non-overpriced
posted prices. This probability can be simpli￿ed by noting that the E￿ [1 ￿ G(pt ￿ E￿ [pt] ￿ ￿)]
in the denominator of ~ ￿t cancels with the same term in the integral:
Pr[Buy] =
q
￿
~ ￿t
￿
￿t
Z
(1 ￿ G(pt ￿ E￿ [pt] ￿ ￿))(1 ￿ F ("￿
t (pt)))d￿(pt)
=
1
￿t
Z
d
￿
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￿
d￿(pt)
=
1
￿t
E￿
h
d
￿
pt;￿t;~ ￿t
￿i
.
With Cobb-Douglas matching, things simplify because,
q
￿
~ ￿t
￿
= ￿~ ￿
￿
t = ￿
￿
￿
t
E￿ [(1 ￿ G(pt ￿ E￿ [pt] ￿ ￿))]
￿.
The seller￿ s value function is:
V s
t = s + ￿EtV s
t+1 + max
pt
￿
d(pt;￿t;￿t)
￿
pt ￿ s ￿ ￿EtV s
t+1
￿￿
,
where pt is own price. For a staggered model, in period ￿ = 0 when the seller is choosing price, the
value function is:
V
s;0
t = s + ￿EtV
s;1
t+1 + max
p0
t
n
d
￿
p0
t;￿t;￿t
￿￿
p0
t ￿ s ￿ ￿EtV
s;1
t+1
￿o
,
188and in period ￿ 6= 0 when price is ￿xed, the value function is:
V
s;￿
t = s + ￿EtV
s;￿+1
t+1 + d(p￿
t;￿t;￿t)
￿
p￿
t ￿ s ￿ ￿EtV
s;￿+1
t+1
￿
.
p￿
t = p￿￿1
t￿1 and V
s;N
t = V
s;0
t , so that V
s;￿+1
t+1 corresponds to V
s;0
t+1 when ￿ = N ￿ 1.
The buyer￿ s value function integrates out over each type of seller, multiplying the probability of
purchase from that type of seller by the surplus obtained from purchasing from that type of seller:
V b
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The purchase decisions from each type of seller are optimal, so
"
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Plugging this into V b
t gives:
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Given the setup presented in the main text and summarized in Figure 6, the laws of motion for
an arbitrary list price distribution ￿t are:
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1 ￿
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E￿t￿1
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189For staggered pricing there are laws of motion for each S￿:
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The value functions for homeowners and renters are,
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where xt is the stochastic AR(1) shock to the ￿ ow utility of renting. In the staggered model V s
t+1
is replaced by V
s;0
t+1. The value functions are standard with the exception of terms for the expected
cost paid by a homeowner and renter if they decide not to enter the housing market, E [cjc < c￿
t]
and E [kjk < k￿
t], respectively.
A.4.2 Proofs
Lemma 3: Optimal Flexible Price Setting The seller￿ s value function is:
V s
t = s + ￿V s
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p
n
d
￿
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.
The seller￿ s optimal price is de￿ned by the ￿rst order condition:
pt = s + ￿V s
t+1 ￿
d
￿
pt;￿t;~ ￿t
￿
@d(pt;￿t;~ ￿t)
@pt
,
where d
￿
pt;￿t;~ ￿t
￿
is de￿ned in equation (12) and "￿
t = b + ￿V b
t+1 + pt ￿ V h
t . The impact of an
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190which gives:
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For uniqueness, the second order condition is:
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This condition holds locally, as
@2d(pt;￿t;~ ￿t)
@p2
t
< 0 around the equilibrium price. However, d
￿
pt;￿t;~ ￿t
￿
is not globally concave as illustrated by Figure 7. Because it is convex as pt ￿ E￿ [pt] ! 1, the
Lemma speci￿es that the optimal price is unique on an interval bounded away from pt = 1.
Intuitively, there may be an equilibrium with close to no trade due to the non-concavity, but this
equilibrium is assumed away. Numerical simulations show that the local optimum is the global
optimum for all parameter values considered.
Lemma 4: Optimal Staggered Price Setting The price-setting seller￿ s value function is:
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Rearranging gives:
p =
PN￿1
￿=0 ￿￿D￿
t (p)Et
"
1 +
￿
@d(p;￿t+￿;~ ￿t+￿)
@p
d(p;￿t+￿;~ ￿t+￿)
￿
s + ￿V
s;￿+1
t+￿+1
￿#
PN￿1
￿=0 ￿￿D￿
t (p)Et
"
￿
@d(p;￿t+￿;~ ￿t+￿)
@p
d(p;￿t+￿;~ ￿t+￿)
# ,
which, de￿ning ￿￿
t = Et
"
￿
@d(pt;￿t+￿;~ ￿t+￿)
@pt
d(pt;￿t+￿;~ ￿t+￿)
#
and ’￿
t = s + EtV
s;￿+1
t+￿+1 + 1
￿￿
t , simpli￿es to,
p =
PN￿1
￿=0 ￿￿D￿
t (p)￿￿
t’￿
t PN￿1
￿=0 ￿￿D￿
t (p)￿￿
t
.
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193Combining gives
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This condition must hold for uniquness. As with the ￿ exible case, d
￿
pt;￿t;~ ￿t
￿
is concave locally
but not globally, as illustrated by Figure 7. Because it is convex as pt ￿ E￿ [pt] ! 1, the Lemma
speci￿es the optimal price is unique on an interval bounded away from pt = 1. Locally, the
left hand side of the ￿nal condition is negative, while the right hand side is indeterminate. In
all simulations considered, this condition holds, and numerical simulations show that the local
optimum is the global optimum for all parameter values considered.
A.4.3 Frictionless Model
In the frictionless case (N = 1 for the staggered model, ￿ = 1 for the backward-looking model),
the de￿nition of an equilibrium simpli￿es to:
De￿nition 7 Equilibrium with ￿exible pricing is de￿ned by a price pt, purchase cuto⁄s "￿
t, and
seller, buyer, homeowner, and renter value functions V s
t , V b
t , V h
t , and V r
t , entry cuto⁄s c￿
t and k￿
t,
and stocks of each type of agent Bt, St, Ht, and Rt satisfying:
1. Optimal pricing (15). All sellers set the same price so pt = E￿ [pt]
2. Optimal purchasing decisions by buyers: "￿
t = pt + b + ￿V b
t+1 ￿ V h
t
3. Demand curve (12) simpli￿es to q (￿t)(1 ￿ F ("￿
t))
4. Optimal entry decisions by homeowners and renters who receive shocks (9) and (10)
1945. The value functions for buyers (13), sellers (14), renters (56), and homeowners (55)
6. The laws of motion for all agents (48), (51), (52), and (50).
For the reader￿ s convenience, the simpli￿ed general equilibrium system without a shock is repro-
duced below. Note that d
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￿
= ￿￿￿ [1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
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A.4.4 Backward-Looking Model
The equilibrium of the staggered pricing model is de￿ned by De￿nition 6. For the reader￿ s conve-
nience, the general equilibrium system is reproduced below.
195Full Backward-Looking Model
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A.4.5 Staggered Pricing Model
The equilibrium of the staggered pricing model is de￿ned by De￿nition 5. For the reader￿ s convenience, the
general equilibrium system for two alternating groups of sellers used for most of the simulations without a
shock is reproduced below.
196Full Staggered Price Model
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￿
0;￿2
￿
￿
A.4.6 Steady State
All three variants of the model share a unique steady state that can be found by equating the value of the
endogenous variables across time periods. Steady state values are denoted without t subscripts. Using the
fact that a ￿xed housing stock of mass one and a ￿xed population in steady state of mass Pop imply:
H + S = 1
B + H + R = N.
The laws of motion and H + S = 1 give:
H =
q (￿)[1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
1￿￿ (1 ￿ F ("￿))
q (￿)[1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
1￿￿ (1 ￿ F ("￿)) + ￿
h (1 ￿ C (c￿))
S =
￿
h (1 ￿ C (c￿))
q (￿)[1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
1￿￿ (1 ￿ F ("￿)) + ￿
h (1 ￿ C (c￿))
.
The laws of motion along with B + H + R = Pop imply:
R =
LK (k￿)￿
h (1 ￿ C (c￿))
￿
r (1 ￿ K (k￿))
H
B =
￿
h (1 ￿ C (c￿))
q(￿)
￿ [1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
1￿￿ (1 ￿ F ("￿))
H
LK (k￿)
￿
r (1 ￿ K (k￿))
=
(Pop ￿ 1)
￿
h (1 ￿ C (c￿))
+
(Pop ￿ ￿)
q (￿)[1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
1￿￿ (1 ￿ F ("￿))
:
The steady state value functions are:
V h =
h + ￿￿
h (1 ￿ C (c￿))
￿
V s + LV 0 + (1 ￿ L)V b￿
￿ ￿￿
hC (c￿)E [cjc < c￿]
1 ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
h (1 ￿ C (c￿))
￿
V r =
u + ￿￿
r (1 ￿ K (k￿))V b ￿ ￿￿
rK (k￿)E [kjk < k￿]
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿
r (1 ￿ K (k￿)))
V b =
b +
q(￿)
￿ [1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
1￿￿ (1 ￿ F ("￿)) 1
￿
1 ￿ ￿
V s =
s + q (￿)[1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
1￿￿ (1 ￿ F ("￿)) 1
1
￿
1
1+exp(
￿
￿)
+￿
1 ￿ ￿
.
198Finally optimal pricing, optimal purchase decisions, and optimal entry decisions imply:
"￿ = b + ￿V b + p ￿ V h
p = s + ￿V s +
1
1
￿
1
1+exp(
￿
￿) + ￿
c￿ = V h ￿
￿
V s + (1 ￿ L)V b + LV 0￿
k￿ = V r ￿ V b.
One can plug these equations into those for "￿, c￿, and k￿ to get a three equation system with three
unknowns that has a unique solution.
For staggered price variant of the model with N staggered groups of list-price-setting sellers, there are
a few more variables that require steady state values. Although each group has a di⁄erent price, in steady
state p￿ = p, "￿ = ", and V s;￿ = V s 8 ￿, where variables ￿ are the frictionless steady-state values. The only
di⁄erence between the two models￿steady states, then, is the S￿. One can show that:
S￿ =
h
1 ￿ q (￿)[1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
1￿￿ (1 ￿ F ("￿))
i￿
PN￿1
j=0
h
1 ￿ q (￿)[1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
1￿￿ (1 ￿ F ("￿))
ij S,
where S is the steady state mass of sellers for the frictionless model. Since all vintages of sellers post the
same price in steady state, this does not a⁄ect the three equation system for the frictionless model, which
continues to de￿ne the steady state for the staggered-pricing model.
For the backward-looking variant of the model, the steady state of the model is identical to the frictionless
case if pi = p and "i = ", where i = fN;Rg.
A.4.7 Simulation Details
I present two main types of results: impulse response functions and stochastic simulations. For both, I
report price, sales volume, months of supply, and buyer and seller entry. This section describes how these
are computed.
Price is the average transaction price in the market. This is a weighted average of prices, where the
weights are equal to the share of transactions accounted for by sellers with each price:
pt =
R
pid
￿
pi
t;￿t;~ ￿t
￿
d￿t
R
d
￿
pi
t;￿t;~ ￿t
￿
d￿t
.
For a frictionless model, this is just the common price. For the backward-looking model, this is equal to
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￿d(p
N
t ;￿t;~ ￿t)p
N+(1￿￿)d(p
R
t ;￿t;~ ￿t)p
R
t
￿d(pN
t ;￿t;~ ￿t)+(1￿￿)d(pR
t ;￿t;~ ￿t) . For the staggered model, this is equal to
pt =
S0
t
S0
t +S1
t
d(p
0
t;￿t;~ ￿t)p
0
t+
S1
t
S0
t +S1
t
d(p
1
t;￿t;~ ￿t)p
0
t
S0
t
S0
t +S1
t
d(p0
t;￿t;~ ￿t)+
S1
t
S0
t +S1
t
d(p1
t;￿t;~ ￿t)
.
Sales volume is the total amount of sales. This is equal to:
volt = E￿t
h
d
￿
p￿
t;￿t;~ ￿t
￿i
St,
and months of supply is equal to the mass ratio of the mass of sellers to sales volume:
MSt =
volt
St
= E￿t
h
d
￿
p￿
t;￿t;~ ￿t
￿i
.
Buyer and seller entry come from the laws of motion (48) and (50) and are equal to:
BEntert = ￿
r (1 ￿ K (k￿
t))Rt + (1 ￿ LK (k￿
t))￿
h (1 ￿ C (c￿
t))Ht
SEntert = ￿
h (1 ￿ C (c￿
t))Ht.
Buyer entry has two terms re￿ ecting the entry decisions of renters who receive shocks and new entrants to
the metropolitan area.
For the impulse response functions, I use Dynare to compute the impulse response as the average di⁄er-
ence between two sets of 100 simulations that use the same sequence of random shocks except for one period
in which an additional standard deviation shock is added. For the entry simulation in Figure 1.6.2, I plot the
above values at monthly frequencies form a selected simulation. For Table 8, I run 200 simulations of 500
years, collapse the data to quarterly frequency, then calculate the annual change in log price, log volume,
and log inventory or estimate the price change on inventory levels regression for each of the 200 simulated
series. I report the average values in the table.
A.4.8 Understanding Momentum Arising From Staggered Prices
The full dynamic intuition with staggered pricing is more nuanced than the static intuition presented in
the main text because the seller has to weigh the costs and bene￿ts of perturbing price across multiple
periods. The intuition is clearest when one considers why a seller does not ￿nd it optimal to deviate from
a slowly-adjusting price path by listing his or her house at a level closer to the new long-run price after a
one-time permanent shock to fundamentals.
After a positive shock to prices, if prices are rising slowly why do sellers not list at a high price, sell at
that high price in the o⁄ chance that a buyer really likes their house, and otherwise wait until prices are
200higher? Search is costly, so sellers do not want to set a very high price and sit on the market for a very long
time. Over a shorter time horizon, the probability of sale and pro￿t are very sensitive to perturbing price
when a house￿ s price is relatively high but relatively insensitive to perturbing price when a house￿ s price is
relatively low. This is the case for two reasons. First, despite the fact that the probability of sale is lower
when a house￿ s price is relatively high, demand is much more elastic and so a seller weights that period￿ s low
optimal price more heavily. Second, on the equilibrium path, prices converge to steady state at a decreasing
rate, so the sellers lose more buyers today by setting a high price than they gain when they have a relatively
low price tomorrow. Consequently, in a rising market sellers care about not having too high of a price when
their price is high and do not deviate by raising prices when others are stuck at lower prices.
After a negative shock to prices, if prices are falling slowly and search is costly, why do sellers not deviate
and cut their price today to raise their probability of sale and avoid search costs if selling tomorrow means
selling at a lower price? Although the fact that the elasticity of demand is higher when relative price is
higher makes the seller care more about not having too high of a relative price when their price is higher,
there is a stronger countervailing e⁄ect. Because prices converge to steady state at a decreasing rate on the
equilibrium path, sellers setting their price today will undercut sellers with ￿xed prices more than the sellers
are undercut in the future. They thus gain relatively fewer buyers by having a low price when their price
is relatively high and leave a considerable amount of money on the table by having a low price when their
price is relatively low. On net, sellers care about not having too low of a price when they have the lower
price and do not deviate from a path with slowly falling prices.
These intuitions in Figure 38, which shows simulation results for the N = 2 case that depict the weights
placed the optimal ￿ exible price in each period, the optimal ￿ exible price in each period, and the reset price,
equal to the weighted average of the optimal ￿ exible prices. The solid blue line corresponds to the period in
which the price is reset, in which the seller is in the higher priced group, and the dashed red line corresponds
to the period after the price is reset, in which the seller is in the lower priced group. Panels A, B, and C are
for an upward shock, while panels D, E, and F are for a downward shock. In Panel A, the weight is much
larger on the reset period￿ and a lower optimal reset price￿ because the elasticity of demand is higher. The
opposite is true in panel D, as the weighting e⁄ect works against momentum, which is why momentum in
reset prices appears stronger on the upside in the staggered variant of the model. However, the weighting
e⁄ect is more made up for by the speed of convergence to steady state, which can most clearly be seen in
the asymmetry of the optimal reset price responses in panel E.
Another way of putting these intuitions is that the model features a trade-o⁄ between leaving money on
the table when a seller has the relatively low price and gaining more buyers when a seller has the relatively
high price. On the upside, since price resetters raise prices more than future price setters and since they care
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Figure 38: Understanding Momentum Arising From Staggered Pricing
Notes: Panels A, B and C show the impulse response to an upward shock and panels D, E, and F show the impulse response to
a downward shock in response to a one-time surprise shock at time zero in a deterministic model solved in Dynare by Newton￿ s
method. Panels C and F show the optimal reset prices. Because the optimal reset price is a weighted average of the optimal
￿exible prices that would prevail in the period the price is reset (period 0) and the period after (period 1), panels A and D
show the weights and panels B and E show the optimal ￿exible prices for each period. Panels C and F are thus equal to the
sum of the products of the blue lines and dotted red lines in the preceding two panels.
more about states with more elastic demand, the loss from losing buyers when a resetters have the relatively
high price is stronger. On the downside, since price resetters cut prices more than future price resetters, the
money left on the table by having a lower price when their prices are relatively low is stronger.
A.5 Calibration
A.5.1 Calibration Targets
The aggregate moments and parameters chosen from other papers are:
￿ A long-run homeownership rate of 65 percent. The homeownership hovered between 64 percent and
66 percent from the 1970s until the late 1990s before rising in the boom of the 2000s and falling
202afterwards.
￿ ￿ = 0:8 from the median speci￿cation of Genesove and Han (2012). Anenberg and Bayer (2013) ￿nd
a similar number.
￿ L = 0:7 from the approximate average internal mover share for Los Angeles of 0.3 from Anenberg
and Bayer (2013), which is also roughly consistent with Wheaton and Lee￿ s (2009) analysis of the
American Housing Survey and Table 3-10 of the American Housing survey, which shows that under
half of owners rented their previous housing unit.
￿ A median tenure for owner occupants of approximately nine years from American Housing Survey
1997 to 2005 (Table 3-9).
￿ The approximately equal time for buyers and sellers is from National Association of Realtors surveys
(Head et al., 2014; Genesove and Han, 2012). This implies that a normal market is de￿ned by a
buyer to seller ratio of ￿ = 1. I assume a time to sale in a normal market of four months for both
buyers and sellers. There is no de￿nitive number for the time to sale, and in the literature it is
calibrated between 2.5 and six months. The lower numbers are usually based on real estate agent
surveys (e.g., Genesove and Han, 2012), which have low response rates and are e⁄ectively marketing
tools for real estate agents. The higher numbers are calibrated to match aggregate moments (Piazzesi
and Schneider, 2006). I choose four months, which is slightly higher than the realtor surveys but
approximately average for the literature.
￿ Price is equal to $750,000. The average log price in the IV sample corresponds to a price of $632,000,
so the $750,000 number implies that on average from 2008 to 2013 prices were 16 percent below their
steady-state level. This is on the conservative side for coastal California where the bust was severe
and appears to have overshot the long-run equilibrium. The results are not sensitive to using a slightly
larger number.
￿ ￿
h and ￿
r are set so renters and homeowners experience a shock every 29 months. According to the
American Housing Survey 1997 to 2005 (Table 4-9), approximately 41 percent of renters moved within
the last year. That translates to a 29 month interval between moves, which I assume are the shocks
that induce renters to consider owning. For homeowners, there is not similar data on considered moves,
so I assume the same shock probability as renters. This means that homeowners stay in their homes
when they receive a shock with higher probability than renters.
￿ c￿, the amount that the marginal homeowner in steady state would pay to avoid moving and stay
in their current house, is set equal to the average transaction cost of selling a home from Haurin
and Gill (2002). Haurin and Gill use variation in the length of time that one will stay in a location
203among members of the military for whom assignments to a base are known in advance to estimate
moving costs of owner-occupancy in a user cost framework. Haurin and Gill￿ s preferred number is
three percent of the home￿ s value and four percent of household earnings. However, I do not have
household earnings so I use their alternate estimate of ￿ve percent of the home￿ s value. I apply this
to the steady state price, c￿ = 0:05 ￿ 750;000 = $37;500.
￿ k￿, the amount the marginal renter in steady state would pay to avoid moving and stay a renter,
is set equal to -$20,000 from the imputed tax savings of owner occupancy from Poterba and Sinai
(2008). They ￿nd that the average household with $125,000 to $250,000 in annual income (I choose
this group because their houses are closest in value to average home in my sample) had an annual 2003
tax savings of $7,689 from homeownership ($2,703 from the mortgage interest deduction, $1,125 from
property tax deduction, and $3,861 from exclusion of imputed rental income). The average renter in
my sample rents for 29 months until the next time they decide to buy or rent, so the total capitalized
value of tax savings is just over $18,500 in 2003 dollars, which I adjust to approximately $20,000 in
2008-2013.
￿ A seven percent annual discount rate corresponding to the mean estimated value for housing searchers
in Carrillo (2012). The results are not substantially changed by using values between four and 10
percent.
There are several parameters I set to reasonable values that do not have an important e⁄ect on the
dynamics:
￿ The probability a homeowner purchases a home they inspect in steady state is 0.5. This pins down ￿.
This parameter does not a⁄ect the results unimportant and is set so that the probability of a match
is on [0;1] in the stochastic simulations (with the exception of a few extremely rare circumstances).
￿ h is set so that the present discounted value of the ￿ ow utility of living in a home is approximately 2/3
of its value in steady state, which implies h = $7,500 per month for a $750,000 house. This parameter
is a normalization.
Three time series moments are used:
￿ The persistence of the shock ￿ = 0:99 is chosen to match the persistence of local income shocks from
Glaeser et al. (2013). They estimate an ARMA(1,1) process at the city level net of a city ￿xed
e⁄ect and linear drift term to back out the shocks that drive housing cycles. Using BEA income data
and Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data on the income of actual home buyers, they ￿nd an annual
persistence of 0.89, which implies a monthly persistence of 0.99. Their estimated moving average
coe¢ cient is small.
2041
2
.
5
1
3
1
3
.
5
1
4
1
4
.
5
L
o
g
 
R
e
a
l
 
P
r
i
c
e
3.6 3.8 4 4.2 4.4 4.6
Log Seller Entry
Price Elasticity of Seller Entry = 0.878, R-Squared .52
Figure 39: Seller Entry Elasticity
Notes: Seller entry is computed as Entrantst = Sellerst - Sellerst￿1 + Salest, with the stock sellers from the Census Vacancy
Survey and sales from the National Association of Realtors. Price is the CoreLogic national house price index adjusted for
in￿ation using the CPI and adjusted for seasonality. All data is quarterly from 1976-2013. The regression coe¢ cient of 0.878
is from a regression of log real price on log seller entry.
￿ A standard deviation of annual log price changes of 0.065 for the real CoreLogic national house price
index from 1976 to 2013. This is set to match the standard deviation of aggregate prices for homes
that transact collapsed to the quarterly level in stochastic simulations.
￿ A price elasticity of seller entry of 0.878 based on the CoreLogic, Census, and National Association of
Realtors data from 1976 to 2013. As shown in Figure 39, this relationship is very strong in the data.
As mentioned in footnote 42 in the main text, I use this moment as a target for both ￿ c￿c and ￿ k￿k
because the stock of buyers is not observed.
Finally, in the calibration to the micro estimates, I use a target of $10,000 for per-period seller ￿ ow cost
to determine the zero point, which is not precisely estimated in the data and depends on the deadline for a
sale used. Together with the target value for the price and the discount rate, the target value for the seller
￿ ow cost determines the seller￿ s markup in steady state, which in turn pins down the location of the average
price on the demand curve.
The $10,000 target is based on two pieces of evidence from Genesove and Mayer (1997) and Levitt and
Syverson (2008):
￿ Genesove and Mayer show that in their data for Boston condominiums, homes with low equity are
listed four percent higher (on a base of $200,000) and are on the market for 15 percent longer at a
205100 percent seller loan-to-value ratio relative to an 80 percent seller loan-to-value ratio. They do not
report average time on the market, so I assume my average steady-state time on the market of four
months. This implies a one month delay nets the seller $13,333.
￿ Levitt and Syverson show that realtors in Chicago sell their house for on average $7,600 more and
remain on the market for 9.5 days longer. This implies that a one month delay nets the seller $23,000,
although some of this may be due to harder work on the part of the realtor.124
I average these two data points and account for discounting to ￿nd that the average seller gives up approxi-
mately $18,000 to sell one month sooner. Given that the ￿ ow utility of being a homeowner is set to $7,500,
I set the ￿ ow utility of being a seller to an even -$10,000. This translates in my calibration into a seller
markup of $56,500, or roughly 7.5% of the steady-state sales price.
The assumed seller search cost may have an important e⁄ect on the degree of momentum in the model
because it controls the seller￿ s degree of impatience. To assess the robustness of the results to this parameter,
in Appendix A.6.4 I present results from a calibration that uses a much smaller assumed seller search cost
of $1,450. Although there is somewhat less momentum because sellers are more patient and willing to forgo
matching with a buyer today to obtain a higher price in the future, the model still generates signi￿cant
momentum.
The 0.4 ￿gure for the AR(1) coe¢ cient in the backward-looking model is described in the main text.
A.5.2 Estimation and Calibration Procedure
As described in the text, the estimation and calibration procedure proceeds in two steps. First, I calibrate
to the micro estimates. Then I match the aggregate and time series moments.
Calibration To Micro Estimates
The procedure to calibrate to the micro estimates is largely described in the main text. I start with the
IV binned scatter plot (pb;db), which can be thought of as an approximation of the demand curve by 25
indicator functions after the top and bottom 2.5 percent of the price distribution is dropped. In Figure 5,
the log relative markup pb is in log deviations from the average, and I convert it to a dollar amount using
the average log price in the IV sample. For each combination of ￿, ￿, and ￿, I use equation (25) to calculate
the sum of squared errors:
￿bwb
￿
db ￿ d3 month (pb)
￿2
.
124My estimates imply similar numbers￿ a one percent price increase on a base of $750,000 increases time on the
market by about six to eleven days. My model, however, implies that a one month delay should require a slightly
smaller price change than three times a 10 day delay.
206Because the data is in terms of probability of sale within 13 weeks, d3 month (pb) = d(pb)+(1 ￿ d(pb))d(pb)+
(1 ￿ d(pb))
2 d(pb) is the simulated probability a house sells within three months. For the weights wq, I use
a normal kernel centered at the average pb with standard deviation equal to the standard deviation of pb to
ensure I do not over-￿t the outliers and consequently over-￿t the curvature in the data. I also need to set ￿t,
the multiplicative constant. I do so by minimizing the same sum of squared errors for a given vector of the
parameters (￿;￿;￿). I then search over the parameter vector to ￿nd the (￿;￿;￿) that minimizes the sum of
squared errors, using 100 di⁄erent random starting values.
As mentioned in the main text, I also choose the price that corresponds to the average price in the
market E [p] to match a seller search cost of $10,000 per month. I do so because the zero point in the binned
scatter plot is not precisely estimated. The seller surplus pins down the steady-state markup because in
steady state:
p =
s
1 ￿ ￿
+ Markup
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
Pr[Sell] + 1
￿
,
so given the assumed steady-state values for p and Pr[sell] a given s pins down the markup. I then ￿nd the
relative price corresponding to E [p] so that the above calibration procedure matches the implied steady-state
markup of $56,500.
Matching the Aggregate Targets
To match the aggregate targets in Table 6, I invert the steady state so that 16 parameters can be solved
for in terms of 16 targets conditional on (￿;￿;￿). I solve this system, de￿ned below, conditional on the
14 steady-state targets and values for the ￿nal two target, ￿ c￿c and ￿ k￿k, which are set equal as described
above. I then select a value for the standard deviation of innovations to the AR(1) shock ￿￿, run 25 random
simulations on 500 years of data, and calculate the standard deviation of annual log price changes and the
entry elasticity in the simulated data. I adjust the target values for ￿ c￿c and ￿￿ and recalibrate the remainder
of the moments until I match the two time series moments. For the backward-looking model, I repeat this
procedure altering ￿ until the impulse response to the renter ￿ ow utility shock peaks after 36 months.
The calibration procedure is repeated separately for the staggered price and backward-looking variants
of the model. Although the results are similar, the ￿￿ needed to match the data is slightly larger in the
backward-looking model due to the additional momentum. While the calibrated values are not the same,
although the di⁄erences are minor.
The 16 Equation System
Many variables can be found from just a few target values, and I reduce the 16 unknowns to a four
equation and four unknown system. I assume there are Per periods per month for the calibration. The
207system is de￿ned by:
￿ ￿, L, ￿, ￿
r , ￿
h, and V 0 to their assumed values. Note that ￿, ￿
r, and ￿
r are adjusted accordingly
based on the number of periods in a month.
￿ ￿ = 1 from the equality of buyer and seller time on the market.
￿ The buyer purchases 1/2 of the time, which implies 1￿F ("￿) = 1
2. Then using the de￿nition of d and
￿ = 1,
￿ =
1
4Per(1 ￿ G(￿￿))
1￿￿ (1 ￿ F ("￿))
:
where [1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
1￿￿ can be found using the calibrated value of ￿ and (￿;￿).
￿ Given ￿, one can solve for "￿ from Pr[Sell] = ￿ exp(￿￿"￿)[1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
1￿￿.
￿ The homeownership rate in the model, H
H+B+R, is matched to the target moment. Plugging in steady-
state values gives:
Homeownership Rate =
￿
r (1 ￿ K (k￿))q (￿)[1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
1￿￿ (1 ￿ F ("￿))
￿
r (1 ￿ K (k￿))q (￿)[1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
1￿￿ (1 ￿ F ("￿))
+￿￿
h (1 ￿ C (c￿))￿
r (1 ￿ K (k￿))
+LK (k￿)￿
h (1 ￿ C (c￿))q (￿)[1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
1￿￿ (1 ￿ F ("￿))
.
The exogenous target value for the probability a homeowner moves in steady state ￿
h (1 ￿ C (c￿))
(which depends on Per), the known value for q (￿)[1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
1￿￿ (1 ￿ F ("￿)) from time to sale in
steady state (which depends on Per), and the target value for ￿
r can be used to solve for the value of
K￿ (k) that matches the target homeownership rate Rate:
K (k￿) =
1
1 + 1
￿r
L￿Rate￿h(1￿C(c￿))q(￿)[1￿G(￿￿)]1￿￿(1￿F("￿))
(1￿Rate)q(￿)[1￿G(￿￿)]1￿￿(1￿F("￿))￿Rate￿￿￿h(1￿C(c￿))
.
￿ The population Pop can then be solved for from Pop = H + B + R:
Pop =
q (￿)[1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
1￿￿ (1 ￿ F ("￿))
q (￿)[1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
1￿￿ (1 ￿ F ("￿)) + ￿
h (1 ￿ C (c￿))
￿
 
1 +
LK (k￿)￿
h (1 ￿ C (c￿))
￿
r (1 ￿ K (k￿))
+
￿
h (1 ￿ C (c￿))
q(￿)
￿ [1 ￿ G(￿￿)]
1￿￿ (1 ￿ F ("￿))
!
.
Again many of the steady-state probabilities depend on Per.
208￿ (1 ￿ C (c￿)) can be solved for from the assumed value for ￿
h and the probability a homeowner moves
in steady state ￿
h (1 ￿ C (c￿)).
￿ Given targets for K (k￿) and C (c￿) and target values for c￿ and k￿ as well as ￿ c￿c and ￿ k￿k, the
properties of the uniform distribution can be used to back out ￿ c, c, ￿ k, and k
c = c￿ ￿ C (c￿)(￿ c ￿ c)
k = k￿ ￿ K (k￿)
￿￿ k ￿ k
￿
.
This leaves h, u, b, and s, which are solved for jointly to match the target price and satisfy three equilibrium
conditions for steady state:
"￿ = b + ￿V b + p ￿ V h
p = s + ￿V s +
1
1
￿
1
1+exp(
￿
￿) + ￿
c￿ = V h ￿
￿
V s + (1 ￿ L)V b + LV 0￿
k￿ = V r ￿ V b.
A.5.3 Additional Calibrated Values
The calibrated values for the backward-looking model are in Table 7 in the main text. The values for the
staggered model are listed in Table 36.
Table 36: Calibrated Parameter Values for Staggered Price Model
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
￿ 0.994 ￿ k $407k b -$92.4k
￿ 0.800 k -$1,160k s -$9.8k
￿ 0.506 Pop 1.484 ￿ .0023
￿h 0.035 L 0.700 ￿ 3.80
￿r 0.035 V 0 $2,606k ￿ 10.47
￿ c $458k h $7.5k ￿￿ 0.311
c -$1,109k u $3.6k ￿ 0.990
209A.6 Additional Simulation Results
A.6.1 Non-Concave Benchmarks
In the main text, I report that without concavity, it would take between 78 and 93 percent backward-looking
sellers to generate a three year impulse response to the renter ￿ ow utility shock. To generate these numbers,
I set ￿ = 300 (in thousands of dollars) so that the concavity kicks in so far from any equilibrium that the
demand curve is linear.
I consider two polar cases. In Figure 10 in the main text, I assume that ￿￿ which is now the constant
semi-elasticity of demand since there is no concavity￿ is equal to its value at the average steady-state price
with concavity, 1
56:5. Under this calibration, 78 percent backward-looking sellers are needed for a 36-month
impulse response to the renter ￿ ow utility shock. This calibration assumes that the variance of idiosyncratic
preference is much smaller than I estimate it to be in my model based on the semi-elasticity of demand for
relatively low-priced homes. I use this calibration for the non-concave 26.5 percent backward-looking lines
in Figures 10 and 40.
The opposite case I consider is to assume that ￿ is the same as I estimate in the data. This calibration
implies seller markups are much higher but the distribution of buyer idiosyncratic preference is unchanged.
Under this calibration, 93 percent backward-looking sellers are needed for a 36-month impulse response to
the renter ￿ ow utility shock.
Both of these numbers are under 100 percent because with all backward-looking sellers, the impulse
response increases without bound. As the fraction of backward-looking sellers is reduced from 100 percent,
mean reversion is introduced into the IRF. Consequently, any amount of momentum can be obtained by
reducing the fraction of backward-looking sellers from 100 percent.
A.6.2 Downward Shock
Figure 40 shows the impulse response to a downward shock directly analogous to Figure 10. For the 26.5-
percent backward-looking model in panel B of Figure 10, and the variants of the staggered model without
momentum in panel A, the results look very similar to the upward shock. There is, however, a larger price
drop on impact and less momentum for the staggered and concave model. This asymmetry between and
upward shock and a downward shock occurs because in the staggered pricing model, groups of sellers leapfrog
one another each period, as discussed in Appendix A.4.8. The optimal price is a weighted average of the
optimal prices in each period, with the weights corresponding to the discounted probability of sale times the
semi-elasticity of demand. The semi-elasticity of demand￿ and hence the weight on price￿ is higher in the
period with a lower price, which helps momentum for an upward shock but works against momentum and
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Figure 40: Price Impulse Response Functions: Downward Shock
Notes: Panel A shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to the ￿ow utility of renting in the frictionless
model with concave demand, the staggered model with concave demand, and the staggered model without concave demand. For
the model without concave demand, the threshold for being overpriced ￿ is raised to a level that is never reached, the slope of
the demand curve is adjusted to the steady-state slope at the average price in the concave model, the model is recalibrated, and
the standard deviation of the stochastic shock is adjusted so that the impulse response is even with the frictionless and concave
impulse response after a year. Panel B shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to the ￿ow utility of
renting in the backward-looking model with and without concavity. Simulated impulse responses are calculated by di⁄erencing
two simulations of the model from periods 100 to 150, both of which use identical random shocks except in period 101 in which
a one standard deviation negative draw is added to the random sequence and then computing the average di⁄erence over 100
simulations.
causes the larger drop on impact in for a downward shock.
A.6.3 Impulse Responses For All Variables
In the main text, I only show impulse-responses for non-price variables for an upward shock in the 26.5
percent backward-looking model in Figure 11. Figures 42, 43, and 44 show the same impulse responses for
a downward shock in the 26.5 percent backward-looking model and for an upward and downward shock in
the staggered models.
The downward shock for the backward-looking model looks close to the mirror image of the upward shock.
The staggered model, however, looks somewhat di⁄erent. While there is still a gradual price response and
a shorter-lived but analogous buyer and seller entry response, volume and inventory both spike on impact.
This is because prices change more rapidly, so buyers in the market when the shock occurs have a strong
incentive to transact today for an upward shock or to wait to buy for a downward shock. While months of
supply still overshoots, this e⁄ect is less substantial and the spike is more prominent.
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Figure 41: Impulse Responses For Calibration With Low Seller Search Cost
Notes: This Figure is the analogue of Figure 10 in the main text using a lower seller search cost for the calibration. Panel A
shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation negative shock to the ￿ow utility of renting in the frictionless model
with concave demand, the staggered model with concave demand, and the staggered model without concave demand. For the
model without concave demand, the threshold for being overpriced ￿ is raised to a level that is never reached, the slope of the
demand curve is adjusted to the steady-state slope at the average price in the concave model, the model is recalibrated, and
the standard deviation of the stochastic shock is adjusted so that the impulse response is even with the frictionless and concave
impulse response after a year. Panel B shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to the ￿ow utility of
renting in the backward-looking model with and without concavity. For the model without concave demand, the threshold for
being overpriced ￿ is raised to a level that is never reached, the slope of the demand curve is adjusted to the steady-state
slope at the average price in the concave model, and the model is recalibrated. Also shown in panel B in the dotted black line
and with grey 95% con￿dence intervals and on the right axis is the impulse response to a one standard deviation price shock
estimated from a quarterly AR(5) for the seasonally and CPI adjusted CoreLogic national house price index for 1976-2013, as
in Figure 1. Simulated impulse responses are calculated by di⁄erencing two simulations of the model from periods 100 to 150,
both of which use identical random shocks except in period 101 in which a one standard deviation negative draw is added to
the random sequence, and then computing the average di⁄erence over 100 simulations.
A.6.4 Calibration Robustness: Lower Seller Search Cost
The calibration procedure assumes a seller search cost of $10,000 per month based on ￿gures from two papers.
This assumed parameter is important for the degree of ampli￿cation of momentum in the model because it
controls the degree to which sellers are willing to forgo a higher price in the future in order to attract buyers
today. To assess the robustness of the results to this important assumed parameter, this section presents a
calibration with a far smaller seller search cost of $1,450.
To do so, I use the calibration procedure detailed in Appendix A.5 but change the assumed seller search
cost to $1,450. This results in similar parameter values for most variables except ￿, which is smaller as the
calibration procedure shifts the average price further into the elastic region of the demand curve.
212The results are shown in Figure 41. Two months of staggered pricing leads to an impulse response with
seven to eight months of momentum instead of 10 months in the baseline calibration. The variant of the
model with backward-looking sellers generates a three-year impulse response with 37.5 percent of backward-
looking sellers, rather than 26.5 percent in the baseline calibration. Thus while using a smaller assumed
seller search cost does reduce the degree of momentum generated by the model, the calibrated model still
generates substantial ampli￿cation of the underlying shock with a much smaller seller search cost.
A.6.5 Deterministic Impulse Responses For Staggered Model
To show that my results are not due to error in the log-cubic approximation pruning higher order terms used
in the stochastic simulations, Figure 45 shows the impulse response to an upward and downward unexpected
one-time deterministic shock solved exactly by Newton￿ s method for the staggered model. These impulse
responses look similar to their stochastic counterparts.
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Figure 42: Impulse Responses to Downward Shock in the Rule-of-Thumb Model
Notes: Each panel plots the indicated impulse response to a one standard deviation downward shock for the frictionless and
backward-looking variants of the model. The frictionless model uses the same calibration and shock as the 26.5 percent
backward-looking model with no backward-looking sellers. Simulated impulse responses are calculated by di⁄erencing two
simulations of the model from periods 100 to 150, both of which use identical random shocks except in period 101 in which
a one standard deviation negative draw is added to the random sequence and then computing the average di⁄erence over 100
simulations.
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Figure 43: Impulse Responses to Downward Shock in the Rule-of-Thumb Model
Notes: Each panel plots the indicated impulse response to a one standard deviation upward shock for the frictionless and
staggered variants of the model. The frictionless model uses the same calibration and shock but all sellers set their price
simultaneously. Simulated impulse responses are calculated by di⁄erencing two simulations of the model from periods 100 to
150, both of which use identical random shocks except in period 101 in which a one standard deviation negative draw is added
to the random sequence and then computing the average di⁄erence over 100 simulations.
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Figure 44: Impulse Responses to Downward Shock in the Rule-of-Thumb Model
Notes: Each panel plots the indicated impulse response to a one standard deviation downward shock for the frictionless and
staggered variants of the model. The frictionless model uses the same calibration and shock but all sellers set their price
simultaneously. Simulated impulse responses are calculated by di⁄erencing two simulations of the model from periods 100 to
150, both of which use identical random shocks except in period 101 in which a one standard deviation negative draw is added
to the random sequence and then computing the average di⁄erence over 100 simulations.
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Figure 45: Response to One-Time Deterministic Shock (Non-Approximated)
Notes: Each panel plots the value of the indicated variable divided by its initial steady-state value in response to a -.3
deterministic permanent shock to u (roughly consistent with one standard deviation stochastic shock) in the upward panel and
a .3 deterministic shock in the downward panel. The frictionless model uses the same calibration and shock but all sellers set
their price simultaneously. Both are solved exactly by Newton￿ s method assuming that the model returns to steady state in
500 years and use the same calibration as the stochastic staggered model, and the frictionless model includes no staggering.
215B Chapter 2 Appendix
B.1 Derivations and Proofs
B.1.1 Steady Sate
Denoting steady state values with a star superscript, the no default assumption means that l￿
1 = 0, v￿
d = 0,
v￿
r = 0. v￿
n = v￿
b and l￿
0 = 1 ￿ v￿
n. This implies ￿￿ = 1, qs (￿￿) = qb (￿￿) = ￿, r￿
n = 1, and r￿
d = 0. Because
in￿ ows into being a seller and out￿ ows from being a seller are equal in steady state,
(1 ￿ v￿
n)￿ = v￿
n￿(1 ￿ F (h￿
n))
v￿
n =
￿
￿ + ￿(1 ￿ F (h￿
n))
l0 =
￿(1 ￿ F (h￿
n))
￿ + ￿(1 ￿ F (h￿
n))
:
Replacing the conditional expectations of surpluses with di⁄erences of cuto⁄s as in (38) and setting r￿
n = 1,
r￿
d = 0, and q￿
s = q￿
b = ￿ yields simpli￿ed steady state value functions:
V ￿
h =
h + ￿ f￿ (V ￿
n + B￿)g
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
B￿ =
ub
1 ￿ ￿
+
(1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ F (h￿
n))E [h ￿ h￿
njh ￿ h￿
n]
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
V ￿
m =
m
1 ￿ ￿
+
￿￿(1 ￿ F (h￿
m))E [h ￿ h￿
mjh ￿ h￿
m]
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
;m 2 fn;dg
R￿ =
ur + ￿￿B￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
:
With everything in terms of the cuto⁄s, a two-equation system that pins down h￿
n and h￿
d. Subtracting the
cuto⁄ condition (34) at the distressed and non-distressed cuto⁄s gives:
V ￿
hn ￿ V ￿
hd = (mn ￿ md) + ￿ [V ￿
n ￿ V ￿
d ]:
Plugging in the steady state values and manipulating yields an equation that implicitly de￿nes the di⁄erence
of the cuto⁄s:
h￿
n ￿ h￿
d = (mn ￿ md)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)
(57)
+￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿f(1 ￿ F (h￿
n))E [h ￿ h￿
njh ￿ h￿
n] ￿ (1 ￿ F (h￿
d))E [h ￿ h￿
djh ￿ h￿
d]g:
The second equation comes from evaluating the cuto⁄ condition (34) at h￿
n:
Vh￿
n = mn + ub + ￿ [B￿ + V ￿
n]: (58)
216Equations (57) and (58) de￿ne a system that can be solved for h￿
d and h￿
n. All of the other steady-state
variables are written in terms of these cuto⁄s.
Proposition 8 If a < mn + ub +
￿(1￿￿)￿E[h￿a]
1￿￿(1￿￿) , there exists a unique steady state of the model.
Proof. Because there are no REO sellers in steady state,
V ￿
n + B￿ =
mn + ub
1 ￿ ￿
+
￿(1 ￿ F (h￿
m))E [h ￿ h￿
mjh ￿ h￿
m]
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
The cuto⁄ condition for h￿
n is:
h￿
n + ￿ [V ￿
n + B￿]
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
= mn + ub + ￿ [V ￿
n + B￿]
h￿
n
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
= mn + ub + ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
[V ￿
n + B￿]
h￿
n = (1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))(mn + ub) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)[V ￿
n + B￿]
Plugging in for V ￿
n + B￿ and re-arranging yields:
h￿
n = (1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))(mn + ub) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
mn + b
1 ￿ ￿
+
￿(1 ￿ F (h￿
n))E [h ￿ h￿
njh ￿ h￿
n]
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
￿
h￿
n = mn + ub +
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ F (h￿
n))E [h ￿ h￿
njh ￿ h￿
n]
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
(59)
We want to ￿nd a unique solution to this equation on h￿
n 2 [a;1). As h￿
n ! 1, the RHS of equation (59)
approaches mn ￿ ub. As h￿
n ! a, the RHS of equation (59) approaches mn + ub +
￿(1￿￿)￿E[h￿a]
1￿￿(1￿￿) . Thus as
long as a < mn + ub +
￿(1￿￿)￿E[h￿a]
1￿￿(1￿￿) , since both the RHS and LHS of equation (59) are continuous in h￿
n,
by the intermediate value theorem we know there exists a solution on [a;1) to equation (59). Furthermore,
we know that the LHS is strictly increasing in h￿
n, while the RHS is strictly decreasing in h￿
n since:
d
dx
(1 ￿ F (x))E [h ￿ xjh ￿ x] = ￿(1 ￿ F (x)) < 0:
This implies that the solution to equation (59) is unique.
Finally note that
h￿
d ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿(1 ￿ F (h￿
d))E [h ￿ h￿
djh ￿ h￿
d]
is a monotonically increasing function of h￿
d and thus, given the solution h￿
n to equation (59), there exists a
unique solution to equation (57).
Note that given our assumptions it is generally the case that a < mn +ub +
￿(1￿￿)￿E[h￿a]
1￿￿(1￿￿) and thus that
there is a unique equilibrium. This is because ￿ is close to 1 and ￿ is close to 0, so the denominator of the
217fraction is very small. Uniqueness would only be a concern with a very low discount factor or high moving
probability.
Due to higher holding costs and balance sheet concerns, an REO seller should be more willing to sell the
property conditional on being matched with a buyer than a normal seller. We show this is always the case
in steady state:
Lemma 9 For a given h, the probability of sale for a distressed seller is higher than the probability of
sale for a non-distressed seller.
Proof. Note again that:
d
dx
(1 ￿ F (x))E [h ￿ xjh ￿ x] = ￿(1 ￿ F (x)) < 0:
Suppose that h￿
n ￿ h￿
d. Then:
(h￿
n ￿ h￿
d) ￿￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿f(1 ￿ F (h￿
n))E [h ￿ h￿
njh ￿ h￿
n] ￿ (1 ￿ F (h￿
d))E [h ￿ h￿
djh ￿ h￿
d]g
< 0
< (mn ￿ md)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)
:
which contradicts equation (57). It must therefore be that h￿
n > h￿
d, which indicates that distressed sellers
are more likely to sell than non-distressed sellers.
We use the Nash bargaining condition to back out steady state prices. We have for m 2 fn;dg and a
given h:
￿
1 ￿ ￿
=
SS
m
SB
m
=
p￿
m (h) ￿ m ￿ ￿V ￿
m
V ￿
h ￿ p￿
m (h) ￿ ￿B￿
And so
￿[V ￿
h ￿ p￿
m (h) ￿ ￿B￿] = (1 ￿ ￿)[p￿
m (h) ￿ m ￿ ￿V ￿
m]
p￿
m (h) = ￿V ￿
h ￿ ￿￿B￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)m + (1 ￿ ￿)￿V ￿
m
= ￿V ￿
h + m + ￿V ￿
m ￿ ￿[m + ￿V ￿
m + ￿B￿]
= ￿
￿
V ￿
h ￿ Vh￿
m
￿
+ m + ￿V ￿
m
=
￿(h ￿ h￿
m)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
+ m +
￿m
1 ￿ ￿
+
￿￿￿(1 ￿ F (h￿
m))E [h ￿ h￿
mjh ￿ h￿
m]
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
=
￿(h ￿ h￿
m)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
+
m
1 ￿ ￿
+
￿￿￿(1 ￿ F (h￿
m))E [h ￿ h￿
mjh ￿ h￿
m]
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
(60)
218It is also always the case that distressed properties sell for less than non-distressed properties:
Proposition 10 Distressed sales trade at a constant discount, in the sense that p￿
n(h)￿p￿
d(h) = ￿ for
all h ￿ h￿
n > h￿
d for some constant ￿ > 0:
Proof. Taking the di⁄erence of prices we get:
p￿
n (h) ￿ p￿
d (h) =
￿(h￿
d ￿ h￿
n)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
+
mn ￿ md
1 ￿ ￿
+
￿￿￿f(1 ￿ F (h￿
n))E [h ￿ h￿
njh ￿ h￿
n] ￿ (1 ￿ F (h￿
d))E [h ￿ h￿
djh ￿ h￿
d]g
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
Using equation (57) this simpli￿es to:
pn (h) ￿ pd (h) =
￿(h￿
d ￿ h￿
n)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
+
mn ￿ md
1 ￿ ￿
￿
mn ￿ md
1 ￿ ￿
+
h￿
n ￿ h￿
d
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
=
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
(h￿
n ￿ h￿
d) ￿ ￿ > 0
B.1.2 Dynamics
This appendix describes how we solve the dynamic model with exogenous defaults presented in section 2.3.
First, the laws of motion simply add in￿ ows and subtract out￿ ows according to ￿gure17:
l0 (t + 1) = (1 ￿ ￿)l0 (t) + vb (t)qb (￿(t))
X
m
rm (t)e￿￿(hm(t)￿a)
l1 (t + 1) = (1 ￿ ￿)l1 (t)
vn (t + 1) = ￿l0 (t) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)l1 (t) + vn
h
1 ￿ qs (￿(t))e￿￿(hn(t)￿a)
i
vd (t + 1) = ￿￿l1 (t) + vd
h
1 ￿ qs (￿(t))e￿￿(hd(t)￿a)
i
vb(t + 1) = ￿l0 (t) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)l1 (t) + vr(t)￿ + vb(t)
h
1 ￿ qb (￿(t))
X
rm (t)e￿￿(hm(t)￿a)
i
vr(t + 1) = ￿￿l1 (t) + (1 ￿ ￿)vr(t)
To generate the dynamic path of Vh, we expand the sum in equation (??) and collecting terms:
Vh (t) =
h
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
+ ￿
1 X
j=1
h
(￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
j￿1 f￿ [Vn (t + j) + B (t + j)]g
i
.
The sum in the second term can be written recursively as:
￿(t) = ￿ [Vn (t) + B (t)] + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(t + 1) (61)
219so that
Vh (t) =
h
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
+ ￿￿(t + 1).
The entire dynamic system can thus be written recursively. The cuto⁄ rule then simpli￿es to:
hm (t)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
+ ￿￿(t + 1) = ub + ￿B (t + 1) + m + ￿Vm (t + 1). (62)
The full general equilibrium model is made up of 13 endogenous variables and 13 equations. The
endogenous variables are the cuto⁄s hn and hd, the masses vn, vd, vb, vr, l0, and l1, and value functions
￿, Vmd, Vmr, B, and R. From these values, all of the other endogenous parameters of the model can be
determined. Substituting out the conditional expectation of the surplus using (38), using the exponential
distribution, and using the de￿nitions of qb and qs from the matching function gives the dynamic system:
Vn (t) = ￿Vn (t + 1) + mn + ￿￿(t)
￿
￿[1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
e￿￿(hn(t)￿a)
Vd (t) = ￿Vd (t + 1) + md + ￿￿(t)
￿
￿[1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
e￿￿(hd(t)￿a)
B (t) = ￿B (t + 1) + ub + ￿￿(t)
1 ￿ ￿
￿[1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
X
m
rm (t)e￿￿(hm(t)￿a)
R(t) = ur + ￿ f￿B(t + 1) + (1 ￿ ￿)R(t + 1)g
￿(t) = ￿ [Vn (t) + B (t)] + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(t + 1)
l0 (t + 1) = (1 ￿ ￿)l0 (t) + vb (t)￿￿(t)
X
m
rm (t)e￿￿(hm(t)￿a)
l1 (t + 1) = (1 ￿ ￿)l1 (t)
vn (t + 1) = ￿l0 (t) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)l1 (t) + vn
h
1 ￿ ￿￿(t)e￿￿(hn(t)￿a)
i
vd (t + 1) = ￿￿l1 (t) + vd
h
1 ￿ ￿￿(t)e￿￿(hd(t)￿a)
i
vb(t + 1) = ￿l0 (t) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)l1 (t) + vr(t)￿ + vb(t)
h
1 ￿ ￿￿(t)
X
rm (t)e￿￿(hm(t)￿a)
i
vr(t + 1) = ￿￿l1 (t) + (1 ￿ ￿)vr(t)
hn (t)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
+ ￿￿(t + 1) = ub + ￿B (t + 1) + mn + ￿Vn (t + 1)
hd (t)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
+ ￿￿(t + 1) = ub + ￿B (t + 1) + md + ￿Vd (t + 1)
where ￿(t) =
vb(t)
vn(t)+vd(t) and rm(t) =
vm(t)
vn(t)+vd(t). We solve this system using Newton￿ s Method as imple-
mented in DYNARE, which guesses that the model returns to steady state at time T, solves a system of 13T
equations, and checks that the model is in fact within " of the steady state at time T. Solving the model
with endogenous defaults of section 2.5 is performed similarly although the laws of motion are modi￿ed as
described in appendix B.1.4.
220We then back out prices as in the steady state. Prices are de￿ned by (39). The mean price for a type
m seller is then:
￿ pm = Eh [pm;h (t)jhm ￿ hm] =
￿
￿
1
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
+ m + ￿Vm (t + 1) (63)
and the overall mean price in a price index is:
￿ p = FV olN
￿
￿
￿
1
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
+ mn + ￿Vn (t + 1)
￿
(64)
+FV olD
￿
￿
￿
1
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
+ md + ￿Vd (t + 1)
￿
where FV olm is the fraction of total volume accounted for by type m sellers.
B.1.3 Calibration
As described in the main text, we use ￿ve aggregate moments from the housing market prior to the crash
to set a, ￿, mn, and md. These moments are the average price of a normal home in steady state ￿ p￿
n, the
variance of the residual price distribution ￿2
p￿
n, the discount for a distressed sale in terms of mean prices
￿ pn￿￿ pd
￿ pn , and the time on the market for a normal sale T￿
n and a distressed sale T￿
d
Using the expressions for the price and the probability of sale in the main text along with properties of
the exponential distribution, these moments are:
￿ p￿
n =
￿
￿[1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
+
mn
1 ￿ ￿
+
￿￿￿e￿￿(h
￿
n￿a)
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
￿2
p￿
n =
￿
2
￿
2 [1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
2
￿ pn ￿ ￿ pd
￿ pn
=
mn ￿ md
￿ pn (1 ￿ ￿)
+
￿￿￿
￿
e￿￿(h
￿
m￿a) ￿ e￿￿(h
￿
m￿a)￿
￿￿ pn (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
=
h￿
n ￿ h￿
d
￿ pn [1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
T￿
n =
1 ￿ ￿exp(￿￿(h￿
n ￿ a))
￿exp(￿￿(h￿
n ￿ a))
=
1
￿
exp(￿(h￿
n ￿ a)) ￿ 1
T￿
d =
1 ￿ ￿exp(￿￿(h￿
d ￿ a))
￿exp(￿￿(h￿
d ￿ a))
=
1
￿
exp(￿(h￿
d ￿ a)) ￿ 1
Plugging the second and fourth equations into the ￿rst gives:
￿ p￿
n = ￿p￿
n +
mn
1 ￿ ￿
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿p￿
n
T￿
n + 1
which implicitly de￿nes mn as a function of known parameters and observable moments.
We then de￿ne a six equation system with six variables ￿a, ￿, ￿, md, h￿
n, and h￿
d ￿that we use to
calibrate the remainder of the model. Taking the square root of the second equation and rearranging gives
221￿ as a function of ￿ and observable moments:
￿ =
￿
￿p￿
n [1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
:
An expression for a is obtained by inverting the fourth equation h￿
n = a+ 1
￿ ln(￿(T￿
n + 1)) and then plugging
into the cuto⁄ condition for n:
Vh￿
n = mn + ub + ￿
￿
B￿ + V ￿
md
￿
h￿
n = (1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))mn + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
mn +
￿e￿￿(h
￿
n￿a)
￿(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
￿
Plugging in for h￿
n and solving gives:
a = (1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))mn + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
mn +
1
(T￿
n + 1)￿(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
￿
￿
1
￿
ln(￿(T￿
n + 1))
The equations for ￿ and a, the moments for T￿
n, T￿
d, and the discount,
￿ pn ￿ ￿ pd
￿ pn
=
h￿
n ￿ h￿
d
￿ pn [1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
T￿
n =
1
￿
exp(￿(h￿
n ￿ a)) ￿ 1 T￿
d =
1
￿
exp(￿(h￿
d ￿ a)) ￿ 1;
along with (57),
h￿
n ￿ h￿
d = (mn ￿ md)
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)
+
￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
n
e￿￿(h
￿
n￿a) ￿ e￿￿(h
￿
d￿a)
o
;
form the six equation system, which we solve numerically.
Although all of the variables are jointly determined, we have found that ￿ and the gap between md and
mn are principally determined by the gap in time on the market and the REO discount while a and ￿ are
principally determined by the moments of the price distribution.
B.1.4 Extended Model
For the extended model, the housing market is unchanged and so the value functions are unchanged. Only
the laws of motion di⁄er, as described by Figure 20. As described in the text, we have two di⁄erent
exogenous shocks. First, we assume that a fraction ￿ (t) of individuals who sell due to taste shocks become
222renters instead of buyers and shock ￿ (t). This leads to the following laws of motion:
l0 (t + 1) = (1 ￿ ￿)l0 (t) + vb (t)qb (￿(t))
X
rm (t)(1 ￿ F (hm (t))) + w(t)
G(Vn (t)) ￿ G(Vn (t ￿ 1))
1 ￿ G(Vn (t ￿ 1))
l1 (t + 1) = (1 ￿ ￿)l1 (t)
w(t + 1) = (1 ￿ ￿I)w(t) + (￿ ￿ ￿I)l1 (t)(1 ￿ G(Vn (t))) ￿ w(t)
G(Vn (t)) ￿ G(Vn (t ￿ 1))
1 ￿ G(Vn (t ￿ 1))
f (t + 1) = ￿Il1 (t)(1 ￿ G(Vn (t))) + ￿Iw(t)
+f (t)
￿
1 ￿
1
￿f (t) + 1
￿
￿ f (t)
G(Vn (t)) ￿ G(Vn (t ￿ 1))
1 ￿ G(Vn (t ￿ 1))
vn (t + 1) = ￿l0 (t) + ￿l1 (t)G(Vn (t)) + (w(t) + f (t))
G(Vn (t)) ￿ G(Vn (t ￿ 1))
1 ￿ G(Vn (t ￿ 1))
+vn [1 ￿ qs (￿(t))(1 ￿ F (hn (t)))]
vd (t + 1) =
f (t)
￿f (t) + 1
+ vd [1 ￿ qs (￿(t))(1 ￿ F (hd (t)))]
vb(t + 1) = (1 ￿ ￿)[￿l0 (t) + ￿l1 (t)G(Vn (t))] +
+vr(t)￿ + vb(t)
h
1 ￿ qb (￿(t))
X
rm (t)(1 ￿ F (hm(t)))
i
vr(t + 1) = ￿
￿
￿Il0 (t) + ￿Il1G(Vn (t)) + w(t)
G(Vn (t)) ￿ G(Vn (t ￿ 1))
1 ￿ G(Vn (t ￿ 1))
￿
+f (t)
G(Vn (t)) ￿ G(Vn (t ￿ 1))
1 ￿ G(Vn (t ￿ 1))
+
f (t)
￿f (t) + 1
+ (1 ￿ ￿)vr(t)
Second, we assume that a falls permanently and that ￿I declines gradually after 10 years. This is the same
as setting ￿ = 0 above, shocking a, and using the following auto-regressive process for a:
￿I = ￿t￿ ￿I where ￿t = ￿￿t￿1 and ￿1 = 1
We assume ￿ = 1 for ￿ve years when it falls to ￿ = :95.
These laws of motion simply add in￿ ows and subtract out￿ ows. A fraction (1 ￿ G(Vn (t))) of individuals
who receive taste shocks default and the same fraction of individuals with taste shocks become locked in.
A fraction ￿ of individuals who would become buyers and sellers become a buyer and a renter instead. A
mass
f(t)
￿f(t)+1 experiences a foreclosure completion. The ￿nal added complexity is accounting for the mass of
individuals who were locked in in period t￿1 but are no longer locked in in period t or who were in foreclosure
in period t ￿ 1 but are no longer in foreclosure in period t due to rising prices. Because only individuals
with a loan balance above Vn (t ￿ 1) are locked in at time t￿1, this mass is a fraction
G(Vn(t))￿G(Vn(t￿1))
1￿G(Vn(t￿1)) of
the mass w(t) and f (t), respectively.
These laws of motion replace the laws of motion in appendix B.1.2 above. The rest of the equations are
the same, yielding a 15 equation and 15 unknown dynamic system.
223B.2 Details Omitted From Main Text
B.2.1 Details of Isolating Each E⁄ect
As described in the main text we perform three experiments to isolate the role of each driving force in our
model. We provide the details of these experiments here:
1. To shut down the market tightness e⁄ect, we assume that a homeowner who defaults is not forced
to become a renter for a certain random amount of time, but can instead immediately re-enter the
housing market as a buyer. The law of motion for the stock of buyers in the market then becomes
vb(t + 1) = ￿ (l0 (t) + l1 (t)) + vb(t)
h
1 ￿ qb (￿)
X
rm (t)e￿￿(hm(t)￿a)
i
;
while all other equations remain unchanged. Note that the stock of renters will always be zero in this
experiment and ￿(t) = 1 for all t.
2. To shut down the choosey buyer e⁄ect, we assume that the buyer believes every seller he meets will
be a retail seller. That is, even though there may well be distressed sellers in the market, the buyer
fails to take their presence into account when determining his optimal market behavior. Along these
lines, for this experiment we modify the Bellman equation of the buyer￿ s value function to read:
B (t) = ￿B (t + 1) + b + qb (￿(t))
1 ￿ ￿
￿[1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
e￿￿(hn(t)￿a):
Again, we leave all other equations unchanged.
3. Finally, we run an experiment in which we include only compositional e⁄ects. For this experiment,
we shut down both the market tightness and choosey buyer e⁄ects by modifying the law of motion for
the stock of buyers and the Bellman equation for the buyer￿ s value function in the manner described
above.
B.2.2 Cross-Markets Analysis With 10% REO Discount
Figure 46 shows the results of the same calibration procedure in 2.7 for a 10% REO discount instead of
a 20% REO discount. The lower REO discount weakens the compositional e⁄ect whereby a large REO
share reduces the aggregate price index by mechanically placing more weight on properties that sell at a
discount. The lower discount also weakens the choosey buyer e⁄ect, since the bene￿t of waiting for a
foreclosure is reduced somewhat (though it still grows substantially in the downturn). Consequently, to
match the non-linearity in price declines relative to the size of the preceding boom, the non-compositional
224Figure 46: Cross-MSA Simulations vs. Data: 10% REO Discount
Note: Scatter plots of data vs. simulation results for 97 MSAs in regression analysis for a 10 percent discount. The
red X represents the national simulation and each black dot is an MSA. The 45-degree line illustrates a perfect match
between the model and the data. The variable being plotted shown in each plot￿ s title. Data is fully described in
appendix B.4. The calibration methodology described in text and appendix B.4.
225Table 37: Judicial vs. Non-Judicial States
Dependent Variable ￿log(P) ￿log(PRetail)
Data 0.084 0.053
(0.035)** (0.025)**
Model With Backlogs 0.014 0.002
(0.005)*** (0.002)
Model No Backlogs 0.008 0.004
(0.004)* (0.002)*
N 45 45
Notes: * = 10% Signi￿cance, ** = 5% Signi￿cance *** = 1% signi￿cance. All standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity. Every reported coe¢ cient is for the judicial state dummy in a regression that includes a linear
and quadratic term for change in log price 2003-2006, z score for share with LTV over 80 percent and its interaction
with change in log price 2003-2006, and z score for share with second mortgage and its interaction with change in log
price 2003-2006. These regressions do not include the Saiz (2010) variables, which are not available at the state level.
The columns di⁄er by dependent variables. The rows di⁄er by data source: the ￿rst row shows the actual CoreLogic
data, the second row uses simulated dependent variable data from a model in which judicial states have a backlog,
and the third row uses simulated dependent variable data from a model in which judicial states have no backlog.
Every regression has 45 states as described in Appendix B.4. We use data from Mian et al. (2014), which they
obtained from RealtyTrac.com, to categorize states as judicial foreclosure or non-judicial foreclosure states. Using
this methodology, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Vermont
are judicial states.
e⁄ects of foreclosure ￿the market tightness e⁄ect ￿must be larger. This results in a longer average time
out of the market of 1.3 years relative to 1.05 years for a 20% steady state discount. Additionally, the
permanent price decline is 22.4%, which is slightly bigger than the 21.5% for a 20% discount. Foreclosures
thus exacerbate the downturn by 50%. The permanent price decline in the model remains high in order to
￿t the non-linearity shown in Figure 15.
Interestingly, because the compositional e⁄ect is reduced, the extent to which foreclosures exacerbate the
retail price decline is increased from 28.7% to 37.5%. Intuitively, with the compositional e⁄ect weakened
the retail price declines must be stronger. Unfortunately, this results in a worse average ￿t for retail price
declines, as shown in panel B of Figure 46. Thus while the model ￿t for overall price declines is roughly
comparable to the 20% steady state price decline case, we prefer the 20% case shown in the main text.
B.3 Judicial vs. Non-Judicial States
Table 37 shows the coe¢ cient on judicial state of running a regression similar to equation (27) with a judicial
state dummy as described in the table note.125 The ￿rst row shows the actual data, while the second row
125As with the main text, the results are largely unchanged if we used weighted least squares and weight by the
owner-occupied housing stock.
226shows the results of a model with a backlog of ￿ = 3;400 for judicial states and no backlog for non-judicial
states and the third row shows the results of a model with no backlog for judicial or non-judicial states.
Adding backlogs to the model is a step in the right direction, but the model is still an order of magnitude
short of the data.
As a result, we speculate that this implies that backlogs cannot be the whole story in judicial states
￿there must be some reduction in the incidence of foreclosures as banks respond to the long foreclosure
timelines. While it is possible that ￿ > 3;400 in judicial states ￿something we cannot simulate because of
numerical issues ￿the results of higher backlogs for a national calibration shown in Figure 23 suggests that
even with a much narrower foreclosure pipeline it is not possible to get that judicial states have a log price
decline that is .084 smaller from foreclosure backlogs alone.
B.4 Data Sources and Calculations
Data
The main data source is proprietary data from CoreLogic, which we supplement with data from the U.S.
Census, Saiz (2010), and Mian et al. (2014).
CoreLogic provides us with a monthly data set for the nation, 50 states, and the 100 largest MSAs126
126By CBSA code and name, they are: 10420 Akron, OH; 10580 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY; 10740 Albu-
querque, NM; 10900 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ; 12060 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA; 12420
Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX; 12540 Bakers￿eld-Delano, CA; 12580 Baltimore-Towson, MD; 12940 Baton
Rouge, LA; 13644 Bethesda-Rockville-Frederick, MD; 13820 Birmingham-Hoover, AL; 14484 Boston-Quincy, MA;
14860 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT; 15380 Bu⁄alo-Niagara Falls, NY; 15764 Cambridge-Newton-Framingham,
MA; 15804 Camden, NJ; 16700 Charleston-North Charleston-Summerville, SC; 16740 Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill,
NC-SC; 16974 Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL; 17140 Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN; 17460 Cleveland-Elyria-
Mentor, OH; 17820 Colorado Springs, CO; 17900 Columbia, SC; 18140 Columbus, OH; 19124 Dallas-Plano-Irving,
TX; 19380 Dayton, OH; 19740 Denver-Aurora-Broom￿eld, CO; 19804 Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI; 20764 Edison-
New Brunswick, NJ; 21340 El Paso, TX; 22744 Fort Lauderdale-Pompano; Beach-Deer￿eld Beach, FL; 23104 Fort
Worth-Arlington, TX; 23420 Fresno, CA; 23844 Gary, IN; 24340 Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI; 24660 Greensboro-High
Point, NC; 24860 Greenville-Mauldin-Easley, SC; 25540 Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT; 26180 Honolulu,
HI; 26420 Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX; 26900 Indianapolis-Carmel, IN; 27260 Jacksonville, FL; 28140 Kansas
City, MO-KS; 28940 Knoxville, TN; 29404 Lake County-Kenosha County, IL-WI; 29820 Las Vegas-Paradise, NV;
30780 Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR; 31084 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA; 31140 Louisville-
Je⁄erson County, KY-IN; 32580 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX; 32820 Memphis, TN-MS-AR; 33124 Miami-Miami
Beach-Kendall, FL; 33340 Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI; 33460 Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-
WI; 34980 Nashville-Davidson￿ Murfreesboro￿ Franklin, TN; 35004 Nassau-Su⁄olk, NY; 35084 Newark-Union, NJ-
PA; 35300 New Haven-Milford, CT; 35380 New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA; 35644 New York-White Plains-Wayne,
NY-NJ; 35840 North Port-Bradenton-Sarasota, FL; 36084 Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA; 36420 Oklahoma City,
OK; 36540 Omaha-Council Blu⁄s, NE-IA; 36740 Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL; 37100 Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-
Ventura, CA; 37764 Peabody, MA; 37964 Philadelphia, PA; 38060 Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale, AZ; 38300 Pittsburgh, PA;
38900 Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA; 39100 Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY; 39300 Providence-
New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA; 39580 Raleigh-Cary, NC; 40060 Richmond, VA; 40140 Riverside-San Bernardino-
Ontario, CA; 40380 Rochester, NY; 40900 Sacramento￿ Arden-Arcade￿ Roseville, CA; 41180 St. Louis, MO-IL; 41620
Salt Lake City, UT; 41700 San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX; 41740 San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA; 41884 San
Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City, CA; 41940 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA; 42044 Santa Ana-Anaheim-
Irvine, CA; 42644 Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA; 44140 Spring￿eld, MA; 44700 Stockton, CA; 45060 Syracuse, NY;
45104 Tacoma, WA; 45300 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL; 45780 Toledo, OH; 46060 Tucson, AZ; 46140
Tulsa, OK; 47260 Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC; 47644 Warren-Troy-Farmington Hills, MI; 47894
227that for 2000-2011 includes:
￿ The CoreLogic home price index and non-distressed home price index estimated from public records.
We refer to these as the aggregate and retail price indices. The CoreLogic non-distressed price index
di⁄ers slightly from the retail price index in the model because it excludes short sales, which we count
as non-REO sales.
￿ The number of pre-foreclosure ￿lings and completed foreclosure auctions estimated from public records.
￿ Sales counts for REOs, new houses, non-REO and non-short sale resales, and short sales estimated
from public records. Because short sales are not reported separately for much of the time frame
represented by the data, we combine short sales and resales into a non-REO existing home sales
measure which we call retail sales. We calculate existing home sales by adding REO and retail sales.
We also use this data to construct the REO share of existing home volume, which we seasonally adjust.
￿ Estimates of 7 quantiles of the combined loan-to-value distribution for active mortgages: under 50%,
50%-60%, 60%-70%, 70%-80%, 80%-90%, 90%-100%, 100%-110%, and over 110%. These statistics
are compiled by CoreLogic using public records and CoreLogic￿ s valuation models.
￿ First lien originations and ￿rst lien re￿nancings estimated using public records.
￿ Over-90-day-delinquent loans, loans in foreclosure, and active loans estimated using a mortgage-level
database. We use the raw counts to construct the share of active loans that are over 90 days delinquent
and in foreclosure.
￿ The mean number of days on the market for listed homes and closed sales estimated using Multiple
Listing Service data.
We seasonally adjust the raw CoreLogic house price indices, foreclosure counts, sales counts, and delin-
quent and in-foreclosure loan shares using the Census Bureau￿ s X-12 ARIMA software with an additive
seasonal factor. For the state and county-level sales counts, auctions counts, days on the market, and REO
share, we smooth the data using a 5 month moving average (2 months prior, the current month, and 2
months post) to remove any blips in the data caused by irregular reporting at the county level.
For the calibration of the loan balance distribution and initial number of mortgages with high LTV ratios,
we adjust the CoreLogic data using data from the American Community Survey as tabulated by the Census.
The CoreLogic data only covers all active loans, while our model corresponds to the entire owner-occupied
housing stock. Consequently, we use the ACS 3-year 2005-2007 estimates of the owner-occupied housing
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV; 48424 West Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Boynton Beach, FL; 48864
Wilmington, DE-MD-NJ; 49340 Worcester, MA.
228stock and fraction of houses with a mortgage at the national, state, and county level, which we aggregate
to the MSA level using MSA de￿nitions.127 From this data, we construct the fraction of owner-occupied
housing units with a mortgage and the fraction of owner-occupied housing units with a second lien or home
equity loan. We use these estimates to adjust the loan balance distribution so it represents the entire
owner-occupied housing stock and in our regressions to construct the fraction of owner-occupied houses with
over 80% LTV.
The LTV data is ￿rst available for March 2006, which roughly corresponds to the eve of the housing bust
as the seasonally-adjusted national house price index reached is peak in March 2006. To approximate the
size of the bubble, we average the seasonally-adjusted price index for March-May 2001, March-May 2003,
March-May 2006, and March-May 2011 to calculate the change in log prices for 2001 to 2006, 2003 to 2006,
and 2006 to 2011. We use these variables in our regressions and to estimate the relative size of the shock
for each geographical area.
We also estimate the maximum log change in seasonally-adjusted prices, smoothed and seasonally-
adjusted volume, and seasonally-adjusted time to sale as well as the maximum REO share for each geo-
graphical area. We estimate the minimum value between March 2006 and December 2011 and the maximum
value between January 2002 and December 2007. We implement these restrictions so that the addition of
counties to the CoreLogic data set prior to 2002 does not distort our results. We calculate the fraction of the
owner-occupied housing stock that was foreclosed upon by adding up completed foreclosure auctions between
March 2006 and December 2012 and dividing by the owner-occupied housing stock in 2006 as calculated
from the ACS adjusted for CoreLogic￿ s approximately 85% coverage, which is assumed to be constant across
locations. Again, our results are not sensitive to the choice of dates.
From the 100 MSAs and 50 states, we drop two MSAs and ￿ve states. The Birmingham, Alabama MSA
is dropped because a major county stopped reporting to CoreLogic in the middle of the downturn, and the
Syracuse New York MSA is dropped because loan balance distribution data is not available for this MSA
in 2006. Maine, Vermont, and South Dakota are dropped because loan balance distribution data is not
available for these states in 2006. For the cross-state analysis, we focus on the continental U.S. and omit
Alaska and Hawaii.
We ￿nally merge data from Saiz (2010) into the MSA data. The Saiz data includes his estimate of
unusable land due to terrain, the housing supply elasticity, and the Wharton Land-Use Regulation Survey
score for each MSA. We are able to match every MSA we have data on except for Sacramento and Honolulu.
Loan Balance Distribution Calibration
127The 3-year ACS estimates include estimates of the housing stock and houses with a mortgage for all counties
with over 20,000 residents. For a few MSAs, one or more small counties are not included in the ACS data. The
bias on our constructed estimates of the fraction of owner-occupied homes with a mortgage and with a second lien
or home equity loan due to these small missing counties is minimal.
229We use a minimum-distance methodology to calibrate the loan balance distribution for each geography.
From the 7 quantiles given to us by CoreLogic and the Census Data on the number of owner-occupied homes
without a mortgage, we construct a CDF of 6 points: the fraction of loans with under 50% LTV, under 60%
LTV, under 70% LTV, under 80% LTV, and under 100% LTV. We then construct a norm for the distance
between the Beta distribution and the empirical CDF. Because the upper tail of the distribution is most
critical for our ampli￿cation channel, we weight the under 50%, under 60%, and under 70% parts of the
distribution by .1 and the under 80%, under 90%, and under 100% by .2. We then choose ba and bb, the
parameters of the Beta distribution, to minimize this norm. The resulting ￿t is close enough that our results
are robust to alternate weightings of the norm.
Sources of Calculations in the Text
All ￿gures in the introduction are tabulated from the CoreLogic data as described above.
For the calibration of the housing market model, the median tenure for owner occupants of approximately
9 years comes from table 3-9 of the American Housing Survey reports for 1997-2005. The 20% REO discount
comes form Campbell et al.￿ s (2011) online appendix. They report an average discount over 1987-2009 of
26%. In table A6, they estimate this by year and show that in current housing cycle it was as low as 22.6%
in 2005 and as high as 35.4% in 2009. 20 percent is thus a reasonable discount.
To determine ￿I, the incidence of income shocks for houses in negative equity, we divide the seasonally
adjusted number of foreclosures by the maximum seasonally adjusted number of homes in negative equity
in the CoreLogic data. The mean annual incidence is ￿I = 8:6%.
To get that interest rates decrease the hazard of default for under-water borrowers from 8.6 percent to
7.1 percent, we use data from Bajari et al. (2010) combined with standard mortgage amortization schedules.
We begin by assuming that all mortgages are at 7 percent interest rates and will be re￿nanced to 4 percent.
The average mortgage is somewhat below 7 percent, but we choose 7 percent to re￿ ect that some ARMs reset
at quite high rates and because we want to simulate the largest possible impact of a re￿nancing. Assuming
houses are bought with 20 percent down in steady state, a 7 percent mortgage has a monthly payment of
$1,217.50 while a 4 percent mortgage has a monthly payment of $873.67 according to standard amortization
schedules and formulas. Bajari et al. report that the mean loan in their data set has a payment-to-income
ratio of .312. Assuming the $1,217.50 monthly payment matches this ratio, monthly income is $3,902.24.
A reduction of the monthly payment to $873.67 reduces the payment-to-income ratio by .088. Bajari et al.
estimate that a one standard deviation change in the payment-to-income ratio ￿equivalent to a .124 change
￿reduces the hazard of default by 17.5 percent. Assuming linearity a reduction of .088 will reduce the
hazard of default by 12.435 percent. Given the initial hazard of 8.6 percent, this implies a default hazard
with a reduced interest rate of 7.1 percent.
230For the principal reductions, we assume a $100 billion dollar principal reduction. 21.5 million households
potentially under water implies an approximately $5,000 principal reduction for each house. If all 50 million
households with a mortgage received the reduction, this would be only a $2,000 principal reduction for each
house.
231C Chapter 3 Appendix
C.1 Simulations of Quasi-Experiments (Figure 24)
This appendix describes the simulations of three quasi-experiments in the Rogerson and Wallenius (2009)
model and the robustness of the simulations to alternative assumptions about the intensive margin labor
supply elasticity. Appendix C.4 describes the analytic solution method in detail.
Calibration. The target values used to calibrate the model￿ s parameters f￿;e1;￿ h;￿g are described in
the main text. In choosing the fraction of life worked (f) for the calibration, we use the frequency at
which employment is measured in the data. For instance, in the EITC simulation we calculate labor force
participation in a given year as whether an individual worked at all in the past year to match the annual
employment observation CPS. Because of this, the fraction of life worked at any given instant (f) di⁄ers
slightly from the stated target value. To calibrate f￿;e1;￿ h;￿g, we set ￿ = 1
"IN T to match the target for
the intensive Frisch elasticity. We then calibrate the remaining parameters using the model￿ s equilibrium
conditions. Finally, we manually adjust e1 to match wR=wmax, following RW.
Experiment 1: Tax Holiday in Iceland. Bianchi et al.￿ s data is the ratio of the total number of weeks
worked to the potential supply of weeks that could have been worked by all working-age individuals in a
given calendar year. We de￿ne labor force participation by whether a generation works in a given week.
We then average across weeks for each calendar year to get an annual measure comparable to Bianchi et
al.￿ s data. With "INT = :5, f = 79:2%, hmax = :45, and wR=wmax = 1=2, the calibrated values are
￿ = 2; ￿ h = :384, ￿ = 10:106, and e1 = :593. These parameter values generate a Frisch aggregate hours
elasticity of 2.085 and a Frisch labor force participation elasticity of 1.773. These and all subsequent reported
Frisch elasticities are calculated by simulating a temporary, small tax change using the same methodology
as the Iceland and Canada SSP simulations; see Appendix C.4 for details. The parameter values generate a
compensated aggregate hours elasticity of .663, a compensated labor force participation elasticity of .577, and
a compensated intensive margin hours elasticity of .144. These and all subsequent reported compensated
elasticities are calculated by comparing the steady state change in response to a small tax change; see
Appendix C.4 for details. After the tax change, the maximum hours worked over the life cycle are .737 and
the minimum hours worked are .570.
Experiment 2: SSP Welfare Demonstration in Canada. We generate the e⁄ective tax rates for the
treatment and control groups of the SSP welfare demonstration in Canada using information on the hypo-
thetical income of the average individual in the treatment group from Lin et al. (1998). Lin et al. use a
wage regression to estimate that the predicted wage of the average individual in the treatment group is $6:24
per hour for individuals in British Columbia and $5:53 per hour for individuals in New Brunswick. Lin et
232al. then present in Table G.2 an itemized calculation of the average treatment group individual￿ s income
accounting for taxes and other transfers under the SSP subsidy and for an individual on the standard Income
Assistance (IA) welfare program. This is called hypothetical income because they use the hourly wage rate
and assume the individual works 30 hours per week for 52 weeks per year in both cases.
Using this calculation, in New Brunswick an individual receiving the SSP subsidy would make $20;184
per year net of taxes and transfers, while an individual working and receiving IA would make $14;847 per
year. If the individual did not work at all and took IA, they would not realize their earnings of $8;627
but would have an IA payment that is $6;117 higher. This re￿ ects the almost dollar-for-dollar reduction of
welfare payments of earnings above $2;400. The individual￿ s income would have been $12;337 if they had
not worked. The additional income from working 1;560 hours per year is thus $2;510 for an individual on
IA and $7;847 for an individual receiving the SSP subsidy. This implies an hourly wage rate of $1:61 on
IA and an e⁄ective tax rate of 70:9% under IA. Under SSP, however, the hourly wage rate is $5:03 and the
e⁄ective tax rate is 9:04%.
Similarly, for an individual in British Columbia, an individual receiving the SSP subsidy would make
$28;267 per year net of taxes and transfers, while an individual working and receiving IA would make $23;078
per year. If the individual did not work at all and took IA, they would not realize their earnings of $9;734
but would have an IA payment that is $7;557 higher. The individual￿ s income would have been $20;901
if they had not worked. The additional income from working 1;560 hours per year is thus $2;177 for an
individual on IA and $7;366 for an individual receiving the SSP subsidy. This implies an hourly wage rate
of $1:40 on IA and an e⁄ective tax rate of 77:6% under IA. Under SSP, however, the hourly wage rate is
$4:72 and the e⁄ective tax rate is 24:3%.
Averaging the British Columbia and New Brunswick results together (as roughly half the sample resides
in each area), an average single parent with one child in the control group faced e⁄ective average tax rates
of 74:3% when moving from no work to full-time work at the minimum wage. An average individual in the
treatment group faced e⁄ective average tax rates of 16:7% for the same change.
Card and Hyslop observe employment rates at a monthly frequency for 53 months starting from the month
of random assignment. To replicate this data as closely as possible, we de￿ne labor force participation by
whether a generation works in a given month. Generating wR=wmax = 1=2 would require e1 < 0. We
therefore set e1 = 0, generating wR=wmax = :615. With "INT = :5, f = 23:25%, and hmax = :45, the
calibrated values are ￿ = 2, ￿ h = :263, and ￿ = 38:378. These parameter values generate a Frisch aggregate
hours elasticity of 3.294 and a participation Frisch elasticity of 3.016. The compensated aggregate hours
elasticity is .765, the compensated participation elasticity is .705, and the compensated intensive margin
hours elasticity is .109. After the tax change, the maximum hours worked are .746 and the minimum hours
233worked are .394.
Finally, the vast majority of individuals in the SSP sample were between the ages of 16 and 46, corre-
sponding to the ￿rst half of life in our model. Consequently, in our simulation we only consider individuals
in the ￿rst half of their life, corresponding to ages 16 to 46 out of a 60-year working life from 16 to 76.
Experiment 3: Earned Income Tax Credit in the U.S. The e⁄ective tax rates for the 1994 EITC expansion
come from Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000), Table 2: the gain from working for a single mother, which includes
changes in wages, welfare, Medicaid, and taxes as a result of the labor supply decision, was $8;943 in 1992
and $10;245 in 1996. This is relative to wages of $18;165, generating e⁄ective tax rates of 50:8% in 1992 to
43:6% in 1996.
Meyer (2010) observes employment rates at an annual level using CPS data. To adjust for observables
and secular time trends, Meyer regresses employment rates on observables, year dummies, and year ￿ number
of children dummies and plots the coe¢ cients on the year ￿ number of children dummies in Figure 2. We
plot the di⁄erence between the no children dummies and a weighted average of the one child and two child
dummies, using the weights reported in Table 6 of Meyer (2010). We then add the di⁄erence between the
dummies and raw labor force participation rates for one- and two-child mothers to arrive at the series plotted
in Figure 24c.
To replicate the data as closely as possible, in the simulations we de￿ne labor force participation by
whether a generation works in a given month. Because of this, we use a target value of f = :758 rather
than f = :791 as in the data. With f = :758 at each instant, the fraction of individuals working in each
year before the quasi-experiment is approximately 79:1%. Because most single mothers are under 45, in our
simulation we only consider individuals in the ￿rst half of their life, corresponding to simulated ages of 16
to 46 out of a 60-year simulated working life from 16 to 76.
With "INT = :5, f = 68:7%, hmax = :45, and wR=wmax = 1=2, the calibrated values are ￿ = 2; ￿ h = :247,
￿ = 22:871, and e1 = :574. These parameter values generate a Frisch aggregate hours elasticity of 2.125
and a Frisch participation elasticity of 1.814. The compensated aggregate hours elasticity is .691, the
compensated participation elasticity is .608, and the compensated intensive margin hours elasticity is .144.
Maximum hours worked after the tax change are .460 and minimum hours worked are .370.
Robustness. We now evaluate the robustness of the results to calibrating to an intensive margin Frisch
elasticity of "INT = :25.
For the Iceland simulation, the calibrated values are ￿ = 4, ￿ h = :509, and ￿ = 32:861. These parameter
values generate a Frisch aggregate hours elasticity of 1.897 and a Frisch participation elasticity of 1.738.
With these parameters, labor force participation jumps 13.3%, rather than 13.5% as presented in the main
text. Maximum hours worked after the tax change are .719 and minimum hours worked are .636.
234For the Canada SSP simulation, the calibrated values are ￿ = 4, ￿ h = :337, and ￿ = 306:149. As above
we set e1 = 0, which generates wR=wmax = :611. These parameter values generate a Frisch aggregate
hours elasticity of 3.089 and a participation Frisch elasticity of 2.949. With these parameters, labor force
participation jumps from 23.5% to 76.3% one year after the subsidy is introduced. After the tax change,
maximum hours worked are .585 and minimum hours worked are .421.
For the U.S. EITC simulation, the calibrated values are ￿ = 4; ￿ h = :327, ￿ = 179:957, and e1 = :581.
These parameter values generate a Frisch aggregate hours elasticity of 1.647 and a participation Frisch
elasticity of 1.475. With these parameters, labor force participation jumps from 79.1% to 85.5% on impact
and then rises to 85.7% over the next 4 years. Maximum hours after the tax change are .455 and minimum
hours are .409.
Calibrating to a smaller intensive Frisch elasticity of "INT = :25 thus does not change our conclusions:
the RW model over-predicts the impacts of the temporary changes in Iceland and Canada by an order of
magnitude, but is closer to matching the steady-state impact of the EITC permanent tax change.
C.2 Meta-Analysis of Quasi-Experimental Estimates (Table 17)
This appendix describes how the participation elasticities and standard errors in columns 2 and 3 of Table
17 are calculated. We report standard errors based directly on the authors￿estimates if available; if not,
we use the delta method to calculate a standard error for the numerator of the elasticity (log employment
changes) based on reported standard errors for employment e⁄ects. If information necessary for the delta
method is missing, we approximate the standard error by assuming the T-statistic on the elasticity would
be the same as the T-statistic on the author￿ s estimate.
1. Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991): The partial elasticity is computed by taking a weighted average
of the estimates in column (3) of Table 9; the weights are computed as the fraction of the population
represented by each estimate using the wage percentiles listed in column (1) of Table 9. We normalize this
partial elasticity by the mean of the employment rate from 1970-89 using one minus the non-employment
values reported in column (3) of Table 1. Participation is de￿ned at the weekly level (by the fraction of
weeks worked in the year). For the standard error, the variance of the partial elasticity is computed as a
weighted average of the variances of the estimates in column (3) of Table 9 using the T-statistics reported
in the same column. We normalize this standard error using the mean of one minus the non-employment
values reported in column (3) of Table 1, assuming that non-employment is measured without error.
2. Eissa and Liebman (1996): The percentage change in participation is reported in Table III, column
(4) as 2.8% with a standard error of 0.9%. The participation rate of single mothers is reported in Table II,
column (1) as 73% with a standard error of 0.4%. The percentage change in net earnings for the same data
235source is reported by Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000), Table 2, as the ￿nancial gain from working for single
mothers in 1990 ($8,458) relative to the gain from working in 1984 ($7,469). The elasticity is thus calculated
as (log(0.73+0.028)-log(0.73))/(log(8458)-log(7469)). Participation is de￿ned as positive work hours in the
past calendar year. For the standard error, the delta method is used with the additional assumption that
the ￿nancial gain in the denominator, for which there is no reported standard error, is measured without
error.
3. Graversen (1998): Table 5, elasticity of participation rate with respect to after tax wage, average of
the four reported estimates for married women and single women, bottom panel, columns (1) and (4). The
author only reports standard errors on the di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences estimates in Table 4 used to calculate
the elasticities in Table 5. Because complete estimates are unavailable, we approximate the standard error of
each of the four reported estimates by assuming that the T-statistics on the di⁄erences-in-di⁄erence estimates
are the same as the T-statistic on the elasticities. We then average the four estimates as above to get the
￿nal reported standard error.
4. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001): On page 1092, an elasticity of 1.07 for any employment (positive
work hours) during the year is reported using gross earnings of single mothers as the base level of earnings.
However, the correct denominator to calculate the percentage wage increase is net earnings prior to the
reform after accounting for taxes and transfers. Making the correction requires multiplying the reported
elasticity by the ratio of net earnings to gross earnings prior to the reform. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000,
page 1043) report that this ratio is 7270/18165, and thus the percentage increase in the wage is actually
45% rather than the 18% assumed to calculate the elasticity reported in Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000). The
corrected elasticity estimate is given by 1.07￿7270/18165=0.43. For the standard error, we recreate the
numerator used in the calculation of the 1.07 elasticity as described by the authors on page 1091. The
change in participation rate comes from the estimate in row (1), column (5) of Table 4. Base participation
in 1984 and its standard error are calculated using weighted average of columns 6 and 7 of the ￿rst row of
Table 2 with the weights calculated from number of observations reported in the last row of column 1 and
2 in Appendix 2. An estimate of the elasticity numerator￿ s standard error is then calculated using the delta
method. Assuming that the denominator of the elasticity and the ratio of net earnings to gross earnings
are measured without error, then the numerator has the same T-statistic as the calculated elasticity. The
reported standard error for the elasticity is calculated by dividing the elasticity (0.43) by the calculated
numerator￿ s T-statistic.
5. Devereux (2004): Table 4, panel 2, column (1), own-wage elasticity. Participation is de￿ned as positive
work hours in the past calendar year. Standard error from same table.
6. Eissa and Hoynes (2004): Table 6, elasticity of participation with respect wages, average estimate of
236married women and married men, 2nd row from bottom. Participation is de￿ned as positive work hours in
the last year. Standard errors are calculated by recreating the authors￿elasticity calculation as described on
page 1951 using estimates from Table 6 and using the delta method. Base participation and wage rates are
calculated from Table 2, using weighted averages of the 3rd and 4th columns based on number of observations
reported in the bottom row. The reported standard error is created by combining the married women and
married men standard errors as above.
7. Liebman and Saez (2006): The numerator for the elasticity is computed as log(.483-.012)-log(.483)
using the Change in Wife Labor Force Participation reported in row (1) and column (2) of Table 6 and the
Percent of Wives with Positive Earnings (1990-1992) reported in column (3) of Table 5. The denominator
for the elasticity is computed as log(1-.419)-log(1-.31) based on the change in tax rates reported on pages
10-11 for OBRA93. Participation is de￿ned as an indicator for positive annual earnings in the past year.
Standard error is constructed using the delta method assuming that the change in tax rates is measured
without error. This calculation uses the standard error on Change in Wife Labor Force Participation in
Table 6 and the Percent of Wives with Positive Earnings as well as the sample size from Table 5.
8. Meghir and Phillips (2010): Page 247, last paragraph, average of single and married men in-work-
income elasticities, 0.27 and 0.53 respectively. For the standard errors, the authors￿calculations are replicated
as described on page 247 using standard errors from Table 3.1, rows (1) and (4), column (4). The standard
errors are then calculated using the delta method for each of the estimates, which are then combined to
create the reported standard error.
9. Blundell, Bozio and Laroque (2013): Page 38, median overall extensive elasticity. Participation is
de￿ned as positive work hours in the past calendar year. Standard error was not reported.
10. Carrington (1996): OLS estimates from Table 2. We approximate the population-constant em-
ployment elasticity as the di⁄erence between the employment elasticity in column (1) and the population
elasticity in column (5). The standard error is calculated from corresponding standard errors on elasticities
under the assumption that the population and employment elasticity estimates are uncorrelated.
11. Gruber and Wise (1999): Using data reported in Table 1, the elasticity estimate is based on a
regression of log(labor force participation at age 59) on log(e⁄ective net-of-tax rate) across countries. Labor
force participation is de￿ned as 1 minus fraction of Men Out of Labor Force at age 59; e⁄ective net-of-tax
rate is de￿ned as 1-implicit tax on earnings. The Netherlands is omitted from the regression because it has
an implicit tax above 1. Reported standard error is from the same regression.
12. Bianchi, Gudmundsson, and Zoega (2001): Estimate and standard error from average of the elastici-
ties for men and women reported in the text, paragraph 4, page 1570. Participation is de￿ned at the weekly
level (fraction of weeks worked in the past year).
23713. Card and Hyslop (2005): From Figure 3, labor force participation before the SSP experiment is
23.6%, and the di⁄erence between the treatment and control groups during the SSP eligibility period is
13.5%. Estimated average tax rates are computed from ￿gures in Lin et al. (1998) as described in Appendix
C.1. Participation is de￿ned as any employment in the past month. To compute standard errors, sample
sizes in Table 2 adjusted for sample attrition as described in footnote 18 were combined with the data on
participation rates from Figure 3. The delta method was then used assuming the change in net-of-tax wage
rates was measured without error.
14. Brown (2009): We obtain an estimate of 0.08 for the elasticity of retirement age with respect to the
wage using the average of the three estimates reported in column 4 of Table 2. Footnote 33 and Section
6.1 suggest that this is the author￿ s preferred estimate. To convert this retirement age elasticity into an
elasticity of years of work with respect to the wage rate, we follow footnote 30 and multiply the elasticity
by the ratio of the mean age at retirement to the mean years of service reported in Table 1. The resulting
elasticity is 0.08￿(60.73/26.75). Participation is de￿ned as years of work, with variation on the retirement
margin. The standard error is constructed from the same table and assumes that the ratio of mean age at
retirement to mean years of service, for which a standard error is not reported, is measured without error.
15. Manoli and Weber (2011): Table 5, re-weighted elasticities. We ￿rst obtain separate elasticities for
men and women by taking a weighted averages of the re-weighted elasticities; the weights are computed
based on the fraction of individuals at each tenure threshold. The elasticity for men is 0.12 and the elasticity
for women is 0.38. We then take an unweighted average of these numbers to obtain the overall elasticity of
0.25. The standard error is constructed from the same table using the same weighted average methodology.
C.3 Micro vs. Macro Elasticities (Table 18)
This appendix describes how each of the values in Table 18 are calculated. With the exception of the Frisch
aggregate hours macro elasticity, the aggregate hours elasticities are de￿ned as the sums of the intensive and
extensive margin elasticities.
Hicksian, extensive margin: The micro estimate is the mean of the estimates in Panel A of Table 17. The
macro estimate is computed by taking the mean of 0.13 from Davis and Henrekson (2005), 0.14 from Nickell
(2003), and 0.25 from Prescott (2004). The elasticity from Davis and Henrekson is computed using the log
di⁄erence in employment based on the slope coe¢ cient in Table 3 (bottom panel, Sample C) and the sample
means of labor force participation and tax rates in Table 1 for the corresponding sample. The elasticity
from Nickell is computed using the average point estimate of 2 percent (reported on page 8) and the sample
means of employment rates and tax rates from Tables 1 and 2, respectively. The elasticity from Prescott is
calculated by regressing log labor force participation rates from OECD Stat Extracts on log net-of-tax rates
238using the same sample of countries and years as Prescott.128 The data on tax rates is taken from Table 2
of Prescott (2004). The data on labor force participation rates are missing for Canada and the U.K. in the
1970s and these observations are therefore excluded.
Hicksian, intensive margin: The micro estimate is the preferred minimum-￿ estimate using Panels A
and B in Table 1 of Chetty (2012). The macro estimate is the mean of the values reported by Davis and
Henrekson (2005) and Prescott (2004). The value from Davis and Henrekson (2005) is computed using log
di⁄erences in annual hours per employed adult based on the slope coe¢ cient in Table 2.3 (middle panel,
Sample C) and the sample means of annual hours per employed person and tax rates in Table 2.1 for the
corresponding sample. The elasticity estimate can be interpreted as a compensated labor supply elasticity if
government expenditure is viewed as unearned income in the aggregate. The value from Prescott (2004) is
calculated by regressing log hours per worker on log net-of-tax rates using OECD data reported by Prescott
in Table 2 on hours per adult, which are converted to hours per worker using labor force participation rates
from the OECD Stat Extracts described above. The data on labor force participation rates are missing for
Canada and the U.K. in the 1970s and these observations are therefore excluded. The elasticity estimate
can be interpreted as a compensated labor supply elasticity if government expenditure is viewed as unearned
income in the aggregate.
Frisch, intensive margin elasticities: the micro estimate is the unweighted mean of 0.70 in Table 2 from
Pistaferri (2003) and 0.37 from Bianchi et al. (2001), as reported in Chetty (2012). The macro value in
brackets is set equal to the micro estimate.
Frisch, extensive margin: The micro estimate is the mean of the estimates in Panel B of Table 1. The
macro value in brackets is computed by subtracting the Frisch micro intensive margin elasticity from the
Frisch aggregate hours macro elasticity.
Frisch, aggregate hours macro: the estimate is computed by taking the mean of the aggregate (total
hours) elasticities implied by two models of business cycles: (1) Cho and Cooley (1994): 2.61 from the sum
of the intensive and extensive margin elasticities implied by the parameters in Table 2 and (2) King and
Rebelo (1999): 4 for representative agent RBC models, from page 975.
C.4 Technical Appendix
This technical appendix describes how we simulate the Rogerson and Wallenius model. We solve the model
analytically as in RW (2007), the working paper version of RW (2009). All of our extensions follow RW￿ s
solution method (with slightly modi￿ed notation). Our results have been veri￿ed with iterative methods.
128The data are for men and women aged 15-64 for 1970-1974 and 1993-1996 in order to
match Prescott￿ s data. Data are available from OECD Stat Extracts at the following URL:
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LFS_SEXAGE_I_R
239The code for our simulations is available at http://obs.rc.fas.harvard.edu/chetty/index.html
Standard Rogerson and Wallenius Model. As described in the main text, each generation solves
max
c;h(a)
log(c) ￿ ￿
Z 1
0
h(a)
1+￿
1 + ￿
da s.t. c = (1 ￿ ￿)
Z 1
0
e(a)max
￿
h(a) ￿ ￿ h;0
￿
da + T
where e(a) = 1 ￿ 2(1 ￿ e1)
￿
￿1
2 ￿ a
￿
￿ is a tent-shaped life-cycle productivity pro￿le as shown in Figure 47.
Similar to RW, we assume that the one unit of time corresponds to 60 years. We assume that time t = 0
corresponds to age 16, while time t = 1 corresponds to age 76. The model can be solved iteratively by
backwards induction, but given RW￿ s choice of functional forms it can be solved analytically as well. For
consistency with RW (2007), we work with generic functions for the utility of consumption (u(c)), the
disutility of labor supply (v (h)), and e¢ ciency units of labor per hour worked (so g (h) = max
￿
h ￿ ￿ h;0
￿
above) and plug in speci￿c functional forms at the end. Each generation solves
max
c(a);h(a)
Z 1
0
u(c) ￿ v (h(a))da s.t. c = (1 ￿ ￿)
Z 1
0
e(a)g (h(a))da + T
RW show that the optimal solution has two properties. First, there exists a cuto⁄ e￿ such that h￿ (a) > 0
if e(a) > e￿ and h￿ (a) = 0 if e(a) ￿ e￿. Consequently, if e(a) is tent shaped, there will be a date at
which the individual enters the labor force and a date at which they exit, and if e(a) is symmetric these
dates will be symmetric around a = :5. Second, if h￿ (a) is optimal and h￿ (a1) > 0 and h￿ (a2) > 0 then
e(a1) > e(a2) ) h￿ (a1) ￿ h￿ (a2) so that the individual works weakly more hours when they have higher
productivity. Finally, note that hourly wages are wh (a) = e(a)g (h(a))=h(a).
Because individuals have a discrete labor market entry and retirement date, an individual works at all
times on some interval
￿
AE;AR￿
where AE is the labor market entry date and AR is the retirement date.
The problem can thus be rewritten:
max
c;h(a);AE;AR u(c) ￿
Z A
R
AE
v (h(a))da s.t. c = (1 ￿ ￿)
Z A
R
AE
e(a)g (h(a))da + T
In order to solve the model, RW re-order time, so that the most productive moment is at time 0 and the
least productive moment is at time 1. Formally, de￿ne ~ e(￿) for ￿ 2 [0;1] so that for each ￿, ~ e(￿) solves
￿ =
Z 1
0
I fe(a) ￿ ~ e(￿)gda
Then ~ e(￿) is the productivity level such that the individual has a productivity greater than ~ e(￿) for ￿ of
240their life and is strictly decreasing by construction. The maximization problem can then be written as
max
c;h(￿);￿￿ u(c) ￿
Z ￿
￿
0
v (h(a))d￿ s.t. c = (1 ￿ ￿)
Z ￿
￿
0
~ e(￿)g (h(￿))d￿ + T
because it will be assumed that e(a) is symmetric around :5, if ￿
￿ < 1, AE = :5 ￿ ￿
￿
2 and AR = :5 + ￿
￿
2 .
Under the parameters chosen by RW and that we use in our simulations, the constraint h(a) < 1 is
always slack and can therefore be ignored. This permits an analytical solution to the problem. Plugging
in the budget constraint and di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿
￿ and h(￿) leads to two ￿rst order conditions:
v (h(￿
￿))
u0
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
R ￿￿
0 ~ e(￿)g (h(￿))d￿ + T
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿) ~ e(￿
￿)g (h(￿
￿)) (65)
v0 (h(￿))
u0
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
R ￿￿
0 ~ e(￿)g (h(￿))d￿ + T
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿) ~ e(￿)g0 (h(￿)) (66)
A balanced budget for the government implies that:
￿
Z ￿
￿
0
~ e(￿)g (h(￿))d￿ = T
so the two FOCs can be rewritten as:
v (h(￿
￿))
u0
￿R ￿￿
0 ~ e(￿)g (h(￿))d￿
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿) ~ e(￿
￿)g (h(￿
￿)) (67)
v0 (h(￿))
u0
￿R ￿￿
0 ~ e(￿)g (h(￿))d￿
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿) ~ e(￿)g0 (h(￿)) (68)
Note that if the individual works their whole life, ￿
￿ = 1 and only the second FOC will hold. Additionally,
the second (h(￿)) FOC implies that
v0 (h(￿))
(1 ￿ ￿) ~ e(￿)g0 (h(￿))
= u0
 Z ￿
￿
0
~ e(￿)g (h(￿))d￿
!
= constant 8 ￿ 2 [0;￿
￿]
This di⁄erential equation pins down the entire hours pro￿le once h(0) = hmax is known. Since ￿
￿ fully
pins down AE and AR, the optimum is de￿ned by two free variables, hmax and ￿
￿, pinned down by the two
FOCs. If ￿
￿ = 1 due to a corner solution, the second FOC will pin down hmax, the only free variable.
The two FOCs can be manipulated to simplify the equilibrium conditions for hmax and ￿
￿. First, divide
the two FOCs to eliminate the integral and evaluate at ￿ = 0 to get:
v (h(￿
￿))
~ e(￿
￿)g (h(￿
￿))
=
v0 (hmax)
emaxg0 (hmax)
(69)
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RW show that this de￿nes an increasing relationship between hmax and ￿
￿. Second, evaluate the second
FOC at ￿ = 0 to get:
(1 ￿ ￿)emaxg0 (hmax)
v0 (hmax)
=
1
u0
￿R ￿￿
0 ~ e(￿)g (h(￿))d￿
￿ (70)
RW show that this de￿nes a decreasing relationship between hmax and ￿. (69) and (70) thus together de￿ne
a unique equilibrium that can be solved numerically given e0, e1, ￿, ￿ h, and ￿. Figure 47 illustrates the
hours pro￿le (solid green line) generated by the numerical solution using parameter values from the EITC
simulation presented in the main text alongside the productivity pro￿le (dashed blue line).
We now plug in the functional forms u(c) = ln(c), v (h) = ￿h
1+￿
1+￿ , g (h) = h ￿ ￿ h, and to choose a
functional form for ~ e(￿). RW assume a linear formulation for the productivity pro￿le in ￿ time:
~ e(￿) = ~ e(￿) = e0 ￿ (e0 ￿ e1)￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)e0 + ￿e1
Normalizing e0 = 1, this implies the an age-productivity pro￿le of e(a) = 1￿2(1 ￿ e1)
￿
￿1
2 ￿ a
￿
￿. With these
functional forms, (69) and (70) simplify to:
￿(hmax)
￿
e0
=
￿h(￿
￿)
1+￿
(1 + ￿)((1 ￿ ￿
￿)e0 + ￿
￿e1)
￿
h(￿
￿) ￿ ￿ h
￿ (71)
(1 ￿ ￿)e0
￿(hmax)
￿ =
Z ￿
￿
0
((1 ￿ ￿)e0 + ￿e1)
￿
h(￿) ￿ ￿ h
￿
d￿ (72)
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h(￿) = hmax
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)e0 + ￿e1
e0
￿ 1
￿
Plugging this into the two FOCs and simplifying gives
￿ h =
￿
1 + ￿
hmax
￿
(1 ￿ ￿
￿)e0 + ￿
￿e1
e0
￿ 1
￿
(73)
￿ =
e0 (1 ￿ ￿)
(hmax)
￿
(
hmax [(1￿￿￿)e0+￿￿e1]
1
￿ +2
￿￿e
1
￿ +2
0
e
1
￿
0 (
1
￿ +2)(e1￿e0)
￿ ￿ h
h
((1￿￿￿)e0+￿￿e1)2￿e2
0
2(e1￿e0)
i) (74)
The intensive margin Frisch elasticity, which is one of the moments we use for calibration, can be calculated
analytically. Rearranging equation (70) and plugging in the functional forms and normalizing e0 = 1 gives:
(1 ￿ ￿)u0 (c) = ￿(hmax)
￿
Taking logs and di⁄erentiating with respect to 1 ￿ ￿ holding u0 (c) constant gives:
"Frisch
hmax, 1￿￿ =
1
￿
Because the hours pro￿le shifts vertically by hmax when taxes change, this is also the intensive margin Frisch
elasticity in the model. Consequently, we can calibrate the model to a particular intensive margin Frisch
elasticity "INT by choosing ￿ = 1
"IN T .
The model is calibrated as described in Appendix C.1. With f￿;e1;￿ h;￿g chosen, the model can be
solved numerically by inverting equations (73) and (74) to solve for hmax and ￿
￿.
Asset Pro￿le in the RW Model. In order to characterize the impact of unanticipated tax changes on
labor supply, we need to know assets at the time of the tax change. Because assets and age are the only
state variables, assets holdings are the time of the tax change are adequate to solve the model.
We assume that each generation receives a lump-sum rebate equal to the taxes they pay at each instant
in time. Under this assumption, it is straightforward to back out an agent￿ s asset position at any time.
Note that the labor market entry and retirement dates are AE = :5 ￿ ￿
￿
2 and AR = :5 + ￿
￿
2 , respectively.
Between AE and AR, hours are
h(a) = hmax
￿
e(a)
e0
￿ 1
￿
= hmax
￿
e0 ￿ 2(e0 ￿ e1)j:5 ￿ aj
e0
￿ 1
￿
243and so earnings when working are
w(a) = g (h(a))e(a)
=
"
hmax
￿
e0 ￿ 2(e0 ￿ e1)j:5 ￿ aj
e0
￿ 1
￿
￿ ￿ h
#
(e0 ￿ 2(e0 ￿ e1)j:5 ￿ aj)
while consumption is always
c = hmax[e0 ￿ ￿
￿ (e0 ￿ e1)]
1
￿ +2 ￿ ￿e
1
￿ +2
0
e
1
￿
0
￿
1
￿ + 2
￿
(e1 ￿ e0)
￿ ￿ he0￿
￿ + ￿ h(e0 ￿ e1)
(￿
￿)
2
2
.
Thus assets at time t are:
St =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
￿ca, a < AE
￿ca +
R a
AE
￿
hmax
￿
e0￿2(e0￿e1)j:5￿aj
e0
￿ 1
￿
￿ ￿ h
￿
(e0 ￿ 2(e0 ￿ e1)j:5 ￿ aj)da, a 2
￿
AE;AR￿
￿ca + c, a > AR
The middle term can be simpli￿ed analytically to:
St = ￿ca + hmax(e1 + 2a(e0 ￿ e1))
1
￿ +2 ￿
￿
e1 + 2AE (e0 ￿ e1)
￿ 1
￿ +2
2e
1
￿
0
￿
1
￿ + 2
￿
(e0 ￿ e1)
￿￿ he1 (a ￿ A1) ￿ ￿ h
￿
a2 ￿
￿
AE￿2￿
(e0 ￿ e1)
if a ￿ :5 and
St = ￿ca + S:5 + hmax(2e0 ￿ e1 ￿ 2a(e0 ￿ e1))
1
￿ +2 ￿ (e0)
1
￿ +2
2
￿
2 + 1
￿
￿
(e1 ￿ e0)
￿￿ h(2e0 ￿ e1)(a ￿ :5) + ￿ h
￿
a2 ￿ :5
￿
(e0 ￿ e1)
if a ￿ :5, where
S:5 = hmax(e1 + (e0 ￿ e1))
1
￿ +2 ￿
￿
e1 + 2AE (e0 ￿ e1)
￿ 1
￿ +2
2e
1
￿
0
￿
1
￿ + 2
￿
(e0 ￿ e1)
￿￿ he1
￿
:5 ￿ AE￿
￿ ￿ h
￿
:52 ￿
￿
AE￿2￿
(e0 ￿ e1)
We solve each generation￿ s problem separately and then add across generations, which are weighted equally,
to simulate the overall response to our quasi-experiments.
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Permanent Tax Changes. We ￿rst consider the EITC simulation of a one time permanent tax change.
Consider the problem of an age t individual with assets St as calculated in the previous section who faces a
new tax schedule ￿. The individual smooths consumption across periods and solves
max
c;h(a)
(1 ￿ t)u(c) ￿
Z 1
t
v (h(a))da s.t. (1 ￿ t)c = (1 ￿ ￿)
Z 1
t
e(a)g (h(a))da + T + St
This equation can be solved by analytically re-ordering time as described above in the solution to the RW
model. All the solution requires is changing the ~ e(￿) pro￿le, with ￿ 2 [0;1 ￿ t], to re￿ ect the fact that some
time has already elapsed.
The new ~ e(￿) function will be piecewise linear, as illustrated in Figure 48 using the parameter values
used for the EITC simulation in the main text. When t = 0, e(￿) = e0 ￿ ￿(e0 ￿ e1) as above, illustrated
by the solid blue line in Figure 48 below. As t rises, e(￿) will be piecewise linear, as the low productivity
time periods up to t will occur once, not twice. Thus e(￿) will look the same for low ￿, but after 2t it will
have twice the slope, as shown by the green dotted line in Figure 48. When t hits :5, no productivity level
occurs twice and so the function will have twice the slope and be linear again. However emax will fall to
e0 ￿ 2(e0 ￿ e1)(t ￿ :5). This case is illustrated by the red dash-dot line in Figure 48.
Consequently, if t < :5, ~ e(￿) is
~ e(￿) =
8
<
:
e0 ￿ ￿(e0 ￿ e1) if ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ 2t
2e0 ￿ e1 ￿ 2(t + ￿)(e0 ￿ e1) if ￿ > 1 ￿ 2t
245If t > :5, ~ e(￿) is
~ e(￿) = 2e0 ￿ e1 ￿ 2(t + ￿)(e0 ￿ e1)
With this new ~ e(￿) pro￿le, the problem becomes
max
￿￿2[0;1￿t];h(￿)
(1 ￿ t)u
 
(1 ￿ ￿)
R ￿
￿
0 ~ e(￿)g (h(￿))d￿ + T + St
1 ￿ t
!
￿
Z ￿
￿
0
v (h(￿))da
The model will have an interior solution if the tax change is not large enough to induce h > 1. We show this
is not the case in our three applications by reporting maximum and minimum hours after the tax change for
each simulation in Appendix C.1. With this constraint slack, the model can be solved analytically. Taking
the ￿rst order conditions, plugging in the government￿ s balanced budget constraint, T =
R ￿
￿
0 ~ e(￿)g (h(￿))d￿,
and simplifying gives:
v (h(￿
￿))
u0 (c)
= (1 ￿ ￿) ~ e(￿
￿)g (h(￿
￿)) (75)
v0 (h(￿))
u0 (c)
= (1 ￿ ￿) ~ e(￿)g0 (h(￿)) (76)
As in the basic RW model, the second FOC implies
v0 (h(￿))
(1 ￿ ￿) ~ e(￿)g0 (h(￿))
= u0 (c) = constant 8 ￿ 2 [0;￿
￿]
which pins down the hours pro￿le.
The two FOCs can be simpli￿ed by dividing the two FOCs to eliminate the integral and evaluating at
￿ = 0 and by evaluating the second FOC at ￿ = 0. With our functional forms, this yields:
￿h(￿
￿)
1+￿
(1 + ￿)
￿
h(￿
￿) ￿ ￿ h
￿
~ e(￿
￿)
=
￿(hmax)
￿
emax
(1 ￿ ￿)emax (1 ￿ t)
￿(hmax)
￿ =
Z ￿
￿
0
~ e(￿)
￿
h(￿) ￿ ￿ h
￿
d￿ + St
Finally, we know that h(￿) = hmax
￿
~ e(￿)
emax
￿ 1
￿
from the di⁄erential equation for the hours pro￿le. The two
FOC simplify to:
￿
￿ = ~ e￿1
￿
emax
￿ ￿ h
hmax
1 + ￿
￿
￿￿￿
(77)
(1 ￿ ￿)emax (1 ￿ t)
￿(hmax)
￿ =
hmax
(emax)
1
￿
Z ￿
￿
0
~ e(￿)
1+ 1
￿ d￿ ￿ ￿ h
Z ￿
￿
0
~ e(￿)d￿ + St (78)
which we solve numerically.
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￿ in hand, it is easy to build the hours pro￿le in calendar time. If ￿
￿ < 1￿2t,
the working life will be entirely after t. The individual will enter the labor force at date AE = :5 ￿ ￿
￿
2 and
exit at date AR = :5 + ￿
￿
2 . If ￿
￿ > 1 ￿ 2t, the agent will have already started working so AE = t. They
will thus exit at date AR = t + ￿
￿. To build the hours pro￿le, we build a function ￿(a): if t > :5,
￿(a) = a ￿ t
and if t < :5,
￿(a) =
8
<
:
2ja ￿ :5j if ja ￿ :5j < t
a ￿ t otherwise
The hours pro￿le is then generated by noting that:
h(a) =
8
> <
> :
hmax
￿
~ e(￿(a))
emax
￿ 1
￿
, a 2
￿
AE, AR￿
0 otherwise
Temporary Tax Changes. The solution method for Iceland and the Canada simulations ￿ both of which
feature a temporary tax reduction ￿ is similar to the EITC solution. However, now there are two di⁄erent
periods in which the above problem is solved ￿ one with tax ￿0 and one with tax ￿1 ￿ and thus the solution
consists of a system of four equations and four unknowns ￿ hmax and ￿
￿ in each tax regime.
Consider the problem of an age t individual with assets St. From t to ￿ t they face a tax rate ￿0, and then
the tax rate changes to ￿1. In this section, we assume that ￿ t < 1, as if ￿ t ￿ 1 the individual only faces ￿0 the
rest of their life and the problem reduces to the EITC problem described above. With perfect consumption
smoothing, the individual￿ s problem is:
max
c;h(a)
(1 ￿ t)u(c) ￿
Z 1
t
v (h(a))da
s.t. (1 ￿ t)c = (1 ￿ ￿0)
Z ￿ t
t
e(a)g (h(a))da + (1 ￿ ￿1)
Z 1
￿ t
e(a)g (h(a))da + T + St
Again re-order time as in RW. There will now be two ~ e(￿) functions: ~ e0 (￿0) with ￿0 2 [0;￿ t ￿ t] in the
period with taxes ￿0 and ~ e1 (￿1) with ￿1 2 [0;1 ￿ ￿ t] in the period with taxes ￿1. ~ e1 (￿1) will look exactly as
in the EITC simulation, with ￿ t replacing t: if ￿ t < :5,
~ e1 (￿1) =
8
<
:
e0 ￿ ￿1 (e0 ￿ e1) if ￿1 ￿ 1 ￿ 2￿ t
2e0 ￿ e1 ￿ 2(￿ t + ￿1)(e0 ￿ e1) if ￿1 > 1 ￿ 2￿ t
247and if ￿ t ￿ :5,
~ e1 (￿1) = 2e0 ￿ e1 ￿ 2(￿ t + ￿1)(e0 ￿ e1)
As for ~ e0 (￿0), if ￿ t ￿ :5, then the area between t and ￿ t will only have the increasing side of the absolute value
function:
~ e0 (￿0) = e0 ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿ t + 2￿0)(e0 ￿ e1)
Similarly, if t ￿ :5, the the area between t and ￿ t will only have the decreasing side of the absolute value
function:
~ e0 (￿0) = 2e0 ￿ e1 ￿ 2(e0 ￿ e1)(t + ￿0)
If t < :5 and ￿ t > :5, then we will have part of the absolute value function in the ~ e0. Let t = minf￿ t ￿ :5;:5 ￿ tg.
Then
~ e0 (￿0) =
8
<
:
e0 ￿ ￿0 (e0 ￿ e1) if ￿0 ￿ 2t
e0 + 2t(e0 ￿ e1) ￿ 2￿0 (e0 ￿ e1) if ￿0 > 2t
With these pro￿les in hand, we note that under each tax regime an individual will always work if their
productivity is above a cuto⁄ level, as in RW. The problem can then be written as:
max
￿￿
0 2[0;￿ t￿t];￿￿
12[0;1￿￿ t];h0(￿);h1(￿)
(1 ￿ t)u(c) ￿
Z ￿
￿
0
0
v (h0 (￿0))d￿0 ￿
Z ￿
￿
1
0
v (h1 (￿1))d￿1
In this case, the model may not have an interior solution as an agent may ￿nd it optimal to work all of the
time for which the tax is ￿0. We describe how we handle these corner solutions below.
Calculating the FOC￿ s and plugging in the government balanced budget constraint in each period gives:
v (h0 (￿
￿
0))
u0 (c)
= (1 ￿ ￿0) ~ e0 (￿
￿
0)g (h0 (￿
￿
0))
v0 (h0 (￿0))
u0 (c)
= (1 ￿ ￿0) ~ e0 (￿0)g0 (h0 (￿0))
v (h1 (￿
￿
1))
u0 (c)
= (1 ￿ ￿1) ~ e1 (￿
￿
1)g (h1 (￿
￿
1))
v0 (h1 (￿1))
u0 (c)
= (1 ￿ ￿1) ~ e1 (￿1)g0 (h1 (￿1))
The second FOC implies that:
v0 (h0 (￿0))
(1 ￿ ￿) ~ e(￿0)g0 (h0 (￿0))
= u0 (c)
= constant 8 ￿ 2 [0;￿
￿
0]
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0 all of h0 (￿0) is pinned down. Similarly, the fourth FOC implies that:
v0 (h1 (￿1))
(1 ￿ ￿) ~ e(￿1)g0 (h1 (￿1))
= u0 (c) = constant 8 ￿ 2 [0;￿
￿
1]
We can then follow the same steps as above, dividing the two FOCs and evaluating at ￿0 = 0 and ￿1 = 0
and evaluating the second and fourth FOCs at ￿0 = 0 and ￿1 = 0, respectively. Plugging in the functional
forms one gets four equilibrium conditions:
hmax
0 = ￿ h
1 + ￿
￿
￿
emax
0
~ e0 (￿
￿
0)
￿ 1
￿
(79)
hmax
1 = ￿ h
1 + ￿
￿
￿
emax
1
~ e1 (￿
￿
1)
￿ 1
￿
(80)
(1 ￿ ￿0)emax
0 (1 ￿ t)
￿(hmax
0 )
￿ =
hmax
0
(emax
0 )
1
￿
Z ￿
￿
0
0
~ e0 (￿0)
1+ 1
￿ d￿0 ￿ ￿ h
Z ￿
￿
0
0
~ e(￿0)d￿0 + (81)
hmax
1
(emax
1 )
1
￿
Z ￿
￿
1
0
~ e1 (￿1)
1+ 1
￿ d￿1 ￿ ￿ h
Z ￿
￿
1
0
~ e(￿1)d￿1 + St
(1 ￿ ￿1)emax
1 (1 ￿ t)
￿(hmax
1 )
￿ =
hmax
0
(emax
0 )
1
￿
Z ￿
￿
0
0
~ e0 (￿0)
1+ 1
￿ d￿0 ￿ ￿ h
Z ￿
￿
0
0
~ e(￿0)d￿0 + (82)
hmax
1
(emax
1 )
1
￿
Z ￿
￿
1
0
~ e1 (￿1)
1+ 1
￿ d￿1 ￿ ￿ h
Z ￿
￿
1
0
~ e(￿1)d￿1 + St
These four equations hold for interior solutions: ￿
￿
0 2 (0;￿ t ￿ t) and ￿
￿
1 2 (0;1 ￿ ￿ t). They also work at the
￿
￿
0 = 0 and ￿
￿
1 = 0 corner solutions because then the hours problem is trivial. At the ￿
￿
0 = ￿ t ￿ t corner
solution, ￿
￿
1, hmax
0 , and hmax
1 are pinned down by the second, third, and fourth FOCs. At the ￿
￿
1 = 1 ￿ ￿ t
corner solution, ￿
￿
0, hmax
0 , and hmax
1 are pinned down by the ￿rst, third and fourth FOCs. If both ￿
￿
1 and
￿
￿
0 are at corner solutions, only the third and fourth FOCs apply. In each case, we solve the general four
equation system and then proceed to the corner solution cases if ￿
￿
0 or ￿
￿
1 are not in the correct intervals.
There may also be a corner solution for hours if h0 (￿0) > 1 for some ￿0; this case is considered separately
in a subsequent section.
Having solved for ￿
￿
0, ￿
￿
1, hmax
0 , and hmax
1 , we can then calculate retirement dates and build the hours
pro￿le. Let AE
i be the labor market entry date and AR
i be the labor market exit date under tax system i.
If ￿
￿
1 < 1 ￿ 2￿ t, the working life will be entirely after ￿ t. The individual will enter the labor force at date
AE
1 = :5￿ ￿
￿
2 and exit at date AR
1 = :5+ ￿
￿
2 . If ￿
￿
1 > 1￿2￿ t, the agent will have already started working so
AE
1 = ￿ t. They will thus exit at date AR
1 = ￿ t + ￿
￿. As for ￿
￿
0, if ￿
￿
0 = 0 the worker does not work between
t and ￿ t. If ￿ t < :5, then AE
0 = ￿ t ￿ ￿
￿
0 and AR
0 = ￿ t. If t > :5, then AE
0 = t and AR
0 = t + ￿
￿
0. If t < :5 and
￿ t > :5, there are three cases. If :5 ￿ t < ￿ t ￿ :5, there are two cases: if 2￿0 < :5￿ t then AE
0 = :5 ￿
￿
￿
0
2 and
AR
0 = :5 +
￿
￿
0
2 and otherwise AE
0 = t and AR
0 = t + ￿0. If :5 ￿ t ￿ ￿ t ￿ :5, there are two cases: if 2￿0 < ￿ t ￿ :5
249then AE
0 = : ￿
￿
￿
0
2 and AR
0 = :5 +
￿
￿
0
2 otherwise AE
0 = ￿ t ￿ ￿0 and AR
0 = ￿ t.
In order to build the hours pro￿le, we proceed as in the EITC section and build a ￿(a) function. ￿1 (a)
looks the same as ￿(a) in the EITC simulation with t replacing ￿ t. For ￿0 (a), if ￿ t < :5,
￿0 (a) = ￿ t ￿ a
if t > :5,
￿0 (a) = a ￿ t
If t < :5 and ￿ t > :5, there are two cases: if :5 ￿ t < ￿ t ￿ :5,
￿0 (a) =
8
<
:
2ja ￿ :5j if a < 1 ￿ t
a ￿ t otherwise
and if :5 ￿ t > ￿ t ￿ :5
￿0 (a) =
8
<
:
2ja ￿ :5j if a > 1 ￿ ￿ t
￿ t ￿ a otherwise
The hours pro￿le can then be generated from the ￿0 (a) and ￿1 (a) functions as with a permanent tax change.
Calculating Elasticities. The elasticities reported in the text and Appendix C.1 are constructed by
simulation. For all of the simulations, we compare labor supply under the pre-quasi-experimental tax
regime ￿ to labor supply under a tax regime of ￿ ￿:01 to approximate an in￿nitesimal tax change. Denoting
hours under the two tax regimes by h1 and h2, respectively, the elasticity is calculated as:
" =
ln
￿
h2
h1
￿
ln
￿
1￿￿+:01
1￿￿
￿
To calculate the Frisch elasticities, we treat the tax change from ￿ to ￿ ￿:01 as a temporary tax change
lasting 1
6;000 units of time using 6,000 generations to approximate a tax change for an in￿nitesimal moment.
Our reported elasticities are thus an approximation to an experiment in which net-of-tax wages are raised
by dw for a time period dt. We report three intertemporal substitution elasticities: the intensive margin
Frisch elasticity, which we know will be 1
￿ from the derivation above, a participation Frisch elasticity, and an
aggregate hours Frisch elasticity. For the aggregate hours elasticity, h1 and h2 are aggregate hours. For the
participation elasticity, h1 and h2 are labor force participation rates. For the intensive margin elasticity h1
and h2 are aggregate hours for generations that would have supplied labor in the period of the tax change
if the tax change had not occurred.
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tax regime of ￿￿:01. Our reported elasticities are thus an approximation to an experiment in which net-of-tax
wages are raised permanently by dw and agents￿unearned income is reduced by a commensurate amount.
We report three elasticities: the intensive margin compensated elasticity, the participation compensated
elasticity, and the aggregate hours compensated elasticity, which are computed in the same manner as
described in the previous paragraph.
Aggregation Over Generations. The analytical methods above are used to solve for the labor supply of a
given generation. We aggregate over generations to calculate the impacts of a tax change on aggregate labor
supply. To approximate a continuous time environment in which a new generation is born every instant,
we use numerical simulations with a large number of generations. In particular, we project the analytical
solution onto a discrete-time grid for each generation, with one generation born every time period. For
the Iceland simulation, we use 9,360 generations, so three generations are born or die each week. For the
Canada SSP simulation, we use 7,200 generations, so 10 generations are born or die each month. For the
EITC simulation, we use 6,000 generations, so 100 generations are born or die each year. We then bin the
data to report the fraction of the population that worked at any point in the last week (for Iceland), month
(for Canada), or year (for EITC), so that we are consistent with the quasi-experimental data. For the EITC
simulation, we then aggregate up to years to re￿ ect Bianchi et al.￿ s data.
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